A TREATISE OF THE PASSIONS AND FACVLTIES of the Soule of Man.

With the ſeverall Dignities and Corruptions thereunto belonging.

By EDVVARD REYNOLDES, late Preacher to the Honorable Society of *Lincoln's Inne*: And now Rector of the Church of *Braunſton* in *Northamptonſhire*.

Iuvenal. Sat. 1.

Quicquid agunt Homines, Votum, Timor, Ira, Voluptas, Gaudia, Diſcurſus, noſtri eſt farrago Libelli.

LONDON,
Printed by *R. H.* for *Robert Boſtock*, dwelling in Saint *Pauls* Church-yard at the Signe of the *Kings Head*. 1640.

TO
HER HIGHNESSE
THE PRINCESSE ELIZABETH,
PRINCESSE PALATINE OF
THE RHINE, DVTCHES OF
BAVARIA, &c. AND ELDEST
Daughter to Her Majeſtie the
Queen of BOHEMIA.

May it pleaſe your Highneſſe;

WHat the Great Philoſopher hath obſerved of Mens Bodies, is, upon ſo much ſtronger Reaſons, true of their Mindes, by how much our Intellectuall Maturity is more lingring, and ſluggiſh than our Naturall, That the too Early Conceptions and Iſſues of them doe uſu-

Ariſtot. polit. lib. 7. cap. 16.

ally proove but weake and unuſefull. And we ſhall ſeldome find, but that thoſe venturous Bloſſoms, whoſe over-haſtie obedience to the Early Spring doth anticipate their proper ſeaſon, and put forth too ſoone, doe afterwards for their former boldneſſe ſuffer from the injury of ſeverer weather, except at leaſt ſome happy ſhelter, or more benigne influence redeeme them from danger. The like Infelicity I finde my ſelfe obnoxious unto at this time. For I know not out of what diſpoſition of minde, whether out of love of Learning (for * Love is venturous, and conceives difficult things eaſier then they are) or whether out of a Reſolution to take ſome account from my ſelfe of thoſe few yeares wherein I had then been planted in the happieſt of all Soyles, the Schooles of Learning; whether upon theſe, or any other Inducements, ſo it hath happened, that I long ſince have taken boldneſſe in the Minority of my Studies to write this enſuing Treatiſe: That before I adventured on the endevour of know-

* *Amor dixit Plato. μάλ& ἐπιχειρῆ ἴσμεν. Cæl. Rhodig. l. 16. cap. 15.*

knowing other things, I might firſt try whether I knew my ſelfe. Leaſt I ſhould juſtly incurre the Cenſure, which that * ſowre Philoſopher paſt upon Grammarians. That they were better acquainted with the evils of *Vlyſſes* then with their owne. This haſty reſolution having produced ſo untimely an iſſue, It hapned by ſome accident to be like *Moſes* in his Infancy expoſed to the Seas. Where I made no other account, but that its own weakneſſe would there have revenged my former boldneſſe, and betrai'd it unto periſhing. But as he then, ſo this now, hath had the marvellous felicity to light on the view, and fall under the compaſsion of a very Gracious Princeſſe. For ſo farre hath your Highneſſe vouchſafed (having hapned on the ſight of this Tractate) to expreſſe fauour thereunto, as not onely to ſpend houres in it, and require a Tranſcript of it, but further to recommend it by your Gracious judgement vnto publike view. In which particular I was not to advice with mine owne Opinion, being

* *Diogenes apud Laertium l.6.*

being to expreſſe my humbleſt acknowledgement to your Highneſſe.

This onely Petition I ſhall accompany it withall unto your Highneſſe feete, That ſince it is a Bloſſome which put forth ſo much too ſoone, It may therefore obtain the Gracious Influence of your Highneſſe favour, to protect it from that ſeverity abroad which it otherwiſe juſtly feareth.

God Almighty make your Highneſſe as great a Mirrour of his continuall Mercies, as he hath both of his Graces and of Learning.

Your Highneſſe

moſt Humble Servant,

EDWARD REYNOLDES.

A PREFACE TO THE READER.

Having beene moved to give way unto the Publication of this Philoſophicall Miſcellany, the Fruit of my yonger Studies, I conceive it needfull to prevent one obvious prejudice under which I may labour. For it may haply ſeeme undecent in me, having adventured to publiſh ſome few, though weake Diſcourſes in Arguments Divine, that I ſhould now ſuffer the Bloſſomes of my youth to looke abroad and runne the hazard of Publike Cenſure. Whereunto when I ſhall have given a ſhort anſwer, I ſhall reſt ſomething the more confident of a Candid conſtruction.

And here I might firſt alledge the honour which God himſelfe hath beene pleaſed to give, Vnto Inferiour, and Naturall knowledge. In the firſt Creation when he gave unto man the Dominion over other Creatures for his uſe, he gave him likewiſe the contemplation, and knowledge of them, for his Makers Glory, and his owne Delight. (For God brought them unto him to give them Names.) And as the Holy Scriptures, are all over full of the Myſteries of Gods wiſdome in Natu-

rall Things, ſo are there ſome ſpeciall Paſſages thereof written [a] as it were purpoſely on that Argument. And we finde that Moſes and Solomon have therein Teſtimony given unto them, not onely of their Divine, but of their Humane, and naturall Knowledge likewiſe.

And if we looke into the Ancient Chriſtian Churches, or into theſe of later times, wee ſhall finde that very many Eccleſiaſticall perſons have not denyed unto the world, their Philoſophicall & Poëticall labors, either whole and alone, or mixed, and directed to Theologicall Ends, as we finde in the writings of Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Euſebius Cæſarienſis, Saint Auſtins Bookes, De Civitate Dei, and others, Venerable Bede, Iſidore Hiſpalenſis, Syneſius Sidonius Apollinaris, Honorius Auguſtodunenſis, &c. In the Hexamerons of Saint Baſil, Nyſſen, Ambroſe, and the Bookes of thoſe who have written more directly upon ſome parts of the Argument of this preſent Treatiſe, as Gregory Nyſſen, Lactantius, Nemeſius, Procopius, Gazæus, Damaſcen, and others. And in later times, beſides the Schoolmen, and thoſe vaſt labours of many of that ſide, in Dialecticall, Phyſicall, and Metaphyſicall writings: we might inſtance in very many of the Reformed Churches abroad, ſome of whoſe yonger labours have ſeene the Light: as alſo in the Oratory, Logicall, Morall, Hiſtoricall, Mathematicall, Miſcellanious writings of many learned Divines of our owne Church, under the Protection of which great Examples I ſhall uſe the Apologie which Quintilian [b] dictateth unto me, Vel Error honeſtus eſt Magnos Duces ſequentibus. That it is no uncomely, but a pardonable Errour, which hath great

Exam-

[a] Iob cap. 38, 39, 40, 41. Pſal. 104, 147.

[b] Lib. 1. cap. 6.

Examples to excuſe it. In which reſpect I finde my ſelfe chiefely ſubject to thu Infelicity, that I am conſtrained to follow ſuch Examples, as little children doe their Fathers, Non æquis paſſibus, *at a very great Diſtance.*

And truely, when I againe, conſider the Excellent c *Vſe and ſubordination, of humane learning unto learning Divine (It being hardly poſſible, without it, to underſtand ſundry paſſages of holy Scripture, depending upon the propriety of Words and Idiomes, or upon the cuſtomes, Rites, Proverbes, Formes, Vſages, Lawes, Offices, Antiquities of the Aſſyrian, Perſian, Greeke, and Romane Monarchies, as might be ſhewed in ſundry particulars, and were a labour moſt worthy the induſtry of ſome able and learned pen:) when I conſider that the* d *ſpoiles of Egypt were by God allowed to enrich Iſrael, and* a *the ſpoyles of the Gentiles reſerved by David, for the building of the Temple: That a* b *Gentile by legall Purification and Marriage, might become an Iſraelite, That the* c *Crowne of* Rabbah *was put upon the head of* David, *and the* d *Sword of* Goliah *uſed to ſlay himſelfe: That the* a *Gold and Myrrh, and Frankincenſe of the Wiſe men of the Eaſt, was offered unto Chriſt: when I finde the* b *Apoſtle convincing the Iewes, out of their Law, and the Philoſophers out of their Maximes. And that* c *every gift, as well as every Creature of God is good, and may be ſanctified for the uſe and delight of Man; I then conclude with my ſelfe, That this Morall and Philoſophicall Glaſſe of the humane Soule may be of ſome ſervice even unto the Tabernacle, as the* d *Looking glaſſes of the Iſraelitiſh women were unto the Altar.*

c *Et quidem de communibus ſenſibus ſapere in Dei rebus, ſed in Teſtimonium veri, non in Adjutorium falſi. Tertul. de Reſurr. carnis. cap. 3. vid. etiam Apol. cap. 47. & Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 1. p. 203. A. 207. A. E. 214. A. B. 218. 219. 223. 227 233. 234 & lib. 6. p. 465. 467. 499 500. Iuſtin. Martyr. Apol. 1. Aug. Confeſſ. l. 11. c. 15. Chriſtiana Doctrina ſus eſſe intelligit, ubicunque invenerit veritatem. Aug. de Doctr. Chri. l. 2 c. 18, 39. 40. Ὅσα παρ' ἑκάστοις καλῶς εἴρηται τῶν ἐγκυκλίων. Iuſtin. Apol. 1. Vid. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 18. c. 52. Greg. Nazian. Orat. 1.*

d *Exod. 12. 35.* a *1 Chron. 29.* b *Deut. 21. 12.* c *2 Sam. 12. 30 Vid. Pet. Æneas. decret. l. 1. Tit. 8. §. 4.*

d *1 Sam. 17. 21.* a *Mat. 2 11.* b *Act. 18. 4 17. 23. - 29.* c *Iac. 1. 17. 1 Tim. 4. 4.* d *Ex. 38. 8.*

Nor can I but a little wonder at the melancholly fancy of Saint Hierom, *who conceiving himselfe in a vision beaten by an Angel for being a Ciceronian, did for ever after promise to abjure the Reading of secular Authors. Though I finde him selfe both justifying the Excellent use of that kind of Learning, and acknowledging that conceited vision of his to have beene but a Dreame.*

It is true indeed that in regard of the bewitching danger from humane learning, and the too great aptnesse in the minds of men to surfeit and be intemperate, in the use of it; Some of the Ancients have sometimes interdicted the Reading a *of such Authors unto Christian men; But this calleth upon us for watchfulnesse, in our studies, not for negligence, for the Apostle will tell us. That to the pure all things are pure. And even of harmefull things when they are prepared, and their malignancy by Art corrected, doth the skilfull Physitian make an excellent use. If then we be carefull to Moderate, and Regulate our Affections, to take heed of the pride and inflation of secular learning, not to admire Philosophy, to the prejudice of Evangelicall knowledge, as if without the revealed light of the Gospel, salvation might be found, in the way of Paganisme; if we suffer not these leane Kine to devoure the fat ones, nor the River Iordan to be lost in the dead Sea; I meane Piety to be swallowed up of prophane Studies, and the knowledge of the Scriptures (which alone would make any man conversant in all other kinde of Learning with much greater Felicity, and successe:) to be under-valued, and not rather, the more admired, as a Rich Iewell compared with Glasse. In this case, and*

c *De Custod. Virginit. ad Eustochium.*

d *Epist. ad Magn. Orat. Ep. ad Pammach. de Obit. Paulinæ. Apolog. adverss. Ruffin. l. 1.*

a *Vid. Notas Conradi Rittershusij in Sid. Pelus. Ep. 56. l. 1. Tertul. de præscript. c. 7. de Idololat. c. 10. contr. Marc. l. 2. c. 16.*

and with ſuch care as this, there is no doubt, but ſecular Studies prepared and corrected from Pride and Prophaneneſſe, may be to the Church as the Gibeonites were to the Congregation of Iſrael, for Hewers of Wood, and Drawers of Water, otherwiſe we may ſay of them as Cato Major *to his ſonne, of the Gracian Arts and Learning,* [b] Quandocunque iſta Gens ſuas literas dabit, omnia Corrumpet.

b Plin. l. 29. c. 1. Vid. Rod. Xiland. in Plutarch. Catonem. §. 13.

Nor have I upon theſe Conſiderations onely adventured on the publication of this Tract, but becauſe withall, in the reviewing of it, I found very many Touches upon Theologicall Arguments, and ſome Paſſages wholy of that Nature. Yea, all the Materiall parts of the Treatiſe doe ſo nearely concerne the knowledge of our ſelves, and the Direction of our lives, as that they may be all eſteemed Borderers upon that Profeſſion.

In the peruſing and faſhioning of it for the Preſſe, I have found that true in writing, which I had formerly found true in Building; That it is almoſt as chargeable to repaire, and ſet right an Old houſe, as to Erect a New one. For I was willing in the moſt materiall parts of it, ſo to lop off Luxuriances of Style, and to ſupply the Defects of Matter, as that with Candid, favourable, and ingenuous Iudgements, it might receive ſome tolerable acceptation. In hope whereof I reſt,

Thine in all Chriſtian ſervice,

EDWARD REYNOLDS.

Perlegi

Perlegi Tractatum hunc, cui Titulus (A Treatiſe of the Paſſions and Faculties of the Soule, &c.) *in quo nihil reperio orthodoxæ fidei, aut bonis moribus adverſum, quo minus cum ſumma utilitate imprimatur.*

Maij 14. 1640. Tho. Wykes. *R.P.*

Epiſc. Lond. Capell. domeſt.

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A TREATISE

of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man.

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IT hath been a just Complaint of Learned Men, that usually wee are more curious in our inquiries after things New than excellent; and that the very neerenesse of worthy Objects, hath at once made them both despised and unknowne. Thus like Children, with an idle diligence, and fruitlesse Curiositie, wee turne over this great Booke of Nature, without perusing those ordinarie

Cic. de Div. lib. 2. Plin. lib. 2. ep. 10.

Characters, wherein is expreſt the greateſt power of the Worker, and excellencie of the Worke; fixing our Admiration onely on thoſe Pictures and unuſuall Novelties, which though for their rareneſſe they are more ſtrange, yet for their nature are leſſe worthy. Every Comet or burning Meteor ſtrikes more wonder into the beholder, than thoſe glorious Lampes of Nature, with their admirable Motions and Order, in which the Heathen have acknowledged a Divineneſſe. Let a Child be borne but with ſix fingers, or have a part more than uſuall, wee rather wonder at One ſuperfluous, than at All naturall. *Sol ſpectatorem niſi cum deficit non habet, nemo obſervat Lunam niſi laborantem, adeò naturale eſt magis nova, quàm magna mirari:* None looketh with wonder on the Sunne, but in an Eclipſe; no eye gazeth on the Moone, but in her Travell: ſo naturall it is with men, to admire rather things New than Common. Whereas indeed things are fit for ſtudie and obſervation, though never ſo common, in regard of the perfection of their nature, and uſefulneſſe of their knowledge. In which reſpect, the plaine Counſell of the Oracle was one of the wiſeſt which was ever given to man, To ſtudie and to know himſelfe; becauſe, by reaſon of his owne neereneſſe to himſelfe, hee is uſually of himſelfe moſt unknowne and neglected. And yet if wee conſider, how in him it hath pleaſed God to ſtampe a more notable Character of his owne Image, and to make him, amongſt all his Works, one of the moſt perfect Models of created

Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 2.

Sen. qu. Nat. lib. 7. c. 1.

Sen. de Benef. lib. 6. c. 23.

ted excellencie, wee cannot but acknowledge him to be one, though of the leaſt, yet of the fitteſt Volumes, in this great varietie of Nature to be acquainted withall. Intending therefore, according to my weakeneſſe, to take ſome view of the inſide, and more noble Characters of this Booke, it will not be needfull for me to gaze upon the Cover, to inſiſt on the materials or ſenſitive conditions of the humane nature, or to commend him in his Anatomie; though even in that reſpect the Pſalmiſt tells us, that he is fearefully and wonderfully made: for wee commonly ſee, that as moſt kind of Plants or Trees exceed us in vegetation and fertilitie; ſo, many ſorts of beaſts have a greater activitie and exquiſiteneſſe in their ſenſes than wee. And the reaſon hereof is, becauſe Nature aiming at a ſuperiour and more excellent end, is in thoſe lower faculties leſſe intent and elaborate. It ſhall ſuffice therefore, onely to lay a ground-worke in theſe lower faculties, for the better notice of mans greater perfections, which have ever ſome connexion and dependance on them. For whereas the principall acts of mans Soule are either of Reaſon and Diſcourſe, proceeding from his Vnderſtanding; or of Action and Moralitie, from his Will; both theſe, in the preſent condition of mans eſtate, have their dependence on the Organs and faculties of the Body, which in the one precede, in the other follow: To the one, they are as Porters, to let in and convey; to the other as Meſſengers, to performe and execute: To the one,

Sen. Ep. 76.

the whole Body is as an Eye, through which it seeth; to the other a Hand, by which it worketh.

Concerning the ministrie therefore of the Body unto the Soule, wee shall thus resolve; That the Reasonable part of Man, in that condition of subsistence which now it hath, depends in all its ordinarie and naturall operations, upon the happie or disordered temperature of those vitall Qualities, out of whose apt and regular commixion the good estate of the Body is framed and composed. For though these Ministeriall parts have not any over-ruling, yet they have a disturbing power, to hurt and hinder the operations of the Soule: Whence wee finde, that sundry diseases of the Body doe oftentimes weaken, yea, sometimes quite extirpate the deepest impression and most fixed habits of the minde. For, as whereseever there is a locomotive facultie, though there be the principall cause of all motion and activitie; yet if the subordinate instruments, the bones and sinewes be dis-jointed, shrunke, or any other wayes indisposed for the exercise of that power, there can be no actuall motion; Or as in the Body Politique, the Prince (whom *Seneca* calleth the Soule of the Common-wealth) receiveth either true or false intelligence from abroad, according as is the fidelitie or negligence of those instruments, whom *Xenophon* tearmeth the Eyes and Eares of Kings: In like manner, the Soule of man being not an absolute independant worker, but receiving all her objects

Solinus de quodam refert quod accepto vulnere in occipitio ad tantam devenit ignorantiam ut nesciret se habuisse nomen.

Honorius Augustodunens. de Philosoph. Mundi, lib. 4. c. 24.

Sen. de Clem. lib. 1. cap. 4.

Xenop. Cyrop. lib. 8. & Arist. Polit. lib. 3. c. 12.

objects by conveyance from theſe bodily inſtruments, which *Cicero* calleth the Meſſengers to the Soule, if they out of any indiſpoſition ſhall be weakened, the Soule muſt continue like a *Raſa Tabula*, without any acquired or introduced habits. The Soule hath not immediately from it ſelfe that ſtrange weakeneſſe, which is obſerved in many men, but onely as it is diſabled by Earthie and ſluggiſh Organs; which being out of order, are more burthenſome than ſerviceable thereunto.

There are obſervable in the Soules of men, conſidered in themſelves, and in reference one to another, two defects; an imperfection, and an inequalitie of operation: the former of theſe I doe not ſo aſcribe to that bodily weakeneſſe, whereby the Soule is any way oppreſt, as if I conceived no internall darkneſſe in the faculties themſelves; ſince the fall of man working in him a generall corruption, did amongſt the reſt infatuate the Mind, and as it were ſmother the Soule with ignorance; ſo that the outward ineptitude of bodily inſtruments, is onely a furtherance and improvement of that Native imperfection. But for the inequalitie and difference of mens underſtandings in their ſeverall operations, notwithſtanding it be queſtioned in the Schooles, Whether the Soules of men have not originally, in their Nature, degrees of perfection and weakeneſſe, whence theſe ſeverall degrees of operation may proceed; yet nevertheleſſe that being granted, I ſuppoſe, that principally it proceeds

ceeds from the varietie, tempers, and diſpoſitions in the inſtrumentall faculties of the Body; by the helpe whereof, the Soule in this eſtate worketh: for I cannot perceive it poſſible, that there ſhould have beene, if man had continued in his Innocencie, (wherein our Bodies ſhould have had an exact conſtitution, free from thoſe diſtempers to which now by ſinne they are lyable) ſuch remarkable differences betweene mens apprehenſions, as wee now ſee there are: for there ſhould have beene in all men a great facilitie to apprehend the myſteries of Nature, and to acquire knowledge (as wee ſee in *Adam*) which now wee finde in a large meaſure granted to ſome, and to others quite denyed. And yet in that perfect eſtate (according to the opinion of thoſe who now maintaine it) there would have beene found a ſubſtantiall and internall inequalitie amongſt the Soules of men: and therefore principally this varietie comes from the ſundry conſtitutions of mens bodies; in ſome, yeelding enablement, for quickneſſe of Apprehenſion; in others, preſſing downe and intangling the Vnderſtanding; in ſome, diſpoſing the Minde unto one object; in ſome, unto another; according as the *impetus* and force of their naturall affections carrieth them. And therefore *Ariſtotle* in his *Politiques* aſcribeth the inequalitie which hee obſerves betweene the *Aſiatique* and *European* Wits, unto the ſeverall Climates and temperature of the Regions in which they lived; according whereunto, the Complexi-

Ariſt. Polit. lib. 7.

ons

ons and Conſtitutions of their Bodies onely could be alter'd; the Soule being in it ſelfe, according to the ſame Philoſopher, impaſſible from any corporeall Agent. And to the ſame purpoſe againe he ſaith, That if an old man had a young mans eye, his ſight would be as ſharpe and as diſtinct as a young mans is; implying the diverſitie of Perception to be grounded onely on the diverſitie of bodily inſtruments, by which it is exerciſed. And therefore he elſewhere obſerves (I ſhall not trouble my ſelfe to examine upon what ground) that men of ſoft and tender skins have greateſt quickneſſe of wit; and on the contrarie, *Duri Carne, inepti mente:* thereby intimating, that there is no more ſignificant and lively expreſſion of a vigorous or heavie Soule, than a happie or ill-ordered Body; wherein wee may ſundry times reade the abilities of the Minde, and the inclinations of the Will: So then it is manifeſt, that this weakeneſſe of apprehenſion in the Soules of men, doth not come from any immediate and proper darkneſſe belonging unto them; but onely from the coexiſtence which they have with a Body ill-diſpoſed for aſſiſtance and information. For hee who is carried in a Coach (as the Body is *vehiculum animæ*) though he be of himſelfe more nimble and active, muſt yet receive ſuch motion as that affoords; and Water, which is conveyed through Pipes and Aqueducts, though its motion by it ſelfe would have beene otherwiſe, muſt yet then be limitted by the poſture and

Ariſt. de Anima, lib. 3.

De Anima, lib. 2.

and proportion of the Vessels through which it passeth.

CHAP. II.

In what Cases the dependance of the Soule on the Body, is lessened by Faith, Custome, Education, Occasion.

BVt yet this dependance on the Body is not so necessarie and immutable, but that it may admit of variation, and the Soule be in some cases vindicated from the impression of the Body: And this first, in extraordinarie; and next, in more common actions. In actions extraordinarie, as those pious and religious operations of the Soule, Assent, Faith, Invocation, and many others; wherein the Soule is carried beyond the Sphere of Sense, and transported unto more raysed operations: For to beleeve and know, that there are layd up for pious and holy endeavours *those joyes which eye hath not seene, nor eare heard*, and to have some glimpses and fore-taste of them, which Saint *Paul* calleth the *Earnest, and first fruits of the Spirit*; What is this, but to leave sense behind us, and to out-run our

our Bodies? And therefore it is, that Religion, I meane chiefely, the Principles, Foundations, Articles, and Myſteries Evangelicall, were alwayes not to be urged by Diſputes of Secular Learning, but to be ſacredly and ſecretly infuſed; not ſo much perſwading to the knowledge of apparent Truths, as drawing to the beleefe of true Myſteries. Divine Truths doe as much tranſcend the Reaſon, as Divine Goodneſſe doth the Will of Man. That One Nature ſhould be in Three Perſons, and Two Natures in One Perſon: That the *inviſible God* ſhould be *manifeſted in the fleſh*, and *a pure Virgin bring forth a Sonne*; That *Death* ſhould be *conquered* by dying, and not be able to digeſt and conſume the Body which it had devoured: That *dead bones* ſhould *live*, and *they who dwell in the duſt awake and ſing*: Theſe are Myſteries, not onely above the reach of Humane, but even of Evangelicall diſquiſition; inſomuch, that even unto *Principalities and Powers* they were not otherwiſe made knowne, but by Divine Revelation delivered unto the Church. *Sarah* laughed, when *Abraham* beleeved; and the Philoſophers mocked, when *Paul* diſputed; and Reaſon expected, that the Apoſtle ſhould have *fallen downe dead*, when contrarily, Faith ſhooke the *Viper into the fire*. There is a great difference betweene the manner of yeelding our aſſent unto God and Nature: For in Philoſophie, we never reſigne our beleefe, nor ſuffer our judgements to be wholly carried to any Concluſion, till there be a demonſtrative Argument grounded on In-

Evangel. non in deget. Syllogiſ. Chryſoſt.

duction from the Sense, for the enforcement thereof. But Divinitie, on the other side, when God speakes unto us, worketh Science by Faith, making us so much the more assured of those Truths which it averreth, than of any Naturall Conclusions, (notwithstanding they may seeme sometimes to beare opposition to humane Reason) by how much Divine Authoritie is more absolute and certaine, than any Naturall demonstration. And this freedome from bodily restraint, have (according to the Schoole-men) those Raptures and Extasies, which rayse and ravish the Soule, with the sweetnesse of extraordinarie Contemplations. And yet even Religion it selfe hath so much condiscended to the senses of men, as to give them manner of roome and service in this great Mysterie. And therefore generally, the Doctrine of Christ is set forth in Parables and Similitudes, and the Faith in Christ confirmed by Sacraments; things most agreeable to the perception and capacitie of the Senses.

Now, for the exemption of the more ordinarie actions of the Soule from any predominancie of the Body, it is chiefely wrought by these three meanes, Education, Custome, and Occasion. For the Rule of *Aristotle*, though in Agents purely Naturall and peremptorie (which are not directed by any degree of knowledge inherent) it held true; yet in Man it is not universall, That any thing which comes from Nature, is unalterable by Custome: For we commonly observe, that

Vid. Arist. Ethic. lib. 10. c. 9. Ethic. l. 2. c. 1.

that the Culture of the Minde, as of the Earth, doth many times deliver it from the barrenneſſe of its owne Nature.

Exercetque frequens tellurem atque imperat arvis;

As frequent Husbandry commands
The emptieſt and moſt barren Lands.

Education then, and Cuſtome, doe as it were revenge Nature; inſomuch, that though the outward Humours and Complexions doe worke the Mind unto an unhappie temper, yet by a continuall grapling with theſe difficulties, it getteth at the laſt ſome victorie, though not without much reluctancie.

And for Occaſion; that alters the naturall inclination of the Will and Affections, rather than of the Vnderſtanding: for ſo wee ſee, that the byas and force of mens deſires are oftentimes turned, by reaſon of ſome ſudden emergent occurrences, contrarie to the ſtanding temper and complexion of the Body. Thus wee reade ſometimes of men in Warre; who notwithſtanding of themſelves timerous and ſluggiſh, yet when the diſadvantage of the place had taken away all poſſibilitie of flight, and the crueltie of the Adverſarie all hope of mercie, if they ſhould be conquered, have ſtrangely gayned by their owne deſpaires, and gotten great and proſperous Victories, by a forc'd and unnaturall fortitude.

Vna salus victis, nullam sperare salutem.

The onely weapon which did win the day,
Was their despaire, that they were cast away.

1 Sam. 4 6,7,8 An example whereof, wee have in the *Philistims*: When the *Israelites* brought forth the *Arke of the Lord* in the Campe, they were sore afraid, and cryed out, *Woe unto us, woe unto us; who shall deliver us out of the hands of these mightie Gods?* And thereupon resolved to quit themselves like men, and fight. And *Cæsar* in his *Caesar Com. l. 1.* *Commentaries* telleth us of a people; who when they went out to Warre, would burne their Houses; that having no Home of their owne, to flye unto, they might by that despaire, be urged to gaine one by the Sword. The Historian reporteth of a Band of *Scythians*, who though they *Justin.* were of themselves bond-slaves, did notwithstanding, upon occasion of their Masters absence, endeavour to shake off their in-bred *Civilitie*; usurping to themselves a Freedome, of which the baseness of their condition was uncapable: Nor could they be removed from this Insolencie, till the sight of Rods and Staves, and other the like instruments of feare, had driven them back into their Nature againe.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the Memorie, and ſome few cauſes of the weakeneſſe thereof.

NOw for theſe inward Senſes, which are commonly accounted three, (though extending themſelves unto ſundry operations of differing qualities) I take the two later, to wit, Memorie, and Fancie, or Imagination, to have a more excellent degree of perfection in man; as being indeed the principall Store-houſes and Treaſuries of the operations of the Soule. Where, by Memorie, I underſtand not the faculrie, as it is common to beaſts with men, and importeth nothing but the ſimple retention, and conſervation of ſome *ſpecies*, formerly treaſur'd up by the conveyance of the outward ſenſe: but as it is *Conſors & co-operatrix Rationis*, as *Hugo* ſpeakes, a joynt-worker in the operations of Reaſon; which the *Latines* call *Reminiſcentia*, or *Recordatio*; including ſome acts of the Vnderſtanding: Which is a reviewing, or (as wee ſpeake) a calling to minde of former objects, by diſcourſe, or rationall ſearching for them; which is made by *Ariſtotle* to be the remote ground of all Arts: For (ſaith hee) Memorie is the Ground of Experience, and Experience the Mother of Art: The dignitie hereof in man, is ſeene, both by perfecting the Vnder-

Lib. de ſpirit. & anima.

Metaph. lib. 1.

standing, in matter of Learning and Discourse, (wherein some men have attained unto almost a miraculous felicitie; as *Seneca* the elder confesseth of himselfe, who could immediately recite two thousand words, in the same order as they had beene spoken before to him; and *Cyrus*, of whom *Zenophon* testifieth, that hee could salute all the Souldiers in his Armie by their Names; and *Mithridates*, who being King over twentie two Countreyes, did speake so many Languages without an Interpreter; and *Politian* in his Epistles telleth of *Fabius Vrsinus*, a Child but of a eleven yeeres of age, in whom there was so rare a mixture of Invention and Memorie, that hee could unto five or six severall persons, at the same time, dictate the matter and words of so many severall Epistles, some serious, some jocular, all of different arguments, returning after every short period, from the last to the first, and so in order; and in the conclusion, every Epistle should be so close, proper, and coherent within it selfe, as if it alone had beene intended:) As also by affording speciall assistance for the direction and discreet managing of our actions, conforming them either unto Precepts and Rules in Moralitie, or unto Principles of Wisdome and publike Prudence, gathered from Historicall observations; while the Minde, by the helpe of Memorie, being as it were conversant with Ages past, and furnished with Examples for any service and imployment, doth by mature application, weighing particulars, comparing times, circumstances,

Sen. Contro. lib. 1. in Præmium.

Plin. lib. 7. c. 24.

Quintil. lib. 11. c. 2.

Polit. Ep. l. 12. ad Pic. Mirand.

ſtances, and paſſages of affaires together, enable it ſelfe with the more hope and reſolution, to paſſe ſucceſſefully through any enterpriſe or difficultie: for *qui credit ſperat*, hee that beleeveth, and is acquainted with the happie iſſue of other mens reſolutions, will with the leſſe anxietie or diſcouragement goe on in his owne.

The principall Corruptions which I conceive of the Memorie, are firſt, too much ſlightneſſe and ſhallowneſſe of obſervation; when out of an impatiencie of ſtaying long, or making any profound enquirie into one object, and out of a gluttonous curioſitie to feed on many, the greedineſſe of the appetite weakeneth the digeſtion, (for ſo ſome have called the Memorie, the Belly of the Soule) and an eagerneſſe to take in, makes unearefull to retaine. And this is the reaſon, why many men wander over all Arts and Sciences, without gaining reall improvement, or ſoliditie in any: They make not any ſolemne Iourney to a particular Coaſt, and Head of Learning, but view all as it were in *Tranſitu*; having no ſooner begun to ſettle on one, but they are in haſte to viſit another. But ſuch men as theſe (except endowed with an incredible and uſuall felicitie of diſpatch) are no more able to finde the uſe, or ſearch the bottome of any Learning, than he who rides Poaſt, is to make a deſcription and Map of his Iourneyes: who, though by much imployment, he may toyle and ſweat more in travelling from place to place; yet is hee farre leſſe able to diſcover the nature of the Countreyes,

treyes, temperature of the Aire, Character of the people, Commodities of the Earth, than he, who though not so violent in the motion, is yet more constant in his abode: and though his haste be lesse eager, yet his observations are more serious. *Omnis festinatio cæca est*, saith *Seneca*; Precipitancie and unstablenesse, as well in the motions of the Wit as of the Body, dazeleth and disableth the eyes: And it is true in the Minde, as in the Stomack; too quick digestion doth alwayes more distemper than nourish, and breedeth nothing but Crudities in Learning: Nor can I call that so much Studie, as agitation and restlesnesse of the Minde; which is as impatient of true setled labour, as it is of quiet. Now, the reason why such a temper of Minde as this, is corruptive to the Memorie, is first, because Memorie is alwayes joyned with some measure of Love; and wee most of all remember that, which wee most respect: *Omnia quæ curant meminerunt*; There where the Treasure is, the Minde will be also: There therefore, where our Love is most constant, our Memories will be most faithfull. So, that sudden vanishing, and broken desires, which like the appetite of sick men, are for the time violent, but give presently over; as they argue an eager Love for the present, of what wee pursue, and by consequence, a *fastidium* and disesteeme of that which wee soone forsake: so doe they necessarily inferre weakenesse on the Memorie, by how much they make our hopes the stronger. For, as *Seneca* speakes, *Caduca memoria futura*

Arist. Rhet. lib. 2. c. 12.

De Benef. lib. 3 c. 3.

futura imminentium; Men ſtrongly bent upon things future, have but weake memories of things paſt.

Secondly, the body of any one Homogeneall Learning, hath this excellent propertie in it, that all the parts of it doe by a mutuall ſervice relate to, and communicate ſtrength and luſtre each to other: ſo that he who goes through with any Science, doth from every new Branch and Concluſion which he meets with, receive a greater clearenesſe and more ſtrong impreſſion of his former degrees of Knowledge. Now then, that man who out of impatiencie of that Reſtraint, cannot endure to goe through an Art, to ſearch into the Root, to obſerve the knittings and dependencies of the parts amongſt themſelves, to ſee by what paſſages Truth is derived from the Principles, to this or to other Branches; muſt needs be ſo much the more forgetfull of what he knowes, by how much he is ignorant of thoſe other parts whereunto it referreth.

Other cauſes there are of weakeneſſe in the Memorie; as namely, a diſtruſt, and from thence an unexerciſe of it. Whereupon *Plato* telleth us, that the uſe of Letters, in gathering *Adverſaria* and Collections, is a hinderance to the Memorie; becauſe thoſe things which wee have depoſited to our Desks, wee are the more ſecure and careleſſe to retaine in our Minds. And on the other Extreme, a too great Confidence in it, and thereupon an over-burthening it with multitude of Notions; whereby as it ſheds much over, ſo it

Quintil. lib. 11. c. 2.

it is withall indiſpoſed for the readie uſe of what it retaines; it falling out in a huddle and tumultuarie heape of thoughts, as in any other throng, that we can never ſo eaſily finde out, or order and diſpoſe what we deſire to uſe, but are confounded in our owne ſtore. But I forbeare to inſiſt on theſe, becauſe I haſten to the higher and more noble part of Man.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Fancie: Its offices to the Will and Reaſon, Volubilitie of Thoughts, Fictions, Errors, Levitie, Fixedneſſe.

NOw for the Imagination, the dignitie thereof conſiſts, either in the office, or in the latitude of it: Its office, is to be aſſiſtant both to the Vnderſtanding and the Will; its aſſiſtance to the Vnderſtanding, is principally in matter of Invention, readily to ſupply it with varietie of objects whereon to worke, as alſo to quicken and rayſe the Minde with a kind of heat and rapterie proportionable in the inferior part of the Soule, to that which in the ſuperior, Philoſophers call Extaſie; whereby it is poſſeſſed with ſuch a ſtrong delight in its proper object, as makes the motions thereof towards

wards it, to be reſtleſſe and impatient: And of this, is that of the Poet;

Eſt Deus in nobis agitante calefcimus ipſo:

By Divine Raptures we aſpire,
And are inflam'd with noble fire.

Μανικὸι ἱ Συ-
σικὸν & καὶ
ἐμπίνον ἐν ποιη-
τικῇ ἐτ' ἐκστά-
σει. *Ariſt. Problem.* §. 30.

The office of the *Imagination* to the *Will*, is to quicken, allure, and ſharpen its deſire towards ſome convenient object: for it often commeth to paſſe, that ſome plauſible *Fancie* doth more prevaile with tender Wills, than a ſevere and ſullen Argument, and hath more powerfull inſinuations to *perſwade*, than the peremptorineſſe of Reaſon hath to *command*. And the reaſon thereof is, becauſe *libertie* being naturall unto mans *Will*, that courſe muſt needs moſt of all gaine upon it, which doth offer leaſt force unto its *libertie*: Which is done rather by an Argument of delight, than of conſtraint; and beſt of all, when a rationall and convincing Argument is ſo ſweetned and tempered, to the delight of the hearer, that he ſhall be content to entertaine Truth, for the very beautie and attire of it; ſo that you ſhall not know, whether it were the weight of the Reaſon that over-rul'd, or the elegancie that enticed him. A man can be well pleaſed, to looke with delight on the picture of his enemie, when it is drawne with a skilfull and curious hand. And therefore, in that great worke of mens *converſion* unto God, he is ſaid to *allure*

Hosea 2.14. 2 Cor.5.17. Cant.5.10,16. Hag.2.7. Rom.11.12. Ephes.3.8. 1 Tim.1.15.

them, and to *speake comfortably* unto them, to *beseech*, and to *perswade* them; to set forth Christ to the Soule, as *altogether lovely*, as the *fairest of ten thousand*, as the *desire of the Nations*, as the *Riches of the World*, that men might be inflamed to love the beautie of Holinesse. That which must perswade the Will, must not onely have *truth*, but a *worthinesse* in it: in which respect the Principles of Knowledge are called ἀξιώματα, *worthy* or honourable speeches: and the Gospel is not onely called λόγος πιστος, a *true* saying; but λόγος ἀξιος, a *worthy* saying; and in that respect fitted for acceptation. It is true of the *Will*, which *Seneca* hath observed of Princes; *Apud Reges etiam quæ prosunt ita tamen ut delectent suadenda sunt*: That unto them even things profitable must be represented with the face rather of delight than of necessitie; even as Physicians, when they minister a very wholesome Potion:

Lucret. lib.4. Plut. de educat. liberorum.

——— *Prius oras pocula circum*
Contingunt dulci mellis flavoque liquore:

That they their Patients may both please & cure,
With mixed-sweets their pallats they allure.

And hence is that observation, that the first reformers and drawers of men into Civill societie, and the practise of Vertue, wrought upon the *Will* by the ministrie rather of the *Fancie*, than of rigid *Reason*; not driving them thereunto by punctuall Arguments, but alluring them by the sweet-

ſweetneſſe of Eloquence; not preſſing the neceſſitie of Moralitie, by naked inferences, but rather ſecretly inſtilling it into the Will, that it might at laſt finde it ſelfe reformed, and yet hardly perceive how it came to be ſo. And this was done by thoſe Muſicall, Poeticall, and Mythologicall perſwaſions; whereby men in their diſcourſes, did as it were paint Vertues and Vices; giving unto ſpirituall things Bodies and Beauties, ſuch as might beſt affect the Imagination: Yea, God himſelfe hath beene pleaſed to honour this way of ſetting out higher Notions, in that wee finde ſome roome in the holy Scriptures for Mythologies; as that of the Vine, the Fig-tree, and the Bramble, for Riddles, for Parables, Similitudes, and Poeticall Numbers and Raptures, whereby heavenly Doctrines are ſhadowed forth, and doe condiſcend unto humane frailties. And another reaſon hereof is, becauſe the deſires of men are fixed as well on pleaſant as on profitable objects; ſo that thoſe inducements muſt needs have moſt Authoritie, which have that happie mixture of *utile & dulce* together; not onely preſſing neceſſitie upon the Vnderſtanding, but pointing as it were and deciphering delight to the Fancie. And this reaſon *Scaliger* gives in his Inquirie, how falſe Things, ſuch as *Plato* his *Elizium*, *Homers* Fictions, *Orpheus* his Muſick, ſhould delight wiſe men: *Propterea quod exuperant vulgares limites veritatis*, ſaith hee; becauſe they are not exacted to the rigor and ſtrictneſſe of Reaſon, nor grounded on the ſeveritie of

Iudg. 18.14.12, *Hoſ.* 12.10.

Scalig. ſubtil. 307.11.

Truth, but are (as I may ſo ſpeake) the Creation of the Fancie, having a kind of delightfull libertie in them, wherewith they refreſh and doe as it were open and unbind the Thoughts, which otherwiſe, by a continuall preſſure in exacter and more maſſie reaſonings, would eaſily tyre and deſpaire.

Concerning the Latitude of this Facultie, it hath therein a double prerogative above others; one, in the multiplicitie of Operations; another, in the framing of Objects. To the former of theſe, I reduce the Thoughts; which, by reaſon of their quickneſſe and volubilitie, and withall their continuall interchanges and ſucceſſions, are the moſt numberleſſe operations of the Soule of man: where, by Thoughts, I underſtand thoſe ſpringings and glances of the heart, grounded on the ſudden repreſentation of ſundry different objects; for when the Mind begins once to be fixt, and ſtanding, I call that rather Meditation than Thought. This multiplicitie of Thoughts is grounded firſt upon the abundance of their Objects; and next, upon the quickneſſe and activitie of Apprehenſion; that is the matter, this the forme of thoſe Thoughts which I now ſpeake of. The abundance of Objects is ſeene in this, that it includes all the varieties of *ſpecies* belonging to other faculties; as that knowledge which the Schooles call *Philoſophia prima*, doth within its owne limits draw in, in ſome ſort, all the ſeverall Objects of particular Sciences. There are Thoughts belonging unto the Will,

flying

flying and purſuing Thoughts, Wiſhings, and Loathings; and there are Thoughts belonging to the Vnderſtanding, aſſenting and diſſenting Thoughts, Beleefe and diſ-opinion: There are Thoughts likewiſe proceeding from Anger, firie and revengefull Thoughts; from Envie, knowing and repining Thoughts; from Ioy, ſweet and refreſhing Thoughts; from Conſcience, comforting and affrightfull Thoughts; and ſo in all other faculties. And for the quickneſſe of Working, the motions of the Thoughts ſhew it, in the concurrence of theſe two things, ſuddenneſſe of journey, and vaſtneſſe of way; while like Lightning they are able to reach from one end of Heaven unto another, and in one light and imperceptible excurſion, leave almoſt no part of the Vniverſe untravelled. Now, of theſe two grounds of multiplicitie in Thoughts, the former, namely, the abundance of Obje&s, is *ab extrinſeco*, and diſperſed over things, (though they are not otherwiſe the Obje&s of Thought, than as the Mind refle&eth on the *Phantaſmata* or images of them in this facultie) but the latter, which is the quickneſſe of Apprehenſion, though it may ſeeme to be the moſt peculiar worke of Reaſon, yet the Imagination hath indeed the greateſt intereſt in it: For, though the A& of Apprehending be the proper worke of the Vnderſtanding, yet the forme and qualitie of that A& (which properly makes it a Thought in that ſtri& ſenſe, wherein here I take it) namely, the lightneſſe, volubilitie, and ſuddenneſſe thereof,

Vid. A. Gell. lib. 9. c. 1. Aug. de Civ. Dei, lib. 9. c. 4.

of, proceeds from the immediate reſtleſneſſe of the Imagination; as is plaine, by the continuall varietie of Dreames and other Fancies, wherein the Facultie is the principall worker. The next thing, is the Latitude of Imagination, in framing of Objects, wherein it hath a propertie of boldneſſe beyond other faculties: For Reaſon, and all other powers, have their fixed and determined limits in Nature; and therefore they alwayes frame themſelves to the truth of things, yeelding aſſent to nothing but what they finde: But the Imagination is a Facultie boundleſſe, and impatient of any impoſed limits, ſave thoſe which it ſelfe maketh. And hence it is, that in matter of perſwaſion and inſinuation, Poetrie, Mythologie, and Eloquence (the Arts of rationall Fancie) have ever (as was obſerv'd) beene more forcible than thoſe which have been rigorouſly grounded on Nature and Reaſon; it being (as *Scaliger* obſerves) the naturall infiniteneſſe of mans Soule, *Aſpernari certorum finium præſcriptionem*, to diſdaine any bounds and confines in her operations.

Now, the libertie of the Imagination in this particular, is three-fold; Creation, as I may ſo ſpeake, and new making of Objects; Compoſition, or new mixing them; and Tranſlation, or new placing them: unto ſome of which three, will be reduced all Poeticall Fictions, fabulous Tranſmutations, high Metaphors, and Rhetoricall Allegories; things of excellent uſe, and ornament in ſpeech.

Now,

Now, for the Corruptions and Diſeaſes of this Facultie, I conceive the principall to be theſe three, Error, Levitie, and dull fixedneſſe: The Error of the Imagination may be taken both actively, and paſſively; the Error which it produceth, and the Error which it ſuffereth: That the Fancie is fruitfull in producing Error, is as manifeſt, as it is difficult to ſhew the manner how it doth it. Hence, thoſe ſtrange and yet ſtrong deluſions, whereby the Mind of melancholy men (in whom this Facultie hath the moſt deepe and piercing operation) have beene peremptorily poſſeſſed: Hence, thoſe vaniſhing and ſhadowie Aſſurances, Hopes, Feares, Ioyes, Viſions, which the Dreames of men (the immediate iſſues of this Facultie) doe produce: Hence thoſe gaſtly Apparitions, dreadfull Sounds, blacke Thoughts, Tremblings, and Horrors, which the ſtrong working of Imagination doth preſent unto, or produce in men; diſquieted either with the uglineſſe of their Sinnes, or heavineſſe of their Natures, making them to feare, where no feare is: which, whether it be done by affecting onely the Fancie, or by the impreſſion of ſuch formes and ſhapes upon the Spirits, which goe unto the outward ſenſes, as may thereby affect them with the ſame Images (not by reception from without, but by impreſſion and tranſfuſion from within) it is manifeſt, not onely by various relations, but by continuall experience, what ſtrong and ſtrange effects thoſe diſtempers have produced.

Aug. Epiſt. 72. ad Nebrid.

Neither are wee to conceive this impossible when we see as admirable effects in another kind wrought by the same facultie, and, as is probable, by the same meanes; I meane, the impression of likelinesse of an Infant in the Wombe, unto the Parents, or some other, who shall worke a stronger conceit in the Fancie: Or if this be not ascribed unto the working of this power, but rather to a secret reall vertue intrinsecall unto the Seed of the Parents (as many doe affirme) yet that other effect of stamping on the Body the Images and Colours of some things, which had made any strong and violent immutation on the Fancie, must needs be hereunto ascribed. As wee see commeth often to passe, in the longing of Women; and in her, who having the picture of an *Ethiopian* in her Chamber, brought forth a black Child; and in the course which *Iacob* tooke, in putting *speckled Rods* before the Cattell, when they were to conceive, that the fancie of them might make their Lambes to be ring-straked and speckled.

Arist. Prob. Sect. 10. q. 12. Plin. l. b. 7. c. 12.

Peucer. de Tenas. copia.

Aug. in Gen. quæst. 93.

The Errors which are in the Fancie, are usually of the same nature with those that are wrought by it: Such was the Error of that man, which would not be perswaded, but that he had on his head a great paire of Hornes, and for that reason would not moove forth nor uncover his face to any. And the causes of these Errors are by *Francis Mirandula* ascribed first to the varietie of tempers in the Body, with the predominancie of those humours which give complexion thereunto:

Vid. Gifanium, in Arist. Eth. l. b. 7. c. 5. & Witn. de Præsag. Dæm. l. 2. c. 24, 25, 26. & l. 3. c. 21.

Fran. Mirand. l. de Imag. c. 8. Aug. de Civ. Dei, l. 18. c. 18 de divin. Dæmon. c. 5, 6.

unto: ſecondly, to the *impoſture* of the Senſes: thirdly, to the government of the *Will*, (though that, as is granted, hath leaſt power over this Faculty) and laſtly, to the miniſtry of *evill Angels*, who can eaſily caſt into the Fancie ſtrange and falſe *ſpecies*, with ſuch ſubtletie, as ſhall eaſily gaine them plauſible credit and admittance. And of this, we finde an expreſſe example (as I conceive) in that evill ſpirit, who promiſed to be a lying ſpirit in the mouth of *Ahabs* Prophets. For the *viſions* of ſuch men being for the moſt part *imaginarie*, the impreſſion of that lying and deceitfull perſwaſion was, in all probabilitie, made upon the *Imagination*. For, notwithſtanding I confeſſe, that Prophets had events by divers meanes revealed unto them, as by *true Voices*, by reall *acceſſe* of *Angels*, and by immediate *illapſe* of Truth into the Vnderſtanding; yet becauſe thoſe two wayes, by *Viſions* and by *Dreames*, were (for ought can be obſerv'd) the moſt uſuall meanes of Revelation; it is not unlikely, that the Devil (who in ſuch things ſtrives, for the better advancement of his owne ends, to imitate Gods manner of working) did by this manner of impoſture on the *Imagination*, ſeeke to poſſeſſe the falſe Prophets, and to delude the King.

Numb. 12. 6. *Ioel* 2. 28.

And here, by the way from the three former, we may take occaſion to obſerve the miſerie of mans corrupted Nature; wherein thoſe Faculties which were originally ordained for mutuall aſſiſtance, doe now exerciſe a mutuall impoſture:

and as man did joyne with a fellow-creature to diſhonour, and if it had been poſſible, to deceive his Maker; ſo in the Faculties of man, we may diſcover a joynt conſpiracie in the working of their owne overthrow and reproach, and a ſecret joy, in one to be deluded by another.

The next *Corruption* which I obſerved, is the *Levitie* and too much *Volubilitie* of this Power, proceeding from the over-haſtie obtruſion of the *ſpecies*. For, notwithſtanding I grant the quickneſſe of its operations to be one principall part of the excellencie thereof; yet I thereby underſtand the *Power*, not the *Infirmitie*; the *Nature*, not the *Diſeaſe* of that Facultie; the *abilitie* of having ſpeedie recourſe unto varietie of Objects, treaſured up in the *Memorie*; or of apprehending new, with dexteritie; not that *floating* and *inconſtant* humour, whereby it makes many needleſſe excurſions upon impertinent things, and thereby interrupteth the courſe of the more needfull and preſent operations of the Soule. For, ſince it may fall out, that unto the ſame Facultie, from diverſitie of occaſions, contrarie operations may proove arguments of worth; a reſtraint unto one manner of working, is an argument of weakeneſſe and defect, in that it ſtraitneth and defraudeth the power of thoſe advantages which it might receive, by a timely application of the other: There may be a time, when the *Fancie* may have libertie to expatiate; but againe, ſome objects will require a more fixed and permanent act. And therefore,

to

to have a vaniſhing and lightning Fancie, that knoweth not how to ſtay and faſten upon any particular, but as an Hanging of divers Colours, ſhall in one view preſent unto the Vnderſtanding an heape of *ſpecies*, and ſo diſtract its intention; argues not ſufficiencie, but weakneſſe and diſtemper in this Facultie.

The laſt Corruption obſerved, is in the other extreame; I meane, that heavineſſe and ſluggiſh fixednesſe, whereby it is diſabled from being ſerviceable to the Vnderſtanding, in thoſe actions which require diſpatch, varietie, and ſuddennesſe of execution: from which peremptorie adheſion and too violent intenſion of the Fancie on ſome particular objects, doth many times ariſe not onely a dulneſſe of Mind, a *Syncope*, and kind of benumnednesſe of the Soule, but oftentimes madneſſe, diſtraction, and torment: Many examples of which kind of depravation of the Phantaſie in melancholy men, wee every where meet withall; ſome, thinking themſelves turned into Wolves, Horſes, or other Beaſts; others, pleaſing themſelves with Conceits of great Wealth and Principalities; ſome, framing to themſelves Feares, and other Hopes; being all but the deluſions and waking Dreames of a diſtempered Fancie.

Ariſt. Prob. Sect. 29.

Lucian. in Lucioſive Aſino. Apul. in Aſino. Plin. lib. 7. c. 22. Olav. Magnus de Region. Septentrion. l. 18. c. 45. 46, 47. Wierus de Præſtig. l. 3. c. 21. Thraſilum omnes ad littus Pyreum appellentes naves ſuas, credidit apud Athen.

His ego ſæpè Lupum fieri & ſe condere Sylvis
Mœrim, ſæpè animas imis exire ſepulcris,
Atque ſatas alio vidi traducere meſſes:

Virg. Eclog. 8.

Here often I have seene this *Mæris* worke
Himselfe into a Wolfe, and into Woods lurke;
Oft have I seene him raise up ghosts from Hell,
And growing Corne translate by Magick Spell.

And upon this over-strong working and stay of the Fancie on some one or other object, it hath oftentimes come to passe, that some men, out of depth of contemplation on some difficulties of Learning, (as is reported of *Aristotle*, in his meditation on the cause of the ebbing and flowing of the Sea) others, out of some strong and predominant passion, as Love, Feare, Despaire, drawing all the intention of the Mind unto them, have attempted such strange practises on themselves, and others, as could not proceed but from a smothered and intangled Reason. And thus much briefely shall suffice, touching the honour of mans common and inferiour Faculties.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of Paſſions, their nature, and diſtribution; of the Motions of Naturall Creatures, guided by a knowledge without them; and of Rationall Creatures, guided by a knowledge within them: of Paſſions Mentall, Senſitive, and Rationall.

NOw proceed unto the Soule of Man: of which, I muſt ſpeake in a double reference; either according to its motions and impreſſions which it makes on the Body, and receiveth from it; or according to thoſe more immanent perfections which it hath within it ſelfe: under the former of theſe, come to be conſidered the Paſſions of Mans Minde, with the more notable perfections and corruptions (as farre as my weakeneſſe can diſcover) which the Soule and Body contracted from them.

Paſſions are nothing elſe, but thoſe naturall, perfective, and unſtrained motions of the Creatures unto that advancement of their Natures, which they are by the Wiſdome, Power, and Providence of their Creator, in their owne ſeverall Spheares, and according to the proportion of their Capacities, ordained to receive, by a regular inclination to thoſe objects, whoſe goodneſſe beareth

beareth a naturall conveniencie or vertue of ſatisfaction unto them; or by an antipathie and averſation from thoſe, which bearing a contrarietie to the good they deſire, muſt needs be noxious and deſtructive, and by conſequent, odious to their natures. This being the propertie of all unconſtrained ſelfe-motions, it followeth, that the root and ground of all Paſſions, is principally the good; and ſecondarily, or by conſequent, the evill of things: as one beareth with it *rationem convenientiæ*, a quieting and ſatisfactorie; the other, *rationem diſconvenientiæ*, a diſturbing and deſtroying nature.

This being premiſed touching the nature and generall eſſence of Paſſions, the diviſion of them muſt be then grounded; becauſe (as Philoſophie teacheth us) Faculties and Operations receive their eſſentiall diſtinctions from their objects, and thoſe ſeverall reſpects wherewith they in order to the Facultie are qualified. Now, ſince all appetite (being a blind Power) is dependant upon the direction of ſome Knowledge; from the diverſitie of Knowledge in, or annexed unto things, may be gathered the prime diſtinction of Paſſions.

Knowledge, in reſpect of created Agents, may be conſidered, either as diſ-joyn'd, and extrinſecall to the things moved, or as intrinſecall and united thereunto; both which ſerve as a Law and Rule, to regulate the inclinations of each nature, that they might not ſwerve into diſordered and confuſed, or into idle and vaine motions, but

but might ever worke towards that fixed end, which God hath appointed them to moove unto.

Paſſions which proceed from Knowledge ſevered and extrinſecall, are thoſe motions of meerely naturall Agents; which are guided to their generall or particular ends, by the Wiſdome and Power of Him that made them. And this it is which cauſeth that peremptorie and uniforme order, obſerved by theſe kind of Agents in their naturall courſe, never either ſwarving or deſiſting there-from, ſo farre as the condition of the matter and ſubject whereon they worke permitteth them; becauſe they are all governed by an immutable, moſt wiſe, and moſt conſtant Law, proceeding from a Will with which there is no variableneſſe nor ſhadow of changing. And therefore we finde thoſe aberrations and irregularities of Nature, wherein it ſwerveth from this Law onely, or at leaſt principally in theſe inferiour things; wherein partly from the deficiencie and languiſhing of ſecondarie Agents, and partly from the exceſſes, defects, mutabilitie, and the like exigences of matter, wee finde ſundry times error and enormitie in their ſeverall workes and ends: Which, whether it be to ſet forth the beautie of regular operations (which by deformitie and confuſion will appeare more beautifull; or whether the originall thereof be divine malediction, which for the ſinne of man hee pleaſeth to lay upon his fellow creatures, which were all created for his comfort and ſervice,

(which Saint *Paul* calleth the *vanitie of the Crea-ture*) it proceedeth certainely from the Will and Power of that Law-giver, who is onely able, for Reasons best knowne to his owne Wisdome, to dispense sometimes with that otherwise unalterable Law, which he gave all his creatures to observe: So that all the Miracles which ever God hath beene pleased to worke, for the conversion of men unto the Faith, or confirmation in it, were but so many exceptions and dispensations from that generall Law.

But, as I said, those irregularities and deviations before spoken of, are seene principally in inferiour things. The Earth, being the principall Creature that did beare the Curse of Mans Fall, which made (if wee will beleeve that relation, though I rather suppose it to be fictitious) the Heathen Philosopher, upon observation of that wonderfull Eclipse of the Sunne at the Passion of our Saviour, to crie out, *Aut Deus Naturæ patitur, aut Mundi machina dissolvetur*; either the God of Nature suffereth, or the Frame of Nature dissolveth: Either something hindereth that universall Power, which sustaineth and animateth all the Creatures, or he doth at least willingly detaine that vertue and the vigour of that Law; without execution whereof, there cannot but follow a laxation of the whole Frame: which particular I have the rather observ'd, to note, that the more raysed and heavenly a Nature is, the more stable and constant likewise it is, to every Divine Law imposed on it.

Now

Now, this *naturall Paſſion* which I ſpeake of, is called by ſundry Names amongſt Philoſophers, the *Law*, the *Equitie*, the *Weight*, the *Inſtinct*, the *Bond*, the *Love*, the *Covenant* and *League* of naturall things in order, to the conſervation of themſelves, propagation of their kind, perfection, and order of the Vniverſe, ſervice of Man, and glory of the Creator; which are the alone ends of all naturall Agents.

By all which we are given to underſtand, that when at any time the ordinarie courſe of Nature is intermitted, when any creature forſakes its native motion, and falleth into confuſion and diſorder, there is then admitted a *breach of a Law*; or, as *Ariſtotle* calls it, ἁμαρτία, an *error*, (which Saint *Iames* telleth us, is ἀνομία, an *iniquitie* of Nature) alſo a certaine levitie, unuſefulneſſe, and emptineſſe of true worth, which I call in Saint *Pauls* phraſe, the *vanitie of the Creature*: thirdly, looſeneſſe, decay, and diſſolution; and thereupon, diſcord and unſerviceableneſſe towards the other parts, with which it ſhould jointly conſpire for the glory of the whole.

Theſe are the inconveniences that follow *Natures*; how much greater are thoſe, which follow *Reaſons* diſobedience: for all this, touching the Paſſions of *Nature*, I have obſerved onely to give light unto thoſe of *Reaſon*, there being the ſame proportion of government in them all; ſaving that, what in things deſtitute of all *knowledge*, is guided by the Law-giver himſelfe, is in the reſt performed by a *knowledge conjoyn'd*, and in-

trinsecall to the Worker: and this is either *Mentall*, or *Sensitive*, or *Rationall*; from all which, arise sundry degrees of Motions, or Passions: *Mentall Passions*, are those high, pure, and abstracted delights, or other the like agitations of the supreme part of the Vnderstanding, which *Aristotle* calleth Νῦς, the *Latines*, *Mens*, or *Apex animi*; which are the most simple actions of the Mind, wherein is the least intermixtion or commerce with inferior and earthy faculties. Which Motions are grounded first on an *extraordinarie Knowledge*, either of *Vision* and *Revelation*, or of an exquisite naturall *Apprehension*; both which are beyond the compasse of usuall Industrie, here to attaine unto: The former of these, I call with the Schoole-men, *Extasie* and *Rapture*; such as Saint *Pauls* was (for so himselfe calleth it) *Novi hominem raptum*; and such as was the Passions of the Mind, in the Prophets and holy men of God; when they were inspired with such heavenly Revelations, as did slide into the Soule with that lustre and abundance of Light, that they could not but ravish it with ineffable and glorious delight. And such, no doubt, is that *joy unspeakable*, and *Peace past understanding*, which the Apostle makes to be the *fruits of the Spirit of God*, in those hearts wherein he lodgeth; whereby the purest and most abstracted part of the Soule, the *Mind*, is lifted up to some glimpses and apprehensions of that future Glory, which in Heaven doth fill the spirits of men with ineffable Light.

2 Cor. 12. 2.

And for the later Branch, *Aristotle* hath placed his

his greateſt felicitie in the *contemplation* of the higheſt and divineſt Truths; which he makes to be the object of that ſupreme part of the Soule. And it was the ſpeech of the Philoſopher *Heraclitus* to the ſame purpoſe, that *Anima ſicca eſt ſapientiſſima*, (which toucheth ſomething upon that of *Ariſtotle*, That Melancholy complexions are uſually the wiſeſt, for that Temper is the dryeſt of all the reſt) That a Mind not ſteeped in the humours of carnall and groſſe affections, nor drench'd in the waves of a diſquiet Fancie, but more rayſed and ſoaring to its originall, by divine *contemplations*, is alwayes endued with the greater wiſdome.

Plutarch. de orac. defectu, & de Eſu carnium, Orat. 1. Ariſt. Problem. §. 30. qu. 1.

Another *Knowledge* from whence the *Paſſions* of this Faculty are rayſed in Man, is that light of *Naturall Principles*, which the Schooles call *Syntereſis*; unto which, the cuſtodie of all *practicall Truths* being committed, they there-hence worke in the *Conſcience* motions of Ioy, Love, Peace, Feare, Horror, Deſpaire, and the like ſpirituall Paſſions, according as the Soule, out of thoſe generall Principles, ſhall gather unto its owne particulars, any either delightfull or diſquieting Concluſions.

Aquin. part. 1. qu. 79. art. 12.

Senſitive Paſſions, are thoſe motions of proſecution or flight, which are grounded on the *Fancie*, *Memorie*, and Apprehenſions of the *common Senſe*: which we ſee in *brute beaſts*; as, in the feare of Hares or Sheepe, the fierceneſſe of Wolves, the anger or flatterie of Dogs, and the like: So *Homer* deſcribeth the joy of *Vlyſſes* his Dog,

Ariſt. de Hiſt. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1. l. 9. per totum. Diogen. Laert. lib. 7. in Zenon.

Dog, which after his so long absence, remembred him at his returne.

Odyss. 5. Οὐῖῃ μὲν ἰδὼν ἔσσυτο, καὶ ἄλαλε κάββαλεν ἄμφω.

For wanton joy to see his Master neare,
He wav'd his flattering tayle, and tost'd each eare.

Now these *motions* in brute creatures, if we will beleeve *Seneca*, are not *affections*, but certaine characters and impressions *ad similitudinem passionum*, like unto Passions in men; which he calleth *Impetus*, the risings, forces, and impulsions of Nature, upon the view of such objects as are apt to strike any impressions upon it.

Sen. de Ira, lib. 1. c. 3.

I come therefore to those *middle Passions*, which I call'd *Rationall*; not *formally*, as if they were in themselves Acts of Reason, or barely immateriall motions of the Soule; but by way of *participation* and *dependance*, by reason of their immediate subordination in man unto the government of the *Will* and *Vnderstanding*, and not barely of the *Fancie*, as in other creatures. And for calling *Passion* thus govern'd, *Reasonable*, I have the warrant of *Aristotle*: who, though the *sensitive Appetite* in man be of it selfe unreasonable, (and therefore by him contradivided to the *Rationall* powers of the Soule) yet by reason of that *obedience* which it oweth to the Dictates of the *Vnderstanding*, whereunto Nature hath ordain'd it to be subject and conformable (though Corruption have much slackned

Vid. Aristot. Ethic. l. 2. c. 6. Mag. Mor. l. 1. c. 7. Eadem, l. 2. c. 2. & Ethic. lib. 6. cap. 3.

Rhet. l. 1. c. 10.

Aquin. part. 1. q. 81. art. 3.

and

and unknit that Bond) hee juſtly affirmeth it to be in ſome ſort a Reaſonable Facultie, not intrinſecally in it ſelfe, but by way of participation and influence from Reaſon.

Now Paſſion thus conſidered, is divided according to the ſeverall references it hath unto its obje&t; which is principally, the Good; and ſecondarily, the Evill of things; and either conſidered after a ſundry manner: for they may be taken either barely and alone, or under the conſideration of ſome difficultie and danger accompanying them. And both theſe againe are to be determin'd with ſome particular condition of union or diſtance to the ſubje&t; for all obje&ts offend or delight the Facultie, in vertue of their union thereunto; and therefore, according as things are united or diſtant, ſo doe they occaſion Paſſions of a different nature in the Mind. The obj.&t then may be conſidered ſimply in its owne nature, as it preciſely abſtracteth from all other circumſtances, including onely the naturall conveniencie or diſconveniencie which it beareth to the Facultie: and ſo the Paſſions are, in reſpe&t of Good, Love; in reſpe&t of Evill, Hatred; which are the two radicall, fundamentall, and moſt tranſcendent Paſſions of all the reſt; and therefore well called *Pondera* and *Impetus animi*, the weight and force, and (as I may ſo ſpeake) the firſt ſpringings and out-goings of the Soule. Secondly, the obje&t may be conſidered, as abſent from the ſubje&t, in regard of reall union (though never without that which the

the Schooles call *vnio objectiva*, union of Apprehension in the Vnderstanding) without which there can be no Passion: and the object thus considered, worketh, if it be Good, Desire; if Evill, Flight, and Abomination. Thirdly, it may be considered as present, by a reall contract or union with the Facultie; and so it worketh, if Good, Delight, and Pleasure; if Evill, Griefe and Sorrow. Againe, as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficultie and danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the naturall strength of the power; which implyeth, in respect of Good, an Impossibilitie to be attained, and so it worketh Despaire; and in respect of Evill, an Improbabilitie of being avoided, and so it worketh Feare: or secondly, as not exceeding the strength of the power, or at least, those aides which it calleth in; in which regard, Good is presented as Attainable, and so it worketh Hope; and Evill is presented, either as Avoidable, if it be future, and it worketh Boldnesse to breake through it; or as Requitable, if it be past, and so it worketh Anger, to revenge it. Thus have wee the nature and distribution of those severall Passions which wee are to enquire after; of all which, or at least, those which are most naturall, and least coincident with one another, I shall in the proceeding of my Discourse, observe some things, wherein they conduce to the honour and prejudice of Mans Nature: But first, I shall speake something of the generalitie of Passions; and what

dignities

dignities are therein moſt notable, and the moſt notable defects.

CHAP. VI.

Of Humane Paſſions in generall: their uſe, Naturall, Morall, Civill: their ſubordination unto, or rebellion againſt right Reaſon.

NOw *Paſſions* may be the ſubject of a three-fold diſcourſe; *Naturall*, *Morall*, and *Civill*. In their *Naturall* conſideration, we ſhould obſerve in them, their eſſentiall *Properties*, their Ebbes and Flowes, their Springings and Decayes, the manner of their ſeverall *Impreſſions*, the Phyſicall *Effects* which are wrought by them, and the like.

In their *Morall* conſideration, we might likewiſe ſearch, how the *indifferencie* of them is altered into Good or Evill, by vertue of the Dominion of right Reaſon, or of the violence of their owne motions; what their Miniſtry is in Vertuous, and what their Power and Independance in Irregular actions; how they are rayſed, ſuppreſſed, ſlackned, and govern'd, according to the particular nature of thoſe things, which require their motion.

In their *Civill* reſpects, we ſhould alſo obſerve how they may be ſeverally wrought upon and

impressed; and how, and on what occasions, it is fit to gather and fortifie, or to slack and remit them; how to discover, or suppresse, or nourish, or alter, or mix them, as may be most advantagious; what use may be made of each mans particular Age, Nature, Propension; how to advance and promote our just ends, upon the observation of the Character and dispositions of these, whom we are to deale withall.

And this *Civill* use of *Passion*, is copiously handled in a learned and excellent discourse of *Aristotle*, in the second Booke of his *Rhetoricks*; unto which profession, in this respect, it properly belongeth: because in matter of *Action*, and of *Iudicature*, *Affection* in some sort is an *Auditor* or *Iudge*, as he speakes. But it seemeth strange, that a man of so vast sufficiencie and judgement; and who had, as we may well conjecture, an Ambition to knit every Science into an entire Body, which in other mens Labours lay broken and scattered; should yet in his Bookes *De Animâ* over-passe the discoverie of their Nature, Essence, Operations and Properties; and in his Bookes of *Morall* Philosophie, should not remember to acquaint us with the Indifferencie, Irregularitie, Subordination, Rebellion, Conspiracie, Discords, Causes, Effects; consequences of each particular of them, being circumstances of obvious and dayly use in our Life, and of necessarie and singular benefit, to give light unto the government of right Reason.

Touching Passions in order unto Civill or Iudiciarie

diciarie affaires, I ſhal not make any obſervation; either of the other, I ſhall in part touch upon, though not diſtinctly and aſunder, but in a briefe and confuſed collection of ſome few particulars.

The Order which I ſhall obſerve, in ſetting downe the Honour and Corruption of them in Generall (which Method ſhall in part be kept in their Particulars) ſhall be this; firſt, according to the *Antecedents* of their *Motion* and *Acts*; ſecondly, according to the *Acts* themſelves; and thirdly, according to the *Conſequents* of them.

Firſt, touching the *Antecedents* to the Act of *Paſſion*, they are either the *Outward* Motives thereunto, as namely, the *Objects*, unto which it is carryed; and the *Cauſes*, whereby it is produced: or the *Inward* Root and Principles of the Act, whereby it is wrought and governed.

For the two former, *Paſſion* is then ſayd commendable, when it is direct and naturall. And the Corruption is, when it is carryed to an undue *Object*, or proceedeth from an indirect *Cauſe*: but theſe are more obſervable in the particulars, and therefore thither I referre their diſtinct handling.

For the third, the Dignitie of Paſſion chiefely conſiſts in a *Conſonancie* and *Obedience* to the Preſcription of *Reaſon*: for there is in mans *Faculties* a naturall *ſubordination*, whereby the actions of the inferior receive their motion and direction from the influence of the higher. Now *Appetite* was in *Beaſts* onely made to be governed by a *ſen-*

sitive Knowledge: But in *Man*, Sense ought not to have any *commanding* or moving Power, but onely *Instrumentall*, Ministeriall, and Conveying, in respect of the *Object*. The Action of *Sense*, was not from the first Institution, ordain'd to touch the *Affection*, but to present it selfe primarily to the *Understanding*; upon whose determination and conduct, the *Passions* were to depend, to submit all their inclinations thereunto, and to be its Ministers, in the execution of all such Duties, as it should deeme any way expedient for the benefit of Mans Nature: so that herein consists a great part of Mans infelicitie, by the *Fall*; that albeit his *Understanding* it selfe be blinded, and therefore not able to reach forth any perfect *Good* to the inferiour parts; yet that small portion of Light, which it yet retaineth for the government of our Actions, is become uneffectuall, as being able onely to convince, but not to reforme.

Αὐτοῦ ἰσχυεῖν ἐπιθέμενα ἢ ἄρχειν ἀλλ' ἐκ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς. *Theodor. ser. 5. de natur. Hom.*

The *Corruption* then of *Passion* in this respect, is the *independance* thereof upon its true *Principle*: when it stayeth not to looke for, but anticipates and prevents the Discourses of *Reason*; relying onely on the judgement of *Sense*, wherewith it retaines an undue correspondence. So that herein is mainly verified that complaint of the Prophet; *Man, being in Honour, hath no understanding, and is become as the *Beasts that perish.* For, as in the *Body*, (to use the similitude of *Aristotle*) if any parts thereof be out of joint, it cannot yeeld obedience unto the government of the Motive Faculties; but when it would carry it one way, it falls another:

Psal. 49. 20.
* Θηρία μὴ λόγον ἔχοντα, &c. *Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 4.* Ἀργὸν καὶ ἀνόητον θηρίον. *in Protrep. & Tatian. orat. ad Græc. Libic. l. 1. c. 13.*

ther: So it is in the *Mind* of Man, when that Naturall continuitie and *Vnion* of Faculties, whereby one was made in operation *dependant* on another, is once diſſolved; when *Affections* are diſ-joynted from *Reaſon*, and caſt off the reines whereby they ſhould be guided, there cannot be that ſweet harmonie in the motion thereof, which is required to the weale of Mans Nature.

Vid. Plutarch. lib. de virtute Morali.

It is prodigious to ſee an *Inſtrument* (ſuch as all *Appetite* ſhould be) to be the *firſt* and *ſelfe-mover* in its owne actions; whence cannot in the *Mind* of Man but follow great danger: it being all one, as if a Waggoner ſhould commit himſelfe to the wild and unſwayed fancie of his Horſes; or, as if a blind man, who hath not the power of directing his owne feet, ſhould be permitted to run headlong, without wit or moderation, having no Guide to direct him. For as Fire (though it be of all other creatures, one of the moſt comfortable and uſefull, while it abides in the place ordained for it;) yet, when it once exceeds thoſe limits, and gets to the houſe-top, it is moſt mercileſſe and over-running: So *Paſſion* (though of excellent ſervice in Man, for the heating and enlivening of Vertue, for adding ſpirit and edge to all good undertakings, and bleſſing them with an happier iſſue, than they could alone have attained unto) yet if once they flye out beyond their bounds, and become ſubject onely to their owne Lawes, and encroach upon Reaſons right, there is nothing more tumultuous and tyrannicall. As *Bias* ſaid of the Tongue, that it was the beſt and the worſt

Plutarch. de Audit.

worst part of the Sacrifice, so may we of the Affections; *Nec meliores unquam Servos nec Dominos sentit Natura deteriores*; They are the best Servants, but the worst Masters, which our Nature can have. Like the Winds, which being moderate, carry the Ship; but drowne it, being tempestuous. And it is true as well in Mans little Common-wealth, as in greater States, That there are no more pestilent and pernicious disturbers of the Publique Good, than those who are best qualified for service and imployment; if once they grow turbulent and mutinous, neglecting the common end, for their owne private respects, and desirous to rayse themselves upon publique Ruines. And indeed it is universally true, Things most usefull and excellent in their Regularitie, are most dangerous in their Abuse.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Exercise of Passion: of Stoicall Apathie: of Permanencie, Defect, Excesse, with the Cure thereof.

THe next consideration of *Passions*, was according to the Exercise of their *Act*: which we may consider, either according to the generall *Substance*, or according to some particular *Accidents*, in the manner of its being. For the first, it is altogether Good,

Good, as being nothing elſe but naturall motion, ordained for the perfection or conſervation of the Creature. For, notwithſtanding naturall *Motion* may haply argue ſome kind of imperfection in the ſtate of the thing moving; as ſuppoſing it ſome way deprived of that, wherein it ſhould *reſt* it ſelfe (which makes *Ariſtotle* conclude, that the nobleſt Act of the Vnderſtanding, *Knowledge* and cleare Viſion, is rather the * *Reſt*, than the *Motion* of that Facultie) yet I ſay, it alwayes implyeth more naturall Perfection in thoſe things whereunto it belongeth: for as Fire, the perfecteſt of Elements; and Heaven, the perfecteſt of Bodies; ſo the Soule of Man, the perfecteſt of formes, hath the moſt vehement motion.

And in this conſideration (ſo it be alwayes *Motion Naturall*, governed and dependant on right *Reaſon*) I find not any *Corruption*, though I find an *Error* and abuſe; that I meane, which maketh *Paſſion* in generall to be *Ægritudo Animi*, a Sickneſſe and Perturbation, and would therefore reduce the Mind to a ſenſeleſſe *Apathie*, condemning all Life of *Paſſion*, as *Waves*, which ſerve onely to toſſe and trouble *Reaſon*. An Opinion, which, while it goeth about to give unto Man an abſolute government over himſelfe, leaveth ſcarce any thing in him, which he may command and governe.

For, although there be in the *Will* over the *Body* an *Imperium*; yet in rigour, this is not ſo much to be tearmed *Command*, as *Imployment*; the Body being rather the *Inſtrument*, than the *Servant* of the

* *Intellectio quies intellectus. Ariſt. Phyſic. l.7. c.4. Ethic. l.10. c.7.* Ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη στάσεως, &c.

Clem. Alex. Strom. lib.4. Ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἵστησιν μόνον· ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἕστηκεν αἰεὶ ἐν διαπαντὸς ἀνομοίῳ. *Ariſt. Problem. §. 30. qu.14.*

Animi commotio averſa à rectâ Ratione, & contra Naturam, Cic. ἰρμὴ πλεονάζουσα, ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις. *Zen. apud Laertium.*

the Soule; and the power which the *Will* hath over it, is not ſo much the command of a Maſter over his Workmen, as of the Workman over his Tooles: The chiefe ſubjects to the *Will*, are the *Affections*, in the right governing whereof, is manifeſted its greateſt power.

The ſtrength of every thing, is exerciſed by *Oppoſition*: We ſee not the violence of a River, till it meet with a Bridge; and the force of the Wind ſheweth it ſelfe moſt, when it is moſt reſiſted: So the power of the *Will* is moſt ſeene, in repairing the breaches, and ſetling the mutinies, wherewith untamed *Affections* diſquiet the peace of mans nature; ſince *exceſſe* and diſorder in things otherwiſe of ſo great *uſe*, requireth amendment, not extirpation; and we make ſtraight a crooked thing, we doe not breake it. And therefore, as he in *Tacitus* ſpake well to *Otho*, when he was about to kill himſelfe, *Majore animo tolerari adverſa quam relinqui*; That it was more valour to beare, than put off afflictions with courage: ſo there is more honour, in the having *Affections* ſubdued, than in having none at all; the buſineſſe of a wiſe man, is not to be *without* them, but to be *above* them. And therefore our * Saviour himſelfe ſometimes loved, ſometimes rejoyced, ſometimes wept, ſometimes deſired, ſometimes mourned and grieved; but theſe were not *Paſſions* that violently and immoderately troubled him; but he, as he ſaw fit, did with them *trouble himſelfe*. His *Reaſon excited, directed, moderated, repreſſed* them, according to the rule of perfect, cleare, and undiſturbed *judgement*.

Hiſt. lib. 2.

* Heb. 2. 17. Heb. 4. 15. 5. 2. Mark. 10. 21. Luk. 10. 21. Ioh. 11. 35. Luk. 22. 15. Mark. 3. 5. Mat. 26. 37, 38.

In

In which reſpect, the *Paſſions* of *Chriſt* are by Divines called rather *Propaſſions*, that is to ſay, Beginnings of Paſſions, than *Paſſions* themſelves; in as much as they never proceeded beyond their due meaſure, nor tranſported the Mind to undecencie or exceſſe; but had both their riſing and originall from Reaſon, and alſo their meaſure, bounds, continuance limited by Reaſon. The *Paſſions* of ſinfull men are many times like the toſſings of the Sea, which bringeth up *mire and durt*; but the *Paſſions* of *Chriſt* were like the ſhaking of pure Water in a cleane Veſſell, which though it be thereby *troubled*, yet is it not *fouled* at all.

Hieron. in Matth. 26. Magiſt. Sent. lib. 3. diſt. 15. Aquin. part. 3. q. 15. art. 4.

Iſa. 57. 20.

The *Stoicks* themſelves confeſſed, that wiſe men might be affected with [a] *ſudden perturbations* of Feare or Sorrow, but did not like weak men yeeld unto them, nor ſinke under them; but were ſtill unſhaken in their reſolutions and judgements, like *Æneas* in *Virgil*:

Mens immota manet, lacryma volvuntur inanes.

He wept indeed, but in his ſtable mind
You could no ſhakings or diſtempers find.

[a] *Lactant. l. 6. c. 14. Aug. de Civ. Dei, l. 9. c. 4. l. 14. c. 9. Aul. Gell. l. 19. c. 1. Cic. Tuſc. qu. lib. 4. Sen. Ep. 85. & de Ira, l. 2. c. 3.*

[b] And therefore indeed, this Controverſie betweene the *Peripateticks* and *Stoicks*, was rather a ſtrife of Words, than a difference of Iudgements, becauſe they did not agree in the *Subject* of the Queſtion; the one, making *Paſſions* to be *Naturall*; the other, [c] *Praternaturall*, and diſorderly motions. For the *Peripateticks* confeſſed, That wiſe men ought to be fix'd & immovable in their vertuous reſolutions, and not to be at all by hopes or feares a de-

[b] *Aquin. 12. q. 24. art. 2, 3. Cic. de fin. l. 4.*

[c] τὰ πάθη παρὰ φύσιν κινήσεις ψυχῆς καὶ ὁρμὰς πλεονάζουσας ἠ ἀπειθεῖς τῷ λόγῳ. *Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 2. & vid. in Pædag. lib. 2. cap. 13. Vid. Sen. ep. 57, 85. & 116. Diog. Laert. in Zenon. l. 7.*

a deterred or diverted from them: but as a Dye, to be b *foure-square*; and which way ever they be cast, to fall upon a sure & firme bottome. Which is the same with that severe and unmovable constancie of Mind in Vertue, in defence whereof the *Stoicks* banished *Affections* from wise men: not intending thereby to make men like c *Cæneus* in the Poet, such as could not be violated with any force, (for they acknowledge subjection to the first motions of Passion) but onely to shew, that the wisdome of Vertue should so compose & consolidate the Mind, and settle it in such stabilitie, that it should not all be bended from the Right, by any sensitive perturbations or impulsions. As they then who pull down houses adjoyning unto *Temples*, doe yet suffer that part of them to stand still, which are continued to the *Temple*: so in the demolishing of inordinate *Passions*, we must take heed, that we offer not violence to so much of them, as is contiguous unto *Right Reason*; whereunto so long as they are conformable, they are the most vigorous instruments, both for the expression, and improvement, and derivation of Vertue on others, of any in Mans Nature.

Now concerning the *Accidents* or manner of these *Acts*, which are from *Passion*, it may be considered either in regard of the *Quantitie* & *Extension*, or of the *Qualitie* & *Intention* of the *Act*. And both these may be considered two manner of wayes: for the *Quantitie* of *Passions*, we may consider that, as the *Quantitie* of *Bodies*, which is either *Continued* or *Severed*; by *Quantitie Continued*, I understand the manner

a *Arist. Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 1.*
b *Τετράγωνος. Ethic. l. 1. c. 10. & Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 6.*
c *Plutarch. contr. Stoicos.*
Plutarch. lib. de vitioso pudore.

manner of a *Paſsions permanencie* and *durance*; by *Severed*, I meane the manner of its *multiplicitie* and *reiteration*; from both which, it hath the denomination of *good* or *bad*, as the *object* whereunto it is carryed, hath a greater or leſſe relation to the *Faculty*. For ſome *objects* are *ſimply*, and without any limitation, convenient or noxious; and towards theſe, may be allowed both a more *durable* and a more *multiplyed Paſsion*: others are *good* or *evill* only, with ſome *circumſtances* of *Time*, *Place*, *Perſon*, *Occaſion*, or the *like*; which therfore require both fewer and leſſe *habituall motions*. The ſame may be ſaid of the *Qualitie* of them; wherein they are ſometimes too *remiſſe*, ſometimes againe too *exceſsive* and *exorbitant*, according to varietie of *conditions*.

Concerning all theſe, I ſhall obſerve this one generall Rule; the *permanencie* or *vaniſhing*, the *multiplicitie* or *rareneſſe*, the *exceſſe* or *defect* of any *Paſsion*, is to be grounded on and regulated by the nature only of its *object*, as it beares reference to ſuch or ſuch a *perſon*; but never by the private *humour*, *prejudice*, *complexion*, *habit*, *cuſtome*, or other like *qualifications* of the *Mind* it ſelfe. To ſee a man of a *ſoft* and *gentle nature* over-paſſe ſome *ſmall indignitie*, without *notice* or *feeling*; or to ſee a man of an *hot* and *eager temper* tranſported with an *extreamer* and more during *Paſsion*, upon the *ſenſe* of ſome *greater injurie*, more notably touching him in his *honeſtie* or *good Name*; is not in either of theſe, any great matter of commendation: becauſe, though the nature of the *object* did in both warrant the *qualitie* of the *Paſsion*; yet in thoſe *perſons* they both proceeded

ded out of *humour* and *complexion*, and not out of serious consideration of the *injuries* themselves, by which onely the *Passion* is to be regulated.

Of these two *extreames*, the *defect* is not so commonly seene, as that which is in the *excesse*: And therefore we wil here a little observe, what course may be taken for the allaying of this *vehemencie* of our *Affections*, whereby they disturbe the *quiet*, and darken the serenitie of mans *Mind*. And this is done, either by *opposing contrary Passions to contrary*; which is *Aristotles* rule, who adviseth, in the bringing of *Passions* from an *extreame* to a *mediocritie*, to incline & bend them towards the other *extreame*, as Husbandmen use to doe those Trees which are crooked; or as dim and weak eyes doe see the light best, when it is broken in a shadow: or else it is done, by *scattering* and *distracting* of them; and that not onely by the power of *Reason*, but sometimes also by a cautelous *admixture of Passions* amongst themselves, thereby interrupting their free current: For, as usually the *Affections* of the *Mind* are bred one of another, (as the Powder in the Pan of a Gun will quickly set on fire that in the Barrell) as *Griefe* by *Anger*, (*Circumspexit eos cum ira & condolescens*, He looked on them with *Anger*, being *grieved*) and *Feare* by *Love*;

Rebic. l. 2. c. 9. lib. 10. c. 1.

Mark. 3. 3.

Res est, solliciti, plena timoris, Amor:

The things to which our heart *Love* beares,
Are objects of our carefull *Feares*.

and *Desire* by *Feare*; as in him of whom *Tacitus* speakes, *Fingebat & metuam, quo magis concupiscerent*;

Hist. lib. 1.

That

That to juſtifie his *Deſires*, he pretended his *Feares*: So likewiſe are ſome *Paſſions* ſtopt, or at leaſt bridled & moderated by others; *Amor foràs mittit timorem*, Perfect *Love* caſteth out *Feare*. It faring in this, as *Plutarch* hath noted in the hunting of Beaſts, that they are then eaſieſt taken, when they who hunt them, put on the skins of Beaſts. As we ſee, the light and heat of the Sun ſhining upon fire, is apt to diſcourage it, & to put it out. And this was that which made *Saul*, when he was poſſeſſed with thoſe ſtrong fits of *Melancholy*, working in him *Furie*, *Griefe*, and *Horror*, to have recourſe unto ſuch a *Remedie*, as is moſt forcible for the producing of other *Paſſions* of a lighter nature; and ſo by conſequence, for expelling thoſe. Thus, as we ſee in the Body *Militarie*, (as *Tacitus* hath obſerved) *Vnus tumultus eſt alterius remedium*, That one tumult is the cure of another; and in the Body *Naturall*, ſome *Diſeaſes* are expelled by others: ſo likewiſe in the *Mind*, *Paſſions*, as they mutually *generate*, ſo they mutually *weaken* each other. It often falleth out, that the voluntarie admiſſion of one *loſſe*, is the prevention of a greater: as when a *Merchant* caſteth out his *ware*, to prevent a *ſhipwrack*; and in a *publike Fire*, men pull down ſome *houſes* untoucht, to prevent the ſpreading of the *flame*: Thus is it in the *Paſſions* of the *Mind*; when any of them are *exceſsive*, the way to *remit* them, is by admitting of ſome further *perturbation* from others, and ſo *diſtracting* the *forces* of the former: Whether the *Paſſions* we *admit*, be *contrarie*; as when a *dead Palſie* is cured with a *burning Feaver*, and *Souldiers* ſuppreſſe the *feare* of *Death*, by the *ſhame* of *Baſeneſſe*;

Ioh. 4. 18.

Plut. orat. 1. de fortitud. Alexandri.

Hiſt. lib. 2.

Iliad. v. 121.

——— Ἀλλ' ἰὼ φίλοι ἄνδρ' ἐκάστους
Αἰδὼ καὶ νέμεσιν.

O fearefull Grecians, *in your minds recount,*
To what great shame this baseneſſe will amount:

and the *hatred* of their Generall, by the *love* of their Countrey; as *Vlyſſes* perſwaded *Achilles:*

Iliad. i. 300.

Εἰ δ' ἦτοι Ἀγαμέμνων μὲν ἀπήχθετο κηρόθι μᾶλλον,
Αὐτὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ δῶρα. σοὶ δ' ἄλλοις πᾶσι παραστὰς
Τιμήμεναι ἀλίαστα κατὰ στρατὸν, &c.

Though Agamemnon *and his gifts you hate,*
Yet looke with pittie on the dolefull ſtate
Of all the other Grecians *in the Campe,*
Who on your Name will divine honour ſtampe,
When you this glory ſhall to them afford,
To ſave them from the rage of Hectors *Sword.*

Or whether they be *Paſſions* of a *different*, but not of a *repugnant* nature; and then the *effect* is wrought, by *revoking* ſome of the *ſpirits*, which were otherwiſe all imployed in the ſervice of one *Paſſion*, to attend on them; and by that meanes alſo, by *diverting* the intention of the *Mind* from one deep *Channell* into many croſſe and broken *Streames*; as men are wont to [a] ſtop one flux of bloud, by making of another; and [b] to uſe *frictions* to the *feet*, to call away and divert the humours which paine the *head.*

a *Calores caloribus onerando deprimimus, & ſanguinis fluxum deriſâ venulâ revocamus, Tertull.*

b *Clem. Alex. Pædag. l. 2. c. 8.*

Which *diſſipation* and *ſcattering* of *Paſſion*, as it is wrought principally by this mutuall confounding of them amongſt themſelves, ſo in ſome particular caſes likewiſe, two other wayes; namely, by *communion* in *diverſe ſubjects*, and *extenſion* on *diverſe objects.* For the firſt, we ſee in matter of Griefe, the *Mind* doth receive (as it were) ſome lightneſſe and comfort,

comfort, when it finds it ſelfe *generative* unto others, and produces *ſympathie* in them: For hereby it is (as it were) disburthened, and cannot but find that eaſier, to the ſuſtaining whereof, it hath the aſſiſtance of anothers ſhoulders. And therefore they were good (though common) obſervations:

Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes ſtupent: And,
Ille dolet verè, qui ſine teſte dolet.

Our tongues can lighter Cares repeat,
When ſilence ſwallowes up the great:
He grieves indeed, who on his friend
Vnteſtified teares doth ſpend.

That *Griefe* commonly is the moſt *heavie*, which hath feweſt *vents*, by which to *diffuſe* it ſelfe: which, I take it, will be one occaſion of the *heavineſſe* of *infernall torment*; becauſe there, *Griefe* ſhall not be any whit *tranſient*, to work *commiſeration* in any *ſpectator*, but altogether *immanent* and *reflexive* upon it ſelfe.

Thus likewiſe we ſee (to inſtance in that other particular branch, of *diffuſing* the *Paſſions* upon *diverſe objects*) how the multitude of theſe, if they be *Heterogeneall* and *unſubordinate*, doth oftentimes remit a *Paſſion*: for example, in *Love*; I take it, that that man who hath a *more generall Love*, hath a *leſſe vehement Love*; and the *ſpreading* of *Affection*, is the *weakening* of it, (I mean ſtill in things not abſolute *ſubordinate*; for, a man may love a Wife more with Children, than without them, becauſe they are the Seales and Pledges of that *Love*) as a River, when it is cut into many leſſer ſtreames, runs weaker & ſhallower. And this, I conceive, is the reaſon, why *Salomon*, when he com-

commendeth a *strong Love*, giveth it but a *single object*; *There is a friend neerer than a Brother*; one, in whom the rayes of this *affection*, like the Sun-beames in a glasse, being more united, might withall be the more fervent. I remember not, that I ever read of *wonderfull Love* amongst men, which went beyond *Couples*; which also *Aristotle* and *Plutarch* have observed. And therefore wē see, in that state there is or should be greater *affection*, wherein is the least *communitie*: *Conjugall Love*, as it is most *single*, so it is usually the *strongest*; and in the Issues and Blessings thereof, there is scarce any more powerfull Epithite to win *Love*, than *Vnigenitus*, an onely Sonne.

φιλία διαιρέμενη εἰς πλείονας. *Plut. de Amic. multitud. Anacharsis apud Latrid. 1.*

Καὶ μὲ φίλησ' ὡσεὶ τὸ παῖδ' ὃν παῖδα φίλος
Μοῦνον πεπνύμενον

He lov'd me as one loves the onely Sonne
Of's old age, borne to great Possession.

Iliad. 1. 479. Plutarch. de multit. Amic.

Insomuch, that even in *God* himselfe (to whom these *Passions* are but by an *Anthropopathy* attributed) that more *generall Love* of his *Providence* and *Preservation*, (which is common to all his *Creatures*) is (if I may so speake) of a lower degree, (though not in respect of any intention or remission in his Will, but onely the effects thereof towards the things themselves) than that more *speciall Love* of *Adoption*, which he extendeth only to those, whom he vouchsafeth to make *One* in him, who was *Vnigenitus* and *Dilectus* from everlasting.

I doe not then (by the way) condemne all *strong* and *united Passions*; but only I observe how those, which hereby grow *exorbitant*, & *work prejudice* to the *Soule*, may by a *seasonable distracting* of *them*, be *reduced* unto

a wholſome temper: for as it is noted, that amongſt men, thoſe who have bodies moſt obnoxious to dayly maladies, are commonly more ſecure from any mortall danger, than thoſe who though free from any generall diſtempers, doe yet find the ſurprize of one more violent; ſo is it with mens Paſſions: Thoſe who have a nature readie, upon ſundry occaſions to break forth into them, doe commonly finde them leſſe virulent and moroſe, than thoſe who have not their Paſſions ſo voluble, and readie to ſpread themſelves on divers objects, but exerciſing their intentions more earneſtly upon one.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the effects of Paſſions, how they ſharpen Vertue: Of vitious Concupiſcence; of their blinding, diverting, diſtracting, and precipitating of Reaſon, and of their diſtempering the Body.

THe laſt conſideration of Paſſions, was according to the Conſequents of their Act, which are the ends and effects thereof, both which I include in one; becauſe the naturall end of all operative qualities, is the effects which they are appointed by their owne, or a ſuperiour Vertue to produce.

I Now,

Now, though in the particulars there be severall perfections confer'd both on the operations of the Will, and of the Vnderstanding, from Passions; yet I cannot thinke on any other generall effect which belongeth equally unto them all, but that onely which *Tully* hath observed out of the *Peripateticks* of Anger, that they are the sharpners (and to keepe his phrase) the Whetstones of Vertue, which make it more operative and fruitfull: for Passion stirring up the Spirits, and quickening the Fancie, hath thereby a direct influence upon the Habits and Manners of the Mind; which being in this estate constrained to fetch all her Motions from Imagination, produceth them with the same cleareneſse and vigour as they are there represented. And therefore *Aristotle* speaking of these two Elements and Principles of all Passion, Pleasure and Griefe, (one of which, all others whatsoever partake of) makes them the Rules of all our Actions, by which they are all governed, and according to the measure whereof, they retaine their severall portions of Goodneſse. Thus Anger, Zeale, Shame, Griefe, Love, are in their severall orders the Whetstones, whereon true Fortitude sharpneth its Sword: for men are never more neglectfull and prodigall of their bloud, than when they are throughly pierced with a sense of injuries, or grieved with a losse of their owne, or their Countreyes honour: So the Poet sayth of *Mezentius*, when *Æneas* had slaine *Lausus* his sonne;

Acad. quæst. lib. 4. Tuscul. qu. li. 4.

Plutarch. lib. de vir. mor.

Ethic: lib. 2. cap. 3.

... *Æstuat*

——— *Æſtuat ingens* Æneid. lib. 10.
Imo in corde pudor mixtoque inſania luctu,
Et furiis agitatus Amor, & conſcia virtus.

A noble ſhame boyl'd in his loweſt breſt,
Rage mixt with griefe ſuffer'd him not to reſt;
Love and a conſcious Valour ſet him on,
And kindled furious Reſolution.

So, Love and Compaſſion are the inciters of Bountie; Hope, the ſtay and anchor of Patience; keeping the Mind, amidſt perils and caſualties, from floating and ſinking; Feare, the ſharpener of Induſtrie; and Caution an antidote in all our actions, againſt Violence, Raſhneſſe, and Indiſcretion: as *Latinus* ſaid unto *Turnus*, when in rage he haſtned to a combat with *Æneas*;

——— *quantum ipſe feroci* Æneid. lib. 12.
Virtute exuperas, tanto me impenſius æquum eſt
Conſulere, atque omnes metuentem expendere caſus.

The more undaunted Courage doth you move,
'Tis fit my ſerious Feares ſhew the more Love;
In mature counſels, and in weighing all
The various dangers and events may fall.

Thoſe imputations therefore which *Tully* and *Seneca*, and other Stoicall Philoſophers make againſt Paſſions, are but light and emptie, when they call them diſeaſes and perturbations of the Mind; which requireth in all its actions both

health and serenitie, a strong and a cleare judgement; both which properties, they say, are impaired by the distempers of Passion: For it is absurd to thinke, that all manner of rest is either healthfull or cleare; or on the other side, all motion diseased and troublesome: for what water more sweet than that of a Spring, or what more thick or lothsome, than that which standeth in a puddle, corrupting it selfe. As in the Wind or Seas, (to which two, Passions are commonly compar'd) a middle temper betweene a quiet Calme and a violent Tempest, is most serviceable for the passage betweene Countreyes; so the agitations of Passion, as long as they serve onely to drive forward, but not to drowne Vertue; as long as they keepe their dependance on Reason, and run onely in that Channell wherewith they are thereby bounded, are of excellent service, in all the travaile of mans life, and such as without which, the growth, successe, and dispatch of Vertue would be much impaired.

For the corrupt effects of Passion in generall, they are many more, because there may be a multiplicitie as well of Evill as of Error, when there is but a unitie of Goodnesse or of Truth. And those effects may be either in respect to themselves, one amongst another, or in reference to the Vnderstanding, Will, or Body. The effects of them amongst themselves, is in their mutuall generating and nourishing of each other; as Feare is wrought by Love, and Anger by Griefe, *Dolor excitat*

excitat iras; as a Lyon when wounded, is moſt raging.

——— *fixumque latronis*
Impavidus frangit telum, & fremit ore cruento. Æneid. lib. 12.

With bloudie mouth, and an undaunted heart,
Breaks & teares from his wound the faſtned dart.

Which effect of Paſſions, I have before toucht upon; neither is it alwayes a corrupt effect, but onely then, when there is in the Paſſion generative ſome diſtemper. In which reſpect of the Vnderſtanding and Will, (both which I compriſe under one Name of Reaſon) I conceive the corruption to be principally theſe foure; Impoſture, or ſeduction; Alienation, or withdrawing; Diſtraction, or confounding; and Precipitancie, or a headlong tranſporting of Reaſon.

Now concerning theſe, we are firſt to remember, that there is in every man a native and originall ſtrugling betweene Appetite and Reaſon; which yet proceedeth from Corruption, and the Fall of Man, not from Nature entire, as the *Papiſts* contend; who affirme, That the ſtrife and reluctancie betweene Senſe and Vnderſtanding, ariſeth from Phyſicall and created conſtitution; and that therefore, that ſweet harmonie which was betweene all the Faculties of Man, Animall and Rationall, in his Creation, proceeded from the government of a ſuper-naturall Grace added thereunto: becauſe it being naturall for Senſe

to deſire ſenſible, and Spirit ſpirituall good things, and things ſenſitive and ſpirituall being amongſt themſelves oppoſite; thoſe deſires which are carryed unto them, muſt needs be oppoſite likewiſe.

An Argument as weake, as the Opinion which it defends, is dangerous and prejudiciall to the honour of Mans Creation; as tending to prove, that the firſt riſings and rebellions of Appetite againſt Reaſon, and all inordinate deſires of inferior Faculties, till they taint the Will, are not formally ſinnes, as having been naturall to *Adam* himſelfe in Innocencie, though by infuſed and ſupernaturall Grace bridled and ſuſpended. An Opinion, which retaineth that odious ſcandall which they faſten upon us, more juſtly and truly on their owne heads, touching making God the Author of Sinne; in that they affirme, that Concupiſcence, whereby Senſe is carried to its obiect inordinately, that is, without the government and aſſent of Reaſon, to have been naturall to *Adam*; which yet Saint *Paul* hath ſo many times called by the expreſſe name of *Sinne*, in one Chapter. *Rom. 7.*

And for the Argument which they bring, we anſwer, That naturally, and from the Law of Creation, there was no formall oppoſition, but a ſubordination betweene Spirit and Senſe. And therefore, notwithſtanding the operations of Appetite are common unto Men and Beaſts; yet we may not grant, that they have the ſame manner of being educed and governed in both theſe.

theſe. For, as the operations of the vegetative Soule, though common to Beaſts, Men, and Plants, are yet in either of theſe ſeverally ſo reſtrained, as that they are truly ſayd to be the proper and peculiar workes of that ſpecificall forme, unto which they are annexed: So likewiſe, the ſenſitive Appetite, though generally it be common to Men and Beaſts; yet in Men, it was ordained to proceed naturally from the government of Reaſon, and therefore may properly be called a humane Appetite, as being determined, reſtrained, and made conformable unto Mans Nature: ſo that as long as Man continued entire and incorrupt, there was a ſweet harmonie betweene all his Faculties, and ſuch an happie ſubordination of them each to other, as that every motion of the inferior powers was directed and governed, and therefore might truly and properly be attributed to the ſuperior; but when once Man had taſted of that murthering Fruit, which poyſoned him and all his poſteritie, then began thoſe ſwellings, rebellions, and unjoynting of Faculties, which made him as lame in his Nature, as it did dead in Grace; whence Paſſions are become now, in the ſtate of corruption, beaſtly and ſenſuall, which were before, by Creation, reaſonable and humane: *For man being in honour was without underſtanding, and is become as the beaſts that periſh.*

But to returne, we are, as I ſaid, to remember, that there is in Man, by reaſon of his generall corruption, ſuch a diſtemper wrought, as that there

there is not onely crookednesse in, but dissention also, and fighting between his parts. And though the Light of our Reason be by Mans Fall much dimmed and decayed, yet the remainders thereof are so adverse to our unruly Appetite, as that it laboureth against us, as the *Philistims* against *Samson*, (or rather indeed as *Dalilah*, for *Samsons* eyes were truly put out, before ever the *Philistims* were upon him) it laboureth, I say, to deprive us of those Reliques of Sight, which we yet retaine.

Aristot. Rhet. L.1. c.3. Quintil. lib.6. cap.2.

And this is that first corrupt effect, which I call Imposture, or occæcation, whereby Passion reigning in the lower parts, and being impatient altogether of resistance or controule, laboureth to maske Reason, and to obliterate those Principles and originall Truths, whereby their unrulinesse might be restrained, or at least convinced. And hence it is, that every man, when he hath given place to the violence of Appetite, laboureth next to incline and prepare his Mind for assent, and to get Reason on the same side with Passion. Disobedience is ever cavilling, and contentious; and he who will not worke the righteousnesse of God, will be sure to dispute against it, and to stumble at it. And therefore the Apostles tell us, that *Repentance, and putting away of Lusts*, is the onely preparation to acknowledge the Truth: for so long as any man resolves to hold fast his sinne, he will ever reject the Truth that opposeth it, and bribe Reason to say something for it.

Rom.2.8. Prov.10.8. Eccles.5.2. 2 Tim.2.25. Iam.1.19,20,21. 1 Pet.2.8. Iohn 3.20.

And

He made himſelfe a Lyon, and anon
Became a Boare, a Panther, a Dragon.

So likewiſe, the *Vnderſtanding* being once invaded by *Paſſion*, is brought to change into diverſe ſhapes, and to judge of things, not according to their naked and naturall truth, but according as it finds them beare in the *Fancie* thoſe impreſſions of *Pleaſure*, which are moſt agreeable to corrupted Nature.

Ægrotantes Medicũ alios Medicos ad ſe vocant, & Magiſtri palæſtræ alios Magiſtros, ὡς οὐ δυναμένου κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς, διὰ τὸ κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν. Ariſt. Poſt. lib. 3. cap. 16.

And another Reaſon, why we ſeeke to warrant and to maintaine a *Paſſion*, when we have given way unto it, is the *love* of our *Eaſe*: For every man, though he can be content to delight in the pleaſure of a Corrupt *Paſſion*; yet that part of it, which hath the ſting in it, is unpleaſant: and therefore there is required the hand of *Reaſon*, by Apologies, Pleadings, and Blandiſhments, either to mollifie the *Paſſion*, that it ſhall not then pierce, or to harden and arme the *ſubject*, that it may not be ſenſible of it.

And, that this Deceit and *Excecation* is a proper worke of *Paſſion*, (beſides our owne dayly experience) this one Argument might ſufficiently proove; namely, the Practice of *Heretiques*: who propoſing to themſelves eyther Gaine, or any other Carnall and corrupt End; did thereupon preſently (as the Apoſtle notes) vent the perverſe Diſputes of their owne corrupt Minds, and make all Truth an

Tertull. contr. Valent. cap. 4.

1 Tim. 6. 5.

Hand-maid and Lacquey to their owne Lusts. And proportionably thereunto, their custome hath beene, *Prius persuadere quàm docere*, to creepe upon the Affections of Men, and get footing there, before ever they would adventure the entertainment of their false Doctrines: And as it is sayd of God, that hee first accepted *Abel*, and then his Sacrifice; so doe they labour first, to worke an approbation of their Persons in the hearts of Men; whence, in the second place, their perverse Conceits doe finde the easier accesse to their Vnderstandings.

Tertul. de Fuga. Isid. Pelus. Li. ep. 102.

For, when silly and unstable Mindes shall once be brought to such a Prejudice, as to have the Persons of Men in Admiration; when they shall see an Impostor come unto them, as a man that had wholly renounced the World; like *Zopyrus* or *Synon*, clothed and deformed with seeming Povertie and Repentance; drawing in and out his breath with no other motions, than sighes; pretending to bring nothing but the plentifull Promises of Salvation, Teares in his Eyes, Oyle and Honey in his Mouth, and the most exquisite Picture of true Holynesse, which it is possible for the Art or Hypocrisie of Mans Invention to draw out: How can the Vnderstanding of weake and simple people choose (especially being before framed unto beleese, by those two Credulous Qualities, of *Ignorance* and *Feare*) but be made inclinable to receive, not onely

Herod. Thalia. Æneid. lib. 2.

onely willingly, but with greedineſſe alſo, whatſoever poyſonous Doctrine, under pretence of wholeſome and ſaving Phyſique, ſuch a ſubtill Impoſtor ſhall adminiſter unto them? Such a great force there is in Voluntarie Humilitie, neglecting of the Body, and other the like pretended pious Frauds, to inſinuate and take poſſeſſion of weake and credulous Natures; with whom haply, more Reall, Serious, and Spirituall Arguments, comming with leſſe pompe and oſtentation, would not prevaile.

——Captique dolis, lacrymiſque coactis
Quos neque Tydides nec Lariſſæus Achilles
Non anni domuêre decem, non mille carinæ.

They are ſurpriz'd by *frauds* and forced teares,
In whom their greateſt foes could work no feares;
Whom ten yeres war not won, nor thouſand ſhips,
Are ſnar'd and conquer'd by perjurious lips.

The ſecond manner of *Corruption*, which *Paſſion* uſeth on the Vnderſtanding and Will, was *Alienating* or withdrawing of Reaſon from the ſerious examination of thoſe *Pleaſures*, wherewith it deſireth to poſſeſſe the Mind, without controule; that when it cannot ſo farre prevaile, as to blind and ſeduce Reaſon, getting the allowance and *Affirmative Conſent* 2.

thereof, it may yet at leaſt ſo farre inveagle it, as to with-hold it from any *Negative Determination*, and to keepe off the Mind from a ſerious and impartiall conſideration of what *Appetite* deſireth; for feare leſt it ſhould be convinced of ſinne, and ſo finde the leſſe ſweetneſſe in it.

2 *Pet.* 3. 5. And this is the Reaſon of that affected and *Voluntarie Ignorance*, which Saint *Peter* ſpeakes of; whereby Minds prepoſſeſſed with a love of inordinate courſes, doe with-hold and divert Reaſon, and forbeare to examine that Truth, which indeed they know; as fearing, leſt thereby they ſhould be deterred from thoſe Vices, which they reſolve to follow. Which is the ſame, with that excellent Metaphore in Saint *Paul*; who ſayth, That *the wrath of God was revealed from Heaven, on all Vngodlineſſe and Vnrighteouſneſſe of Men*, τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων, *which hold or detaine the Truth in Vnrighteouſneſſe*: that is, which impriſon and keepe in that τὸ γνωστὸν Θεοῦ, as the Apoſtle interpreteth himſelfe, in the next Verſe; all thoſe Notions of Divine Truth, touching the Omnipotencie and Iuſtice of God, which were by the finger of Nature written within them, to deterre them from, or (if not) to make them inexcuſable, in thoſe unnaturall pollutions wherein they wallowed. Thus *Medea* in the Poet:

Rom. 1. 18.

Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν ὅια δρᾶν μέλλω κακά,
Θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων.

I know 'tis wicked that I goe about,
But Paſſion hath put all my Reaſon out.

Eurip. Medea. Vid. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2. p. 284. Edit. Heinſ.

And therefore, that Maxime of the Stoicall Philoſopher, out of *Plato*, is falſe; Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἄκουσα στερεῖται τῆς ἀληθείας, That all men are unwillingly deprived of Truth; ſince, as *Ariſtotle* hath obſerved, directly agreeable to the phraſe of Saint *Peter*, there is Ἄγνοια ἐν προαιρέσει, an elected or *Voluntarie Ignorance*, which for their Securities ſake, men nouriſh themſelves in.

Arria. Epictet. lib. 1. cap. 28. Ariſtot. Ethic. l. b. 3. c. 1. Maluntneſcire quia jam oderunt. Tertull. Apol. c. 1. Ταῦλα τὴ Ἀγνοια. Juſtin. lib. qu. & Reſp. q. 140. Τάδε ἰαύσιν. Clem. Alex.

And that there ſhould be ſuch an *Alienation* of the *Mind* from Truth, when the Fancie and Heart are hot with *Paſſion*, cannot be any great wonder: For, the *Soule* is of a limited and *determined Activitie* in the Body; inſomuch, that it cannot with perſpicuitie and diligence give attendance unto diverſe Objects. And therefore, when a *Paſſion* in its fulneſſe, both of a violence and delight, doth take it up, the more cleare and naked brightneſſe of Truth is ſuſpended and changed: So that, as the Sunne and Moone, at their riſing and ſetting, ſeeme farre greater than at other times, by reaſon of thick Vapours, which are then interpoſed; ſo, the *Mind* looking upon things through the Miſts and Troubles of *Paſſion*, cannot poſſibly judge

of them, in their owne proper and immediate Truth, but according to that magnitude or colour, which they are framed into, by prejudice and diſtemper.

3. But then, thirdly, if *Reaſon* will neither be *deluded* nor won over to the patronage of *Evill*, nor *diverted* from the knowledge and notice of *Good*; then doth *Paſſion* ſtrive to *confound* and diſtract the Apprehenſions thereof, that they may not with any firmeneſſe or efficacie of Diſcourſe, interrupt the Current of ſuch irregular and head-ſtrong Motions. And this is a moſt inward and proper Effect of *Paſſion*: For, as things preſented to the *Mind*, in the nakedneſſe and ſimplicitie of their owne Truth, doe gaine a more firme Aſſent unto them, and a more fixed intuition on them; ſo, on the contrarie ſide, thoſe things which come mixt and troubled, dividing the intention of the *Mind* betweene *Truth* and *Paſſion*, cannot obtaine any ſetled or ſatisfactorie Reſolution from the Diſcourſes of *Reaſon*.

And this is the Cauſe of that *Reluctancie* betweene the *Knowledge* and *Deſires* of *Incontinent* Men, and others of the like Nature: For, as *Ariſtotle* obſerves of them, they are but ἡμιπόνηροι, *Halfe-Evill*, as not ſinning with that *full* and plenarie Conſent of *Will*, but *Prater Electionem*, as he ſpeakes; ſo I may more truly ſay of them, that they have but an *Halfe-Knowledge*, not any diſtinct and applicative

Ethic. l. 7. c. 10. In confinio concupiſcentiæ & pœnitentiæ aſpera & tumultuoſa gaudia. Plutarch. lib. Philoſophand. cum princip.

plicative Apprehenſion of Truth, but a confuſed and broken Conceit of things in their Generalitie: Not much unlike unto Night-talkers, who cannot be ſayd to be throughly aſleepe, nor perfectly awaked, but to be in a middle kind of inordinate temper betweene both; or (as *Ariſtotle* himſelfe gives the ſimilitude) it is like a *Stage-Player*, whoſe Knowledge is expreſſe and cleare enough, but the things which it is converſant about, are not perſonall and particular to thoſe men, but belonging unto others, whom they perſonate: So, the *Principles* of ſuch men are in the generall, Good and True; but they are never brought downe ſo low, as if they did concerne a mans owne particular Weale or Woe, nor thorowly weighed, with an aſſuming, applying, concluding Conſcience; but, like the notion of a Drunken or ſleeping man, are choaked and ſmothered with the Miſts of *Paßion*. *Ethic. lib.7. cap.3.*

And this third Corruption is that, which *Ariſtotle*, in the particular of Incontinencie, calleth Ἀσθένεια, the *weakeneſſe* and diſabilitie of *Reaſon*, to keepe cloſe to her owne Principles and Reſolutions: Whereunto exactly agreeth that of the Prophet; *How weake is thy heart, ſeeing thou doeſt all things, the workes of an imperious Whoriſh Woman?* And elſewhere, Whoredome and Wine are ſayd to *take away the Heart*. So *Hector* deſcribes laſcivious *Paris*: *Ethic. lib.7. cap.7.* *Ezech.16.30.* *Hoſ.4.11.*

—καλὸν,

Iliad. γ. 45.

——— κάλὸν,
Εἶδος ἔτ' ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἔστι βίη φρεσὶν οὐδέ τι τόλμη.

Thy face hath beautie in't, but in thy breſt
There doth no ſtrength nor reſolution reſt.

4. The laſt Effect (which I ſhall but name) is that which *Ariſtotle* calleth προπέτεια, *Raſhneſſe* or *Precipitancie*; which is the moſt Tyrannicall Violence which *Paſſion* uſeth; when, in ſpight of all the Dictates of *Reaſon*, it furiouſly over-ruleth the *Will*, to determine and allow of any thing, which it pleaſeth to put in practiſe; and like a Torrent, carryeth all before it; or, as the Prophet ſpeakes, *ruſheth like an Horſe into the Battell*: So *Luſt* and *Anger* are ſometimes, in the Scripture, called *Madneſſe*; becauſe it tranſporteth the Soule beyond all bounds of Wiſdome or Counſell, and by the Dictates of *Reaſon* takes occaſion to become more outragious, *Ipſaque præſidia occupat*, feedes like Wild-fire upon thoſe Remedies, which ſhould remove it: As ſhe ſayd in the Poet;

Ier. 50. 38. *Pſal.* 102. 8. *Eccleſ.* 9. 3. *Luk.* 6. 11.

Senec. Medea.

Levis eſt dolor, qui capere conſilium poteſt,
Libet ire contra.

That's but light griefe, which counſell can abate;
Mine ſwells, and all advice reſolves to hate.

The

The corrupt effects which Paſſion worketh in the laſt place on the Body, are divers, according to the particular nature of the Paſſions; ſometimes too ſudden and violent, ſometimes too heavie oppreſſion of the heart; the other, ſudden perturbation of the ſpirits. Thus old *Ely* dyed, with ſudden griefe; *Diodorus*, with ſhame; *Sophocles*, *Chilo* the *Lacedemonian*, and others, with joy; Nature being not able to beare that great and ſudden immutation, which theſe Paſſions made in the Body. The cauſes and manner of which cogitation, I referre (as being inquiries not ſo directly pertinent to the preſent purpoſe) unto Naturall Philoſophers and Phyſicians. And from the generalitie of Paſſions, I proceed unto the conſideration of ſome particulars, according to the order of their former diviſion: In all which, I ſhall forbeare this long Method of the Antecedents, Concomitants, and Conſequents of their Acts, (many particulars whereof, being of the ſame nature in all Paſſions, will require to be obſerved onely in one or two, and ſo proportionally conceived in the reſt) and ſhall inſiſt principally in thoſe particulars which I handle on the cauſes and effects of them; as being Conſiderations, wherein commonly they are moſt ſerviceable or prejudiciall to our Nature.

CHAP. IX.

Of the affection of Love, of Love naturall, of generall communion, of Love rationall, the object and generall cause thereof.

NOw the two first and fundamentall Passions of all the rest, are Love and Hatred. Concerning the Passion of Love, we will therein consider first its object, and its causes; both which being of a like nature, (for every morall object is a cause, though not every cause an object) will fall into one.

Love then consists in a kind of expansion or egresse of the heat and spirits to the object loved, or to that whereby it is drawne and attracted: whatsoever therefore hath such an attractive power, is in that respect the object and generall cause of Love. Now, as in Nature, so in the Affections likewise, we may observe from their objects a double attraction: The first, is that naturall or impressed sympathie of things, whereby one doth inwardly incline an union with the other, by reason of some secret vertues and occult qualities disposing either subject to that mutuall friendship, as betweene Iron and the Loadstone: The other, is that common and more discernable attraction which every thing receives from those natures, or places, whereon they are ordained and directed by the Wisedome and Provi-

Providence of the firſt Cauſe, to depend both in reſpect of the perfection and conſervation of their being. For, as God in his Temple, the Church, ſo is He in his Pallace, (if I may ſo call it) the World, a God of Order, diſpoſing every thing in Number, Weight, and Meaſure, ſo ſweetly, as that all is harmonious, (from which harmonie, the Philoſophers have concluded a Divine Providence) and ſo powerfully, as that all things depend on his Government, without violence, breach, or variation.

Arrian. Epict. lib. 1. c. 6.

And this Order and Wiſdome is ſeene chiefely in that ſweet ſubordination of things each to other, and happie inclination of all to their particular ends, till all be reduced finally unto Him who is the Fountaine, whence iſſue all their ſtreames of their limited being, and the fulneſſe of which, all his creatures have received. Which the Poet, though ſomething too Poetically, ſeemeth to have expreſs'd:

Principio Cœlum ac Terras campoſque liquentes
Lucentemque globum Lunæ Titaniaque Aſtra
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infuſa per Artus
Mens agitat molem, & magno ſe corpore miſcet.

Æneid. lib. 6. Pet. Crinit. lib. 6. c. 12.

(Lights,
Heaven, Earth, and Seas, with all thoſe glorious
Which beautifie the Day, and rule the Nights,
A Divine inward Vigour, like a Soule,
Diffus'd through ev'ry joint of this great Whole,
Doth vegetate, and with a conſtant force
Guideth each Nature through its fixed courſe.

* *Græci enim τὸ πᾶν vocant.*

And such is the naturall motion of each thing to its owne Sphere and Center; where is both the most proper place of its consisting, and withall, the greatest freedome from forraine injurie or violence.

But we must here withall, take notice of the generall care of the Creator; whereby he hath fastned on all creatures, not onely his private desire to satisfie the demands of their owne nature, but hath also stamp'd upon them a generall charitie and feeling of Communion, as they are sociable parts of the Vniverse or common Body; wherein cannot possible be admitted (by reason of that necessarie mutuall connexion betweene the parts thereof) any confusion or divulsion, without immediate danger to all the members. And therefore God hath inclin'd the nature of these necessarie agents, so to worke of their discords the perfect harmonie of the whole, that if by any casualtie it fall out, that the Body of Nature be like to suffer any rupture, deformitie, or any other contumely, though haply occasioned by the uniforme and naturall motions of the particulars; they then must prevent such damage and reproach, by a relinquishing and forgetting of their owne natures, and by acquainting themselves with motions, whereunto considered in their owne determinate qualities, they have an essentiall reluctancie. Which propertie and sense of Nature in common, the Apostle hath excellently set downe in 1 *Cor.* 12. where he renders this reason of all, that there might be no

Schism

Schiſme in the Body: which likewiſe he divinely applyeth in the myſticall ſenſe, that all the ſeverall *gifts of the Spirit* to the Church, ſhould drive to one common end, as they were all derived from one common Fountaine; and ſhould never be uſed, without that knitting qualitie of *Love*, to which he elſewhere properly aſcribeth the building, continuation, and perfecting of the *Saints*. 1 *Cor.* 8. 1. *Epheſ.* 4. 12.

Now, as it hath pleaſed the infinite Wiſdome of God to guide and moderate, by his owne immediate direction, the motions of neceſſarie agents, after the manner declared to their particular, or to the generall end, (which motion may therefore, as I before obſerved, be called the naturall Paſſion of things) ſo hath it given unto Man a reaſonable Soule, to be as it were his Vice-gerent in all the motions of Mans little World.

To apply then theſe proportions in Nature to the affection of Love in Man, we ſhall finde firſt a Secret, which I will call Naturall; and next, a Manifeſt, which I call a Morall and more diſcurſive attraction. The firſt of theſe, is that naturall ſympathie wrought betweene the affection and the object, in the firſt meeting of them, without any ſuſpenſion of the perſon, till farther inquirie after the diſpoſition of the object; which comes immediately from the outward, naturall, and ſenſitive Vertues thereof, whether in ſhape, feature, beautie, motion, ſpeech, behaviour; all which comming under the ſpheare

of Senſe, I include under the name of Iudiciarie Phyſiognomie: Which is not a bare delight in the outward qualities, but a farther preſumption of the Iudgement; concluding thence, a lovely diſpoſition of that Soule, which animateth and quickneth thoſe outward Graces.

Ethic. lib. 8. And indeed, if it be true which *Ariſtotle* in his *Ethicks* tels us, That ſimilitude is the ground of Love; and if there be no naturall Love ſtronger than that which is betweene the Body and the Soule, we may well ground ſome good preſumption of ſimilitude in the qualities of the Soule with thoſe lovely impreſſions of Nature which we find in the Body, and may by the ſame reaſon collect a mutuall diſcoverie, by which we acknowledge a mutuall ſympathie betweene them. And therefore it was no ill counſell (though not alwayes to be heeded) *Cave tibi ab iis quos natura ſignavit*, to take heed of ſuch, who like *Cain* have any marke of notorious deformitie ſet upon them by Nature. And therefore *Homer* ſpeaking of the garrulous, impudent, envious, and reviling qualities of *Therſites*, fits him with a Body anſwerable to ſuch a Mind.

Iliad. β. 217.

——αἰόλος δ' ἀνὴρ ἦλθ' Ἰλιόθι πάλιν
φόλκος· ἦν χωλὸς δ' ἕτερον πόδα, τὼ δὲ οἱ ἄμμε
κύφω δὲ στῆθος συνοχωκότε, ἄκρα ὑπήρθε,
φόξος· ἦν κεφαλὴν φοβερὴ ἐπ' ἐπηετανὸν θυσάνη.

The moſt ill-ſhapen man that to Troy *came,*
With eye diſtorted, and in each foot lame,

His

His ſhoulders crooked, to his breſt ſhrunke downe,
A ſharpe wrye head, here and there patcht with downe.

But yet herein, though it be injurious for a man out of too much auſteritie of Mind, to reject the judgement of ſenſe, and to quarrell with this naturall inſtinct; yet it is fit, that in this caſe, conſidering the deceitfulneſſe of things, and what a divers habit, Education or Hypocriſie hath wrought in many, betweene the out and inſide of their Natures; that we ſhould, I ſay, bring a feareſull judgement, like love of *Bias* the Philoſopher, which may eaſily, upon good warrant and aſſurance, alter it ſelfe: otherwiſe, when a thing is throughly knowne to be lovely, our hearts may boldly quiet and repoſe themſelves in it.

But here likewiſe we muſt obſerve that proportion of Nature, That if our affection cannot ſtand in private towards one particular, without dammage and inconvenience to the publique Body, Politique or Eccleſiaſticall, whereof we are members, the generall muſt ever be eſteemed more deare and precious. A ſcandall to the Body, and a Schiſme from the whole, is more dangerous and unnaturall, than any private Diviſions: for, if there be a wound or ſwelling in one part of the Body, the parts adjoyning will be content to ſubmit themſelves unto paine, for the recoverie of that; and rather than it ſhall periſh, ſuffer any trouble which may conduce to the reliefe thereof.

And

And this is the Love of fellow-members, amongſt themſelves. But then, if any part be ſo farre corrupted, as that it doth more eaſier derive its contagion upon others, than admit of any ſuccour from them, ſo that by the continuance thereof in the Body, the whole is endangered; or, if the whole Body be readie to periſh by Famine; then doth the Senſe of Communitie ſo ſwallow up that other more private reſpect, as that the members will be even cruell amongſt themſelves, to the cutting and devouring each of other, that thereby the ſafetie of the whole may be procured. And therefore, the Fable of the Faction betweene the Belly and the Members, was wiſely applyed by *Menenius Agrippa*, in a Rebellion amongſt the people of *Rome*; to ſhew how unnaturall a thing it is, and how pernicious to the parts themſelves, to nouriſh their owne private Diſcontents, when the Weale publique is together therewithall endangered.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of the Rule of true Love: the Love of God and our ſelves: ſimilitude to theſe, the cauſe of Love in other things: of Love of Concupiſcence: how Love begetteth Love; and how preſence with, and abſence from the object, doth upon different reſpects exerciſe and encreaſe Love.

FRom this *generall* and fundamentall cauſe of *Love*, proceed ſome others, *ſpeciall* and particular; whereof, the firſt and principall is a *ſimilitude* and reſemblance betweene the thing *loved*, and that which is the Naturall *Rule* of *Love*.

Now, the Rule of all Love, is by Divine Truth preſcribed to be *God*, and a *Mans ſelfe*; ſo that, what beareth ſimilitude to theſe, is the proper and right Object of our Affection. To ſpeake therefore a word or two of theſe. *Ariſt. Probl. ſect. 10. ſect. 51.*

The Maſter-Wheele, or firſt Mover in all the Regular Motions of this Paſſion, is the *Love of God*, grounded on the right *knowledge* of Him; whereby the Soule being raviſhed with the apprehenſion of his infinite *Goodneſſe*, is earneſtly drawne and * *called out*, as it were, to deſire an *Vnion*, *Viſion*, and participation of his Glory and Preſence; yeelding up it ſelfe unto Him, (for * Καλὴ καὶ ἐπικλησις.

by * *Love* a man giveth himselfe to the thing which he loves) and conforming all its Affections and Actions to his Will.

And this *Love* is then *Regular*, when it takes up all the *kinds* of *Love*, and all the *degrees* of *Love*. For we *love God*, *Amore amicitiæ*, for the *Goodnesse* and Excellencie which is in himselfe, as being most *lovely*; and *Amore desiderii*, with a desire of being united unto him, as the Fountaine of all our *blessednesse*; and *Amore complacentiæ*, with a *love* of joy and *delight* in him; when the Soule goes to God, like *Noahs* Dove to the Arke, and with infinite sweetnesse and securitie reposeth it selfe in him; and lastly, *Amore Benevolentiæ*, with an endeavour (so farre as a poore Creature can to an infinite Creator; *for our Good extendeth not unto him*) to bring all praise, service, and honour unto him.

And thus we are to *love him above all things*; first, *Appretiativè*, setting an higher price upon his Glory and Command, than upon any other thing besides; all Dung, in comparison. Secondly, *Intensivè*, with the greatest force and intention of our Spirit, setting no bounds or measure to our Love of him: thirdly, *Adæquatè*, as the compleat, perfect, and *adæquate object* of all our *Love*, in whom it must begin, and in whom it must end. And therefore, the Wise-man speaking of the Love and Feare of God, tells us, that it is *Totum Hominis*, the *Whole of Man*. Other Objects are severally fitted, unto severall Faculties; Beautie to the Eye, Musick to the Eare, Meat to the Palate,

Lear-

* *Amor non nisi donum amantis in Amatum. Guilel. Paris. de Legibus, c.19.*

Learning to the Mind; none of theſe can ſatisfie the Facultie, unto which it belongs not. And even to their proper Faculties, they bring *Vanitie* and *Vexation* with them: *Vanitie*, becauſe they are *emptie*, and doe *deceive*; and becauſe they are *mortall*, and will *decay*: *Vexation*, in the Getting; for that is with Labour; in the Keeping, for that is with Feare; in the Multiplying, for that is with Care; in the enjoying, for if we but taſte, we are vexed with deſiring it; if we ſurfet, we are vexed with loathing it. God onely is *Totum Hominis*, fitted to all the wants of an immortall Soule: *Fulneſſe*, to make us *perfectly* happie; *Immortalitie*, to make us *perpetually* happie: after whom we hunger with deſire, and are not griped; on whom we feaſt with delight, and are not cloyed. He therefore is to be *loved*, not with a divided, but a *whole Heart*. To *love* any Creature, either *without God*, or *above God*, is *Cupiditas*, *Luſt*: (which is the *formale* of every ſinne, whereby we turne from God to other things) but to *love* the *Creatures under God*, in their right *order*; and *for God*, to their right *end*, (for he made all things for himſelfe) this is *Charitas*, true and regular *Love*.

Matth. 22. 37.

Vid. Auguſt. de Doct. Chriſt. Li. c. 22. & l. 3. c. 10. & de Trinitat. l. 8. c. 3. & l. 9. c. 8.

Now, the Image and likeneſſe of God, (not to ſpeake of that Eternall and Eſſentiall *Character of his Fathers brightneſſe*) is in his *Word*, and in his *Workes*; the one, being the Manifeſtation of his *Will*; and the other, of his *Power* and *Wiſedome*. Our *love* to his *Word*, is our *ſearch* of it; as being the onely *Glaſſe*, wherein we ſee the Won-

ders and deepe things of God: our *Beleefe* of it, *All*, and *Onely*; acknowledging in it, the fulnesse of its *Truth*, and of its *sufficiencie*: and our *Obedience* to it, submitting our selves, with purpose of heart, unto the rule and guidance of it.

Touching the *Workes of God*, there are two chiefe things, whereunto the affection of Man is by the Creatures *attracted*, and wherewith it desires an *Vnion*, namely, the *Truth* and *Goodnesse* of them; for by these onely, may all the diverse Faculties of Mans Soule be exercised and delighted: The love of both which, is then onely *Regular*, when it is *limited*, in regard of the quantitie and qualitie of the act; *Humble*, in the manner of pursuance, without swelling and curiositie: and lastly, *subordinate* unto that great Love of God, whose Image we can no further truly love in the Creature, than as we are thereby directed to a farther love of Him.

I come now unto that other *Rule of Love*, wherein *Aristotle* hath placed the Nature thereof, *A Mans selfe*, or that unitie and proportion which the thing *loved* beareth unto the partie *loving*; which in one place, he calleth ἰσότης, *Equalitie*; in another, ταὐτότης, *Identitie*; in another, ὁμοιότης, *Similitude*; in another, κοινωνία, *Communion*; all Relative tearmes, which referre unto the *partie loving*.

Ἔστιν ἀνὴρ ὁ φίλος. Arist. lib. 9. cap. 9. Ethic. lib. 8. cap. 9. 12. Lib. 9. cap. 3. 9.

The Root of every mans *love* unto *himselfe*, is that *unitie* and *identitie* which he hath with *himselfe*; it being naturall to every thing, to take delight in the simplicitie of its owne being: because the

the more *ſimple* and *One* it is, the more it is like the *Fountaine* of its being; and therefore hath the more perfection in it. And this *love* of Man unto *himſelfe*, if *ſubordinate* unto the *love of God*, and *governed* thereby, is *Debitum Naturæ*, a neceſſarie Debt; and ſuch, as the neglect whereof, is a treſpaſſe againſt Nature. *Ariſtot. Ethic. lib. 9. c. 4. 8.*

Now then, as we *love* our *ſelves*, for the *unitie* which we have in our ſelves; ſo, whereſoever we find any *ſimilitude* to our *ſelves*, or character of our *ſelves*, either in *Nature* or *Habits*, upon that alſo doe the beames of this Affection extend. Now, a thing may repreſent our ſelves, firſt, in *Subſtance*; as the Husband and Wife are ſaid to be *one fleſh*, and Children are branches and portions of their Parents: Secondly, in *Qualities* or Accidents; as one *man* reſembleth another in *Naturall*, and one *friend* another in *Habituall* Qualities; *as Face anſwereth to Face in Water, ſo the heart of Man to Man.* *Ariſt. Magnor. Moral. lib. 1. c. 34.*

With reſpect unto this double *Similitude*, there is a double *Love*; the one, *Naturall*; the other, acquired, or *Habituall*: the former is common with Men unto other Creatures: Thus in *Ælian*, *Plutarch*, and others, we reade of the Naturall affection of Elephants; which ſeeing their young fallen into a deepe Pit, will leape downe after them, though it be preſent death; and of the marvellous *cunning* and *valour* which many other Birds and Beaſts uſe to provide for the ſafetie of their Brood, expoſing and offering themſelves to danger, that they may be delivered: *Ælian. lib. de Anim. 2. c. 40. Lib. 2. c. 25. Lib. 6. c. 9. Lib. 9. c. 8. Lib. 11. c. 38. Plutarch. de Solert. Animal. & de Amore. Ariſtot. Hiſt. Anim. lib. 9. c. 4. 8.*

Yea, the *Pelican* (if wee beleeve the ſtory) doth feed her young ones, when they have been bitten with Serpents, with her owne blood to recover them againe: which Embleme *Iohn* the ſecond, king of *Portugall* is ſaid to have choſen, whereby to expreſſe his *Love* to his Subjects: And *Homer* elegantly expreſſeth the care of a Bird feeding her young ones.

Sophocles in Electra, & ibi Scholiaſt. p. 127

Tholoſſ. de Repub. lib. 8. c. 1. Sect. 19.

Iliad. 1. 324.

——— ἀμφὶ νεοττοῖσι τετρίγυῖα
Μάστακ' ἐπὶ κλάδυσι, κακῶς δ' ἄρα οἱ πέλει αὐτῇ.

She brings her young ones what meat ſhe can find,
When ſhe her ſelfe with hunger's almoſt pin'd.

And the like affection, another Poet hath expreſſed in the moſt cruell of all the Beaſts, the Tyger:

Statius, Theb. Lib. 10.

——— *Sic Aſpera Tygris*
Fœtibus abreptis Scythico deſerta ſub Antro
Accubat, & lepidi lambit veſtigia lecti.

——The Tyger (which moſt thirſts for blood)
Seeing her ſelfe rob'd of her tender brood,
Lies down lamenting in her *Scythian* Den, (lyen.
And licks the prints where her loſt whelps had

Allan. de animal. cap. 40. & lib.

And this kind of *Piety* wee finde *Reciprocall*, returning from the young ones upward; ſo the young Lyons are ſaid to feed and provide for their old ones; which is alſo obſerv'd of Eagles, Storkes and other creatures. And hence wee

read

read of νόμοι πελαργικοὶ, *Lawes*, which receive their demomination from the *Stork*, providing that children ſhould nouriſh and take care of their Parents in their diſtreſſe. And for men, ſo great is the power of naturall affection, that Parents deſire nothing more, than to be excelled by their children; even vitious men (as *Seneca* ſomewhere ſpeaketh) deſire that their ſonnes may be vertuous, and vertuous men that they may bee more worthy and happy than themſelves, as *Hector* prayed for his ſonne.

Ælian. lib. de Anim. 2. cap. 40 & lib. 3. cap. 23 & lib. 9. c. 1. & lib. 10. c. 16. Plutarch. de ſolert. animal. Ariſtoph. in Avibus. Plin. lib. 10. c. 23. & lib. 8. cap. 37.

Καὶ ποτέ τις εἴπῃσι παῤῥὸς ἀνῶγε πολλὸν ἀμείνων. *Iliad. 1. 480.*

Let it be ſaid, here's a brave Sonne indeed,
Who doth his noble Father farre exceed.

And *Æneas* to *Aſcanius*.

Diſce puer virtutem ex me, veroſque labores,
Fortunam ex aliis,——— *Æneid. lib. 12.*

Vertue and Patience learne my ſonne of me,
But may thy fortunes better Patternes ſee.

And therefore *unnaturallneſſe* of Affection is reckoned up by the Apoſtle amongſt the fouleſt of ſinnes, when like *Iſmael* the nature of men groweth wilde and brutiſh, as the Philoſopher calleth ſuch men θηριώδεις, men of ſavage and fierce diſpoſitions. And therefore in the Scripture an unnaturall man is called *Onager homo*, a wilde- *2 Tim. 3. 3.*

wilde-asse man, *Gen.* 16. 12. *Iob* 11. 12. but a meeke and tender-spirited man is called *Ovis homo*, a Sheepe-man, or a man of a sociable and calme disposition, *Ezek* 36.37,38. And amongst the *Thebans* there was a Law made, which appointed a Capitall penalty upon those unnaturall men, who should cast out and expose their children unto ruine.

Ælian. var. hist. l.2. c.7.

And as this kind of Love ariseth from *Propinquitie of Nature*, so another there is growing out of *Similitude of Manners*. All flesh, as *Syracides* speakes, will *resort to their like, and every man will keepe company with such, as he is himselfe*; as wee see learned men hold correspondency with those that are learned, and good with those that are good: no man that excelleth in any quality, shall ever want Friends; because every man, that either hath or liketh that Quality, will love it in any other man, and him for it. For by the same reason that a man by the study or practice of any good things laboureth to commend himselfe to his owne judgement, and to the love of others; he is ingaged (unlesse hee will bee false to his owne grounds) to love any other whom hee obserueth to study and practice the same thing: For how can I expect, that that in mee should reape *Love* from others, which in others reapeth nothing but *Envie* from me? And upon this reason it is, that a man can hardly permit another to *love* that, which he himselfe hateth; because we are too apt to make our *Iudgements* or *Passions* the rule of another mans, and to dislike that

Ecclus. 13.17.

Ἀεὶ δὲ χαρὰ χαρᾷ ἐν μετὰ πάντα. *Menand. Thersitis vitia, non aliter indicat Homerus quàm quod esset virûs præstantissimis Achilli & Vlyssi invisus. Iliad. 2. Vid. Aristot. Prob. §.10. q.51.* Τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁμοιότητος μὲν μισεῖν δὲ μισεῖν, &c. *Theoc. Idil. 9.* Φιλία δὲ μίσεος ἀποδιδοῖσα διὰ τὸν ὁμοιότητα. *Stoici apud Diog. Laert. in Zenon. l.7. Maxim. Tyrius dissert. 4.*

in

in him, which we doe not allow in our ſelves: Which unruly affection, the Poet hath excellently deſcribed in *Achilles*, when his friend mediated a reconciliation betweene him and *Agamemnon*:

——— οὐδὲ τί σε χρὴ
Τὸν φιλέειν, ἵνα μή μοι ἀπεχθήαι φιλέοντι,
Καλὸν τὲ σεῦ ἐμοὶ τὸν κήδειν ὅς κε μὲ κήδῃ. *Iliad. 1.* 610.

It is not courteous, that where I hate, you
Should love, except you'ld have me hate you too:
But take this rule, if you'l be thought my friend;
The man that offends me, doe you offend.

So much naturally are men in love with their owne *likeneſſe*, that many times they can be content to have their very deformities imitated: and therefore, the chiefe art of flatterers, is to commend and imitate every thing of him, of whom they would make a prey. *Plutarch. de Adulat. & Amicit.*

It is true, that in ſome caſes, *ſimilitude* is the cauſe of *Envie*; but this is onely then, when *firſt* the qualitie wherein men agree, is a litigating and contentious qualitie: in which caſe, the meeting of ſuch men in one diſpoſition, is but like the meeting of two rough Streames, which makes them runne with the more noyſe: Therefore, a wiſe and a meek-tempered man ſhall ſooner winne and hold the *love* of an angry man, than he, who is like unto him in that diſtemper; becauſe ſuch a man (though indeed he be Conquerour, in regard of his Wiſdome) yet by

his Patience he seemeth to yeeld: and there is nothing which a mans Passion loves so much as victory. Whereas betweene Anger and Anger there must needs be fighting of affections, which is the remotest temper from *Love*.

Secondly, when by accident, the quality, wherein men agree, doth any other way inconvenience them, either in point of credit, usefulnesse, or profit. For as the Starres, though they agree in light, yet *Validiorum exortu exilia obscurantur*, those that are small suffer losse by the brightnesse of others. So amongst men, agreeing in the same abilities, one many times proveth a prejudice and disadvantage unto the other, as the Poet said,

Plin. Panegyr.

Hesiod.

Καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων.

The Potter's often angry with his mates,
One neighbour-Architect the other hates.

And therefore as the Sunne and Moone agree best in their light when they are fartheſt asunder, so in these Arts, which maintaine life or credit, men usually agree best at a distance, because thereby the one doth the lesse dammage or darken the other.

Now this *Naturall* and *Habituall Love* is then regular, when *Subordinate* to that greater, our Love of God, and when governed by the dictates of a rightly informed *Reason*, which amongst many others are these three.

Ἀπὸ συμπράττων. Τὸ μέχρι βαμῶν. vid. A. Gell. l. b. 1. c. 3.

First,

First, That our *Love* carry its right respect, and no sinister, or by-end with it; That wee love a friend for himselfe, and not with indirect ends, onely upon our owne benefit: For, as b the Philosopher speakes, true *Love* is a *benevolent* Affection, willing good unto another for his owne sake. *Hominum charitas*, saith *Cicero*, *gratuita est*. True *love* is *free*, and without selfe respects: whereas to shrowd our owne private aymes under the name of friendship. *Non est amicitia sed mercatura*, is onely to make a Trade and Merchandize of one another.

b *Rhet. l. 2. c. 4*

c *De Nat. deor. Lib. 1.*

Senec. Epist 9.

Secondly, that our *love* be *serene*, not mudded with errour, and prejudice: * in the most able men that are, God is pleased to leave some wants and weakenesses, that they may the better know themselves, bee acquainted with divine bounty in what they have, and their necessary use of others in what they want. And therefore it was a seasonable increpation of *Polydamas* to *Hector*.

* Καὶ ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς τοῦτ' ἐδίδαξεν βροτῶν οἰκτρὸν, κἀπὸ δ' ἄλλο προσκυνεῖν χλιδᾷ. σὺ μὲν μάχῃ, τὰς δὲ βουλὰς ταῖσδε. *Eurip. Rhes.* 106.

Οὐτέ πῃ αἰεὶ πᾶσιν θεὸς, πολεμήϊα ἔργα,
Τεύχειν ἠδὲ βίλῃ ἠδίλεης πᾶσιδόμοισι ἄνδρας;
Ἀλλ' ἄπυς ἄμα πάντα δώκεται, &c.

Iliad. 7. 720. vid. Plutarch. de Animi Tranquil. Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. 14. ep. 13.

Because thou canst in Warre all men out do,
Wilt thou presume thou canst in Counsell so?
One breast's too narrow to containe all Arts,
God distributes his gifts in severall parts.

In this case therefore our care must bee to discerne betweene the abilities and infirmities of

men, that our Honour and Love of the *Person* render not his *weakenesses* beautifull us, nor worke in us an unhappy diligence in the imitation of them. *Vix enim dici potest, quantò libentius imitamur eos, quibus favemus*; Love is very apt to transport us so farre as to make us imitate the errours of whom we love. Like unskillfull Painters, who not being able to reach the *beauty* of the face, expresse onely the *wrinkles* and blemishes of it.

Quintil. lib. 2. cap. 2. & li. 10. c. 2.

Plutarch. de Adulat.

Thirdly, that our love keepe in all the *kinds* thereof its due proportion, both for the *nature* of them, being towards some a *love of Reverence*, towards others of *friendship*, towards others of *Compassion*, towards others of *counsell* and *bounty*; as also for their severall *degrees* of *intension*, which are to be more or lesse according to the *Naturall*, *Morall*, or *Divine* obligations which wee finde in the persons loved. For though wee must *love All men as Our selves*, yet that inferres not an *Equality*, but a *Fidelity* and *Sincerity* of *love*; Since even within Our selves, there is no man but loves his *Head* and his *Heart* and other vitall parts with a closer Affection than those which are but fleshly and integrall, and more easily repayrable. And therefore the Apostle limiteth the μάλιστα, the greatest *degree* of our *love* upon two objects, those of our *owne house*, and those of the *houshold of faith*; not excluding others, but preferring these.

1 Tim. 5. 8. Gal. 6. 10.

I shall end this particular with naming one *Species* of *Love* more (for all this hitherto hath been *Amor Amicitiæ*, a Love of a Person for him-

himſelfe) and it is that which the Schooles call *Amor Concupiſcentiæ*, a love of *Concupiſcence*, or a *Circular love*, that which begins and ends in a *Mans ſelfe*, when his Affections having gone forth to ſome obje&, doth againe returne home, and loves it not *directly* for any *abſolute* goodneſſe which it hath in it ſelfe, but as it is *conducible* and beares a relation of *Convenience* to him that loves it. For though all affection of *love* (as *Ariſtotle* obſerved) bee *Circular*, in as much as the *Object* firſt moves the *Appetite*, and then the *Appetite* moves to the *Object*, and ſo the motion ceaſeth where it began (which is a circle;) (which alſo by the way ſhewes us in an Embleme the firmeneſſe and ſtrength which *love* workes amongſt men; becauſe of all Formes and Fabriques, thoſe which are *Circular* are the ſtrongeſt; as we ſee in Arches, wherein every part doth mutually touch and claſpe in that which is next it:) Yet in this *love* which I here ſpeake of, there is a greater *circle*; in that, after all this, there is another Regreſſe from the Object to the Appetite, applying the goodneſſe thereof unto the ſame, and loving it onely for the commodity and benefit, which the mind is likely to receive from it.

Another ſubordinate and leſſe principall *cauſe* of *love*, may be *love* it ſelfe; I meane in another man: for as it is naturall, according to *Ariſtotle*, to praiſe, ſo ſure it is to love, φιλανδρωποι. Men of loving and good natures: and ſo he maketh juſt, beneficient & pleaſant Καὶ ὅλως τοὺ σπουδαῖ φιλοφίλες men that are true lovers of their owne friends to

Ethic. l. 8. cap. 1 & Lib. 9. cap. 1

be the proper objects of Love. And herein is that partly verified, that *Love is strong as Death*. For as that grave which buries a dead man, doth likewise burie all his enemies (it being unnaturall to *hate* the dead, whom wee cannot *hurt*: for the utmost harme, that malice can doe, is to kill. And therefore it is noted as a prodigious hatred betweene the two emulous brothers of *Thebes*, *Æteocles* and *Polynices*;

Statius The baid.

Nec furiis post fata modus flammaque rebelles
Seditione rogi.——

Their furies were not bounded by their fate,
Ones funeral flame the others flame did hate.)

Even so likewise a mans *love* hath a power to bury his enemies, and to draw unto it selfe the most backward and differing affections; for being of a transient nature, and carrying forth it selfe into the person beloved, it usually (according to the condition of other naturall Agents) worketh semblable and alike affections unto it selfe. For besides that, hereby an Adversary is convinced of nourishing an injurious and undeserved enmity; hee is moreover mollified and shamed by his owne witnesse, his conscience telling him that it is odious and inhumane to repay love with hatred. Insomuch that upon this inducement, *Saul* the patterne of raging and unreasonable envie, was sometimes brought to relent and accuse himselfe. And this is the occasion

Pessimam causam meam hoderni pietas fecit, prorsus nocens, quicunque visus tam bono fratri & nocens. Senec. in Thyeste.

ſion (as I take it) of that ſpeech of *Salomon*; *If thine enemie hunger, give him bread to eat; if he thirſt, give him water to drinke; for thou ſhalt heape coales of fire upon his head.* Which, though perhaps, with earthie and baſe minds, it hath a propertie of hardning and confirming them in their hatred; yet, with minds ingenuous and noble, it hath a cleane contrarie effect, to melt and purge them. And ſo the Apoſtle telleth us, that *we love God, becauſe he loved us firſt*; and *Mary Magdalene* having had *much forgiven her*, did therefore *love Chriſt much*. And therefore the Poets counſell is good:

Prov. 25. 21.

Nimis durus eſt animus, qui delictionem, ſi noluerat impendere, nolit rependere. Aug. de Cate. l. Rudib. c. 4.

1 Ioh. 4. 19. Luke 7. 47.

Σπείρατε τὰς φιλίας ἵν' ἄν φιλεῖτε φιλῆσθε.

Theocrit.

If for thy love thy ſelfe would'ſt loved bee,
Shew love to thoſe that doe ſhew love to thee.

Vin' at ameris? ama. Martial.

The next two Cauſes, which I conceive, of Love, I will joyne in one; namely, the *abſence* from, and contrarily, the *preſence* with the thing *loved*; both which, in a different reſpect, doe exerciſe *Love*. And therefore, firſt, I like not that ſpeech of *Ariſtotle*, that though diſtance of place doe not diſſolve the *root* and *habit*, yet it doth the exerciſe and *acts* of *Love*; except he meant it (as I ſuppoſe he doth) of the *tranſient acts* thereof, whereby each friend doth the office of *Love* and *Beneficence* to another. For, as in naturall bodies there is not onely a *Complacencie* or *Delight* in their proper place, when they *enjoy* it; but an innate

Ethic. lib. 8. cap. 5.

nate propension and *motion* thereunto, when they are *absent* from it; so in the mind of man (whose a *Love* in his *Weight*) there is not onely a *Love* of *Delight* in the *fruition*, but a *Love* likewise of *Desire*, in the *privation* of a Good; which, the more it wanteth, the more it fixeth it selfe upon it: b as some things doe naturally attract fire at a distance. Thus the Poet expresseth the Love of *Dido* to *Æneas*:

* *Animus amore rapitur, sicut corpus pondere. Aug. de Civit. Dei, lib. 11. c. 28. Pondus meum Amor meus, eo feror quocunq; feror. Confess. lib. 13. cap. 9. & Epist. 89.*
b *Plutarch. Sympos. l. 5. q. 7. Æntid. 4.*

Illum absens absentem auditque videtque.

When night had severed them apart,
She heard and saw him in her heart.

Τὸ ἐν πολλῶν ἀσύγχυτον ἅπτειν συναγαγὼν καὶ συνδῆσαι, *in* 1 Cor. 10. 30.

And it is the wonder of *Love* (as Saint *Chrysostome* speaketh) to collect and knit together in one, things farre separated from each other: Wherein stands the Mysterie of the *Communion* of the *Church* on Earth, both with it selfe, in all the dispersed members of it, and with *Christ* the Head; and that other part of it, which *triumpheth* in Heaven. So that herein, *Divine Love* hath the same kind of Vertue with *Divine Faith*; that as this is the *being* and *subsisting* of things *to come*, and distant in *Time*; so that is the *Vnion* and knitting of things *absent*, and distant in *place*.

But then, much more doth *Presence* to the goodnesse of an object *loved*, encrease and exercise our Love; because it gives us a more compleat sight of it, and Vnion unto it. And therefore Saint *Iohn* speakes of a *Perfection*, and Saint

1 *Iob.* 4. 18.

Paul

Paul of a *Perpetuitie* of our *Love* unto *God*, grounded on the fulneſſe of the *Beatificall Viſion*, when we ſhall be *for ever with the Lord*; whereas now, *ſeeing onely in a Glaſſe darkely*, as we *know*, ſo likewiſe we *love but in part onely*. And *Ariſtotle* makes Mutuall *Converſation* and Societie one of the greateſt bonds of *Love*; becauſe thereby is a more immediate exerciſe; and from thence, a greater encreaſe of the Affection. 1 Cor. 13. 8. Ethic. lib. 8. c. 5

As living * Creatures, ſo Affections are *nouriſhed*, after the ſame manner as they are *produced*: Now it is neceſſarie, for the firſt working of *Love*, that the Obiect have ſome manner of *Preſence* with the Affection, either by a *Knowledge* of *Viſion*, or of *Faith*. And therefore Saint *Paul* ſayth, *If they had knowne, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory*; their Ignorance and Hatred of Him, went both together: *Simul ut definunt ignorare, ceſſant & odiſſe*; as ſoone, ſayth *Tertullian*, as they ceaſed to be ignorant of Chriſt, they ceaſed to hate Him: And uſually, in the phraſe of the Scripture, *Knowledge* and *Love* are identicall. So then, all *Love* proceeding from *Knowledge*, and all *Knowledge* preſuppoſing ſome *Preſence* of the thing knowne, it appeareth, that the *Preſence* of the Obiect begetteth, and therefore, by proportion, it nouriſheth this Affection. * *Plutarch. l. de Invidia & Od. Ariſtot. polit. lib. 1. c. 7.* 1 Cor. 2. 8. *Apolog. l. c. 1.* 2 *Tim.* 2. 19. *Matth.* 7. 23. *Iob.* 9. 21. *Pſa.* 1. 6. 37. 18. *Rom.* 8. 29.

The laſt Cauſe or inducement to this *Paſſion*, (which I will but name) is an Aggregate of diverſe *Beautifull* and *Amiable* Qualities in the Obiect; as namely, *Sympathie, Iuſtice, Induſtrie, Temperance, Ingenuitie, Facilitie, Pleaſantneſſe* and

Innocencie of Wit, *Meekneſſe, Yeeldingneſſe, Patience, Sweetneſſe* of behaviour and diſpoſition, without Cloſeneſſe, Suſpition, Intermedling, Inquiſitiveneſſe, Moroſitie, Contempt, Diſſention; in all which, men are either *Injuſti* or *Pugnaces*, doe either wrong us, or croſſe us: Which two, the Philoſopher makes the generall Oppoſites of *Love*: On which I ſhall forbeare to inſiſt, as alſo on the Circumſtances of the Act of this *Paſſion* it ſelfe, in the Quantitie and Qualitie thereof, and ſhall proceed in briefe to the *Conſequents* or *Effects* of this *Paſſion*.

Rhetor. l. 2. c. 4.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Effects of Love, Vnion to the Object, Stay and Immoration of the Mind upon it, Reſt in it, Zeale, Strength, and Tenderneſſe towards it, Condeſcention unto it, Liquefaction and Languiſhing for it.

THe firſt which I ſhall obſerve, is *Vnion*, occaſioned both by the *Love* which we have to a thing, for its *owne ſake*, and likewiſe, for the *Love* of *our ſelves*, that there may be a greater mutuall intereſt each in other. Where-ever *Love* is, it ſtirreth up an endeavour, to carry the heart unto the thing which it *loveth*: *Where the Treaſure is, there the heart will be.*

be. Hence, none are ſayd to *love* God, but thoſe that are ſome way united unto him. And therefore, as *Gods* firſt *love* to man, was in making man like himſelfe; ſo his ſecond great *love*, was in making himſelfe like man. Hence, we reade ſo often of that *myſticall* inhabitation of *Chriſt* in his *Church*, of that more peculiar *Vnion* and preſence with his people, of a Spirituall *Implantation* unto him by *Faith*, of thoſe neere relations of *Filiation* and *Fraternitie*, of mutuall intereſt each in other, *I am my beloveds, and my beloved is mine*; importing an inſeparable *Vnion* of the *Church* to *Chriſt*. And this may be the reaſon of that order in Saint *Pauls* ſolemne Benediction, The *Grace* of *Chriſt*, the *Love* of *God*, and the *Communion* of the *Spirit*: for, as the *Grace* of *Chriſt* onely taketh away that enmitie which was betweene ſinners and God, and is the onely meanes of our reconciliation unto him; ſo the *Love* of *God* is the onely *Bond* of that *Communion*, which we have with him and his holy *Spirit*.

Vnion is of diverſe ſorts. One, ſuch whereby diverſe things are made *ſimply one*, either by the *converſion* of one into the other, or by the *compoſition*, or *conſtitution* of a third out of the things united, as of mixt bodies out of united Elements, or of the whole ſubſtance out of the eſſentiall parts: Another, ſuch whereby things united are made one *after a ſort*, either by an *accidentall aggregation*, as diverſe ſtones make *one heape*, or by an *orderly* and artificiall *diſtribution*, as diverſe materialls make *one houſe*. Or by either a *naturall* or *morall*

Ariſt. Rhetor. lib. 2. cap. 4. Diogen. Laert. in Zenon. l. 7.

inclination and ſympathy which one thing beareth unto another. And of this ſort is that *union* which ariſeth out of *love*, tending firſt unto a mutuall *ſimilitude* and conformity in the ſame deſires; and next unto a mutuall *poſſeſſion*, fruition, and proprietie, whereby the minde loving, longeth to be ſeiſed of the thing which it loveth, and cannot endure to bee deprived of it. So *Moſes* praied, *I beſeech thee ſhew me thy glory*; for the *viſion* of God is the *poſſeſſion* of him; and ſo *David*, *My ſoule thirſteth for God, when ſhall I come and appeare before him?* And this is the foundation of all *ſorrow*, when the ſoule is diſpoſſeſſed of that which it *loved*, and wherein it reſted. And this *deſire of Poſſeſſion* is ſo great that *Love* contenteth it ſelfe not with the *Preſence*, but even then putteth out its endeavours unto a neerer, and more *reall union*, as if it would become *really One* with the thing which it *loveth*; which is ſeene in *embracings*, kiſſes, in the exiliency and egreſſe of the ſpirits, in the expanſion of the heart, in the ſimplicity and naturalneſſe of all mutuall carriages, as if a preſent friend were not yet preſent enough. Which kind of expreſſions of *love* are thus elegantly deſcribed by *Homer*, when *Eumæus* ſaw *Telemachus* ſafely returned home from Sea.

Amor Hedera Plutarch. de Aud. Scalig. de ſubtilitate. Ariſt. Polit. lib. 2. c. 4. Vel præſentem deſideramus. Plin. Paneg.

Odyſſ. Π. 14.

——ταχὺν δ' ἀνόρουσε συβώτης
ἐκ δ' ἀρὰ οἱ χειρῶν πίσυν ἄγγεα, τοῖς ἐκύβευτο
Κήρυκες δόσποτα οἴκου· ὁ δ' ἄντ' ἤλυθ' ἀνακτι.
Κύσσε δὲ μιν κεφαλήν τε καὶ ἄμφω φάεα καλὰ
χεῖράς τ' ἀμφοτέρας· θαλερὸν δὲ οἱ ἔκπεσε δάκρυ.

Eumæus

Eumaus all amaz'd ſprung to the dore.
The pots of wine which his hands mixt before
Did both fall from them: he ranne on to meet,
And with full welcomes his young maſter greet.
He kiſt his head, hands, eyes; and his teares kept
Time with his kiſſes, as he kiſt he wept.

The like elegant deſcription wee have of the love of *Penelope*, when *Vliſſes* after his returne was perfectly knowne unto her.

Δακρύσασα δ' ἶσπε δραμοῦσ', ἀμφὶ δὲ χεῖρας
Ἀμφὶ βαλὼν κεφαλῇ, κατὰ μὲν ἔκυσε. *Odyſſ. χ. 208.*

She wept and ran ſtraight on, her hands ſhe ſpread
And claps'd about his neck, and kiſt his head.

Love hath in *morall* and divine things the ſame effect which *fire* hath in *naturall*, to congregate homogeneall, or things of the ſame kinde, and to ſeparate heterogeneall, or things differing: as we ſee in the Love of God, the deeper that is, the more is the ſpirituall part of man collected together, and rayſed from the earth. And therefore in heaven, where love ſhall bee perfect, all things ſhall be harmonious and homogeneal, not in regard of naturall properties, but in a pure and unmixed ſpiritualneſſe of affections in a perfect unity of minds and motions.

From the *union* of love proceeds another ſecret effect, namely, a *reſting* of the mind in the thing

loved. In which reſpect the Philoſopher calleth knowledge the *reſt* of the underſtanding. And this can onely be totall and perfect in the Vnion of the Soule with God, the chiefeſt good thereof. Whence ſome have made the threefold *Appetite* in man, Concupiſcible, Rationall and Iraſcible, to have their finall perfection and quiet by a diſtinct union to the Three Perſons in the Trinity: for the *Concupiſcible* power is carried *ad bonum* to *good*, which they ſay is the Attribute of the *holy Spirit*; the Rationall *ad verum*, to that which is *true*, which is the Attribute of the *Sonne*; and the Iraſcible *ad Arduum*, to *Power*, which is the Attribute of the *Father*. But to let that paſſe for a ſpiders web (curious, but thin) certaine it is that *God* onely is that *end*, who can fully accompliſh the perfection and terminate the deſires of thoſe creatures, whom hee made after a peculiar manner to know and enjoy him. But proportionably, there ariſeth from the *Vnion* unto any other *Object* of *Love*, a *ſatiating* and *quieting* of the Facultie; which, in a word, is then onely, in *Objects* of inferiour order and goodneſſe, regular, when the *Object* is *naturall*, and the *Action limited*. Diſproportion and Enormitie are the two Corruptions in this particular.

Gerſon de myſt Theol.

A third Effect, which I ſhall obſerve of *Love*, is *Stay*, and immoration of the Mind upon the *Object loved*, and a *diverting* of it from all others: as we obſerved in *Eumæus*, when he ſaw *Telemachus*, he threw away the Buſineſſe which he was about before: And the Woman of *Samaria*, being

ing tranſported with the *love* of Chriſt, left her Pitcher, which ſhe had brought to the Well, that ſhe might goe and call others unto his Doctrine: And *Mary* left the thoughts of entertaining Chriſt at the Table, out of an extraordinarie deſire to entertaine him in her heart. And this effect the Poet hath excellently expreſſed in *Dido*; who having ſhewed before a marvellous Princely wiſdome and ſedulitie, in fortifying her new Kingdome, and viewing the Workes her ſelfe, (as he had before deſcribed) as ſoone as ſhe was once tranſported by the *love* of *Æneas*, then all ſtood ſtill on a ſudden.

Non capta aſſurgunt turres, non arma juventus
Exercet; portuſve, aut propugnacula bello *Æneid. l. 4.*
Tuta parant; pendent opera interrupta——

The Towers long ſince begun, roſe up no more,
And Armes did ruſt, which ere-while brave youth wore.
No Ports, no Sconces, no defence went on,
But all their works hung broken, and halfe done.

Thus, as *Plutarch* hath obſerved, the Images of things in the fancies of other men are like words written in water, which ſuddenly vaniſh; but the Impreſſions which love makes, are as it were, written with an hot iron, which leaveth fixed and abiding prints in the memory.

Love and *Knowledge* have mutuall ſharpening and cauſality each on other: for as Knowledge doth generate Love, ſo Love doth nouriſh and exerciſe

ercise\Knowledge. The reaſon whereof is that unſeparable union, which is in all things between the *Truth* and *Good* of them: for it being the property of *Truth* to unite and apply *Goodneſſe* (nothing being apprehended as Good, unleſſe that Goodneſſe be apprehended as *true*) the more Appetite enjoyeth of this, the deeper inquiry doth it make, and the more compleat union doth it ſeeke with that: the Heart and the Treaſure can ſeldome be ſevered; the Eagles will alwayes reſort to the body; *Davids* Love gave length and perpetuity to his meditation, even all the day.

And herein, methinkes, may conſiſt another proportion betweene the ſtrength of *Love* and *Death*; for as in Death nature doth collect and draw in thoſe ſpirits, which before lay ſcattered in the outward parts, to guard and arme the heart in its greateſt conflict; uniting all thoſe languiſhing forces which are left, to teſtifie the naturall love which each living creature beareth to its owne conſervation: ſo doth *Love* draw and unite thoſe Spirits which adminiſter either to the Fancie or Appetite, to ſerve onely for the nouriſhing of that Affection, and for gazing upon that treaſure whereunto the Heart is wholly attracted. Which Spirits, being of a limited power and influence, doe therefore with the ſame force, whereby they carry the mind to the conſideration of one thing, withdraw it from all other that are heterogeneall; no determined power of the Soule being able to impart a ſufficient activity unto diverſe

verſe independing operations, when the force of it is exhauſted by one ſo ſtrong; and there being a ſympathy, and as it were, a league between the faculties of the Soule, all covenanting not to obſcure or hinder the Predominant Impreſſions of one another. And therefore as in *Rome* when a Dictatour was created, all other Authority was for that time ſuſpended; ſo when any ſtrong *Love* hath taken poſſeſſion of the Soule, it gives a Superſedeas and ſtop unto all other imployments. It is therefore preſcribed as a Remedy againſt inordinate *Love*.

Plutarch. in Amatorio.

——— *Pabula Amoris*
Abſterrere ſibi, atque alìo convertere mentem.

Lucret. apud Petr. Crinit. lib. 16. cap. 4.

To draw away the fewell from this fire,
And turne the minde upon ſome new deſire.

For Love is *Otioſorum Negotium*, as *Diogenes* ſpake, the buſineſſe oftentimes of men that want imployments.

Ἀσχολίαν ἀσχολίαν. *Diogenes apud Laert. lib. 6*

Another effect of Love is Iealouſie or *Zeale*. Whereby is not meant that ſuſpicious, inquiſitive, quick-ſighted quality of finding out the blemiſhes, and diſcovering the imperfections of one another (for it is the property of true Love to thinke none evill) bnt onely a provident and ſolicitous feare, leaſt ſome or other evill ſhould either diſturbe the peace, or violate the purity of what we love: like that of *Iob* towards his ſons; and of the *Apoſtle* towards his Corinthians, *I*

Laert. lib. 6.

Iob 1. 5.

2 Cor. 11. 2. *am jealous over you with a godly jealousie:* So *Penelope* in the Poet was jealous of the safety of *Vlisses*.

Ovid. Epist.

In te fingebam violentos Troas ituros,
Nomine in Hectoreo pallida semper eram.

How oft my deere *Vlisses* did I see
In my sad thoughts proud Trojans rush on thee?
And when great *Hectors* name but touch'd mine ears,
My cheeks drew palenes frõ my paler fears.

Zeale is a compounded affection, or a mixture of *Love* and *Anger*; so that it ever putteth forth it selfe to remove any thing which is contrary to the thing we love; as we see in *Christ*, whose zeale or holy anger whipped away the buyers and sellers out of the Temple. In which respect it is

Joh. 2. 17. said that the *zeale of Gods house did consume him.*

ἀπο τῶ ζέειν λέγ. As water when it boyleth (from which metaphor the word *zeale* is borrowed) doth in the boyling consume, or as the candle wasteth it selfe with

Cant. 8. burning. In which respect likewise it is said, *that much water cannot quench Love.* It is like Lime, the more water you cast upon it, the hotter it growes. And therefore the sinne of *Laodicea*,

Rev. 3. 15. which was contrary unto *zeale* is compared unto *lukewarme* water, which doth not boyle, and so cannot worke out the scumme or corruption which is in it.

Plutarch. de Amore prolis. And from hence it is that *Love* makes *Weake things strong*, and turneth Cowardice into Valour and Meekenesse into Anger, and Shame into Bold-

Boldneſſe, and will not conceive any thing too hard to undertake. The fearefull Hen, which hath nothing but flight to defend her ſelfe from the Dogge, or the Serpent, will venter with courage againſt the ſtrongeſt creatures to defend her little chickens. Thus Zeale and Love of God made *Moſes* forget his meekeneſſe; and his Anger was ſo ſtrong, that it brake the Tables of the Law, and made the people drink the Idol which they had made. And this is wittily expreſſed by *Seneca*, that *Magnus dolor iratus amor eſt*, a great griefe is nothing elſe but Love diſpleaſed, and made angrie. It tranſporteth Nature beyond its bounds or abilities, putteth ſuch a force and vigour into it, as that it will adventure on any *difficulties*; as *Mary Magdalen* would in the ſtrength of her *Love* undertake to carry away the dead body of Chriſt (as ſhe conceived of him) not conſidering the weight of that, or her owne weakeneſſe. It hath a conſtraining vertue in it, and makes a man do that which is beyond his power; as the *Corinthians*, when they were *poore* in *eſtate*, were yet *rich* in *Liberality*. It makes a man impatient to be unacquainted with the eſtate of an abſent friend, whom wee therefore ſuſpect not ſufficiently guarded from danger, becauſe deſtitute of the helpe which our preſence might afford him. In one word, it makes the wounds and ſtaines of the thing loved to redound to the grief and trouble of him that loveth it. He that is not jealous for the credit, ſecurity, and honour of what hee pretendeth affection to, loves nothing

Num. 12. 11. Exod. 32. 19.

Senec. in Herc. Oetæ.

Vid. Plutarch. Amatorium.

Non patiar me quicquam ne ſcire de eo quem amem. Plin. Epiſt.

but himselfe in those pretenses.

Another Effect of *Love* is *Condescension* to things below us, that wee may please or profit those whom we love. It teacheth a man to deny his owne judgement, and to doe that which a looker on might happily esteeme Weakenesse or Indecencie; out of a fervent desire to expresse affection to the thing beloved. Thus *Davids* great *Love* to the *Arke* of Gods presence did transport him to leaping and dancing, and other such familiar expressions of joy (for which *Michall* out of pride despised him in her heart) and was contented by that, which she esteemed baseneſſe, to honour God: herein expressing the *love* of him unto Mankind, who was both his *Lord* and his *Sonne*; who emptied, and humbled, and denied himselfe for our sakes, not considering his owne worthinesse, but our want; nor what was honourable for him to doe, but what was necessary for us to be done. *Quicquid Deo indignum, mihi expedit*, what ever was unworthy of him, was expedient for us. Thus Parents out of Love to their children doe lispe, and play, and fit their speeches and dalliances to the Age and Infirmities of their children. Therefore *Themistocles* being found playing and riding on a reed with his little boy, desired his friend not to censure him for it, till hee himselfe was a father of children.

The last Effect which I shall observe of this Passion is that which we call *Liquefaction or Languor*, a melting, as it were, of the heart to receive the

—καὶ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων φίλοις κοινὰ δίκαιον κτᾶσθαι. *Euripid. Helen.*

Plutarch. Apothegm. Lacon.

Vid. Plutarch. sympos. lat. l. 5. q. 7.

the more eaſie impreſſions from the thing which it loveth, and a decay of the Spirits, by reaſon of that intenſive fixing of them thereon, and of the paineſull and lingring expectation of the heart to enjoy it. Love is of all other the inmoſt and moſt viſcerall affection. And therefore called by the Apoſtle, *Bowels of Love*. And we read of the *yearning* of *Ioſephs bowels* over *Benjamin* his mothers ſonne, and of the true Mother over her child. *Incaluerunt viſcera*, they felt a fervour and agitation of their bowells, which the more vehement it is, doth worke the more ſudden and ſenſible decay and languiſhing of Spirits. So *Ammon* out of wanton and inceſtuous *Love* is ſaid to *grow leane from day to day*, and to have been *ſicke* with vexation for his ſiſter *Thamar*.

αἰς ἔνεστι τὶς καρδίᾳ σὺν δείλαισι πάσαι πάσαν ἀν' ἡμαρ ἰεχρὸς &c. *Theocrit. Idyll. 2.*

Gen.43. *1 Reg.3.26.*

2 Sam.13.

And in ſpirituall love we find the like expreſſion of the Spouſe; *Stay me with flagons, comfort me with apples, for I am ſick of love:* Wine to exhilerate, apples to refreſh thoſe Spirits, which were, as it were, melted away, and waſted by an extreame out-let of Love. And for this reaſon the Obje& of our Love is ſaid to *Overcome us*, and to *Burne the Heart*, as with *Coales of Iuniper*; and the like expreſſions of wounding and burning the Poet uſeth.

Cant.2.5.

Cant.6.5.8.6.

Æneid.4.

——*Eſt mollis flamma medullas*
Interea, & tacitum vivit ſub pectore vulnus.

A wellcome ſoft flame in her bones did reſt,
And a cloſe wound liv'd in her bleeding breaſt.

Now the cause of this *Languor*, which love worketh, is in *Sensitive* Objects, an earnest desire to *enjoy* them; in *Spiritual* Objects, an earnest desire to *increase* them. In the former, want kindleth love, but Fruition worketh wearinesse and satiety: In the other fruition increaseth love, and makes us the more greedy for those things which when we wanted, we did not desire. In earthly things the desire at a *distance* promiseth much pleasure, but tast and experience disappointeth expectation. In heavenly things, eating and drinking doth renew the *Appetite*, and the greater the experience, the stronger the *desire*: as the more acquaintance *Moses* had with God, the more he did desire to see his glory. And so much may suffice for the first of the Passions, Love, which is the fountaine and foundation of all the rest.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Paſsion of Hatred, the Fundamentall Cauſe or Object thereof Evill, how farre forth Evills are willed by God may bee declined by men, of Gods ſecret and revealed Will.

THe next in order is *Hatred:* of which the Schoole-men make two kinds; an *Hatred of Abomination* or loathing; which conſiſts in a *pure averſion* or flight of the Appetite from ſomething apprehended as *Evill*, ariſing from a diſſonancy and repugnancy betweene their natures: and an *Hatred of Enmity*, which is not a flying, but rather a *purſuing Hatred*, and hath ever ſome *Love* joyned with it, namely a Love of any Evill which we deſire may befall the perſon or thing which wee hate.

I ſhall not diſtinctly handle theſe aſunder, but ſhall obſerve the Dignities and Corruptions of the Paſſion in generall, as it implies a common *diſconvenience*, and naturall *Unconformitie* between the Object and the Appetite.

The *Object* then of all *Hatred* is *Evill*; and all evill implying an oppoſition to Good admits of ſo many ſeverall reſpects as there are kinds of oppoſition.

And

And there is firſt an *Evill* of *Contrariety*, ſuch as is in the qualities of Water unto Fire, or a Wolfe unto a Sheepe, occaſioned by that *Deſtructive* Efficiency, which one hath upon the other.

Secondly, an *Evill* of *Privation*, which we hate formally and for it ſelfe, as implying nothing but a *Defect* and Abſence of *Good*.

Thirdly, an *Evill* of *Contradiction* in the *not being* of any creature, oppos'd to its being. For *Being* and *Immortality* is that which *Ariſtotle* makes one of the principle objects of *Love*; Annihilation then, or Not being is the chiefeſt Evill of things, and that which Nature moſt abhorreth.

Laſtly, an *Evill* of *Relation*; for as things in their owne ſimple natures *Evill*, may have in them a *Relative Goodneſſe*, and ſo to be deſired; as the killing of beaſts for the ſervice, and the death of malefactors for the ſecurity of men: ſo things in their abſolute being *Good* may have in them a *Relative*, or *Comparative Evill*, and in that ſence bee by conſequence hated; as our Saviour intimates *He that hateth not father and mother, and his owne life for me, is not worthy of me*: when they prove ſnares and temptations to draw us from the Love of Chriſt, they are then to bee undervalued in compariſon of him. And therefore we find in the Law if a mans deareſt brother or child, or wife, or friend ſhould entice him from God unto Idolatry, he was not to conceale, pitty, or ſpare him, but his owne hand was to bee firſt upon him. And thus the Poet hath elegantly expreſſed the behaviour of

of *Æneas* toward *Dido*, who being inflamed with Love of him, would have kept him from the expedition, unto which by divine guidance he supposed himselfe to be directed.

——— Quanquam levire dolorem
Solando cupit, & dictis avertere curas,
(Multa gemens magnoq; animum labefactus amore)
Iussa tamen Divûm exequitur.———

Though he desir'd with solace to appease,
And on her pensive soule to breathe some ease,
(Himselfe with mutuall love made faint) yet still
His purposes were fixt t' obey Gods will.

So then we see what qualification is required in the *Object* of a just *Hatred*, that it be Evill, and some way or other offensive, either by defiling or destroying nature: and the Passion is ever then irregular when it declineth from this rule.

But here, inasmuch as it is evident that the being of some evill comes under the Will of God; (*Is there any Evill in a City, and the Lord hath not done it?*) and our will is to bee conformable unto his; it may seeme that it ought to fall under our Will too, and by consequence to bee rather loved than hated by us, since wee pray for the fulfilling of Gods Will.

For resolution of this, wee must first consider, that God doth not love those *Evils* which hee thus *willeth*, as formally and precisely considered in themselves. And next wee will observe how

farre the Will of God is to bee the rule of our will; whence will arise the cleare apprehension of that truth which is now set downe, that the unalterable *Object* of mans *Hatred* is all manner of *Evill*, not onely that of deformity and sinne, but that also of destruction and misery.

Firſt then for the Will of God, we may boldly say what himselfe hath sworne, that hee will not the death or destruction of a sinner: and by consequence neither any other evill of his Creature, as being a thing infinitely remote from his mercy; he is not delighted in the ruine, neither doth hee find pleasure or harmony in the groanes of any thing which himselfe created: But hee is said to will those Evills as good and just, for the manifestation of his glorious *Power* over all the Creatures, and of his glorious *Justice* on those, who are voluntarily fallen from him. But now because it is left onely to the Wisedome of God himselfe to know and ordaine the best meanes for glorifying of himselfe in and by his creatures, we are not here hence to assume any warrant for willing evill unto our selves or others, but then onely when the honour of the Creator is therein advanced. And so the Apostle did conditionally wish evill unto himselfe, if thereby the glory of Gods mercy towards his Countrey-men the Iewes might be the more advanced.

Secondly, it is no good Argument, *God willeth* the inflicting of such an *evill*, therefore it is unlawfull for my will to decline it: for first the Will of God, whereby hee determineth to worke this

this or that evill on particular Subjects, is a part of his *ſecret Counſell.* Now the *Revealed*, and not the *Hidden Will* of God is the rule of our Wills and Actions: whence it commeth to paſſe, that it is made a part of our neceſſary obedience unto God in our wiſhes or averſations to goe a croſſe way to his unrevealed purpoſe. Peradventure in my ſicke bed it is the purpoſe of God to caſt my body into the earth, from whence it was taken; yet for me herein to ſecond the Will of God by an execution thereof upon my ſelfe, or by a neglect of thoſe Ordinary meanes of recovery which hee affords, were to deſpiſe his mercy, that I might fulfill his Will. Peradventure in my flight a ſword will overtake mee, yet I have the warrant of my Saviours example and precept to turne my backe rather than my conſcience in perſecution: alwaies reſerved, that though I will that, which God willeth, yet my will bee ever *ſubordinated* unto his. Wee owe *ſubmiſſion* to the *will* of *Gods purpoſe* and Counſell, and wee owe *conformity* to the *will* of his *Precept* and Command; we muſt ſubmit to the will, whereby God is pleaſed to worke himſelfe, and wee muſt conforme to the will, whereby hee is pleaſed to command us to worke. And therefore

Secondly, though the Will of God were in this caſe knowne, yet is not our will conſtrained to a neceſſary inclination, though it bee to an humble ſubmiſſion and patience in bearing that which the Wiſedome and purpoſe of God hath made inevitable; for as the promiſes and de-

crees of Good things from God doe not warrant our slacknesse in neglecting, or our profanenesse in turning from them; so neither doth the certainty and unavoidablenesse of a future evill (as death intended upon us by God) put any necessity on our nature to deny it selfe, or to love its owne distresses.

Of which that we may be the more sure, wee may observe it in him, who as hee was wholly like us in nature, and therefore had the same naturall inclinations and aversations with us; so was hee of the same infinite essence with his Father, and therefore did will the same things with him, yet even in him we may observe (in regard of that, which the Scripture saith, was by *the hand and Counsell of God before determined*) a seeming Reluctancy and withdrawing from the Divine Decree. He knew it was not his Fathers Will; and yet, *Father, if thou bee willing, let this cup passe from me:* he was not ignorant that he was to suffer, and that there was an *Oportet*, a necessity upon it, and yet a second and a third time againe, *Father, if it be possible, let this Cup passe from me.* Consider it as the *Destruction* of his Temple, and *Anguish* of nature, which hee could not (being in all things like unto us) but love; and then *Transeat*, Let it passe: but consider it as the *necessary meanes* of procuring pretious blessings for mankind, and of fulfilling the eternall Decree of his Fathers Love, and then, *Not as I, but as thou wilt.*

The same may be applied in any manner of humane

mane evills, notwithstanding we are with an armed *patience* to sustaine them, or with an obedient *submission* unto Divine pleasure to wait for them; yet in regard of that *pressure* of nature, which they bring with them (on which the God of Nature hath imprinted a naturall desire of its owne quiet and integrity) so farre forth all *Evill*, not onely may, but must bee *Hated* by every Regular will, upon paine of violating the Law of its Creation.

And indeed in all this there is not any deviation from the *Will* of God, intending that which we abhorre: for as it stands not with the nature of man to hate himselfe, or any good thing of his owne making; so neither doth it stand with the goodnesse of God to hate his Creature, or to delight barely in the misery or afflictions thereof; but onely in that end of manifesting his glory and righteousnesse, whereunto hee in the dispensation of his Wisdome and Iustice hath wonderfully directed them. And therefore, as to murmure at the Wisedome of God in thus ordering evills unto a good end, were a presumptuous repining; so on the other side, not to entertaine those naturall desires of a straightned mind after deliverance from those evills, were to be in *Solomons* phrase *too Righteous*, and out of a purpose to answere the ends of Gods Wisedome, to crosse the Law of his Creation.

So then it is evident that the *Object* and *fundamentall cause* of *Hatred*, is *all* and *onely Evill*: which (however in respect of the *Existence* of it, it bee

in ſome caſes *Good*; for as it is in the *power* of *God* to educe out of confuſion order, light out of darkeneſſe, his owne honour out of mans ſhame; ſo is it his *providence* likewiſe to turne unto the great good of many men thoſe things which in themſelves doe onely hurt them) Yet I ſay this notwithſtanding, as it worketh the deformity and diſquiet of nature, it is againſt the created law and in-bred love, which each thing beareth to its owne perfection; and therefore cannot but be neceſſarily hated.

As on the other ſide, thoſe ordinary and common goods, which we call, in reſpect of God, bleſſings, as health, peace, proſperity, good ſucceſſe, and the like; notwithſtanding they commonly prove unto men, unfurniſhed with thoſe habits of wiſedome and ſobriety, whereby they ſhould bee moderated, occaſions of much evill and dangers; ſo that their Table is become their ſnare (as the experience of thoſe latter Romane Ages proveth, wherein their victories over men hath made them in luxury and vileneſſe ſo prodigious, as if they meant to attempt warre with God.) Notwithſtanding I ſay all this; yet for as much as theſe things are ſuch as doe quiet, ſatisfie, and beare convenience unto mans nature, they are therefore juſtly with thankefulneſſe by our ſelves received, and out of love deſired unto our friends.

I now proceed from the object or Generall fundamentall cauſe of hatred, unto ſome few which are more particular, and which do ariſe from it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the other Causes of Hatred, Secret Antipathy, Difficulty of procuring a Good commanded, Injury, Base Feares, Disparity of Desires, a Fixed Iealous Fancy.

THe first which I shall note is a secret and hidden Antipathy which is in the natures of some things one against another. As Vultures are killed with sweet smells, and Horse-flies with oyntments; the Locust will die at the sight of the Polypus, and the Serpent wil rather flye into the fire, than come neere the boughes of a wild Ash: some plants will not grow, nor the blood of some Creatures mingle together; the feathers of the Eagle will not mixe with the feathers of other foules. So *Homer* noteth of the Lyon, that hee feareth fire, and the Elephant nauseates his meat, if a Mouse have touched it. A world more of particulars there are which Naturalists have observed of this kind: from which naturall Antipathy it commeth, that things which never before saw that which is contrary to them, doe yet at the very first sight flye from it, as from an enemy to their nature, nor will they ever be brought by discipline to trust one another.

Arist. Hist. Anim. l. 9. c. 44. See Plin. Nat. Hist. l. 8. c. 4. 9. 10. lib. 9. c. 62. l. 10. c. 37. 74. lib. 16. c. 13. l. 20. in proem. lib. 22. c. 20. lib. 24. c. 1. Aelian. de Animal l. 3. c. 7. L. 4. c. 5. l. 5. c. 48. 50. l. 6. c. 22. 45. 43. Plutarch Symposi. lib. 2. 47.

Plutarch. de Odio & Invid.

Iliad. λ. 22.

——οὐ γὰρ λύκοισι καὶ ἀρνάδεσσιν ὅμοια
φρονέειν ἐπίκειται ἀμείλιχα θυμὸν ἔχοντε
ἀλλὰ κακὰ φρονέουσι διαμπερὲς ἀλλήλοισιν.

Lyons with men will ne're make faithfull truce,
Nor can you any way the Wolfe induce
To Love the Lamb: they study with fixt hate,
The one the other how to violate.

And the like kind of strange *Hatred* wee may sometimes find amongst men; one mans disposition so much disagreeing from anothers, that though there never passed any injuries or occasions of difference betweene them, yet they cannot but have minds averse from one another; which the Epigrammatist hath wittily expressed.

Martiall.

Non amo te Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare;
Hoc tantum possum dicere, Non amo te.

I love thee not, yet cannot say for what;
This onely I can say, I love thee not.

Another cause working *Hatred* of a thing in the minds of men, is the *difficulty* and conceited impossibility of obtaining it, if it bee a good thing which wee either doe or ought to desire, which the Casuists call *Acedia*, being a griefe of the appetite looking on a *Difficult Good*, as if it were evill because difficult; from whence ariseth a Torpor

a Torpor and Supine neglect of all the meanes, which might helpe us to it. Thus wicked and resolved ſinners, conceiving happineſſe as unacquirable by them, do grow to the Hating of it, to entertaine rancorous affections againſt thoſe, which perſwade them to ſeeke it, to envie and maligne all ſuch they find carefull to obtaine it; to proceed unto licentious reſolutions of rejecting all hopes or thoughts of it, & to divert their minds towards ſuch more obvious and eaſie delight, as will be gotten with leſſe labour; thus *Difficulty* rendereth *Good* things *Hateful*; as Iſrael in the wilderneſſe deſpiſed the pleaſant Land, becauſe there were ſonnes of *Anak* in it.

Vid. Ariſt. Ethic. lib. 9. c. 4.

And this is one great cauſe of the different affections of men towards ſeverall courſes of life; one man being of dull and ſluggiſh apprehenſions, hateth Learning: another by nature quicke and of noble intellectualls wholly applyeth himſelfe unto it, the *difficulty* perſwading the one to *deſpiſe* the *Goodneſſe*, and the *Goodneſſe* inducing the other to *conquer* the *difficulties* of it: ſo one man looking unto the *paine* of a vertuous life, contemnes the *reward*; and another looking unto the *Reward*, endures the *paine*. And wee ſhall uſually find it true, that either *Lazineſſe*, fearing diſappointment, or *Love* being diſappointed and meeting with difficulties which it cannot conquer, doth both beget a kind of Hatred and diſlike of that which did either *deterre* them from ſeeking it, or *deceive* them when they ſought it. As ſhee, who while there was any Hope, did ſollicite *Æ-*

Æstad.4.

neare with her teares and importunities; when he was quite gone did follow him with her imprecations.

There is no *Malice* growes ranker than that which ariseth out of the corruption of Love; as no darkenesse is more formidable, than that of an Eclipse, which assaults the very vessels of Light; nor any taste more unsavory than of sweet things when they are corrupted. The more *naturall* the *Vnion*, the more *impossible* the *Re-union*. Things joyned with glew, being broken asunder may be glewd againe; but if a mans Arme be broken off, it can never be joyned on againe: So those Hatreds are most incureable, which arise out of the greatest and most naturall Love.

Arist. Politic. lib. 7. c. 7. Fratres primi maduerunt sanguine muris Lucan. lib. 1.

Plutarch. de amore frat.

δεινὴ γὰρ ὀργὴ, ἢ διὰ φίλων φίλη,
ὅταν φίλοι φίλοισι συμβάλωσ' ἔριν.

Eurip. Medea.

When Love of friends is turn'd to Wrath, be sure
That Wrath is deepe, and scarce admits a Cure.

Another very usuall, but most evill cause of *Hatred*, is *Injury*, when a man because hee hath done wrong, doth from thence resolve to Hate him. Too many examples whereof there are in Writings both sacred and prophane: *Iosephs* Mistresse first *wronged* him in assaulting his chastity, and then *Hated* him and caused him to be cast into prison. *Ammon* first abused his sister *Tamar*, and then *Hated* her worse than before hee loved her. *Phædra* having solicited *Hippolitus* her

her husbands ſonne unto inceſt; being denyed, did after accuſe him to his father, and procure his ruine. And *Ariſtotle* propoſeth it as a Probleme, Why they, who corrupt and violate the chaſtity of any, doe after hate them? and gives this reaſon of it, becauſe they ever after looke on them, as guilty of that ſhame and ſadneſſe, which in the ſinne they contracted. This cauſe of Hatred *Seneca* and *Tacitus* have both obſerved as a thing uſuall with proud and inſolent men, firſt to *Hurt* then to *Hate*.

Probl. Sect. 4. Sect. 11.

Proprium humani ingenii odiſſe quos laeſerit. Tacit. vit. Agri. & Senec. de Ird l. 2. c. 33.

And the reaſon is firſt, becauſe injurie is the way to make a man, who is wronged, an enemy; & the proper affection, which reſpecteth an enemy is Hatred. Againe, he who is wronged, if equall or above him that hath done the wrong, is then feared: and *Oderunt quos metuunt*, it is uſuall to hate thoſe whom we feare: if inferiour, yet the memory and ſight of him doth upbraid with guilt, & affect with an unwilling & unwelcome review of the ſinne, whereby he was wronged; and Pride ſcornes reproofe, and loves not to be under him in Guilt, whom it overtops in Power: for Innocence doth alwaies give a kind of ſuperiority unto the perſon that is wronged; beſides, Hatred is a kind of Apologie for wrong: For if a man can perſwade himſelfe to hate him whom he hath injured, he will begin to beleeve that hee deſerved the injury which was offered unto him; every man being naturally willing to find the firſt inducement unto his ſinne, rather in another than himſelfe.

The next cause (which I shall observe) is *Feare*, I meane slavish Feare: for as Love excludeth Feare; so Feare begetteth Hatred; and it is ever seene: *Qui terribiles sunt, timent*: they that terrifie others doe feare them, as well knowing that they are themselves hated: for as *Aristotle* speaketh, *Nemo quem metuit, amat*; no man loves him whom he feares: which is the same with that of Saint *Iohn*, *Love casteth out Feare*: not a *Reverend*, submisssive, awfull *feare*; not a *cautelous*, vigilant and obedient *feare*; not a *feare* of *Admiration*, nor a *feare* of *Subjection*; but a *feare* of *slavery* and of Rebellion, all flashes of Horrour, all the tossings and shipwracks of a torne mind, all the tremblings of a tormented spirit; briefely all evill and hurtfull feare. And this I beleeve is one principall reason of that malice and contempt of godlinesse, which shewes it selfe in the lives of Atheisticall and desperately wicked men, which as it ariseth out of the corruption of nature, so is it marveilously enraged by the fearefull expectation of that fiery vengeance, which their pale and guilty consciences doe already preoccupate; for as their conscience dictates, that they deserve to be hated by God; so their stubbornesse and malice concludes that they will hate him againe; *Let us eate and drinke, for to morrow we shall dye.*

There may be a double root of this *Feare*, outward and inward. The *outward* is the cruelty and oppression which we suffer from the potent, and thereupon the lesse avoidable malice of the person hated (as it was the speech of *Caligula*, *Oderint*

rint dum metuant) And herein our Averſation (if it obſerve that generall rule of goodneſſe in paſſions, Subordination to Reaſon and Piety) is, not onely allowable, but naturall, while it extends it ſelfe no further than the Evil which we wrongfully ſuffer. For I cannot but think that the ſpittle and ſcourges, the thornes and buffets, the reed and knees of thoſe mocking and blaſphemous Iewes were ſo many drops of that full Cup, which He, who knew no ſinne, was ſo deepely deſirous to have paſſe from him.

But then next, the *inward* root of Feare is the *guilt* and burthen of an uncleane and uncovered Conſcience, for Pollution and weakeneſſe is naked, muſt needs be fearefull. And therefore that inference of *Adam* had truth in it, *I was afraid, becauſe I was naked*: for having diſrobed himſelfe of Originall righteouſneſſe, hee was thereupon afraid of the curſe and ſummons of an offended juſtice. Now from this *feare* may ariſe a double hatred; an hatred of a mans owne Conſcience: for an evill man οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἔχει as the Philoſopher ſpeakes, is not a friend unto himſelfe, but flies and labours to runne away from himſelfe, and is never in ſo bad company, as when he is alone, becauſe then he keeps company with his owne Conſcience.

Ethic. lib. 9. cap. 4. διὸ καὶ τὰς κόλασις ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς πλείστους ἐπὶ τὰ τιμωρίας ἐπὶ τοὺς μισοῦντας. *Scholiaſt. in Sophocl. in Oedip. Tyr.*

Which is the reaſon why ſome mens hatred of themſelves hath proceeded ſo far, as to make themſelves the Inſtruments of that ſmall meaſure of Annihilation, which they are capable of. Wherein notwithſtanding they diſcover, how

farre their fury ſhould extend againſt themſelves if they were as omnipotent to effect, as they are ready to deſire it: for he that hates a thing, would if he were able, purſue it even unto not being. There is no man but hath a naturall hatred of Toads, Serpents, Vipers, and the like venemous Creatures. And yet that man which hates them moſt, if his Conſcience be naked and let looſe to flye upon him, if that worme that never dies (unleſſe killed with our Saviours blood) begin thorowly to ſting and gnaw him, would thinke himſelfe a wiſe Merchant, if he could exchange beeings with the worſt of theſe. The Worme and Viper of Conſcience is of all the Creatures the moſt ugly and hateſull. A wicked man, when he doth diſtinctly know himſelfe, doth love every thing, ſave God, better than himſelfe.

Juvenal. ——— *Diri conſcia facti*
Mens habet attonitos & ſurdo verbere cædit
Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum.

The mind being conſcious of ſome dire offence,
Fils them with feares; a Torturer from thence
Shaketh, and with redoubled blowes doth urge
The unheard laſhes of an hidden ſcourge.

Nor can I eſteeme this a corrupt, though it be a miſerable paſſion; for as a bad man is to himſelfe the worſt, ſo is he by conſequence the hateſulleſt of all Creatures.

The ſecond *Hatred*, which may ariſe from that

Feare

Feare which is cauſed by a ſecret *guilt* of minde, is of all others moſt corrupt and rancorous, namely an hatred of the Authors or Executioners of Iuſtice; of the equity and juſtneſſe of whoſe proceedings, we are from within convinced; ſuch as is the malice and blaſphemy of malefactors againſt the Iudge, and of Devils and damned men againſt God and his righteous judgments, which yet they cannot but acknowledge that they moſt worthily doe endure: for it is the nature of proud and ſtubborne creatures (as was before obſerved) *Odiſſe quos læſerint*, firſt to wrong God, and then to hate him.

Another particular cauſe of this paſſion may be a *Diſparity* of Affections and Deſires: for notwithſtanding there bee many times *Hatred* where there is *Similitude* (as thoſe beaſts and birds commonly hate one another, which feed upon the ſame common meat, as the Philoſopher obſerveth) and ſundry men hate their owne vices in others, as if they had not the trade of ſinne enough to themſelves, except they got a Monopoly, and might ingroſſe it; yet this ever proceeds from an apprehenſion of ſome enſuing inconveniences which are likely to follow there-from, as hath beene formerly noted: So that in that very ſimilitude of *Natures*, there is a diſagreement of *ends*, each one reſpecting his owne private benefit. *Hiſt. Animal.*

Now the *Corruptions* herein are to be attended according to the Nature of that *diſparity* whereon the paſſion is grounded; which ſometimes is

Morall,

Morall, wherein it is laudable to hate the vitious courses, in which any man differres from us, or we our selves from the right rule of Life; so that the passion redound not from the quality to the person, nor breake out into an endeavour of his disgrace and ruine, except it bee in such a case, when our owne dignity or safety, which wee are bound more to regard, being assaulted, is in danger to be betrayed, unlesse prevented by such a speedy Remedy. Sometimes this *Disparity* may be in actions *Civill*, and with respect to society: and then as the opposition, which hatred discovereth, may be principally seene in two things; *Opposition* of a mans *Hopes*, and of his *Parts* and abilities, by crossing the one, and undervalewing the other: So corruption may easily proceed from two violent and unreasonable grounds, *Ambition* and *Selfe-love*; the one pursuing its hopes, the other reflecting upon its worth. And to this particular may be reduced, that *Hatred*, which ariseth out of a *Parity of Desire*, as amongst *Competitors* for the same Dignitie, or Corrivalls for the same Love, or Professours of the same Arte, either by reason of Covetousnesse, or Envy, or ambition, a greedy desire of their owne, or a discontented sight of anothers good.

Mallem hic primus esse, quàm Romæ secundus. Cæsar de oppidulo quodam dum Alpes transiret Plutarch.

Nec quenquam jam ferre potest Cæsar vè priorem
Pompeiusve, parem——

Thus two great Rulers doe each other hate,
Cæsar no Better brookes, *Pompey* no mate.

And

And theſe are very unfit affections for ſociety, when private love of men to themſelves ſhall devoure the love which they owe unto their Country. More noble was the behaviour of *Themiſtocles*, and *Ariſtides*, who when they were ever imployed in the publique ſervice of State, left all their private enmities in the borders of their own Country, and did not reſume them til they returned, and became private men againe. *Plutarch. de gerund. Rep.*

The laſt cauſe which I ſhall obſerve of *Hatred* may bee a *ſetled* and permament *Intuition* of the object, a penetrating, jealous, and interpreting fancy: becauſe by this means a redoubled ſearch and review doth generate a kinde of habituall deteſtation; it being the nature of Evill commonly to ſhew worſe at the ſecond or third view. And that firſt, becauſe the former Act doth worke a prejudice, and thereby the after apprehenſion comes not naked, but with a fore-ſtalled reſolution of finding Evill therein: and next, becauſe from a ſerious and faſtened ſearch into the Object the faculty gaineth a greater acquaintance with it, and by conſequence a more vehement diſlike of it, the former knowledge being a maſter and light unto the latter. But light and wandring fancies (though they may bee more ſudden in the apprehenſive of Evill, and by conſequence liable to an oftner Anger, yet by reaſon of the volubility of the minde joyned with an infirmity and unexerciſe of memory, they are for this cauſe the leſſe ſubject to deepe and rooted hatred.

Vnto this Head may bee referred that *Hatred* which ariseth from excessive *Melancholy*, which maketh men sullen, morose, solitary, averse from all society, and Haters of the light, delighting onely like the [a] Shrieke-Owle or the Bitterne in desolate places, and [b] monuments of the dead. This is that which is called [c] λυκανθρωπία, when men fancy themselves transformed into Wolves and Dogs, and accordingly hate all Humane society. Which seemeth to have bin the distemper of [d] *Nebuchadnezzar*, when hee was thrust out from men, and did eate grasse with the beasts. [e] *Timon* the Athenian was upon this ground branded with the name of μισάνθρωπος, The *Man Hater*, because he kept company with no man, but onely with *Alcibiades*, whereof he gave this only account, because hee thought that man was borne to doe a great deale of mischiefe. And we read even in the [f] Histories of the Church, of men so marvelously averse from all converse or correspondence with men; that they have for their whole lives long, some of sixty, others of ninety yeares, immured themselves in Cels and silence, not affording to looke on the faces of their neerest kindred, when they travelled farre to visit them. So farre can the opinion of the minde, actuated and furthered by the melancholy of the body, transport men even out of humane disposition, which the [g] Philosopher telleth us is naturally a lover of Society, and therefore he saith that such men are usually given to contention, the signe and the fruit of hatred.

n Zeph. 2. 14. Isa. 34. 11. 14, 15
b Matth. 8. 28.
c Herodote de Neuris in Melpom. Plin. lib. 8 c. 22. Virgil. Eclog 8. Pompon. Mela de situ orbis l. 2 Wierus de præstig. dæmon. l. 3. c. 21. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 18. c. 17. Olaus mag. de Reg. Septentr. lib. 18. c. 45. 46. 47. Luci. in Asine.
d Dan. 5. 21.
e Cicer. de Amicit. & lib. 4. Tuscul. quæst. Suidas in Timon. Plutarchus in Alcibiade & Antonio. Laert. in Timone. Turneb. Adversar. l. 24. cap. 33.
f Socr. l. 4. c. 18. Theodoret. l. 4. dap. 26. Sozom. l. 6. c. 29.
g Aristot. polit. lib. 1. cap. 2.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIIII.

Of the Quality and Quantity of Hatred, and how in either respects it is to bee regulated.

I Proceed now unto the consideration of this Passion in the *Quantity* and *Quality* of its Acts: which must bee observed according to the *Evill* of the Object: for if that be *unchangeable*, there is required a continual *Permanency* of the Passion in regard of the disposition of the Mind: or if it be *Importunate* and Assaulting, there is required a more frequent *repetition* of the Act. The same likewise is to bee said of the *Quality* of it; for if the Evill be of an Intense and more Invincible nature, our Hatred must arme us the more: if more Low and remisse, the Passion may bee the more negligent.

Here then is a fourefould direction of the Quantities and Qualities of our Hatred, and it will hold proportion in the other passions. First the unalterableness of the Evill, warrants the continuance of our hatred. Secondly, the importunity and insinuation of it warrants the Reiteration of our hatred. Thirdly, and fourthly, the greatness and the Remission of it requires a proportionable intention and moderation of hatred.

We may instance for the three former in sinne, so much the worst of Evils, by how much it is a remotion from the best of Goods.

First then *Sinne* is in its owne formall and abstracted nature, *Vnchangeable*, though not in respect of the subject, in whom it dwelleth; for a Creature now bad, may by the mercy of God bee repaired and restored againe; but this is not by a changing, but by a forsaking of Evill, by a removing of it, not by a new molding it into another frame. Sinne then remaineth in its owne Nature unchangeable and alwaies evill, and the reason is becausse it is a Transgression of a *perpetuall Law*, and a Remotion from an *unalterable Will*: Sinne then is to bee hated with a continuall and peremptory hatred. But in other things there is according to the nature of their evils required a conditionall and more flexible dislike, they being evils that have, either some good annexed unto them; or such as are of a mutable nature. And therefore wee see that in most things the variety of Circumstances doth alter the good or evill of them, and so makes the passions thereabout conversant, alterable likewise. Otherwise men may naturally deprive themselves of those contents and advantages, which they might receive by reasonable use of such indifferent things as they formerly for inconveniences now removed, did dislike. And in *Morality* likewise much dammage might be inferred, both to private persons and to the publique by nourishing such private enmities and being peremptory in continuing those former

mer differences, which, though happily then entertained upon reasonable grounds, may yet afterwards prove so much the more harmefull, by how much the more danger is to be feared from the distemper of a growne and strong, than of a vanishing and lighter passion.

Secondly, Againe as no evill altogether so unchangeable as *Sinne*, so is there nothing so much to be opposed with a *Multiplicity* and Reiteration of our hatred in regard of its *importunity* and insinuation, that as there is an impudence in the assault, so there may be a proportionable resolution in the withstanding of it: Some Evils there may be, which require onely a present and not a customary exercise of this passion. Present I say when the Object is offensive and not customary; because as the Object, so the Passion likewise may be unusuall. Sinne onely is of all other evils the most urging and active, furnished with an infinite number of stratagems and plausible impostures to insinuate into natures (though best armed against such assaults; and therefore here onely are necessary such reiterated acts, as may keepe us ever on our guard, that we be not unprepared for a surprize.

Thirdly, Then for the *Quantity* of an Evill, because that is not in any thing so *intense* as in *Sinne* whither wee consider it in its owne Nature, as a Rebellion against the highest good, or in its effects; either in regard of the diffusion of it, it being an overspreading pollution, or of the vastnesse of it, both in Guilt and Punishment: In

these respects our *Hatred* of it cannot be too deep or rooted: whereas other evils are not so intense in their nature, nor so diffusive in their Extension, nor so Destructive in their Consequents; and therefore do not require an unlimited Passion, but one governed according to the Exigence of Circumstances.

And here I shall take notice of one or two particulars touching the manner of corruption in this particular. As first when a man shal apply his *Hatred of Prosequution*, or ill willing against that Evill, which is the proper object onely of *Aversation*: for some things there are onely of conditionall evills, which hurt not by their own absolute being, but by their particular use or presence, which being offensive onely in their application requires a particular forbearance, not any further violence to their natures.

μισῶ γὰρ ἐχθρὸν μὲν φίλου γενναίου πολὺ δ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ὅστις ἐλεύθερον φρενῶν. *Sophoc. Aiax.*

Secondly, a Corruption in regard of Intension is either when the passion admits not of any admixtion of Love, when yet the object admits of an admixtion of good; or when the hatred is absolute against onely relative Evills. There is not any man betwixt whose naturall faculties and some particular courses or objects, there is not some manner of antipathy and disproportion (it being the Providence of divine dispensation so variously to frame and order mens fancies, as that no man shall have an Independance or selfe sufficiency, nor say unto the other members I have no need of you; but there should bee such a mutuall Ministry and assistance amongst men, as where-

whereby might bee ever upheld thoſe eſſentiall vertues of humane ſociety, *Vnity* and *Charity*, no mann being able to liue without the aide of others; nor to upbraid others with his owne ſervice. Now in this caſe, if any man, who either out of the narrowneſſe and incapacity, or out of the reluctancy and antipathy of his owne mind, is indiſpoſed for ſome courſes of life or ſtudy, ſhall preſently fall to a profeſſed vilifying of them, or to an undervalewing of Perſons, who with a more particular affection delight in them, or to a deſire of the not being of them, as things utterly unuſefull, becauſe hee ſees not what uſe himſelfe can have of them, he doth herein diſcover as much abſurdity in ſo peremptory a diſlike as a blinde man ſhould doe in wiſhing the Snnne put out, not conſidering that hee himſelfe receiveth benefit at the ſecond hand from that very light, the beauty whereof hee hath no immediate acquaintance withall.

For as too exceſſively to doate on the fancie of any particular thing may prove harmefull, as appeareth in the Poeticall fable of *Midas*, whoſe unſatiable deſire to have every thing that he touched turned to gold, ſtarved him with hunger; and ſo what hée out of too exceſſive loue made his Idoll, became his ruine; (as many men need none other enemy to undoe them than their owne deſires.) So on the ~~other ſide, the extreame~~ *Hatred* of any thing may be equally inconvenient; as we ſee intimated in that other fable of the ſervants, who when they had, out of an extreme malice againſt

gainst the poore Cock, at whose early crow, their covetous master every day roused them unto their labour, killed him, and so (as they thought) gotten a good aduantage to their lazinesse, were every day by the vigilancy of their master, whose Couetousnesse now began to crow earlier than his Cock, called from their sleepe sooner than they are before; till at length they began to wish for that, which the rashnesse and indiscretion of their hatred had made away. And therefore when we goe about any thing out of the dictates of Passion, it is a great point of Wisedom, first to consider whither we our selves may not afterwards be the first men, who shall wish it undone againe.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Good and Evill Effects of Hatred. Cautelousneſſe and Wiſedome to profit by that we hate, with Confidence, Victory, Reformation. Hatred is Generall againſt the whole kind, Cunning, Diſsimulation, Cruelty, running over to Perſons Innocent, violating Religion. Envie, Rejoycing at Evill. Crooked Suſpition. Contempt. Contumely.

NOw proceed to the Conſequents or Effects of this Paſſion: And firſt for the uſefull and profitable Effects thereof, which may be theſe.

Firſt, a *Cautelouſneſſe* and fruitfull *Wiſedome* for our own welfare to prevent danger, and to reape benefit from that, which is at enmitie with us. For we ſhall obſerve in many evils that no man is brought within the danger, who is not firſt drawne into the love of them. All inordinate corruptions then moſt deſperately wound the Soule, when they beguile and entangle it. But the greateſt uſe of this *Caution* is to learne how to benefit by the *Hatred* of others, and as learned Phyſitians doe, to make an Antidote of Poyſon. For as many venemous creatures are

Quod de Cantharide obſervavit Plutarc lib. de ſerâ numinis vindictâ

Venenum aliquando pro remedio fuit. Sen. de Benef. l. 2. c. 18.

by Arte used to cure the wounds, and repaire the injuries, which themselves had made (Naturall Attraction, as it were, calling home that poyson which injurie and violence had misplaced:) So the malice and venome of an Enemy may by wisdome be converted into a Medicine, and by managing become a benefit, which was by him intended for an injury. Or to use the excellent similitude of *Plutarch*, As healthy and strong beasts doe eate and concoct Serpents, whereas weake stomacks do nauseate at delicates: so wise men do exceedingly profit by the hatred of their enemies, whereas fooles are corrupted with the love of their friends; ond an injury doth one man more good, then a courtesie doth another. As Wind and Thunder when they trouble the Ayre, doe withall purge it; whereas a long calme doth dispose it to putrifaction: or as the same Whetstone that takes away from a weapon, doth likewise sharpen it; so a Wise man can make use of the detraction of an enemy to grow the brighter and the better by it. And therefore when *Cato* advised that *Carthage* should be utterly destroyed, *Scipio Nascica* perswaded the contrary upon these reasons, that it was needful for *Rome* to have alwaies some enemies, which by a kind of antiperistasis might strengthen & keep alive its vertue, which otherwise by security might be in danger of languishing and degenerate into luxury. For as the Israelites, when there was no Smith amongst them did sharpen their instruments with the Philistins; so indeed an enemy doth serve to

Plutarch. de capiend. ex hostibus utilit. Cæl. Rhodigin. Antiq. lect. l. 5. cap. 17.

Florus. lib. 2.

1 Sam. 13. 20.

quicken

quicken and put an edge upon thoſe vertues, which by lying unexerciſed might contract ruſt and dullneſſe, and many times when the reaſons of the thing it ſelf will not perſwade, the Feare of giving advantage to an Enemy, or of gratifying him, will over-rule a man, leſt hereby he give his foes matter of Inſultation.

Hoc Ithacus velit & magno mercentur Atridæ.

This makes our foes rejoyce; they would have bought
With a great price thoſe crimes we doe for nought.

Thus as a Sink by an houſe makes all the houſe the cleaner, becauſe the Sordes are caſt into that: Or as they obſerve that Roſes and Violets are ſweeteſt, which grow neare unto Garlick and other ſtrong ſented Herbes, becauſe theſe draw away unto them any fetid or noxious nouriſhment: ſo the eye and neareneſſe of an enemy ſerveth by exciting *Caution* and diligence to make a mans life more fruitfull and orderly, then otherwiſe it would have beene, that we may take away occaſion from them that would ſpeake reproachfully. And thus *Hector* ſharpely reproving the Cowardice of his brother *Paris* (who had beene the onely cauſe of the Warre and calamity) when he fled from *Menelaus*, draweth his rebuke from hence, and telleth him that he was,

πατρὶ μέγα πῆμα, πόλει τε παντὶ τε λαῷ, *Iliad.* γ. 51.
δυσμενίοισιν μὲν χάρμα, &c.

To Father, City, People, losse and blame;
Joy to his foes, and to himselfe a shame.

Secondly, Hatred worketh *Confidence* and some Presumption and good assurance of our owne, or some assisting strength against evils. Which ariseth first out of the former: for *Cautelousnesse* or Furniture against the onset of evil cannot but make the mind more resolute in its owne defence, than if it were left naked without Assistance. Againe, of all others, this is one of the most *confident Passions*, because it moves not out of sudden perturbations, but is usually seconded and backt with Reason, as the Philosopher observes; and ever the more *Counsell*, the more *Confidence*. Besides, being a deepe and severe Passion, it proportionably calleth out the more strength to execute its purposes. There is no Passion, that intendeth so much evil to another, as *Hatred*; *Anger* would onely bring *Trouble*; but *Hatred*, *Mischiefe*; Anger would onely *Punish* and Retaliate, but Hatred would *Destroy*; for as the Philosopher notes, it seeketh the *not being* of what it Hates. A man may be Angry with his friend, but hee hates none but an enemy; and no man can will so much hurt to his friend, as to his enemy. Now the more hurt a passion doth intend, the more strength it must call out to execute that intention; and ever the more *strength*, the more *Confidence*.

Rhetor. l. 2. c. 4.

Thirdly it worketh some manner of *Victory* over the evill hated: for *Odium semper sequitur ex*

animi elatione, as *Scaliger* out of *Aristotle* hath observed, It ever ariseth out of pride and height of mind ὑπεροχῆς τινος ἐστὶν ἡ ὕβρις. Injury ever comes from some strength, and is a kind of Victory. For so farre forth as one is able to hurt another, he is above him. And this effect holds principally true in morall and practick courses; wherein I think it is a generall Rule: Hee in some measure loves an evill, who is overcome by it: for conquest in this nature is on the Will, which never chooseth an object till it love it. There onely we can have perfect conquest of sinne, where will be a perfect hatred of it. Here, in the best, there is but an incompleat restauration of Gods Image: the body of nature and the body of sinne are borne, and must die together.

Fourthly, it hath a good effect in regard of the evill hated in reasonable Creatures, namely the *Reformation* of the person, in whom that evill was. For as countenance and incouragement is the fosterer; so *Hatred* and contempt serveth sometimes as Phisick to purge out an evill. And the reason is because a great part of that goodnesse, which is apprehended to be in sinne, by those that pursue it, is other mens approbation. Opinion puts valew upon many uncurrent Coynes, which passe rather because they are receiued, than because they are warrantable. And therefore if a man naturally desirous of credit see his courses generally disliked, he can hardly so unnature himselfe, as still to to feed on those vanities, which hee seeth doe prouoke others unto loathing, though I confesse,

feſſe, it is not a perſwaſions of mens, but of Gods hatred of ſinne, which doth worke a genuine and thorow Reformation.

I now proceed to obſerve thoſe Effects, which are corrupt and hurtfull: and here wee may obſerve,

Firſt, the rule of *Ariſtotle*, whoſe maxime it is, that *Hatred* is alwaies κατὰ τὸ γένος against the *whole kinde* of its obje&: ſo then all the actions and effects of this Paſſion are corrupt, which are not *Generall*, but admit of private Reſervations and Indulgences. For ſince the nature and extent of the paſſion is ever conſidered with reference to its obje&, there muſt needs bee irregularity in that affection, when it is converſant about an uniforme nature with a various and differing motion. And this is manifeſtly true in that, which I made the principall obje& of a right hatred, *Sin*. In which, though there is no man, which finds not himſelfe more obnoxious and open to one kind than another (it being the long experienced policie of the Devill to obſerve the diverſe conditions of mens natures, conſtitutions, callings, and imployments; and from them to proportion the quality of his inſinuations upon the will;) inſomuch that a man may herein happily deceive himſelfe with an opinion of loathing ſome evils, with which, either his other occaſions ſuffer him not to take acquaintance, or the difficulty in compaſſing, diſgrace in practiſing, or other prejudices perſwade to a caſuall diſlike thereof, yet I ſay it is certaine, that if a mans *Hatred* of *Sinne* be not

not ~~in him~~ an *Vniverſall* and tranſcendent Hatred againſt all ſinne, even thoſe which his perſonall relations make more proper unto him, if hee doth ſtill retaine ſome privy exceptions, ſome reſerved and covered delights, be his pretences to others, or his perſwaſions to himſelfe what they will, this is rather a perſonated than a true hatred a meteor of the braine, than an affection of the Soule. For as in the good, ſo in the ill of things; notwithſtanding there ſeeme to be many contrarieties and diſſimilitudes (as *Seneca* ſaith) *Scelera diſſident*, that ſinnes do diſagree; yet indeed there is in that very contrariety ſuch an agreement againſt God (as in *Herod* and *Pilate* againſt *Chriſt*) as admits not of any, in order unto God, but a gathered and united paſſion. And hence is that of Saint *Iames*, *Hee that offendeth in one is guilty of all*; becauſe in that one hee contemneth that Originall Authority which forbad all. There are no tearmes of conſiſtence betweene love and hatred divided upon the ſame uniforme Object. It is not the materiall and blind performance of ſome good worke, or a ſervile and conſtrained obedience to the more bright and convicting parts of the Law, that can any more argue, either our true love to the Precept, or our hatred to the Sinne, than a voluntary patience under the hand of a Chirurgion can prove, either that we delight in our owne paine, or Abhorre our owne fleſh. It is not Gods Witneſſe within us, but his Word without us; not the Tyrannie of Conſcience, but the goodneſſe of the Law that doth kindly and genuinely

genuinely restraine the violence, and stop the Eruptions of our defiled nature. Or though perhaps Feare may prevent the exercise and sproutings, nothing but Love can pluck up the root of sinne. A *Lacedemonian* endeavouring to make a dead carcasse stand upright as formerly it had done while it was alive, and not effecting it, concluded that outward meanes would availe little except there were something *Within* to support it. It is certainely so in actions as it is in bodies. *Feare* as an outward prop may helpe a while to keepe them up, but *Love* is the inward forme and life of them, without which they will quickly faint and fall againe.

Plutarch. Apothegm. Laconi.

Secondly, Another evill effect of hatred is a *close* and cunning *Dissimulation* in suppressing of it, and palliating it with pretences of faireneſſe and plausibility, till it have a full advantage to put forth it selfe. For by this meanes is the *passion strengthned*, and the *Person*, whom it respects, *weakned*: this by incautelousneſſe and *Credulity*; (for common Charity, when it sees no signes of malice, will not easily suspect it) that by Restraint and *Suppression*; for any thing the more united, the more weighty it is: and as Winde, so Passions, the closer it is pent, the more strength it gathereth. *Plutarch* compareth it unto fire raked under ashes, and reserved untill another day, when we have some use of it. Which disposition the Historian hath often observed in *Tiberius* (whose principall vertue was Dissimulation) who being offended in the Senate with some words

Vide Senec. Epist. 103.

words ſpoken by *Hatevius* and *Scaurus*; the Hiſtorians obſervation upon it is this. *In Hatevium ſtatim invectus; Scaurum, cui implacabilius iraſcebatur, ſilentio tramiſit.* The one he rebuked; but the other whom he more implacably hated, hee paſſed by with ſilence. And elſewhere upon occaſion, *Quæ in præſens civiliter habuit, ſed in animo revolvente iras, etiamſi impetus affectionis languerat, memoria valebat.* Though hee ſeemed to take what was ſpoken courteouſly, yet hee laid it up in his minde, and though the heate of Paſſion, by being ſuppreſſed, did languiſh, the memory and grudge remained ſtrong ſtill. In which words the Hiſtorian hath expreſſed that excellent deſcription of the ſame quality in *Homer*.

Tacit. Anal. lib. 1.

Anal. lib. 4. Statuit reponere odium donec impetus fama & favor exercitus langueret de Domitian. in vita Agric.

Ἰλιὰς χ. 81.
Διογ. Laert. l. 7 μῆνις ὑγὲ ἐπέεσσι.
Διὰ τοῦτο τὸν χόλον τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγκείμενον. πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ τὸν θυμὸν ἐκπονοῦσιν.
Euripid. Medea. 119.

Iliad χ. 81.
Low men with a Kings wrath are quite oppreſt,
For though he ſeeme the ſame day to digeſt
The heate of's Paſſion, yet he ſtill reſerves
Cloſe Anger in his breaſt till fit time ſerves.

Whereunto agreeth that of the Tragedian.

Senec. Traged. Medea.

Ira quatenus nocet
Profeſſa perdunt odia vindictæ locum.

Anger thats hid gives surer blowes.
But profest hate doth revenge lose.

Aperta Odia palam de pelli, fraudem & dolum Obscura, eoque inevitabilia. Tacit. Hist. lib. 4. Plutarch. Apophth. & in Fabio.

And therefore *Hannibal* was wont to say that hee was more afraid of *Fabius* when hee did nothing, than of *Marcellus* when he did fight, of the one mans closeneſſe, than of the others boldneſſe.

Aristotle, & Iuvenal. Vindicta malum quo non iucundius ullum.

And the reason why of all the Passions this of hatred can thus smother and suppresse it selfe is, because it doth not affect the heart with trouble or sadnesse (which affection the soule loves not long to hold fast) but with a perverse joy and delight in pondring the contrivances of Revenge (which the Philosopher and the Poet have placed amongst the Objects of Delight.)

Ælian. de Animal. l. 5. c. 40.

Now of all the waies whereby this passion is suppresst, the most hatefull to God and man is, when men doe palliate and shrowd their malice under pretences of Love, and praise men unto ruine. Like the Panther which with his sweet breath allureth other Creatures to come unto him, and when they are come, devoureth them. *Pessimum inimicorum genus laudantes*, of all kinds of enemies those are the worst, which as the Prophet speakes, doe *breake mens heads with oyle*, and make a poyson of their owne merits to kill them with praises, as *Achilles* spake in the Poet.

Tacit. Ann. 4. Διὰ ἐχθρῶν φίλων ἀφικόμενος.

Sophoc. in Aiac.

Iliad. 9. 313. Salust. in Catil.

Ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν,
Ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἄλλο δὲ βάζῃ.

That man's as odious to me as hell gates,
Who with his mouth ſpeakes faire, with his heart hates.

And it was wicked counſell which *Theognis* gave to his *Cyrnus*, amongſt ſo many ſage and morall precepts, like a dead flye in a pot of oyntment.

Ἠδὲ κακὸν κακὸν ἐχθρὸν ἐὼν μάλα μηχανόωτο ἔλθειν,
ὥστε μιν, ἀσφαλέως μηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔπος.

Fawne on thy Foe, till he be in thy will,
Then, without Reaſons give revenge her fill.

It is a quality of all others moſt diſtant from nobleneſſe and ingenuitie of mind, for generous ſpirits will acknowledg with honour and love the vertues of their enemies; as *Fabritius Lucinus*, when many were competitours for the Conſulſhip gave his ſuffrage to *Cornelius Ruffinus*, the worthieſt of the Company, though hee were his bitter enemie: and *Ceſar* cauſed the demolliſhed ſtatues of *Pompey* to be erected againe, not ſuffering the honor of ſo brave a Commander (though his enemie) to bleed and languiſh under his eye. Whereupon *Cicero* told him that in reſtoring the Statues of *Pompey* he had faſtned and made ſure his owne. And *Publius Scipio* made none other uſe of his Enmity with *Tiberius Graechus*, than to diſpoſe his daughter unto him in marriage, becauſe at that time when he was ſure to judg with leaſt favour and partiality, he found him to bee a

ἐχθρὸς οὐ λύκῳ, οὐδὲ γυναῖκες. *Sophoc. Ibid.*

A. Gellius lib. 4 cap. 8.

Plutarch. de capium ex hoſtibus util.

Homer Il. a. 48. ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐχθρὸν μειλιόσσομαι, ἠδέ κε λώιον ἦσιν *Theogn.*

Aul. Gell. l. 12. c. 8. Liv. lib. 38.

vertuous and deseruing man. And the Emperour *Adrian*, to shew that he esteemed *Hatred* retained a base and un-princely disposition, as soone as hee came to the Empire, he layd aside all his former enmities, in so much as then meeting one, who had beene his capitall enemy, he said unto him, *Evasisti*, thou art now escaped from my displeasure.

Ælius Spartia. in Hadrian.

Thirdly, Another evill effect of Hatred is *cruelty*; for it * seeketh (as I noted out of the Philosopher) the *Not-being* of that which it hates: and therefore among the Egyptians, a * Fish was the Hieroglyphick of Hatred, because of all Creatures they doe most devoure one another. And thus *Achilles* in the Poet expresseth his hatred of *Hector*, when he besought him to bestow upon his dead body an honourable buriall.

* μίσος ἐπιθυμία τοῦ κακοῦ εἶναι τινι μετὰ ὀργῆς τιμωρητικῆς. Diog. Laert. lib. 7. Clem. Alex. Pædag. l. 2. c. 8. Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 5. & lib. 1.

Αἰ γάρ πως ἀντίον μὲν ἰὼν καὶ θυμὸς ἀνώγοι
ὠμὰ μεσηγὺ φάγμεν κῆλα δ' ἅμαντα

Iliad χ. 345.

I would my mind would give me leave to gnaw
Thy Flesh in morsells and to eate it raw.

And the like like expressions we finde of the cruelty of *Tiberius*, a man full of rancour.

Fastidit vinum, quia jam sitit iste Cruore,
Tam bibit hunc avidè, quàm bibit antè merum.

Sueton Tiber. c. 19.

He loaths all Wine for Blood, & now with more Greedy delight drinkes this than that before.

Hatred

Hatred contenteth not it ſelfe with the death of an Enemie, but is many times prodigious in the manner of it, and after out-lives that which it hateth, inſulting with pride and indignities over the dead bodie which cannot complaine, nor otherwiſe, but by its owne loathſomneſſe revenge it ſelfe. *Caligula*, that monſter of men, when hee commanded any to bee ſlaine, gave this charge with it, *Ita ferì ut ſe mori ſentiat*, that hee ſhould periſh with ſuch lingring blows, as that he might feele himſelfe to dye. And he often commanded aged men to ſtand by and looke upon the ſlaughter of their children, and after would force them unto mirth and feaſting, for feare of their others which were left alive; for to have mourned for one, would have forfeited the others. And for indignities offered unto dead bodies, there is nothing, which more frequently occurreth. The Philiſtines cut off the head of *Saul* and ſent it in Triumph up and downe their Country. And the Hiſtorian notes of *Otho* that he never looked with more inſatiable delight upon any ſpectacle, than the head of *Piſo* his enemy. So when the Grecians ſaw the dead body of *Hector*, every man (as the Poet deſcribes it) did beſtow a ſtab, and a contempt upon it. But above all moſt hatefull was the cruelty of *Marc. Antonius* and his wife *Fulvia*, ſhewed on the dead body of *Cicero* the glory of the Romane eloquence, they cut off his head and his hands, ſetting them in contempt, where he was wont to deliver thoſe excellent Orations; from whence they tooke it to their Table, and

Sutton. de Cal. & in Tiber. c. 61.

Ib. in Calig.

Senec. de Ira. lib. 2. c. 33.

ἐ θέαμα, ὃ θάνατον τὸν ἐχθρὸν λύπης, ἐ᾽ ἐᾳ μεθῆ κρὸς Sophoc. Aiax.

Tacit. hiſt. lib. 1

Capita hoſtium in conto præfigi ſolita. Apud Ioſ. lib. 14.

Virg. Æneid. 2. Ipſum Hectora ſæpe circum Troiam, & Exuviæ. Hercul furens.

Pet. Crinit. lib. 1. cap. 8. Plutarch. in Ciceron.

Fulvia curſing it and ſpitting upon it, pulled out the tongue (which all ages have admired) out of the mouth, and pricked it full of holes with her needle or bodkin; to ſhew that malice would ever doe miſchiefe to a man in his nobleſt and higheſt treaſure: as we ſee in that deſperate Italian, who having his enemy in his mercy, firſt made him (in hope to eſcape) to renounce his religion and ſalvation, and then preſently ſlew him; that as farre, as was in his power, hee might kill his ſoule, as well as his body.

Sext. Titius quod habuit imaginem L. Saturnini domi ſuæ condemnatus. Cic. pro Rabirio.

But yet further *Hatred* doth not content it ſelf to be *Cruell* to the perſon hated, but runneth over from him unto others, that have any relation to him, though never ſo innocent: As we ſee in *Haman*, who though onely diſpleaſed with the neglect of *Mordecai*, thought ſcorne to lay hands on him alone, and therefore plotted the ruine of all the Iewes. And it is noted by Hiſtorians, that when *Sejanus* fell, the ſtorme lighted on his Family and friends as well as on himſelf: as is alſo obſerved in the puniſhment of the conſpiracy againſt *Nero* detected by *Millichus*. And *Themiſtocles* (though innocent) was like to have ſuffered in a crimination of Treaſon, onely for being a friend unto *Pauſanias*. Yea ſo over flowing is this Quality, that it will ſometimes ſtrike a friend rather than not reach an enemy. It was a wicked profeſſion of *Darius*, *Pereat cum inimico amicus*, Let my friend rather periſh with mine Enemy, than mine Enemy eſcape by my friend. And hence it is obſerved of *Ariſtides*, that he was wont to propoſe

Tacit. Anal. lib. 3. 6. Suet. Tib. c. 61. Anal. lib. 15. Plutarch. de cap. ex baſ. util. & Curt. lib. 7.

Plutarch de Adulat. & Amic. Plutarch. In Ariſtid.

poſe ſuch advices as hee knew did conduce unto publick weale by ſome other men and not from himſelfe, leaſt *Themiſtocles* out of hatred of his perſon, ſhould have withſtood and impedimented a generall good. But *Ajax* in the Poet went yet higher.

ἐχθρὸν—ἐκδῦναι—— Sophoc. in Ajac.
κἀμὲ δυσπρᾶξαι θάνατος.

So I may ſlay mine Enemy,
Let the ſame ruine ſwallow me.

And the principall reaſons of this overflowing of hatred are *Feare* and *Cowardice*; for he, who hateth the Father, and ſheweth cruelty unto him, doth uſually feare the Sonne, leſt be riſe up in his fathers quarrell: and hence is that maxime of cruell policy, Forſan futurum ultor extillì patrìi. Senec. Troas.

Νήπιος ὅστις πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει. Staſinus apud Clem. Alex. Strom. 6. Hom. Odyſſ. 7. 307.

That man's unwiſe who doth the father ſlay,
And leaves the Sonnes his quarrell to repay.

For wee know *Oreſtes* revenged his fathers quarrell and blood upon *Ægiſthus*.

And beſides *cruelty* doth uſually proceed from *cowardice*, as *Amianus Marcellinus* hath obſerved, and fearefull men, when they have any advantage to be cruell, doe ſeldome hold any meaſure therein, as being ever in doubt, if they leave any

Odium etiam Timor parat. Tertul. Apol. cap. 26. Vicium animi ex mollitie naſci conſuetum. Am. Marc. l. 27. & Ariſt. Rhetor. lib. 2.

any fire unquenched, that themſelves ſhall bee burned with it. And therefore wee never read of any Emperours, which were more cruell, than thoſe who were moſt fearefull and effeminate, as *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Commodus*, *&c.* As they ſay that wounded beaſts, when they die, bite hardeſt; their feare and deſpaire making them furious: So there is no wrath or *Cruelty* to that which proceeds from *weakneſſe*, when it hath either jealouſie, or advantage, or deſpaire to ſet it on. Yea, ſo violent it is, that it hath tranſported men unto *profaneſſe*, and made them violate Nature and Religion. As wee ſee in the cruelty of *Tiberius* towards the family of *Sejanus*, who, becauſe it was an unheard and prodigious thing for a little tender virgin to be ſtrangled, gave command that the daughter of that late Favourite, ſhould firſt be defloured, that ſo ſhee might bee the fitter to bee ſlaine. And *Boniface* the eighth Pope of that name being, according to the Ceremony of that Church, on Aſh-wedneſday to ſprinkle aſhes on the heads of ſuch Biſhops, as kneeled at his feet, and in ſome ſerious manner to mind them of their mortalities; when *Prochetus* Biſhop of *Genua*, whom he bitterly hated, tendered himſelfe at his feet to receive this Ceremony, he threw the Aſhes in his eyes, with this benediction, *A Gibelline* thou art, and as a *Gibelline* thou ſhalt die: ſo powerfull was his malice to profane the rites of his religion! Yea, ſo farre will hatred proceed in this deſperate contempt of God, that, if we may beleeve ſo prodigious a villany,

Sanct. de Ira lib. 1. c. 13.

Maximè mortiferi eſſe ſolent morſus morientium beſtiarum. Flor. lib. 2. c. 13.

Suet. Tiber. c. 61

Tacit. Anal. l. 5

Pet. Crinit. lib. 7. c. 13.

lany, it hath ſomtimes turned the very cup of the Lord into a Cup of poyſon: as it is reported of Pope *Victor* the third, that he was poyſoned in the Chalice at the Communion. Nether have there been wanting Examples of deſperate men, who have made the moſt holy parts of Religion, Vowes, and Sacraments, the Seales and Pledges of their conſpiracies in Malice: as once *Catiline* and his aſſociates did animate themſelves in their bloudy purpoſes, with drinking the bloud of a ſlaine Childe.

Martin. apud Plesin. in vit. Pont. 3.

Saluſt. in Cat. Florus lib. 4. Dion. lib. 37. Plut. in licen. & in Poplicol.

Now of all *Hatreds*, there are none more furious and unnaturall than thoſe which ariſe out of contrarieties in *Religion*; becauſe as a Stone, the higher the place is from whence it fals, doth give the more dangerous blow: no wound's ſo mortall, as that of a Thunder-bolt: ſo of all other thoſe Hatreds which make pretences unto Heaven, and which ariſe from motives of the higheſt Nature, are ever moſt deſperate and mortall. And therefore our Saviour tels us, that in this caſe men would forget all the bonds of naturall Obligation; inſomuch that the *Father would deliver his owne Childe, and the Children their Parents unto death.* As we find that the bloudy Hatred of *Cain* againſt *Abel* aroſe from the different acceptance of their Sacrifices. Neither is it any wonder if that enmity grow exceſſive, which hath *Zeale* to kindle it, and pretence of *Religion* to warrant it: For when that which ſhould reſtraine and ſet limits to a Paſſion, is made a party to ingage it, and ſewell to foment it, no wonder if a Paſſion

which hath no bounds from Religion, do impose none upon it selfe. And this occasion of mutuall *Hatred*, wee finde observed even in the ridiculous superstitions of Egypt, when one Towne would kill and eat the flesh of another in zeale to the Sheep, or Calves, or Dragons, which they did severally worship.

Modum tenere in eo difficile est quod bonum esse credideramus. Senec. Ep. 23.
Plut. de Isid. & Osir. Juvenal.

——— *Summus utrinq;*
Inde furor vulgo quòd Numina vicinorum,
Odit uterq; locus.

This caus'd their rage, this made their great debate:
One Towne did worship what the next did hate.

Another dangerous effect of *Hatred* is *Envy* and *Maligvitie* at the sight of anothers happines; and therefore *Envy* is called an *Evill Eye*, because all the diseases of the *Eye* make it offended with any thing that is light and shineth; as Vermine doe ever devoure the purest Corne, and Moaths eat into the finest Cloath, and the Cantharides blast the sweetest Floures. So doth *Envy* ever gnaw that which is most beautifull in another whom it hateth; and as the Vulture, draweth sickneſse from a perfume. For such is the condition of a rankorous Nature, as of a raw and angry wound, which feeles as great paine in the good of a Chirurgions, as in the ill offices of an Enemies hand, it can equally draw nourishment unto this Passion from the good and ill of whom it hates; yea and commonly greater too from the good than from the ill: For, *Odiorum acrior causa*

Arist. Rhetor. lib. 2. cap. 10. Plut. de Odio & Invidia.

Ælian. de Animal. lib. 3 c. 7. lib. 4 c. 18.

cauſa quando iniqua: When *Hatred* is built upon a bad foundation, it commonly raiſeth it ſelf the higher. And the reaſon is, becauſe in Paſſions of this Nature, the leſſe we have from the Object, the more we have from our ſelves, and what is defective to make up our malice in the demerit of him whom wee hate, is ſupplyed by the riſing of our owne ſtomacke: as we ſee in the body that thin and empty nouriſhment will more often ſwell it than that which is ſubſtantiall.

And therefore I thinke there are not any Examples of more implacable *Hatred*, than thoſe that are by *Envy* grounded on *Merit*. As *Tacitus* obſerves between the paſſages of *Domitian* and *Agricola*, that nothing did ſo much ſtrengthen the Emperours hatred againſt that worthy Man, as the generall report of his honourable behaviour and actions in thoſe military ſervices, wherein hee had been imployed. And the ſame likewiſe he intimates in the affections of *Tiberius* and *Piſo* towards *Germanicus*. *Tacitus.*

It is wiſely therefore obſerved by the Hiſtorian, That men of vaſt and various imployments, have uſually the unhappineſſe of *Envy* attending them, which therefore they have ſometimes declined by retyring and withdrawing themſelves from continuall addreſſes, as a wiſe mariner, who (as he ſpake) doth *aliquantulam remittere Clavum ob magnam fluctus vim*. And thus we finde the honour which *Davids* merits procured him, which was the foundation of that implacable *Hatred* of *Saul* towards him. For as in naturall mo- *Plutar. lib. de Rep. Gerendâ.*

tions, that which comes from the farthest extreme, is most swift and violent: so in the motions of the Minde, the farther off wee fetch the reason of our *Hatred*, the more venomous and implacable it is.

And here we may observe the mutuall and interchangable services, which corrupt affections exercise amongst themselves: For as Philosophy observes in the generation of those cold Meteors which are drawne to the middle region of the Aire, they are first by the coldnesse of the place congealed, and afterward doe by the like impressions fortify and intend the same quality in the Region: so here *Hatred* first generates *Envy*, and this againe doth reciprocally increase *Hatred*, and both ioyne in mischiefe. So much the more hurtfull to the Soule, wherein they are, than to the Enemy whom they respect, by how much they are more neer and inward thereunto: for certainly a malignant humour doth most hurt where it harboureth.

From this followeth another evill Effect, which I will but name, being of the same Nature with *Envy*; and it is that which Philosophers call Ἐπιχαιρεκακία a rejoycing at the calamity of him whom wee hate, a quality like that of those who are reported to have * been nourished with poyson. For as in Love there is a mutuall partaking of the same Ioyes and Sorrowes (for where the will and affections are one, the senses are in some sort likewise) so *Hatred* ever worketh contrarietie of affections: That which worketh Griefe

Ἐπιχαιρεκακία, Vox in' analysi non exstat. Laert. in Zen. lib. 7. Plutarch. de Curiosit. Arist. Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 7. Mag. Mor. cap. 22. Prov. 17. 5. 24. 17.

* Caelius Rhod. Antiq. lect. lib. 6. cap. 35.

Griefe unto the one, doth worke Ioy unto the other. And therefore *Thales* being asked how a Man might bee cheerfull and beare up in afflictions, answered: If hee can see his enemies in worse case than himselfe. The Poet hath given us the Character of such kinde of Men:

Pectora felle virent, Lingua est suffusa veneno:
Risus abest, nisi quem visi fecere Dolores.

flow;
Their breasts with gall, their tongues with venome
They laugh not, till they see men brought to woe.

Diog. Laert. l. 1.

And therefore they are elegantly compared by the Philosopher unto Cupping Glasses, which draw onely the vitious humours of the body unto them, and unto Flies that are overcome with the spirits of Wine, but nourished with the froth. Like those Wormes which receive their Life from the corruption of the Dead. And surely, the Prince of Devils may well have his Name given him from * Flies, because hee taketh most pleasure in the ulcers and wounds of Men, as Flies ever resort unto Sores.

* Beelzebub. Matth. 12. 24. βάαλ μύιων vertunt 70. 2. Reg. 1. 3. Κυίωπος apud Pausan. lib. 5. & Clem. Alex. in Protrept. Myiodem vocat Plin. l. 29. cap. 6.

Another corrupt Effect of *Hatred* is a sinister and crooked suspition, whereby with an envious and critical Eye we search into the actions and purposes of another; and according as is the sharpnesse of our owne wits, or the course of our owne behaviour and practices, we attribute unto them such ends as were haply never framed but in the forge of our owne braines: Evill men being

being herein like Vultures, which can receive none but a foule Sent. It is attributed amongst one of the noble Attributes of Love, that it *Thinketh none Evill*: and certainly, there is not a fouler quality against Brotherly Love, than that which (for the satisfying of it selfe in (but the Imaginary Evill of him whom it disliketh) will venture to finde out in every action some close impiety, and pierce into the reserved and hidden passages of the heart: like him in the Philosopher, who thought where ever hee went, that hee saw his owne Picture walke before him. And therefore we see how *Agrippina* when she would not discover any shew of *Feare* or *Hatred* towards her Sonne *Nero*, who had at the first plotted her death on the Sea; and that fayling, sent the second time *Anicatus* the Centurion to make sure worke, did in both these practices decline all shew of suspition, and not acknowledge either the Engine or the Murther to be directed by him. *Solum Insidiarum remedium aspiciens, si non intelligerentur.* Supposing the onely remedies of these plots to bee, if shee seemed not to understand them. For ill meanings doe not love to be found out. As the same Historian telleth us of *Tiberius*, *Acrium accepit recludi qua premeret*: Hee hated that man who would venture to dive into his thoughts. And certainly there is not any crooked *Suspition* which is not rooted in *Hatred*. For as to thinke the worst of our owne Actions, is a signe of *Hatred* to our sinnes (for I thinke no man loves his sinnes who dares search them:) so

Tacit. Annal. lib. 14.

con-

contrariwiſe to have an humour of caſting the worſt gloſſes upon the Actions of another Man, where there is not palpable diſſimulation, argues as great a want of Love. Wee ſeach for Evill in our ſelves to *expell* it; but wee ſearch for evill in another to *finde* it. There is ſcarſe a more hateſull quality in the eyes of God or Man, than that of the Herodians, to lye in wait to catch an innocent man, and then to accuſe him.

Another Effect which proceedeth from corrupt *Hatred*, is proud and inſolent carriage, whereby wee contemne the quality, or undervalue and villifie the Merit of a perſon. For though the Apoſtle hath in this reſpect of Pride and Swelling, oppoſed Knowledge unto Love: *Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth*; yet the oppoſition holdeth not there onely: For there is *Tumor Cordis*, as well as *Tumor Cerebri*; as well a ſtubborne as a learned Pride, a Pride againſt the Perſon, as againſt the weakneſſe of our Brother, a Pride whereby wee will not ſtoope to a yeelding and reconciliation with him, as whereby wee will not ſtoop to the Capacitie and Edification of him; that is, the ſwelling of Malice, and this of Knowledge. And hence it is that *Hatred* (as *Ariſtotle* hath excellently obſerved) when it is ſimple and alone (though that ſeldome fall out) is without the admixtion of any Griefe. And the reaſon I take it is, becauſe Griefe is either for the Evill of another, and ſo it is ever the Effect of Love; or for the Evill which lyeth upon our ſelves, and ſo is the cauſe of Humi- *Rhet. lib. 2. c. 4.*

Humilitie; neither of which are agreeable with Hatred, whose property ever it is to conceive in it selfe some worth and excellency, by which it is drawne to a Contempt and Insolence towards another Man. And therefore as it was Pride in Men and Angels, which wrought the first Hatred between God and them; so the most proper and unseparable Effect of this hatred ever since is Pride.

The last Corruption of this Passion is *Impatience*, *Contention* and *Fury*, as the wise Man telleth us, *Hatred stirreth up strife*. And therefore that worthy Effect of Love, which is contrary to this of Hatred, is called Μακροθυμία, and *Longanimitas*. Long suffering to signifie some length, distance, and remotion between a Mans Minde and his Passion. But Hatred, being of a fierce Nature, is so farre from admitting any Peace, or yeelding to conditions of parley, that as hath been observed out of *Aristotle*) it rests not satisfied with the Misery, but desires (if it bee possible) the utter overthrow of an Enemy.

Prov. 10. 12.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Affection of Desire. What it is. The severall kindes of it, Naturall, Rationall, Spirituall. Intemperate, Unnaturall, Morbid Desires. The Object of them Good, pleasant, as possible, as absent either in whole, or in degrees of perfection or continuance. The most Generall Internall cause Vacuity, Indigence. Other Causes, Admiration, Greatnesse of minde, Curiosity.

THe next Passions in order of Nature to these two are *Desire* and *Abomination*, which because they differ not much otherwise from Love and hatred, than the Act from the Habit, or then a man sitting from himselfe walking, Desire being but the motion, and exercise, as delight is the Quiet and Repose of our Love, I shall therefore the more briefly passe it over. *Desire* is the wing of the soule whereby it moveth, and is carried to the thing which it loveth, as the *Eagle to the Carkeise* in the Scripture proves, to feed it selfe upon it, and to be satisfied with it. For as the Appetite of the Eagle is attended with sharpenesse of sight to discover its prey, with swiftnesse of wing to hasten unto it, and with strength to seize upon

Iob 39.30. *Matth.* 24.28. *Habac.*1.8.

it: So according to the proportion of the Soules love unto its object doth it command and call together both the Wisedome and Powers of the whole man to dire& unto, and to promote the procuring of it. And the very best characters and truest lineaments which can bee drawne of the minds of men, are to be taken from their *Desires*, rather than from their *Practises*. As Physitians often judge of the Diseases of sicke men by their Appetites. Ill men dare not doe so much evill as they desire, for feare of shame or punishment: Good men cannot doe so much good as they desire for want of Power and Provisions of vertue. Besides *Practises* may be over-ruled by ends, but *Desires* are alwaies genuine and naturall, for no man can bee constrained to will that which hee doth not love; And therefore in the Scripture good men have had most confidence in approving themselves unto God by their affections and the inward longings of their soules after him as being the purest and most unfaigned issues of Love, and such as have least Proximity and Danger of infection from forraigne and secular ends. Saint *Paul* himselfe was much better at *willing* than at *performing*; and Saint *Peter* who failed in his promise of *Doing*, dares appeale to Christs owne Omniscience for the truth of his *Loving*. Whatever other defects may attend our actions, this is an inseparable character of a pious soule, that it *desires to feare Gods name*, and according to the prevalency of that affection, hath its conversation in heaven too. In which regard *Christ* is called

Plutar. Nat. Quæst. cap. 26.

Rom. 7. 18, 19. Iosh. 21. 17.

Neh. 1. 11. Isa. 26. 8. Phil. 3. 20.

led the *Desire of all Nations*, both because where he is he draweth all the hearts and desires of his people unto him, and also doth by his grace most fully answer and satisfie all the desires that are presented before him: as it is said of one of the Romane Emperours *Neminem unquam dimisit Tristem*, he never sends any discontented out of his presence. *Hag.2.6. Iohn 12 32. Psal.107.9.*

The desires of the Soule are of three sorts, according to the three degrees of perfection which belong unto man, *Naturall*, *Rationall*, *Spirituall*.

Naturall desires respect τὰ ἀναγκαῖα things of simple *Necessity* to the Being, Preservation, and integrity of Nature, as the *desires* which things have to their proper *nourishment* and *place ad conservationem individui*, for preserving themselves and to *propagation*, & increase *ad conservationem speciei*, for preserving of their kind. *Arist. Ethic. lib.7. cap.6.*

Rationall Desires are such as respect τὰ προηγμένα such things as are *Elegible* in themselves, and the proper objects of *right Reason*, such as *Felicity* the common *End* of all rationall Appetitions, *Vertue* the *way*, and *externall good* things, as Health, Strength, Credit, Dignitie, Prosperity, the *Ornaments* of humane life.

Spirituall Desires respect τὰ ἐπουράνια, τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ ἀνω Heavenly, and spirituall things, the *things of God*, *Things which are above*, The knowledge whereof we have not by Philosophicall, but by Apostolicall discovery, by the *Spirit of God who onely searcheth the deepe things of God*. *Heb.9.23. 1.Cor.3.13. Col.3.1.*

The *Corupt Desires* contrary unto these are either *Vitious* or *Morbid*. *Vitious* are againe of two sorts: First, *Intemperate* and incontinent Desires, which erre not in the substance or nature of the thing desired; but only [illegible] as the Philosopher speakes in the *measure* and *manner* of desiring them. It is lawfull to drinke Wine, and a Man may erre (as *Timothy* did) in an over * rigorous severity to Nature, when health or needfull refreshment requireth it: For our flesh is to be subdued to *reason*, not to *infirmities*, that it may be a *servant* to the Soule, but not a *burden*. But if we let Wine bee [illegible], as the Heathen called it, to take a freedome against us, like *Cham* to mocke us, and discover our nakednesse, and make us servants unto it. If we doe not only *eate* Hony, but *surfet* on it; If wee must have meat like Israel in the Wildernesse, not only for our *Need*, but for our *Lust*; If we eat and drinke so long that we are good for nothing, but either to lye downe and sleep, or to rise up and play, to live to day and to dye to morrow; If we make our belly the grave of our Soule, and the dungeon of our Reason, and let our *Intestines* as well morally as naturally farre exceed the length of the whole Man besides. This is in the Apostles phrase to be *lovers of pleasure rather then lovers of God*, and it is an intemperate excesse against natural desires which will ever end in pain. It was a witty speech of *Anacharsis* the Philosopher, that the Vine beareth three sorts of Grapes: The first of *Delight*: The second of *Excesse*: The third of *Sorrow*. If wee let our *Delight* steale us into

Prov. 31. 6.
1. *Tim.* 5. 23.
Psa. 104. 15.
* *Vid. Socrat. lib.* 4. *cap.* 18. *Euseb. lib.* 4. *c.* 38. *l.* 5. *c.* 17. *Iren. l.* 1. *c.* 34. *Tertul. Adv. Psych c.* 15. *Epiph. To.* 2. *l.* 2. *Vid. Gul. Stat. Antiq. Comm. lib.* 3. *cap.* 7, 8. *Clem. Al. ped. lib.* 2. *cap.* 1, 2. *Hieron. lib.* 2. *adv. Iovinian*

Megarenses obsonant, quasi crastinâ die morituri. Tert. Apol. cap. 39.

Diog. Laert. l. 1.

into *Exceſſe*, and become a mocker, our *Exceſſe* will quickly betray us unto *Sorrow* (as *Dalilah* did *Sampſon* to the *Philiſtins*) and let us know that after Wine hath mocked it can rage too. Like the head of the *Polypus*, which is ſweet to the Palate, but after cauſeth troubleſome ſleeps and frightfull dreames. *Prov. 20.1. Plut. de Auditione.*

Secondly there are brutiſh and *unnaturall Deſires*, which the Philoſopher calleth θηριώδεις, ſerine and inhumane, inſtancing in thoſe barbarous Countries, where they uſe to eat mens fleſh and raw meat; and in the Woman who ripped up Women with childe that ſhee might eat their young ones: Vnto which head I refer thoſe which the Apoſtle cals πάθη ἀτιμίας and πάθη ἀκαθαρσίας, *vile and diſhonorable, Affections and Paſſions of Luſt* wherein forſaking the guidance of Nature, they diſhonored their bodies amongſt themſelves, and gave themſelves over, as S. *Iude* ſpeaketh unto *ſtrange fleſh*; alſo inceſtuous and promiſcuous Luſts, going with naked and painted Bodies, as the antient Brittaines offering of men and children in ſacrifices, eating of the bodies of Friends that dyed, burning of the living with the dead, and other like ſavage and barbarous practices, wherein wee finde how farre naturall corruption improved with ignorance and want of Education or Religion, can imbrace the Manners of Men. *Rom. 1. 26. 1. Theſſ. 4. 5. Iude ver. 7. Vid. Euſeb. de prap. Evang. lib. 1. cap. 4. Hieron. lib. 2. Contr. Iovin. Theod. Serm. 9. de legib. Cal. Rodigin. Antiq. lib. 10. cap. 21. 28. Plin. lib. 5. cap. 17. 30. & lib. 7. cap. 2.*

Laſtly, there are *morbid Deſires*, growing out of ſome diſtemper of Mind or Body, called by the Philoſopher νοσώδεις, as thoſe of children, which *Kirkr. l. 7. c. 6.*

eate coales or dirt, and the strange and depraved longings of women with child, called אבן or *Pica* from the Bird of that name, because the inconstant and various appetences of nature, so misguided by vitious humours, is well resembled by the strange mixture of white and black feathers in that Bird.

Ethic. l. 7. c. 6.

Cal. Rodig. l. b. 3. cap. 15. Vid. Stephan. & Gesnerum in voce אבן.

Having considered the severall kinds both of Regular and corrupt *Desires*. I shall content my selfe with a very briefe inquiry into the causes, and effects of this Passion.

The causes moving it are *Externall ex parte objecti*, in the object, or *Internall ex parte subjecti* in the minde. The *Object* is any thing apprehended *sub ratione Boni & Iucundi*, as good and pleasant. For upon those inducements did Satan first stirre the desire of *Eve* towards the forbidden fruit. *She saw that it was good for food, and pleasant to the eye.*

Debens & Iucunde vid. Philosoph. Rhetor. lib. 1.

Gen. 3. 6. ותרא האשה כי טוב העץ למאכל וכי תאוה הוא לעינים ונחמד העץ להשכיל

Damascen de Orthodox. fid. l. 2. c. 22.

Now the Qualification of these to distinguish the formall reason of their being objects to our desires, from that wherein they are Objects of our love, is first that they bee *Possible*: For *Desire* being the motion and indeavour of the Soule towards that good which it loveth, and wherein it seeketh to delight, take away the possibility of such delight, and this would bee *motus in Vacuo*, like that of *Noahs* Dove that found no place for her feet to rest on. Hope is the whetstone, and wheele of industry, if that faile, how ever a man may waste and pine away his thoughts in empty *Velleities* and imaginary wishes, he can never put forth

forth nor addreſſe his endeavours towards an impoſſible good. Though an old man may wiſh himſelfe young againe, yet no man was ever ſo beſotted as to endeavour it. And this diſtinction betweene vaniſhing *wiſhes* and ſerious *deſires* is of great conſequence to be attended in all the motions of the Soule morall or ſacred, in as much as thoſe Deſires onely which are Active and Induſtrious, purpoſely addreſſing themſelves to the proſecution of that which they apprehend as acquirable, doe commend the Soule from whence they iſſue for vertuous and pious.

Concupiſcunt etiam & quæ non poſſunt Sen. de Ira lib. 1. c. 3.
ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἐπιθυμία Ariſt. Ethic. lib. 3. c. 4.
Vid. de volitione & velleitate Aquin. 1. 2. qu. 13. art. 5. & Valent. To. 2. diſp. 2. quæſt. 8 p. 2.

Secondly, the object of the *Deſires quatale* is apprehended as *Abſent* and *diſtant*, in as much as preſence worketh delight rather than deſire. The things we have, we enjoy, wee doe not covet, wee reſt in them we doe not move towards them. Yet not alwaies *Abſent quoad totum*, but *quoad gradus*, not in the whole, but in the parts and degrees of it: for the preſence of a good thing doth in ſome ſort quicken the Deſires towards the ſame thing ſo farre forth as it is capable of *improvement* and augmentation.

Creſcit Amor nummi quantum ipſa pecunia creſcit. Et minus hunc optat qui non habet Iuvenal. Sat. 14. Ariſtot. lib 1. Politic. c. 8. Plutarch. lib. de Cupidit. divitiæ. Senec. ep. 73. Matt. 9. 24.

As we ſee in externall riches of the body, none deſire them more eagerly than thoſe that poſſeſſe them; and the more vertuous the Soule of man is, the more is the heart enlarged in the Appetition of a greater meaſure; as the putting in of ſome water into a Pump, doth draw forth more. No man is ſo importunate in praying, *Lord help mine unbeliefe*, as hee that can ſay *Lord I beleeve*. Thus even *preſent* things may be deſired in order to

to improvement, and further degrees of them: as many times a man hath a better ſtomacke to his meat after he hath begun to eat, than when he firſt ſate downe unto it. Againe, things *preſent* may be the Obiect of our *Deſires* unto *continuance*, as hee that delighteth in a good which he hath, deſireth the continuance of that Delight. And therefore *Life*, even while it is poſſeſſed it is deſired, becauſe the poſſeſſion of it doth not cauſe the Appetite to nauſeate or ſurfet upon it. Few men there are who deſire not old Age, not as it is old Age, and importeth decay, decrepidneſſe, and defects of Nature: For a young man doth not deſire to bee old now; but as it implyeth the longer and fuller poſſeſſion of Life: For a man being conſcious to himſelfe, firſt of his owne inſufficiency to make himſelfe happy, from and within himſelfe; and next of the immortality of his Nature: as upon the former reaſon, he is buſied in ſending abroad his *Deſires* (as the Purveyors and Caterers of the Soule) to bring in ſuch things as may promote *perfection*: ſo thoſe very *Deſires* having ſucceeded, doe farther endeavour the ſatisfaction of Nature, by moving towards the *Perpetuity* of what they have procured. It was a ſordid and brutiſh wiſh of *Philoenus* in the Philoſopher, who wiſhed that he had the throat of a Crane or Vulture that the pleaſure of his taſte might laſt the longer (it being the Wiſedome of Nature, intending the chiefe Perfections of Man to his Soule, to make his Bodily Pleaſures the ſhorter.) But ſurely the Soule of Man having a reach

Ariſt. Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 13. Eadem lib. 3. c. 3. problem. 28. queſt. 7. Suidas in Philoenus. Ælian. var. Hiſt. Lib. 9. Τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πολλὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἃ ἀγαπητὸν ἐστὶ ἀπολέσαι. *Diog. Laert. in Antiſthen. lib.*

as farre as Immortality, may iuſtly deſire as well the *Perpetuity* as the *Preſence* of thoſe good things wherein ſtandeth her proper perfection. And therefore it was excellent counſell of *Antiſthenes* the Philoſopher, That a man ſhould lay up ſuch proviſions, as in a Shipwracke might ſwimme out with him ſuch treaſure as will paſſe and be currant in another World, and will follow us thither, which as the Apoſtle ſpeaks, is *to lay up a good foundation againſt the time to come*

The *Internall Cauſes* moving *Deſire*, in regard of the ſubject or minde of man, may be different according to the different kinds of Deſires ſpoken of before. The moſt generall which reſpecteth them all is a *Vacuity*, *Indigence*, and ſelfe-inſufficiency of the Soule: For having not within it ſelfe enough either to preſerve it or to content it, it is forced to goe out of it ſelfe for ſupplies; for whereſoever God hath implanted ſenſitive and rationall affections, he hath bin pleaſed to carry them from themſelves, and to dire& them abroad for their ſatisfaction: by that means preſerving the Soule in humility, and leading it as by Degrees up unto himſelfe. Every creature though it have its life in its own poſſeſſion; yet the preſervation of it, it fetcheth from ſome things without. The excellenteſt creatures are beholding to the meaner, both for their nouriſhment, and for their knowledge. And therfore of all Graces, God hath choſen *Faith & Repentance*, as the chief means of carrying us to him, becauſe theſe two do moſt

ἀναλήψεως τῆς ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ φυσικὴ ὀρεκτικὴ. *Ariſt. Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 11.*

ἐν τῷ ἐνδεὲς εἶναι ἐπιθυμία. *Clem. Alex. Str. l. 7.*

carry us out of our selves, and most acquaint us with our insufficiencies, *Repentance* teaching a man to abhorre himself, & *Faith* to deny himself.

Now because *Emptinesse* is the cause of *Appetence*, we shall hereupon finde, that the fullest and most contented men, are ever freest from vaste desires. The more the minde of any man is in *weight*, the more it is in *rest* too. As they say that in Rivers, ships goe slower in the Winter, but withall they carry the greater burdens: So many times men of lesse urgent and importunate Appetitions, and motions of mind, are more furnished and better ballanced within. In *Iothams* Parable the Bramble was more ambitious than the Vine, or the Olive. And the Vine we see which is of all other *Arbor Desiderii*, the Tree of Desire, is weakest and cannot stand without another to support it. Therefore wee shall finde that mens Desires are strongest when their constitutions are weakest, and their condition lowest; as wee see in servants that labour, women that breed, and sick men that long, whose whole life in that time is but a change and miscellany of Desires. Thus we see little children will reach at every thing which is before them, being wholly destitute of internall furniture. Vacuity is ever sucking and attractive, and will make even dull and heavie things rise upward. Eager and greedy, various and swarming Appetitions are usually the signes either of a childish or a sicke Temper of minde; as the Naturallists observe that the least creatures are the greatest breeders, a Mouse bringeth

Si quid detrivit à nobis petitrimus. Sen. Epist. 119. Vid. Plutarch. de Curiosit. Cælius Rhodig. lib. 14. cap. 7.

Iudg. 9 9. 15.

Iob 1, 2. 3.

τὰ μεγαλοψυχότατα ζῶα τῶν μικρῶν ἐστι καὶ τὰ μικρὰ πολύτοκα. *Arist. de Generatio Animal. lib. 4. cap 4.*

bringeth more young ones than an Elephant.

Onely here wee muſt diſtinguiſh both of contentment and of Deſires. There may bee a double *Contentment*, the one ariſing out of *ſluggiſhneſſe* and narrowneſſe of minde; when men out of an unwillingneſſe to put themſelves to the paines of gaining more, reſt ſatisfied with what they have, and had rather have a poore quiet, than a Treaſure with labour. As they ſay of the Fig-tree, though it be leaſt beautifull of other Trees (for it alone beareth no flowers) yet withall it is free from Thunder. And as the Hiſtorian ſaid of ſome men that they are *ſolâ ſecordiâ Innocentes*, doe men no hurt only becauſe it would coſt them paines to doe it: ſo may wee of theſe, that they are beholding to their torpid and ſluggiſh conſtitution, for the contentment which they profeſſe to have. And this doth not regulate inordinate deſires, but onely lay them aſleepe, as even an hungry man when he ſleepeth, hath his hunger ſleepe with him.

Vivunt, non quomodo volunt; ſed quomodo Caperunt. Sen. de Tranq. cap. 2. Plut. Sympoſ. lib. 5. quæſt. 9.

Tacit.

Another contentment there is ariſing out of *Wiſedome* and practicall learning (as the Apoſtle tells us, that it is a matter of learning to bee contented) when the heart being eſtabliſhed and made ſteady with grace, and ſolid materials within, as a ſhip with ballaſt, is the leſſe toſſed with lower affections, as *Saul* cared not for his Aſſes when he heard of a Kingdome.

Phil. 4. 11, 12. Heb. 13. 9. Namq; labant curvæ juſto ſine pondere naves. Perq; mare inſtab. leni nimiâ levitate ſeruntur. Ov. Met. lib. 2. Iuven. Sat 14. Plin. lib. c. 56. Stuck. l. 2. c. 8. fol 165.

——*Gratæ poſt munus ariſtæ*
Contingunt homines veteris faſtidia quercus.

When men had once discover'd better corne,
They loath'd their mast & oaken bread did scorn

And this kinde of contentment doth not stupifie loose Desires, but change them, as the Cats *Vnum magnum* was more worth to her than all the variety of shifts which the Foxe did boast of, and one Sunne doth more comfort us in the day than many thousand starres in the night.

* *Plut. de Solert. Animal.*

Againe, Desires are either of things *excellent*, as the vertuous and spirituall desires of the soule whereby men move towards God; and these doe neither load the heart, nor cloy it, but much rather open and enlarge it for more. No man was so well acquainted with God as *Moses*, who yet was the more importunate to know him better, *I beseech thee shew me thy glory*, nor any man more acquainted with Christ than Saint *Paul*, who yet desired *to be dissolved and to be with Christ* neerer.

Sapiens est divitiarum naturalium quaesitor acerrimus; Sen. Epist. 119

Exod 33.18.

Phil. 1.23.

Other Desires are of *middle things* τὰ μεταξύ as the Philosopher calls them; such as Wealth, Profit, Victory, Honour, which are not good in themselves, but as they are managed. And these *Desires* though not extinguished, yet are very much asswaged, and moderated by the weight and wisedome, of solid contentment. He was the wisest man then alive, and who knew all the quintessence, and what ever was desireable in the Creature, who said *Da mihi panem Statuti mei. Give me the Bread of my Allowance*; τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα μοι ἄρτον so much as the quality of my place

Ariſt. Ethic. lib. 7. cap. 6.

Prov. 30.8.

Theophylact.

and

and ſtate requireth, which is that which our Saviour limiteth our deſires unto, ἄρτος, ἐπιούσιος & ἀναγκαῖος our portion and *dimenſum*, ἐφήμερος in Saint *Iames*, *dayly food*, and was pleaſed to anſwer that wiſe King in that his requeſt, and to give us a record and Catalogue of his daily bread.

Another cauſe of *Deſire* may bee *Admiration*; A ſtrange thing though monſtrous and deformed calleth the eyes of every man unto it. Rarity is a marveilous *Lenocinium*, and inticer of Deſire, *æſtivæ nives, hybernæ roſæ* as the Panegyriſt ſpake, Snow in the Summer and Roſes in Winter; the Birds of this Countrey, and the Roots of another; dainties hardly procured without the ſhipwracks of men, to feed the gluttony rather of the eye than of the belly; theſe are the delights of the curioſities of men. The ſame fruits when they are worſe but rarer, have a farre greater value ſet upon them, then when expos'd by their commones unto every mans purchaſe And it was a wiſe complaint of old *Cato*; That it went ill with the City when a Fiſh was ſold for more then an Oxe. We ſee Deſires doe not put forth themſelves more freely in any then in children, I thinke the chiefe Reaſon of it is the ſame which the Philoſopher giveth of their memories, becauſe every thing to them is new and ſtrange, for ſtrange things as they make ſtronger impreſſions upon the *Retentive*, ſo they doe upon the *Appetitive* faculties. And therefore we find *Herod* who cared nothing at all for the Doctrine of Chriſt, becauſe it was holy and divine, had yet a great

Τρυφὴ ψυχικὴ Suidas. Luke 12.42. James 2.15. Iob 23.12. 1. Reg. 4.22. Vide Waſer. de menſuris, lib. 2. cap. 3. & Aug. l. canibium de pane quotid. ad calcem Inſtit. Syria. Stuck. convival. lib. 1. cap. 22.

Plut. Apoph.

Rhet lib. 2.

Luke 23 8.

Desire to have seene his miracles, because they were wonderfull. And Men have travelled farre to see those persons and things, the fame whereof they have before admired, strange Learning, strange Birds and Beasts, strange Floures and Roots, strange Fashions; yea, strauge Sinnes too (which is the curiositie and corruption of Nature) are marvellous attractive, and beget emulation amongst Men. *Nero* gave rewards to the inventors of strange Lusts. Even *Solomons* Ships, besides substantiall Treasure, did bring home Apes and Peacockes. Athens which was the eye, the floure, and Epitome of Greece (to shew that this curiosity is the disease as well of Wits, as of Childehood) spent all their time and study *in inquiring after new things*. And for this cause it is (as I conceive) That wise Men have made Lawes to interdict the transporting of their countrey fruits into other places, lest the sight of them should kindle in strangers a Desire to bee Masters of the Countries where they grew, as we see the Grapes and Figges of Canaan were used as Incentives unto the expedition of Israel: and hence *Plutarch* telleth us that the Word Sycophant is derived to note originally such as detected those who surreptitiously transported Figges into other Countries. As on the other side wee read that the Athenians set up a Pillar, wherein they published him to bee an Enemy of the City, who should bring Gold out of Media, as an Instrument to corrupt them. And the Romane Governour commanded his souldiers

Aristippus Achinas navigavit Socratē invisurus Plut de Curiosit.

1. Reg. 10. Plato Ægyptū Italiam, Siciliam petijt Philosophiæ causā. Vid. Theod. Orat. 1: De fid. Zeph. 1, 8. Græcia ignotus. Aristid. Tom. 2. Orat de pace poster.. Græciæ, Græcia.

Thycidides Vide Cæl. Rhod. l. 10. c. 25. Acts 17. 21.

Plut. in Solon, & de Curiosit. & lib. 1. Cod. quæ res exportari non debeant.

Aristid. To. 3. Orat. 2. Ælius Spart. in Pisce. Nig.

ſouldiers that they ſhould not carry any Gold or Silver into the Field with them, leſt thereby they ſhould bee looked on by the Adverſary, as the Perſians by *Alexander*, rather as a prey than a foe.

A third cauſe which I ſhall touch on of exciting Deſires, is *height and greatneſſe of minde*. which cannot well ſet bounds of meaſure unto it ſelfe, as *Seneca* ſaid in another ſenſe, *Magnitudo non habet certum modum*. Great minds have great ends, and thoſe can never be advanced but with vaſt and various Deſires. A great Ship will not be carried with the Sayle of a Lyter. Nor can an Eagle fly with the wings of a Sparrow. *Alexander* was not ſo great in his Victories as in his Deſires, whom one World could not ſatisfie: nor *Pompey* in his Triumphs, as in his Ambition, to whom it was not enough to be Great, except he might be the Greateſt.

Epiſt. 43.

Æſtuat infelix anguſto limite mundi. Vt Gyaræ inclauſus ſcopulis, &c. Iuv. Satyr. 10. Sen. de Benefic. l. 7. c. 2. p. 54. & 119.

Another cauſe of Deſires may be Curioſitie, which is nothing elſe but a deſire of prying into, and liſtning after the buſineſſes of other Men, which is called by *Solomon*, *Ambulatio Animæ*: The walking up and downe of the Soule, as he elſewhere telleth us, that *the Eyes of a Foole are in the Ends of the Earth*: Such a Man being like the witches which *Plutarch* ſpeaks of, that weare Eyes when they went abroad, but put them in a box when they came home: Or like the Falckoners Hawkes that are hooded in the Houſe, and never ſuffered to uſe their Eyes but to the hurt of other Birds: like

Eccleſ. 6 9. Prov 17. 24.

Plut. de Cur.

Horſe quiſq; modo ſemper fugit. Lucret. apud Sen. de tranq. l. c. 2.

Non horum tecum esse potes, non otiari et ponere, &c. Horat.

like a man in a Dungeon, that sees nothing where hee is; but can see a great deale of light abroad at a little passage. So these kind of Men have vast desires of forreine Knowledge, but wonderfully shun the acquaintance of themselves. As they say of a Swine, that hee looks every way but *upward*: so we may of Pragmatists, that their eyes looke alwaies save onely *inward*. Whereas the Minds of prudent Men are like the Windowes of *Solomons* Temple, broader inward than outward. As the Pillar that went before Israel in the Sea, whose light side was towards Israel, but the darke towards *Pharaoh*: Or as the Sunne in an Eclipse, whose light is perfect inwards, though towards us it bee darkened. A wise Mans eyes are in his head, whereas a Foole hath [illegible] as it is in the *Proverbs*, his minde in his heeles only to wander and gad abroad.

1. *Reg.* 6. 4.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of other causes of Desire, Infirmity, Temerity, Mutability of Minde, Knowledge, Repentance, Hope. Of the effects of it in Generall, Labour, Languor. In speciall, of Rationall Desires, Bounty, Griefe, Wearinesse, Indignation against that which withstands it. Of Vitious Desires, Deception, Ingratitude, Envy, Greedinesse, Basenesse of Resolution.

Other causes of Desires are *Infirmity*, *Rashnesse*, and *Mutability* of Mind, Which three I put in one, as having a neer Relation and dependance within themselves. For commonly impotent Appetions as those of Children, of sick, of incontinent Persons, are both Temerarious in precipitating the Minde, and anticipating the Dictates of Reason which should regulate or restraine them: as also mutable and wandring like the Bee from one Flowre unto another; *Infirmity* not suffering a man to hold fast his Decrees, and *Temerity* not suffering him to resolve on any; and lastly, *Mutabilitie* making him weary of those things which weaknesse and rashnesse had unadvisedly

Λεγω δε το μεν ασθενες, ὃ λαβοντα ἡδονην μη δυναται μενειν επι τοις βελτιοσι λογοις· το δε ταχυ, ὃ ου μελλησαντες ορεγονται ὧν αν τυχωσι. Arist. Ethic lib. 7. c. 8.

visely transported him unto. *Omnium Imperitorum animus in lubrico est*: Weake minds have ever wavering and unfixed resolutions. Like fickle and nauseating stomacks, which long for many things and can eat none. Like sicke bodies, *quæ mutationibus ut remedijs utuntur*, as *Seneca* speakes, which tosse from side to side, and thinke by changing of their place they can leave their paine behind them. Like *Achilles* in the Poet:

Maximum indicium est malæ mentis fluctuatio. Sen. Ep. 120. vid. ep. 10. & de Tranq. cap. 2. Ἀστατοῦσιν ἅτε μὴ ἔχοντες ὅπου ἐμμείνωσιν. Aristid. Tom. 2 Orat. 1. Vid. etiam Plutarch. de Tranquillit. Iliad. 9.

Ἄλλοτε μὲν τε παλιμπλὴς κεκλιμένος ἀνέστη,
Ἄλλοτε δ' ἀνστὰς ἁπάνευθε πὸ ἰὸν ἀφίει.

Now he leans on his side, now supine lyes,
Then grov'leth on his face, and strait doth rise.

This Sickneſſe and Inconſtancy of Deſires is thus elegantly deſcribed by the old Poet *Lucretius*:

Vt nunc plerumq; videmus,
Quid sibi quisq; velit nescire & quærere semper.
Commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit.
Exit sæpe foras magnis ex ædibus ille,
Esse domi quam pertæsum est subitoq; reverti.
Currit agens mannos ad villam præcipitanter
Auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instet.
Oscitat extemplo tetigit cum limina Villæ,
Aut abit in somnum gravis, atq; oblivia quærit:
Aut etiam properans Vrbem petit, atq; revisit.
Hoc se quisq; modo fugit. At, quod scilicet ut fit,
Effugere haud potis est, ingratis hæret & angit.

Lucret. lib. 3. Tæder, Cruciat, agitor, flagror, verſor in amoris vitâ, miser exanimor, feror, diſſertor, diſcerpor, dilanior. Item animi habeo. Ibi ſum, ibi non ſum, ubi non ſum ibi eſt Animus. Ita mihi ingenia ſunt, quod lubet non lubet iam id contra nitor, &c. Plaut. Ciſtellar.

We

We see how troubled Mortals still enquire,
Yet nee're can find what 'tis which they desire.
One changeth place, as if he could unload
And leave his weights behind him. Runs abroad,
Weary of a great Palace; strait turnes back,
And hath not found the thing which he did lack.
Wearied both here & there, he mounts his steed,
And runs to th' neighbor town with swifter speed
Than if he went to quench a fire. Being set,
He gapes and sleeps, and studies to forget
Why he came thither, haply turne his raine,
And to the City poasteth backe againe.
Thus guilty Man doth study how to shunne,
And scape himselfe, but nee're can get it done.
He bears the thing he flyes. What he would leave
Vnwelcome selfe unto it selfe doth cleave,
And cleaving doth torment.

Nihil tam occupatum iam multiforme tot ac tam variis motibus concisum ac laceratum, quàm mala mens. Quintil. lib. 12. c. 1. Non horam tecum esse potes, non otia recte Ponere teque ipsum vitas fugitivus & erro. Horat. Vid. Plutarch. de Tranquillit.

The more simple, One, and perfect Nature is (as the Philosopher divinely noteth) the more it delighteth in one and the same uniforme operation. *Mutability* is not pleasant in it selfe; but the delight of it ariseth out of the *pravitie* and *defect* of *Nature*.

Τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἀεὶ ἡδύ, ἀφ' ἑνὸς γὰρ ἐνέργειαν ἔχει· διὸ τὸ ὁμοίως ἐν πλείοσι χαίρειν ἀνθρώπου.
Arist. Ethic. lib. 7. c. ult.

I might here insist on other more obvious causes of desire: As,

1 *Knowledge* and experience of the goodnesse of that which wee desire: as the Apostle also telleth us, *That Experience worketh Hope*: And we use to say, *Ignoti nulla Cupido*. A man cannot desire that of which he hath no Apprehension. Knowledge is Appetites Taster.

Tam denique omnes nostra intelligimus bona. Quam quæ in potestate habuisse mali ea amissa. Plaut. capt. v. c. 7. l. 3

2 Sorrow and Repentance for the Evils we feele, the contrary whereunto we are the more induced to desire. We never desire Health so eagerly as when Sickness teacheth us to value it: For as in Colours, so in Actions or Affections, contraries doe set forth and sharpen one another. And as *Labour Naturall* makes a Man earnestly desire the Shadow, as *Iob* speaks: so *Sorrow* which is *Labour Mentall*, doth make a Man earnestly thirst after that which can remove the thing which begets that sorrow. The Apostle telleth us, *That Desire and Zeale are the fruits of godly Sorrow*. *David* never panted so earnestly after Gods favour and presence, as when he felt what a Griefe it was to be without it: For in this case there is an Apprehension of a double goodnesse in the thing we desire, both as perfective unto Nature Indigent, and as medicinall unto Nature wronged.

2 Cor. 7. 11.

Lastly *Hope of speeding in our Desires*: For the stronger any mans perswasions are, the more cheerfull and vigorous will bee his endeavours to succeed. But I shall content my selfe with the intimation of these things. And in the next, very briefly to runne over some *Effects* and Consequents of this Affection: Which are,

1 In regard of *Desires* at large, *Labour* and *Paines*: For they are onely Velleities and not Volitions: halfe and broken wishes, not whole desires, which are not industrious; but waste away in sluggish and empty speculations. a The Fisherman that will take the Fish, must be con-

a Διὰ τὰ ἄπρακτα γίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμίας ἢ βουλήσεις. Aristipp. apud Laert. lib. 2.

tente

tented to be dashed with the Water. [b] And he that will expect to have his desires answered, must put as well his hands as his prayers unto them:

Ἀργὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ ἅπας ἥκιστ' ἂν εἴη
Βίον δυσάρατ' ἂν ζώοιεν οἱ πένητες.

Who takes God in his mouth, but takes no paine,
By devout sloath shall never gather gaine.

It was the just reproose of him in the Poet who was upbraided with comming to the feasts, but withdrew himselfe from the labour of other Men. Nature hath often made the roots of those Plants bitter, whose fruits are sweet, to teach us that Delight is the fruit of Labour. And therefore the Philosopher telleth us, that *Desire* is usually accompanied with *Sorrow*.

Againe, *Desires* doe commonly worke a *Languor* and fainting towards the thing desired, if they be either strong or hasty: For † Hope deferred maketh the heart sicke. As *Ahabs* eager desire of *Naboths* Vineyard, cast him upon his bed. And *David* expresseth his longings towards Gods Law, by the breaking and fainting of his Soule. *Cum expectatio longior est consenescit animus, & debilitatur mens.*: Delaied expectation weakneth and withereth the mindes of Men. And therefore the Apostle expresseth strength of Desire by groaning, which is the Language of Sicknesse.

[b] *Eurip. Electra. Plutarch. Instit. Lacon.* ἐπὶ μὲν τὰμὰ ἐυτυχῆ δίκη ἐς ζόνε ἀφίκηται, &c. *Eurip. Rhes.*

[c] *Homer. Iliad.* δ 341348. *Eurip. Rhes.* 325 d *Aristot. apud Latrt. lib.* 5.

[e] *Arist. Eudemi lib.* 2 *cap.* 10. † *Prov* 13. 12. 1 *Reg.* 21. 4. *Psa.* 119. 20. 81 *Usque ad agri studium desiderii. El. Lamprid. in Com. Rom.* 8. 22. 2 *Cor.* 5 2.

2 In regard of *Reasonable* and Spirituall Desires. The effects of this affection are:

1 *Large-heartednesse* and *Liberality*. That which a man earnestly desireth he will give much for, and bestow much upon. As when Christ became the desire of all Nations, they did dedicate all their desirable things unto him, as the ἀναθήματα and trophies of his mercifull triumph over them. One man adorns the Gospell with his power, another with his wit, another with his wealth, another with his wisedome.

Phil.3.8.9. 10. Matth.13.45. Hag.2.6.7. Matth.2.11. Isa.60.5.17. Psal.68.29.

Those Abilities of Nature, Art, or Industry, which were before the armour of sinne, are then become the spoyles of Christ. *Antonius* out of the strength of his desires towards *Cleopatra*, bestowed many countries upon her.

Plutarch.in Anton.

2 *Griefe* for any losse or hazard of the thing desired. As the Sea-mans needle which is jogged and troubled, never leaves moving till it finde the North point againe. *Flagrantia sunt animorum desideria cum solatia perdiderunt*, as the Orator spake. Desires burne hotteſt when they are in danger of disappointment.

Nazar.Orat. Panegyr.

3 *Wearinesse* and *Indignation* against any thing which standeth between Desire and the fruition of that which is desired. *Vehementior per metus & pericula exibit*: That which resisteth increaseth it. As a River goes with more strength where it is hindred and withstood. The Church did venture blowes when she sought her Love, and like the Palme Tree rose up above her pressures: *plures efficimur quôties metimur a vobis*, as Tertullian

Senec.Epist.75. Ab obiect. savior ibit. Plutarch.Symposi.l.4. A.Gell.l 3.c.6. Tertul.Apolog. cap.ult.

Tertullian ſpeakes to the Heathen. The more you mow us downe, the thicker wee grow; the more we ſuffer for him, the more we love and deſire him. Saint *Paul* careth not for a diſſolution, that he may goe to Chriſt, as a ſtone is contented to be broken in pieces, that it may move to its place.

Thirdly, For *Corrupt* and *vitious Deſires*; their *Effects* are firſt, *Deception*, and haling of Reaſon as it were captive from determining, adviſing, or duly weighing the pravity and obliquity of them. So that the things which a man knowes in *theſi*, and at large, in *hypotheſi*; and as to his owne particular intereſt or inconvenience he doth not at all attend. He can ſay them, he cannot apply them. As he who acteth a part on a Stage, knowes the things which he ſpeaks, but is not a whit affected with them. And the Philoſopher giveth the reaſon of it, the very ſame with S. *Iames*, ἀλογισμένη, That Reaſon which overcomes Luſt muſt bee λογισμένος, Reaſon ingrafted; or to uſe the phraſe of another Apoſtle, συγκεκραμένον, immixed and contempered with the ſoule, and not onely extrinſically irradiating it. And theſe kinde of men are elegantly called by *Iulius Pollux*, ἑκόντες men willingly ſlaviſh, and ἡττημένοι ſubdued and brought under by their owne affections. As *Plutarch* ſaith of *Agiſelaus*, that he was ruled by *Lyſander* his ſervant, he having only the name, but the other the execution of his power. This ſlavery of mens minds under the tyranny of luſtfull deſires is thus deſcribed by the Satyriſt.

Iam 1.14. ἐκτρεπόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας ἑλκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος. *Ebr.* c.7. 2. ἀλλοφύλου. *Ib* cap.7 ut. *Hoſ.*4.11. αἰχμάλωτα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ. c.3. vid. c.5.9. *Vid. Plaut. Aſinar. Act* 1. *Scen.*3. *Cicer. de Senect.ut.*

*Iam.*1.21. *Heb.*4.2. ñ

*Onomaſt. lib.*3. *cap.*7.

Plutarch. in Lyſandro.

Mane

Persius Sat. 5. Vid. Arrian. Epict. l. 3. c. 24.

Mane piger stertis? surge, inquit Avaritia, eja.
Surge: negas? Instat, surge inquit, non quo surge.
Ecquid agam rogitas? En saperdam advecho ponto,
Castoreum, stupas, hebenum, thus, lubrica Coa.

What sluggard snore so long? saies lust, up rise,
Awake, get out. Darst thou say nay? it cries
The same againe, up, rise; I cannot. No?
Rise though you cannot, when Ile have it so.
What must I doe? what doe? up, wipe your eies
See, here's a goodly Ship of merchandise;
Shell-fish, Castoreum, Flax, black Indian woods,
Frankinsence, Wines of Coos and other goods.

Thus sordidly doe vaine men sell themselves, and as it were render up their Reason into the hands of vitious and greedy Affections, giving leave to their soules to suffer a ship-wrack in that vessell which bringeth goods into their Cellars, and traffiquing their own judgment in exchange for a ship of wares.

Sen. de Benef. lib. 3. c. 3. & Ep. c. 27.

Secondly, These kinde of *Desires* make men *ungratefull* and *forgetfull* of any kindnesse which hath already been done them. *Memoria minimum tribuit, quisquis spei plurimum.* As in buckets at a well, the longer the line of the one is which moves downward, the shorter is the line of the other which riseth upward; so the larger our Desires are towards the future, the narrower our memories are of things past. And usually mens valuations of things are more in the performance, then

then when they are performed. And the reason, is because as nature hath set our eies forward, and not behinde us: so the appetites of men, for which the eyes are the principall factors, looke naturally before them, not to what they *Have*, but to what they *Hope*. The eye whereby we looke backeward into our lives is the eye of *Repentance*, we there either see our selves bad, or little. And a man is an unwelcome object unto himselfe in both these Relations. But the eye whereby we looke forward, is an eye of *Hope*, and *Desire*, and by that we are represented to our selves better and greater then we are already. Iron moves not upward except the Loadstone be very neere it; But it mooveth downward, though the Center be never so remote. So much stronger are the motions of *Desire*, then those of acknowledgement and retribution.

Nam fere maxima pars movem hunc hominis habent, quod sibi volunt, Dum id impetrant Boni sunt, sed id ubi jam penes sese habent, ex bonis pessimi & fraudulentissimi Plaut. Captiv. nihil aequè est gratum adepto & concupiscentibus Plin. lib. 2. Ep. 15.

Besides the apprehensions of *Goodnesse* in a thing are much other in the *Desire* then in the *Review*: as usually the Sunne and the Moone looke bigger at their rising, then when they are come over our heads. *Desire* lookes on nothing in them but that which pleaseth, *Review* findes that in them which displeaseth. When we desire Wine we thinke onely on the sweetnesse, when we review it, we remember the headach. Besides what we desire is apprehended as the matter of our life, what is past, men apprehend as in the hand of death. *Quicquid retro est mors tenet.* As in our life, so in our delights, so much of them is dead as is over and gone. We love our food

Senec. de Brevit. vitæ & Ep. 120.

when it is meate, we loathe it when it is excrement. When it goes into us we desire it, when it passeth through us we despise it. And the secret worke of concoction, (which is as it were the Review of out meat) doth distinguish that in them which the first Appetite tooke in a lumpe, and together.

And in truth in all secular and sublunary desires we shall ever finde that they are like the Apples of Sodome, *Quæ contacta cinerescunt*, which have ashes hidden within their beauty, and death lurking under them. All the matter of our secular or sensitive Desires are just like the meates we eate, which goe much more into excrement, then into nourishment and substance. Like the Cyprus tree which they say is very faire, but beares no fruit. Like the Egyptian Temples which are beautifull in *frontispicio*, but ridiculous in *penetrali*. And if we looke well on them, we shall finde, that as they are mortall themselves, so they come to us through mortality. It was a bold, but true *ἀξίωμα* of *Seneca*. *Mortibus vivimus*. We live by the deaths of other things. Our fullest Tables furnished with death, nothing but *feretra*, the *biers* of birds and beasts. Our richest garments the bowels and skinnes of other creatures, which worke out their owne lives to preserve ours. Silke is a grave to the worme that weaves it, before it is a garment for us. Our Offices and Honours seldome come to us but by the mortality of those that prepossessed them. And our mortality makes them the fitter objects of other mens Desires.

Tertul. Apol. cap. 40.

Phocion apud Plutarch. Apoph. Clem. Alex. Ped. lib. 3. cap. 3.

3 These *Desires* as they are *forgetfull*, so they are *envious*, and looke with an evill eye upon others competion, accounting their succesſe our owne dammage. If a man ſhould draw the genealogie of all the injuries and emulations of the world, we ſhould finde the Roote of that great Tree to be nothing but luſt. It was Deſire and inordinate appetite by which the devill perſwaded our firſt parents to picke a quarrell with their Maker. *Whence come Warres and fightings*, ſaith Saint *Iames*, *but from luſts which warre in your members?* When a man hath warre within, no wonder if he have no peace without. He that cannot agree with himſelfe, will diſagree with all the world beſides. The ſea toſſeth every thing which comes into it, not becauſe it is wronged, but becauſe it is unquiet. And a luſtfull man will contend with every innocent man that proſpers, not becauſe this man doth him injury, but becauſe he grudgeth this mans proſperity. As the ſea repreſenteth every ſtrait thing that is put into it crooked, ſo luſt every harmeleſſe thing perverſe, and as *Seneca* ſpeakes, hath *Odium ſine inimico*, hatred without an enemie. Greedy Deſires are like a ſwollen and envious ſpleene, which ſucks away ſubſtance from all the reſt of the body.

Vid Senec. de Ira. lib. 3. c. 31. Alienis gemitibus libenter Emolumenta conquirit. Ammian: Marcell. lib. 31. Egregium Exemplum invidiæ etiam Eccleſiaſticæ ex cupiditatibus orta apud eundem Marcellinum inter Damaſum, & Vrſicinum. lib. 27.

Epiſt. 105.

4 These *Deſires* are *Hidroptically*, and like a * [illegible] in the ſtomacke which is not quenched, but enraged with that which feeds it. *Vnnaturall Deſires* being herein very like unto *naturall luſts*, the further they proceed, the ſtronger and

* *Celius Phadig. lib. 6, 39. lib. 14. cap. 1.*

swifter they are. Like wind in a bladder they never fill the heart, but enlarge it. The Grecians began their drinkings in little Cups, but proceeded unto Flagons: and many times those Appetitions which begin in modesty goe on unto impudence, and the more our lives hastens to leave the world, the more our lust hastens to possesse it. As it is noted of the *Parthians*, that the more they drinke, the more they thirst. And, which is a marvellous illogicall stupidity, the more continuall experience men have of the vanity of the world, the more greedy experiments they make to finde out solidity in it. Like your melancholy searchers after the Philosophes Stone, that never dote so much upon their project as then when it hath deluded them, and never flatter themselves with stronger hopes to be enriched by their Art, then when it hath brought them unto beggary.

Laert. in Anacharsis lib. 1. Senec. de Ben. lib. 2. c. 27. Nihil Satis mali, nisi, Imo moriendi bus ep. cap. 120. Plin. lib. 35. c. 22.

Lastly, from hence it comes to passe that these kindes of Desires are *Base*, and dejects the minde unto fordid and ignoble Resolutions. For *ex nihil satis, nihil turpe*. He that hath never enough will count nothing base whereby he may get more. As the *Historian* saith of *Otho*, that he did *Adorare vulgus, jacere oscula, & omnia serviliter pro Imperio*. Adore the people, dispence and scatter abroad his curtesies, crouch unto any servile expressions, to advance his Ambitious designes. Like *Antæus* in the Poets, fall to the earth, so hee may grow the stronger by it. As *Zopyrus* and *Pisistratus* who wounded, mangled, deformed

Tacit. Hist. 1.

Herodot. Thalia. Plutarch. in Solone.

formed themſelves, that they might thereby inſinuate, and gaine their ends. As the Scripture noteth of *Abſolom*, and the Hiſtorian of *Julian*, that out of affectation of popularity, they ſtouped and delighted to converſe with the loweſt of the people. Which cunning humility, or rather ſordidneſſe of Ambition, *Menelaus* in the Tragedian, hath thus elegantly objected in a contentious debate unto *Agamemnon*.

Ammian. Marcel. lib. 25.

Οἶδ' ἐν ἑλλήνεσσι ἀρχὴν διαδίδυς ἀφ' ἡμῶν,
Τὸ δοκεῖν μὲν ὑμᾶς χείζον, τὸ δ' ἔλασσον δίκαι.
Ὡς πίστιν ἔλαβε, δυσμαὶ δίξαὶ ἐφθόγγασεν,
Καὶ δοῦλος ἦρχε δεσπόταις τὴν δίλιαν ἀμείνων,
Καὶ δῆθεν ἀφῆκεν ἰξὺς πᾶν, κ'εἰ μὴ τι δίλοι,
Τοῖς τοξεύειν ζητῶν ἀφ' αὑτοῦ τὸ φιλότιμον ἐκ μέσου, &c.

Euripi. Iphig.

You know how you the Rule o're Grecians *got,*
In ſhew declining what in truth you ſought:
How low, how plauſible you apprehended
The hands of meaneſt men: How then you bended
To all you met: How your gates open flew,
And ſpake large welcome to the pop'lar Crew:
What ſweetned words you gave even unto thoſe
Who did decline, and hate to ſee you gloze.
How thus with Serpentine and guilefull Arts
You ſcrew'd and wound your ſelfe into the hearts
O'th'vulgar: And thus bought the power, which now
Makes you forget how then you us'd to bow.

CHAP. XVIII.

Rules touching our Deſires. Deſires of lower Objects muſt not be either haſtie, or unbounded; ſuch are unnaturall, turbid, unfruitfull, unthankfull: Deſires of heavenly Objects fixed, permanent, induſtrious: Connexion of vertues, ſluggiſh Deſires.

UNto the things already delivered touching this affection, I ſhall here add two or three Rules pertaining to the morall uſe, and managing of it. And they are, Firſt, concerning Objects of an *Inferiour* and Tranſitory nature, that our *Deſires* be neither *Haſtie* and precipitate, nor *Waſte*, and unlimited. And in matters more *High* and Noble, that they be not either *wavering* and interrupted *Deſires*, or *Lazie* and negligent *Deſires*.

1 For the firſt of theſe, we have a rule in *Solomon*, concerning Riches, which will hold in all other Objects of an immoderate deſire: *He that maketh haſte to be rich, ſhall not be without ſinne*; I may add, *Not without cares neither*: for we know the nature of all Earthly things, they have ſomething of the Serpent in them, to *Deceive*. The way of riches and profit, is a thorny way; the way

Prov. 28. 20. 20. 21.

way of Honour and Ambition, a ſlippery and giddy way; the way of carnall Pleaſures, a deep and a fowle way, the way of learning it ſelfe (the nobleſt of all ſublunary things) an involved and intricate way. And certainely he had need have better eyes then a blinde Paſſion, who in ſo ill ground will make good haſte and good ſpeed together. *In labyrintho properantes ipſa velocitas implicat.* He is the likelieſt man to get firſt out of a Maze, who runnes faſteſt. An over nimble *Deſire* is like the ſtomacke of a ſicke man newly recovered, more greedy, then ſtrong, and fuller of Appetite then Digeſtion. Whence ariſe immature and unconcocted counſels, blinde and ungoverned Reſolutions: like thoſe monſtrous people, which *Plinie* ſpeakes of, whoſe feet goe backeward, and behinde their eyes. For when the minde of man is once poſſeſſed with conceit of *Contentment* to be found in worldly glories, when the inſinuations and ſweet inchantments of Honour, Profit, Pleaſure, Power, and Satans *Hæc omnia*, hath once crept upon the affection, and lulled reaſon aſleep; it is then ſufficient that we know the end, which we deſire; we have not the patience to inquire after the right way unto it: becauſe it is the ſuſpition of our greedy *Deſires*, that the true means are commonly the moſt tedious, and that honeſty for the moſt part goes the fartheſt way about. And hence withall it uſually commeth to paſſe that theſe haſty and preproperous Appetitions do hinder ends, and intercept Advantages which ſlowneſſe with maturity might have made uſe of.

ἡ γὰρ μὴ σπουδὴ ἁμαρτία. Cilo apud Laert. lib. 1.

As

Plutarch. in Lucullo.

As the Romane Souldiers by their greedinesse on their prey, missed of taking Mithridates, who otherwise could not have escaped them. And therefore it was wise counsell of *Nestor* in the Poet.

Iliad. 7. 70.

Μήτις ἔτι μετόπισθε νεῶν ἰέναι μενεάων
μυρίτω, ὅς κεν πλεῖα φέρων ἐπὶ νῆας ἵκηται.
Αὐτὰρ ἀνδρὰς κτείνωμεν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἕκηλοι
νηυσὶν ἀμπλήσαντ' ἀλέσθων τιθηνεῶντες.

Let none goe lingring after spoyle, and stay
To load himselfe with a too hasty prey.
But first let's kill: W'are sure after such fight,
Carcasses being rifled cannot bite.

Sentc. de Tranq. l. 2. Arian. Epict. lib. 1. c. 26.

2 The next Rule to keepe this Passion in order with reference unto inferiour Objects is, that it be not an *infinite* and unlimited *Desire*. Appetite should answere our power to procure, and our strength to beare and to digest. Wee should not goe about to swallow a Camell, when a Gnat doth make us straine, Immoderate *Desires* can neither be satisfied, nor concocted. And this unboundednesse of Desires we are to take heed off; for these reasons.

Arist. Polit. lib. 1. cap. 6. Sentc. Ep. 16. 39. de benefic. lib. 2. c. 27.

1 First, for the *unnaturalnesse* of it: for all *unnaturall* and unnecessary *Desires* are *infinite*, as the Philosopher hath observed; As he that is out of his way may wander infinitely. An unlimited *Desire* is onely there requisite, where the Object

Object thereof is Infinite, and ordained to perfect Mans Nature; but not where it is onely a means appointed for his benefit and comfort. Wherein he ought therefore then to enioy his Contentment, when it is sufficient not to fill his Minde which is immortall; and therefore not able to bee repleniſhed with any periſhing happineſſe) nor to outreach the vaſtneſſe of his opinion, which which being Erronious is likewiſe Infinite (For *Omnis Error immenſus*, as *Seneca* ſpeaks; but then only when it affords ſuch conveniences, as wherewithall the ſeaſonable and vertuous imploiments of Nature may with content be exerciſed. It is then a corrupt *Deſire* which proceeds not from our Want, but from our Vice. As that is not a naturall thirſt, but a diſeaſe and diſtemper of the Body, which can never be ſatisfied.

Extranei non augent bonum, ſed condiunt. Senec. Epiſt. 66.

Nunquam ſatè invenit libido. Cicer. Tuſc. *Malum infinitum.* Ariſt. Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 6. Polit. l. 2. c. 5. *Exiguum naturæ opinio immenſarium* Epic. apud Sen.

Now the miſeries of *unnaturall Deſires* are firſt, that they corrupt and expell thoſe which are Naturall: as multitudes of ſtrangers in a City doe eat out the Natives; thus in luxurious Men, ſtrange Love doth extinguiſh that which is Conjugall. 1.

Plutarch. in Gryllo, & de Sanit. tuend.

Secondly, they ever bring vexation to the minde with them. As immoderate laughter, ſo immoderate Luſts are never without paine and convulſions of Nature. Morbid *deſires* of the Mind are like an Itch or Vlcer in the Body, which is with the ſame nayles both angered and delighted, and hath no pleaſure but with vexation. 2.

Plut. de Sanit. tuend.

Sen. de Tranq. cap. 2.

Thirdly, they are ever attended with Repen- 3.

tance, both because in promises they disappoint, and in performances they deceive; and when they make offers of pleasure, do expire in pains; as those delicates which are sweet in the mouth, are many times heavy in the stomacke; and after they have pleased the Palat doe torment the bowels. The Minde surfets on nothing sooner than on unnaturall Desires.

Alterna inter spiditatem nostram & Pœnitentiam vices sunt. Sen. de Otio sap. cap. 27.

Fourthly, for this reason they are ever changing and making new experiments; as weake and wanton stomacks which are presently cloy'd with an uniforme dyet, and must have not onely a painefull but a witty Cooke, whose inventions may be able with new varieties to gratifie and humour the niceneſſe of their appetite. As *Nero* had an officer who was called *Elegantiæ Arbiter*, the inventor of new Lusts for him.

4. *Sen. de Benef. l. 3. c. 3.*

Quod Ministerium fuerat, Ars habiti cœpit. Liv. l. 39 Κτῆσις ἕξις τις. Arist. Ethic. l. 3. c. 12.

Lastly, unlimited Desires are for the most part Envious and Malignant: For he who desires every thing, cannot chuse but repine to see another have that which himselfe wanteth. And therefore *Dionysius* the Tyrant did punish *Philoxenus* the Musitian, because he could sing, and *Plato* the Philosopher, because he could dispute better than himselfe. In which respect hee did wisely, who was contented not to be esteemed a better Orator than he who could command thirty legions.

5. *Tacit. Annal. l. 16.*

Plut. de Tranq.

Favorinus apud Ælium Spart. in Adr.

Secondly, *unbounded Desires* doe worke *Anxiety* and *Perturbation* of Minde; and by that means disappoint Nature of that proper end which this Passion was ordained unto; namely, to be a means of obtaining some further good; whereas those Desires

Desires which are in their executions Turbid, or in their continuance Permanent, are no more likely to lead unto some farther end, than either a misty and darke, or a winding and circular way is to bring a Man at last unto his journeyes end; whereof the one is dangerous, the other vaine. And together with this they doe distract our noble Cares, and quite avert our thoughts from more high and holy desires. *Martha* her *Many things*, and *Maries One thing* will very hardly consist together.

Lastly, there is one Corruption more in these *unlimited Desires*, they make a man *unthankfull* for former benefits: as first, because *Caduca memoria futuro imminentium.* It is a strong presumption that he seldome looks backe upon what is past, who is earnest in pursuing some thing to come. It is S. *Pauls* Profession and Argument in a matter of greater consequence, *I forget those things which are behind, and reach forth unto those things which are before.* And secondly, though a man should looke backe; yet the thoughts of such a benefit would be but sleight and vanishing, because the Mind finding present content in the liberty of a roving Desire, is marvellous unwilling to give permanent entertainment unto thoughts of another Nature, which likewise (were they entertained) would be rather thoughts of murmuring than of thankfulfulnesse: every such man being willing rather to conceive the benefit small, than to acknowledge the vice and vastnesse of his owne Desires.

Sen. de Benef. lib. 3.

The next rule which I observed for the go-

vernment of these Passions, do respect those *Higher* and more glorious Objects of Mans Felicity: And herein,

1 Our *Desires* are not to be *Wavering* and Inconstant, but Resolute and full of Quickness and Perseverance: First, because though we be poore and shallow vessels; yet so narrow and almost shut up are those passages, by which wee should give admittance unto the matter of our true happines, yea so full are we already of contrary qualities, as that our greatest vehemency wil not be enough, either to empty our selves of the one, or to fill our selves with the other. And therefore the true *Desires* of this Nature are in the Scripture set forth by the most patheticall and strong similitudes of *Hunger* and *Thirst*; and those not common neither, but by the panting of a tyred Hart after the rivers of water, and the gaping of the dry ground after a seasonable showre. Secondly, every desirable Object the higher it goes, is ever the more united within it selfe, and drives the faster unto an unity: It is the property of Errours to be at variance; whereas *Truth* is *One*, and all the parts thereof doe mutually strengthen and give light unto each other: So likewise in things *Good*, the more noble, the more knit they are. *Scelera dissident*: It is for sinnes to be at variance amongst themselves. And those lower Goods of Riches, Pleasure, Nobility, Beauty, though they are not Incomparable; yet they have no naturall Connexion to each other; & have therfore the lesse power to draw a constant and continued Desire. But for nobler and immateriall

Ἐρωτικὸς ὁ τύραννος. Ethic. l. 7. c. 14.

teriall goods wee ſee how the Philoſopher hath obſerved a connexion betweene all his morall vertues, whereby a man that hath one, is naturally drawne to a deſire of all the reſt: for the minde being onee acquainted with the ſweetnes of one, doth not onely apprehend the ſame ſweetneſſe in the others, but beſides findeth it ſelfe not ſufficiently poſſeſt of that which it hath, unleſſe it bee thereby drawne to procure the reſt: all whoſe properties it is by an excellent mutuall ſervice to give light and luſtre, ſtrength and validity, and in ſome ſort greater Vnity unto each other. *Ethic. l. 6. c. 12.*

And laſtly for the higheſt and divineſt good; the truth of Religion, that is in it ſelfe moſt of all other One, as being a Beame of that Light and Revelation of that Will, which is Vnity it ſelfe. And therefore though we diſtinguiſh the Creed into twelve Articles, yet Saint *Paul* calleth them all but μία πίστις one Faith, as having but one Lord for the Object and End of them. Now then where the parts of good are ſo united, as that the one draweth on the other, there is manifeſtly required united deſire to carry the ſoule thereunto. *Eph. 4. 5.*

II. The laſt Rule which I obſerved was that our Deſires ought not to bee faint and ſluggiſh, but induſtrious and painefull, both for the arming us to avoid and withſtand all oppoſitions and difficulties, which we are every where likely to meet withall in the purſuit of our happineſſe; and alſo for the wiſe and diſcreet applying of the ſeverall furtherances requiſite thereunto. And indeed that is no True, which is not an Operative

Deſire: a Velleity it may be, but a Will it is not. For what ever a man will have, hee will ſeek in the uſe of ſuch meanes, as are proper to procure it. Children may wiſh for Mountaines of gold, and *Balaam* may wiſh for an happy death, and an Atheiſt may wiſh for a ſoule as earthly in ſubſtance as in Affection; but theſe are all the ejaculations rather of a Speculative fancie, than of an induſtrious affection. True deſires as they are right in regard of their object, ſo are they laborious in reſpect of their motion. And therefore thoſe which are idle and impatient of any paines, which ſtand like the Carman in the Fable, crying to *Hercules* when his Waine ſtuck in the mud to helpe it out, without ſtretching out his owne hands to touch it, are firſt unnaturall deſires, it being the formall property of this Paſſion to put the Soule upon ſome motion or other. And therefore wee ſee whereſoever Nature hath given it, ſhe hath given likewiſe ſome manner of motion or other to ſerve it. And ſecondly they are by conſequence undutifull and diſobedient Deſires, in that they ſubmit not themſelves unto that Law, which requireth that wee manifeſt the life and ſtrength of our Love by the quickneſſe and operation of it in our Deſires. And laſtly, ſuch Deſires are unuſefull and fruitleſſe: for how can an object, which ſtandeth in a fixed diſtance from the Nature, which it ſhould perfect, be procured by idle and ſtanding affections? The deſires of the ſluggard (ſaith *Salomon*) ſlay him, becauſe his hands refuſe to labour. Theſe affections muſt have

Pro. 21. 25: 13. 4.

have life in them, which bring life after them: Dead desires are deadly desires.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Affection of Ioy or Delight. The severall Objects thereof, Corporall, Morall, Intellectuall, Divine.

THe next Passions in order belonging to the Concupiscible Faculty, are those two, which are wrought by the *Presence* of, and Vnion to an Object; and that is, when either wee by our desires have reached the Object, which worketh *Ioy* and Delight: or when in our flight the Object hath overtaken us, which worketh *Griefe* and Sorrow. And these two do beare the most inward relation unto and influence upon all our actions. Whereupon *Aristotle* in his Ethicks hath made them the foundation of our vertues, and rules of our working. And the reason is naturall, because the end of our motion is to attaine rest, and avoid perturbation. Now *Delight* is nothing else but the Sabbath of our thoughts, and that sweet tranquility of mind, which we receive from the Presence and Fruition of that good, wherunto our Desires have carried us. And therefore the Philosopher in

ἡσονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς. τῷ ἡδεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν. *Ethic. l. 2. c. 3.*

Cicer. Tusc. l. 4. ἰσχὺς & ἔμφασις. *Zeno apud Laert. l. 7. Clem. Alex. strom. lib 2.* κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς *Rhetor. l. 1. c. 11*

in one place call it a motion of the Soule with a sensible and felt instauration of Nature, yet elsewhere hee as truly telleth us that it standeth rather in * rest than motion; as on the other side Griefe is the streightning and anguish of our minds wrought out of the sense and burden of some present Evill oppressing our Nature. Now these Passions are diverse, according to the diversity of the Objects: which are either *Sensitive* and Bodily; and then Delight is called *Voluptas* Pleasure, being a medicine and supply against bodily indigence and defects: or *Intellectuall* and Divine, and then it is called *Gaudium* Ioy, being a sweet and delightfull tranquillity of minde, resting in the fruition and possession of a good. So also is the other Passion of *Sadnesse* considered; which in respect of the Body is called a Sense of *Paine*; in respect of the Soule, a Sense of *Griefe*.

First then for the *Object* of our *Delight*; it is onely that which can yeeld some manner of satisfaction unto our nature, not as it is a corrupt and erring, but as it is an *Empty* and perfectible nature. Whatsoever then is either *Medicinall* for the Repairing, or *Naturall* for the Conserving, or any way *helpefull* for the advancing of a Creature, is the onely true and allowable object of its Delight. Other pleasures which eat out and undermine Nature, as water which by little & little insensibly consumeth the bank against which it beateth, or as * Ivie which seemeth to adorn the Tree unto which it cleaveth, but indeed sucketh out and stealeth away the sap therof, may haply yield some

* ἀνάπαυσις μᾶλλον ἢ κίνησις ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή. Ethic. l. 7. c. ult.

Gaudere in Sinu. Cic. ἐν θέρμῃ χειμερινῇ. Iliad. ω. *Qui sapit in tactio gaudeat ille Sinu. Tibul. Vid. Damascen de Orthodox. fide lib 2. cap. 13. & Nemes. de Anima. c. 18*

* *Arboris vtcat omnem Succum auferendo, &c. Plin. l. 16. c 34.*

ſome meaſure of vaniſhing content to mindes, which taſt every thing with a corrupted palate; but certainely ſuch ſophiſticall premiſes can never inferre in the concluſion any other than a perfunctory and tottering content. And therefore *Seneca* is bold to find an impropriety in *Virgils* Epithite, *Mala Gaudia*, Ioyes which iſſue from a polluted fountaine; as not having in them that inſeparable attribute of abſolute Delight; which is to be unvariable. For how can a mind (unleſſe blinded with its owne impoſtures, and intangled in the errours of a mis-led affection) receive any nouriſhing and ſolid content in that, which is in it ſelfe vaniſhing, and unto its Subject deſtructive? Whatſoever then may bee delighted in, muſt have ſome one of the forenamed conditions, tending either to the *Reſtitution* of *decayed* nature, to the *preſervation* of *entire* nature, or to the *Perfection* of *Empty* nature. And to the former and imperfecter ſort of theſe, *Ariſtotle* referreth all corporeall and ſenſitive Pleaſures (unto which he therefore granteth a ſecondary and accidentall goodneſſe) which hee calleth ἰατρικὰ the Medicines of an indigent nature; whereby the defects thereof are made up, and it ſelfe disburdened of thoſe cares, which for the moſt part uſe to follow the want of them.

Epiſt. 59. Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 14. c. 8.

Κινητικὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡδονή. Nemeſ. c. 18.

Ethic l. 7. c. 14. ἄγαθαι μὲν οὖν τιν.

Herein then I obſerve a double corruption; an unnaturall and unlimited Delight. *Unnaturall*, I meane thoſe accurſed pleaſures, which were exerciſed by men given over to vile affections and greedy in the purſuing of luſts, whoſe very names

abhorre the light. *Vnlimited* Delights are those, which exceed the bounds of Nature, and the prime Institution of lawfull and indifferent things. For such is the condition of those, that if they repaire not, and strengthen nature, * they weaken and disinable it; as in the body Luxury breeds diseases, and in the mind Curiosity breeds Errours.

* *Vnde factum ut quæ ad funera pertinerent in Templo veneris venderentur. vid. Plutarch. quæ Rom. q. 23.*

Other Objects there are of a wider nature than those, which concerne the Body; and they are *both the Morall and Contemplative* Actions of the Mind; To both which *Aristotle* hath attributed principally this passion; but more specially to the latter, whose object is more pure and whose Acts lesse laborious, as residing in that part of the Soule, which is most elevate from sense: and therefore most of all capable of the purest simplest and unmixed Delights. Now every thing is the more free, cleare, independant; spirituall, by how much it is the more unmixed. And these are the choisest perfections, whereby the Soule may be filled with joy. It is true indeed, that oftentimes the contemplations of the mind have annexed unto them both Griefe and Anxiety; but this is never naturall to the act of Knowledg, which is alwaies in its owne vertue an impression of Pleasure: But it ariseth either out of the sublimity of the Object, which dazleth the power; or out of the weaknesse and doubtings of the Vnderstanding, which hath not a cleare light thereof; or out of the admixtion and steeping them in the Humours of the Affections, whereby men ministet

Ethicd. 10. c. 7.

niſter unto themſelves deſperate thoughts or weake feares, or guilty griefes, or unlimited Deſires, according as is the property of the Obje& joyned with their own private diſtempers: Thus we ſee the Intuition of Divine Truth in minds of defiled affections, worketh not that ſweet effect which is naturall unto it, to produce, but Doubtings, Terrours and Diſquietings of Conſcience; it being the propertie of the workes of Darkneſſe to be afraid of the word of Light. But of all theſe former objects of mans Delight (becauſe they are amongſt *Salomons* Catalogue of things under the Sunne) none are here without vexation and vanities: For to let paſſe the lightning of an idle mirth, which indeed is madneſſe and not Ioy. For *Seneca* telleth us that true *Ioy* is a *ſerious* and ſevere thing: and not to meddle with riches and other ſecular Delights, which have *wings* to fly from us and *thornes* to prick us, even that higheſt naturall Delight of the Mind, Knowledge, and the heavenly eloquence of the Tongues of Angels (which a man would think were above the Sunne, and therfore not obnoxious to *Salomons* vanity) would be in man, without the right corre&ive thereof, but a tinkling noiſe, yeelding rather a windy Pleaſure than a true Delight. The properties whereof is not to puffe up, but to repleniſh. And therefore it is the prayer of Saint *Paul*, *The God of Peace fill you with all Ioy*. True heavenly *Ioy* is a *filling*, a ſatiating Ioy: a *Ioy unſpeakeable*, with Saint *Peter*; a *Peace paſt underſtanding*, with Saint *Paul*. Nor doth this property of overflowing and ſwallowing the

Iob.3.20.
Iob 21.14.
Iſa.30.11.
2 Pet.3.5.

Eccleſ.2.2.
τῶ γέλωτι μανίαν ὄνομα ἐπέθηκα, τῇ δὲ ἡδονῇ τί τοῦτο ποιεῖς;
Sophoc. Ajax.
Senec. Epiſt. 23

Rom.15.13.

Mind add any degrees of offence or anxiety thereunto: for it is not the weakneſſe of the ſoule, as it is of the body to receive hurt from the excellency of that which it delighteth in, nor doth the mind deſire to ſubdue or conquer, but onely to be united with its object.

And here the onely corruption of our Delight is, the deficiency and imperfections of it. For though this bleſſed Light leaves not any man in the ſhadow of death, yet it takes him not quite out of the ſhadow of ſinne, by the darkneſſe whereof hee is without much of that luſtre and glory, which he ſhall then have, when the righteous ſhall ſhine like the Sunne in the Firmament. Yet at the leaſt our endeavours muſt be, that though our *Ioyes* cannot be here a *Repleniſhing Ioy*, yet it may be an *Operative Ioy*, and ſo worke out the meaſure of its own fullneſſe. I have done with the ſeverall Objects of mans delight, Corporall, Morall, Intelle&uall and Divine.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Cauſes of Joy. The union of the Obiect to the Faculty, by Contemplation, Hope, Fruition, Changes: by accident a cauſe of Delight.

I Now proceed to ſpeak of the more particular cauſes and effects of this Paſſion. Touching the former, not to meddle with thoſe which are unnaturall, belluine, and morbid (which the Philoſopher hath given ſome inſtances of) The generall cauſe is the naturall *goodneſſe* of the Obiect, and the particulars under that. Any thing which hath a power to *unite* and make preſent the Obiect with the Faculty. And that is done (to ſpeake onely of intellectuall Powers) three manner of wayes; by *Contemplation*, by *Confidence*, and by *Fruition*, by thinking of it in the Minde, by expecting of it in the Heart, and by enjoying it in the whole Man.

Ariſt. Ethic. lib. 7. cap. 6.

Ariſt. Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 1.

Contemplation addes unto the Soule a double Delight: Firſt, from it's owne property, it being the proper and naturall agitation of mans minde, inſomuch that thoſe things which wee abhorre to know experimentally, our curious and contemplative nature deſires to know ſpeculatively. And

therefore the Devils firſt temptation was drawne from the knowledge as well of evill as good, for he knew that the minde of Man would receive content in the underſtanding of that, which in it's owne nature had no perfection in it.

But then ſecondly, in the Object of true Delight, Contemplation miniſtreth a farther Ioy, in that it doth in ſome ſort pre-unite our Soules and our Bleſſedneſſe together: and this is partly the reaſon why *Ariſtotle* ſo much advanceth his Contemplative before his practique Felicity: For though this in regard of it's immediate reference unto Communion, be of a more ſpreading and diffuſive Nature; yet certainly, in that ſweetneſſe of content, that ſerenity of Soule, that exaltation of thoughts which we receive from thoſe noble motions of the higher Mind, the other doth farre in pleaſure and ſatisfaction ſurpaſſe all active happineſſe. And hence we ſee in the parts of Mans Body, thoſe which are (if I may ſo ſpeake) more contemplative, have precedence to thoſe that are more practique. The parts of Viſion are before the parts of Action; the right eye is preferred before the right hand. Thus we may obſerve in God himſelfe (notwithſtanding in him there can bee neither acceſſion nor intermiſſion of Delight) yet by way of expreſſion to us ward, he did not in the creation of the World ſo much ioy in his *fiat*, as in his *vidit*; not ſo much when he gave his creatures their *Nature*, as when he ſaw their *Goodneſſe*: Nature being the Object of *Power*; but Goodnes the Object of *Delight*; and therefore the day of his

his reſt was more holy than the dayes of his working, that being appointed for the Contemplation, as theſe were for the production of his creatures.

And as Contemplation by way of *Preſcience*, when it looketh forward on good things hoped: So alſo by way of *Memory*, when it looketh backward and receiveth evill things eſcaped, doth miniſter matter of renewed Ioy. No Man looketh on the Sea with more comfort, than he who hath eſcaped a ſhipwracke. And therefore when Iſraell ſaw the Egyptians dead on the Sea ſhore, the fear of whom had ſo much affrighted them before, they then ſang a Song of Triumph. Paſt troubles doe ſeaſon, and as it were ballace preſent Comforts, as the Snow in Winter increaſeth the beauty of the Spring. *Ariſt. Rhet. l. 1. c. 10.*

But in this particular of *Contemplation*, notwithſtanding the excellency of it, there may be Corruption in the Exceſſe (For in thoſe matters of Delight, except they be ſuch as are diſproportioned to our corrupt Nature, I meane divine things, wee ſeldome erre in the other extreme.) And that is, when wee doe not divide our ſelves between our parts, and let every one execute his proper function, ſo to attend upon meere mentall notions, as to neglect the practicall part of our Life, and withdraw our ſelves from the fellowſhip and regard of humane ſociety, is as wicked in Religion, as it would be in Nature monſtrous to ſee a fire burne without light, or ſhine without heate (aberrations from the ſupreme Law being in

in divine things impious as they are in naturall prodigious.)

And therefore that vowed sequestration and voluntary banishment of Hermits and Votaries from humane society, under pretence of devoting themselves to Contemplation, and a fore-enjoying of the Light of God, is towards him as unpleasing, as it is in it selfe uncomfortable, for their very patterne which they pretend in such cases to imitate, was not only a burning lamp by the heate of his owne Contemplations; but a shining lamp too, by the diffusing of his owne Comforts to the refreshing of others.

A second cause of Delight is the sure *Confidence* of the Mind. Whereby upon strong and unerring grounds, it waiteth for the accomplishment of it's desires: so that what ever doth incourage our *Hope*, doth therewithall strengthen and inlarge our *Delight*. *Spe gaudent* saith S. *Paul*, and *Sperantes gaudent* saith the Philosopher, Hope and Joy goe both together: For where Hope is strong, it doth first divert and take off the Mind from poring upon our present wants, and withall ministreth tranquillity unto it from the evidence of a future better estate.

Rom. 12. 12. *Arist. Rhet. l.* 1. *c.* 11, 12.

But here we must take heed of a deep Corruption: For though I encline not to that opinion which denyeth *Hope*, all asswaging and mitigating force, in respect of evils, or any power to settle a floating Mind; yet to have an ungrounded Confidence, and either out of Presumption or Security to resolve upon uncertaine and casuall events, there-

there-hence to deduce Arguments of Comfort' works but an empty and imaginary Delight, like his in the Poet:

——*Petit ille dapes ſub imagini ſomni,*
Oraq; vana movet, dentemq; indente fatigat.

Ovid. Met.

Who dreaming that he was a Gueſt
At his Imaginary Feaſt,
Did vainely glut upon a Thought,
Tyring each Iaw and Tooth for naught:
And when he fanci'd dainty meat,
Had nothing but a Dreame to eat:

Iſa. 29. 8. μὴ οὐ δόξει λιμὸν κἤλιος ἀγυεῖσιν ἰνιήσις. Theoc. Idyll. 21.

Or like the Muſitian in *Plutarch*, who having pleaſed *Dionyſius* with a little vaniſhing Muſick, was rewarded with a ſhort and deceived Hope of a great Reward. A prefumptuous Delight though it ſeeme for the time to miniſter as good content as that which is raiſed on a ſounder bottome; yet in the end will worke ſuch inconveniences as ſhall altogether countervaile and overweigh the deceipt of its former Ioyes: For the Mind being mollified and puffed up with a windy and unnouriſhing comfort, is quite diſabled to beare the aſſault of ſome ſudden evill, as having its forces ſcattered by Security, which caution and feare would have collected. For wee know in Bodies, *Vnion* ſtrengthneth natural motion, and weakneth violent; and in the Mind the collecting and uniting of it doth both inable it for proſecution of its owne ends, and for reſiſting all oppoſite force.

Plut. de Audit.

It is therefore no comforting but a weakning Confidence, which is not provident and operative.

The third and most effectuall cause of *Delight* is the *Fruition* of Good, and the *reall Vnion* thereof unto the Mind: for all other things worke delight no farther, than either as they looke towards, or worke towards this. And therefore if we marke it in all matter of Pleasure and Ioy, the more the *Vnion* is, the more is the *Delight* (And Vnion is the highest degree of Fruition that can be) thus wee see the presence of a Friend, yeelds more content than the absence, and the imbraces, more than the presence: so in other outward Delights, those of *Incorporation*, are greater than those of *Adhesion*. As it is more naturall to delight in our meats than in our garments; the one being for an union inward to increase our strength; the other outward only to protect it. In the understanding likewise, those assents which are most cleer, are most pleasant, and perspecuity argues the perfecter union of the Object to the Faculty. And therefore we have *Speculum & Ænigma* put together by S. *Paul*, *We see as in a glasse darkly*, where the weaknesse of our knowledge of God is attributed to this, that we see him not face to face with an immediate union unto his glory, but at a distance in the creature and in the word, the *glasse* of *Nature* and of *Faith* (both which are in their kind *evidences of things not seen*) we shall only there have a perfection of Ioy, where we shall have a consummate union, *in his presence* only is the *fulnesse of Ioy*.

Now

Now three things there are which belong unto a perfect fruition of a good thing: First, *Propriety* unto it, for a ſicke man doth not ſeele the joy of a ſound mans health, nor a poore man of a rich mans money. *Propriety* is that which makes all the emulation and contention amongſt men, one man being agreeved to ſee another to have that which he either claimeth or coveteth. Secondly, *Poſſeſſion*: For a man can reap little comfort from that which is his owne, if it be any way detained and withheld from him, which was the cauſe of that great contention between *Agamemnon* & *Achilles*, & between the Greeks & Trojans, becauſe the one tooke away and detained that which was the others. Thirdly, *Accommodation*, to the end for which a thing was appointed: For a man may have any thing in his cuſtody, and yet receive no comfort nor reall delight from it, except he apply it unto thoſe purpoſes for which it was inſtituted. It is not then the having of a good but the uſing of it which makes it beneficiall.

Τὰ αὐτὰ πᾶσι οὐκ ἀρέσκει οὐδὲ ἡδέα πάντων. *Ariſt. Rhet. l. 2. Pol. l. 2. c. 3. Ethic. l. 8. c. 13.*

Arrian. Epiſt. l. 1. c. 22.

Now beſides thoſe naturall cauſes of *Delight*, there is by accident one more; to wit, the *Change* and *Variety* of good things, which the diverſity of our natures and inclinations, and the emptineſſe of ſuch things as we ſeeke Delight from, doth occaſion, where Nature is ſimple and uncompounded, there one, and the ſame operation is alwaies pleaſant; but where there is a mixed and various Nature, and diverſity of Faculties, unto which doe belong diverſity of inclinations, there changes doe miniſter Delight: as amongſt learned

Ethic. lib. 7. c. vl. l. 10 c. 4.

ned men, variety of studies; and with luxurious men, variety of pleasures.

And this the rather, because there are no sublunary contentments, which bring not a * *Satiety* along with them, as hath been before observed. And therefore the same resolution which the Philosopher gives for the walking of the Body, when he enquireth the reason why in a journey the inequality of the wayes do lesse weary a man than when they are all plaine and alike. We may give for the walking and wandring of the Desire (as *Solomon* cals it) to wit, that change and variety doe refresh Nature, and are in stead of a rest unto it. * And therefore as I have before observed of *Nero*, the same hath *Tully* observed of *Xerxes*, that hee propounded rewards to the inventors of new and changeable pleasures.

Hereunto may be added as a further cause of *Pleasure*. Whatsoever serveth to let out and to lessen Griefe, as *Words*, * *Teares*, *Anger*, *Revenge*, because all these are a kind of victory, then which nothing bringeth greater pleasure. And therefore *Homer* saith of Revenge, that it is sweeter than the dropping honey.

Gustata magis quam Potata delectant. Cic. Tusc. l. 2. Prob. sect. 5. quæst. 1. Vid. Senec. de Tranq. c. 2, 3.

* *Quod etiam de Tiberio notavit Sueton. cap. 43. Qui hoc officio fungebantur dicti (ut videtur) ab Ælio Lampridio Voluptarij in Alex. Sever.*
* *Κοινὸν ἡ χαρὰ τῶν λύπῃ διαφορά. Xenoph. Hellenic. lib. 7.*
Est quædam etiam volendi voluptas. Plin. & Cic. de fine, l. 1. Arist. Rhet. l. 1. c. 11.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of other Cauſes of Delight. Vnexpectedneſſe of a God. Strength of Deſire. Immagination. Imitation. Fitneſſe and Accommodation. Of the effects of this Paſſion. Reparation of Nature. Dilatation. Thirſt in noble Objects, ſatiety in Baſer. Whetting of induſtry. A timorous unbeliefe.

VNto theſe more principall Cauſes of this Affection I ſhall briefly adde theſe few which follow.

1 The *ſuddenneſſe* and *unexpectedneſſe* of a good thing cauſeth the greater Delight in it. For *Expectation* of a thing makes the Minde feed upon it before hand, as young Gallants who ſpend upon their eſtates before they come to them, and by that meanes make them the leſſe when they come. As ſometimes it happeneth with choice and delicate ſtomackes. That the ſight and ſmell of their meate doth halfe cloy and ſatiate them before they have at all taſted any of it: ſo the long gazing upon that which we Deſire by *Expectation* doth as it were deflowre the Delight of it before fruition. Whereas on the other ſide, as the Poet expreſſeth it.

Vix ſum apud me ita animus commotus eſt metu ſpe, gaudio, mirando hoc tanto tamque repentino bono Terent. Andr. Act. 5. 4. Tacitus hæret lam, animo mens tam repentinum tamque magnum non concipiente Gaudium Apul. Aſin. Aur. lib. 11.

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Vix ſum apud me ita animus commotus eſt metu ſpe, gaudio, mirando hoc tanto tamque repentino bono Terrent. Andr. Act. 5. A. Tacitus barelam, animo mes tam repentinum tamquè magnum non concipiente Gaudium Apul. Aſin. Aur. lib. 11.

Sophocl. Antig.

——ἀ ἰδίᾳ τις ψυχὰ μεγάλας χαρᾶς
Ἔσχεν ἄνω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλπὶς ἰδεῖν.

No joy in greatnesse can compare with that,
Which doth our Hopes and thoughts anticipate.

So strong and violent hath been the immutation which *sudden joy* hath wrought in the Body, [a] that many (as I have formerly noted) have beene quite overwhelmed by it, and beene made pertakers of *Augustus* his wish to enjoy an [b] euthanasia and to dye pleasantly. And for this Reason it is that [c] new things, and such as we [d] admire, and were [a] not before acquainted withall doe usually Delight us, because they surprize us, representing a kinde of strangeneſſe unto the minde, whereby it is enlarged and enriched. For strange and New things have ever the greateſt price set upon them. As I noted before of the Romane Luxury, That it gloryed in no Delicates but those which were brought out of [b] strange Countries, and did first pose Nature, before either feed or adorne it.

a *Multis mortem attulit gaudium ingens, insperatum interclusit animam, & vim magni nervique motus non sustinente.* A. Gell. lib. 3. c. 1. lib. 3. c. 1. & cap. 15.
b Sueton in Aug. cap. 99.
c Aristot. Ethic. 1004.
d *Delectat quicquid est Admirabile* Cic. partic. Orat.
a *Proximorum incuriosi longinqua sectamur* & Plin. lib. 8. Epist. 20.
b Vid. Clem. Alex. Paedag. l. 2. c. 1. Plin. l. 9. c. 34. & lib. 22. c. 2. Plutarch. De Tranquil. vitae.
c Vid. Ciceron. Tusc. qu. l. 5.

2 *Strength of Desire*, doth on the other side enlarge the pleasure of fruition, because Nature ever delighteth most in those things which cost us deareſt, and strong desires are ever painfull. When [c] *Darius* in his flight drank muddy water, & *Ptolomie* did eate dry bread, they both professed that they never felt greater pleasure: strength of Appetite marveilously encreasing the Delight in that which satisfied it. For want and

Difficulty are great Preparations to a more feeling fruition, [a] as Bees gather excellent Honey out of the bittereſt Herbes. And as we ſay, *Nulla ſunt firmiora quàm quæ ex dubijs facta ſunt certa.* Thoſe evidences are ſureſt which were made cleare out of doubtfull. So thoſe pleaſures are ſweeteſt, *Quæ ſuaves fiunt ex triſtibus*, which have had wants and feares and Difficulties to provide a welcome for them. And therefore [b] Wreſtlers and Fencers, and ſuch like Maſters of Game, were wont to uſe their hands unto heavie weights, that when in their Games they were to uſe them empty and naked, they might doe it with the more expeditenesſe and pleaſure.

3 *Imagination* and fancy, either in our ſelves or other Men, is many times, the foundation of Delight. *Diogines* his ſullen and Melancholly fancy tooke as much pleaſure in his Tubbe and Staffe, and water, as other men in their Palaces, and amplieſt proviſions, And he in the Poet.

Qui ſe credebat miros audire Tragados
In vacuo lætus ſeſſor Plauſorquè Theatro.——
Cum redit ad ſeſe pol, me occidiſtis Amici
Non ſervaſtis ait, cui ſic extorta voluptas,
Et demptus per vim mentis gratiſſimus error.

Who thought he heard rare Tragedies of wit,
And in an empty Theater did ſit
And give Applauſes: but being heal'd complains
Friends I'm not ſav'd by this your love, but ſlain,
Rob'd

a *Plutarch. de Tranquill.*
b *Quintil. lib. 5. cap. 12.*
c *Quintil. lib. 11. cap. 2.*
Si mihi tranquilla & placata omnia ſuiſſent, incredibili quæ nunc ſuor lætitia voluptate Caruiſſem Cic. Orat poſt Reditum.
Max. Tyrius Diſſert. 33.
Plutarch. de profect. virtutem.

Horat. Epiſt. lib. 2. Ep.

Robb'd of that sweet Delight I then did finde,
In the so gratefull errour of my Minde.

Fictæ fabulæ cum voluptatem Legimus Cic. de fin. lib. 5.

Hence likewise it is that Men are delighted with Mythologies and Poeticall Fables, with Elegancies, Iests, Vrbanity, and Flowers of wit, with Pageants pompes, Triumphes, and publick Celebrities, because all these and other the like, are either the fruit or food of the Imagination.

Vid. Plutarch. de Aud. Poet. & Quintil. lib. 2. ap. 13.

4 Vpon the same Reason we are marveilously Delighted with lively *Imitation*, as with those Arts which doe curiously expresse the workes and lineaments of Nature. Insomuch that the similitudes of those things doe wonderfully content us whose naturall Deformities we abhorre. We are well pleas'd with *Homers* Description of *Thirsites*, and with *Sophocles* his expression of the Vlcer of *Philoctetes*, with *Parmeno* his Imitation of the grunting of a Hog, and *Theodorus* his of the ratling of wheeles, with *Plautus* his discription of a chargeable Wife, and *Horace* his of a garrulous companion, though the things themselves we should willingly decline.

Hinc cucumi stultitiæ. pediculi, febrium, &c. Plaut in Aulul. Horat. l. 1. Sat. 9.

Ethic. lib. 10. cap. 7. Plutarch. de Aud. Poetis.

5 Those things Delight every man which are ἐπιτήδεια, as the Philosopher speakes, *Suitable fitted*, and *accommodated* to his Genius and frame of Nature, as in the same Plant, the Bee feedeth on the flower, the Bird on the Seed, the Sheepe on the Blade, the Swine on the Roote. So in the same Author one man observeth the Rationall, another the Historicall, a third the Elegant and more Rhetoricall passages, with speciall De-

light

light, according as they are best accommodated unto the Complexion of each Minde. And I finde it observed out of *Hipocrates*, that even in the Body many times that kinde of meat which Nature receiveth with Complacency, and with a more particular Delight, though in it selfe it may be worse; yet proveth better nourishment unto that Body than such, as though better in it selfe, findeth yet a reluctancy and backwardnesse of Nature to close or correspond with it. The same seeds are not proper for the sand and for the clay; nor the same imploiments of Minde for Men of various and different Constitutions. Nor is there I beleeve any thing which would more conduce to the generall advancement of Arts and Learning, than if every Mans Abilities were fixed and limited to that proper course, which his naturall sufficiences did more particularly lead him unto. For hereupon would grow a double Delight, and by consequence improvement (for every thing growes most when it is best pleased) The one from *Nature*, the other from *Custome* and acquaintance, which conquereth and digesteth the difficulties of every thing we set about, and maketh them yet more naturall unto us. And therefore the Philosopher reckoning up many things that are pleasant to the minde, putteth these two in the first place. Those things that are *Naturall*, and those that we are *accustomed* unto, wherein there is least violence offered unto the inclinations and impressions of Nature.

Cal. Rhodig. lib. 5. cap. 34.

Nemes. ex Arist. c. 18.

Ethic. l. 10. c. 9.

Touching the *Effects* of this Passion, I shall

name but these few: First, the effects of *Corporall* Delights are only (as I observed out of *Aristotle*) *medicinall*, for repayring the breaches and ruines of our decayed Natures; for animating and refreshing our languishing spirits; for preserving our selves in a good ability to execute Offices of a higher Nature; for furnishing the World with a succession of men, which otherwise the greedines of mortality would in short time devoure. These are true and intended ends of those Delights, and when they once transgresse these bounds, they begin to *oppresse Nature, weaken and distemper the Body, clog the mind, and fill the whole man with satiety and loathing, which is the reason (as was even now noted) why men too violently carried away with them, are presently overcloyed with one kind, and must have variety to keep out loathing; which *Tacitus* observes in that monster of women *Messalina, facilitate adulterorum in fastidium versa ad incognitas libidines profluebat*, that loathing more easy and common sinnes, shee betooke her selfe to unnaturall lusts, and I verily think is particularly intended by S. *Paul, Rom.* 1. 26.

* τὰς δὲ ἡδονὰς ὅταν περιδίωσιν ὅσαι φύσει εἰσὶν διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ φύσει ἡδὺ τὸ τοιοῦτο ἐν ἅπασι γίνεται.
Sophoc. Antig.

Plut. in Grylo. Annal. l. 11.

A second effect of Ioy is *Opening* and *Dilatation* of the heart and countenance, expressing the serenity of the mind, whence it hath the name of *Laetitia*, as it were a broad and spreading Passion. Now the reason of this motion occasioned by Ioy, is the naturall desire, which man hath to be united to the thing wherein he delights to make way and passage for its entrance into him. And hence wee find in this Passion an exultation and

Laetitia amentes latitudine.

egresse

egreſſe of the ſpirits, diſcovering a kind of looſeneſſe of Nature in her ſecurity, doing many things not out of reſolution, but inſtinct and power tranſporting both mind and body to ſudden and unpremeditated expreſſions of its owne content: For of all Paſſions, Ioy can be the leaſt diſſembled or ſuppreſſed, *nam gaudio Cogendi vis ineſt*, ſaith *Pliny*, it exerciſeth a kind of welcome violence and tyranny upon a man, as we ſee in *Davids* dancing before the Arke; and the lame Mans walking, and leaping, and praiſing God, after hee had been cured of his lameneſſe. And this diffuſion of the ſpirits ſheweth both the haſte and forwardneſſe of Nature, in ſtriving as it were to *meet* her Object, and make large *roome* for its entertainment, as alſo to diſpell and ſcatter all adverſe humours that would hinder the ingreſſe of it, and laſtly to ſend forth newes as it were through the whole province of nature, that all the parts might beare a ſhare in the common Comfort. *Panigir. ad Trajan.*

Thirdly, thoſe noble Delights which ariſe from heavenly cauſes, doe withall cauſe a ſweet thirſt and longing in the Soule after more, as ſome colours do both delight the ſight and ſtrengthen it: For while *God* is the Object, there cannot bee either the ſatiety to cloy the Soul, nor ſuch a full comprehenſion as will leave no roome for more. *Plut in Pric.*

Thus they who delight in the fruition of God by Grace, doe deſire a more plentifull fruition of him in glory; and they that delight in the ſight of Gods Glory, doe ſtill deſire to be for ever ſo delighted. So that their *Deſire* is without *Anxiety*,

because they are *satiated* with the thing which they doe desire, and their *satiety* is without *loathing*, because still they desire the thing wherewith they are *satiated*; they desire without Griefe, because they are replenished; and they are replenished without wearinesse, because they desire still; they see God and still they desire to see him: they enjoy God, and still they desire for ever to enjoy him: they love and prayse God, and make it their immortall businesse still to love and prayse him:

Et quem semper habent, semper habere volunt.

Whom they for ever have, with love yet higher
To have for ever, they do still desire.

* *Aristid. Tom. 1. Orat. in Puteu. Æscul.*

* Divine Joy is like the water of *Æsculapius* his Well, which they say is not capable of putrifaction.

Ariss. Ethic. l. 10. c. 5. Polit. l. 8. c. 5.

Fourthly, Delight whetteth and intendeth the actions of the Soule towards the thing wherein it delighteth; it putteth forth more force, and more exactnesse in the doing of them, because it exonerateth the mind of all those dulling Indispositions which unfitted it for Action. And for this reason happily it is, that the Lacedemonians used * Musicke in their Warres to refresh and delight Nature: For Joy is in stead of recreation to the Soule, it wonderfully disposeth for businesse. And those Actions which Nature hath made necessary, it hath put pleasure in them, that thereby Men might be quickned and excited unto them;

* *Plut. de Hom. A. Gell. l. 1. c. 11.*

and

*and therefore Wisemen have told us that pleasure is, *Sal & condimentum vitæ.* The Sawce which seasoneth the Actions of men.

*Cicer. offic. lib. 1. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2. Plaut. Casin. Act. 2. Sc. 4. Quintil. lib. 5. cap. 14.

Lastly, because the Nature of man is usually more acquainted with sorrowes, then with pleasures, therefore whether out of *Conscience* of guilt, which deserves no joy, or out of *experience*, which useth to finde but little joy in the world, or out of *feare* of our owne aptnesse to mistake, or out of a *provident care*, not to close or feed upon a Delight, till we are fully assured of our Possession of it, and because usually the Minde after shaking is more setled, whether for these or any other reasons, we see it usually come to passe, that vehement joy doth breed a kinde of jealousie and unbelieve, that sure the thing we have is too good to be true? and that then when our eyes tell us, that they see it, they doe but dazle and deceive us, as *Quod nimis volumus haud facile credimus*:

The things which we desire should be,
We scarse beleeve when we doe see.

So *Iacob* when he heard that his sonne *Ioseph* was alive, fainted, being astonished at so good newes, and could not beleeve it. And when God restored the Iewes out of captivity, they could thinke no otherwise of it then as a dreame. And *Peter* when he was by the Angel delivered out of prison, tooke it for a vision only, and an apparition, and not for a truth.

Gen. 45. 26. Psal. 126. 1.

Act. 12. 9. Luke 24. 41.

And lastly, of the Disciples after Christs resurrection, when he manifested himselfe to them, it is said, *That for very joy they beleeved not*, their feares keeping backe, as it were, and questioning the truth of their joyes, *Omnia tuta timens*, not suffering them too hastily to beleeve what their eies did see.

As in the Sea when a storme is over, there remaines still an inward working and volutation, which the Poet thus expresseth,

Vt si quando ruit, debellat aſque reliquit
Eurus aquas, pax ipſa tumet, pontumque jacentem,
Exanimis jam volvit hyems.——

As when a mighty tempest doth now cease,
To tosse the roaring Billowes, even that peace
Doth swell and murmurre, and the dying Wind
On the calm'd Sea leaves his owne prints behind.

Even so in the Minde of man, when it's feares are blowne over, and there is a calme upon it, there is still *à motus trepidationis*, and a kinde of solicitous jealousie of what it enjoyes.

Antead. 4. Maius gaudium quam quod universum homines caperent: aix satis credere se quisque audisse videat somni unam speciem, Liv. lib. 33. Odiss. χ. 213.

And this *unbeleefe* of *joy* is admirably set forth in the Carriages of *Penelope*, when her Nurse and her sonne endevoured to assure her of the truth of *Vlysses* his returne after so many yeares absence by the Poet, in which doubting she still persisted, till by certaine signes *Vlysses himselfe* made it appeare unto her, whereupon she excused it after this manner.

Ἀμφὶ

Αστὴ μοὶ σὺ μὴ νεμεσσᾶο μᾶλ' ὑμέναιος.

My deare *Vlysses* let it not offend,
That when I saw you first, I did suspend
My love with my beliefe, since my faint brest
When first with those glad tidings it was blest,
Trembled with doubts, lest by such forged lies
Some crafty, false pretender might devise
To have ensnar'd me, and with these false sounds,
Defiel'd my love, and multiplied my wounds.

CHAP. XXII.

Of the Affection of Sorrow, the Object of it evill, sensitive, Intellectuall, as present in it selfe, or to the mind, by memory, or suspition, particular causes, effects of it. Feare, Care, Experience, Erudition, Irresolution, Despaire, Execration, Distempers of Body.

THe opposite Passion to this of Delight, is *Griefe* and *Sorrow*, which is nothing but a perturbation and nnquietnesse wrought by the pressure of some *present evill*, which the mind in vaine strugleth with, as finding it selfe alone too impotent for the conflict.

flict. Evill I say either formally, as in sinne, or paine, present, or feared: or privatively, such as is any good thing which we have lost, or whereof we doe despaire, or have beene disappointed. And this is in respect of its object as the former Passion, either *Sensitive* or *Intellectuall*. Sensitive is that anguish and distresse of Nature which lyeth upon the body. A Passion in this sense little conducing to the advancement of Nature, being allwaies joyned with some measure of its decay, but onely as it serves sometimes for the better fortifying it against the same or greater evils, it being the condition as of corporeall delights, by custome to grow burdensome and distastefull, so of paines to become easie and familiar.

The other and greater *Griefe* is *Intellectuall*, which in *Solomons* phraise is, *A wounded spirit*; so much certainely the more quicke and piercing, by how much a spirit is more vitall then a body, besides the anguish of the soule, findes alwayes, or workes the same sympathy in the body, but outward sorrowes reach not ever so farre, as the spirituall and higher part of the soule. And therefore we see many men out of a mistake, that the distresse of their soules hath beene wrought by a union to their bodies, have voluntarily spoiled this, to deliver and quiet that.

The causes of this Passion, are as in the former, whatsoever hath in it power to disturbe the mind by it's *union* thereunto. There are then two *Conditions* in respect of the *Object*, that it be *Evill* and *Present*. *Evill* first, and that not onely *formally* in it selfe;

ſelfe; but *apprehenſively* to the underſtanding. And therefore wee ſee that many things which are in their Nature *Evill*; yet out of the particular diſtemper of the Mind, and deceitfulneſſe in them, may prove pleaſant thereunto. And this is the chiefe Corruption of this Paſſion, I meane the miſplacing, or the undue ſuſpending of it: For although ſtrictly in its owne property, it be not an advancement of Nature, nor addes any perfection; but rather weakens it; yet in regard of the reference which it beares either to a ſuperior Law, as teſtifying our Love unto the Obedience, by our griefe for the breach thereof: or to our conſequent Carriage and Actions, as governing them with greater Wiſedome and Providence, it may bee ſaid to adde much perfection to the mind of man, becauſe it ſerves as an inducement to more cautelous living.

The next Condition in reſpect of the Object, is, that it be *Preſent*, which may fall out either by *Memory*, and then our *Griefe* is called *Repentance*: or Fancy and *Suſpition*, and ſo it may be called *Anxiety* of Mind: or by *Senſe* and preſent union, which is the principall kind, and ſo I call it *Anguiſh*.

For the firſt, nothing can properly and truly worke *Griefe*, by miniſtry of *Memory*, when the Object or Evill is long ſince paſt; but thoſe things which doe withall ſtaine our Nature, and worke impreſſions of permanent deformity. For as it falleth out, that many things in their exerciſe pleaſant, prove after in their operations offenſive and burdenſome: ſo on the other ſide many things

which for the time of their continuance are irkesome and heavy, prove yet after occasions of greater Ioy. Whether they be means used for the procuring of further good.

Heb. 12. 11.

Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum
Tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi, &c.

Aenead. l. 1. Iliad. 4.

Through various great mishaps & dangers store,
We hasten to our home and wished shore:
Where fates do promise rest, where Troy revives,
Only reserve your selves for better lives.

Or whether they be Evils which by our Wisedome we have broken through and avoided;

——sed & haec olim meminisse iuvabit.

When we are arrived at ease,
Remembrance of a storme doth please.

The Objects then of *Repentance* are not our passive, but our active Evils: not the Evils of suffring, but the Evils of doing; for the memory of *afflictions* past, represents unto us Nature loosed and delivered, and should so much the more increase our Ioy, by how much redemption is for the most part a more felt blessing than Immunity; but the memory of *sinnes* past represents Nature obliged, guilty, and imprisoned. And so leaves a double ground for *Griefe*, the staine or pollution, and the guilt or malediction a deformity to the Law, and a curse from it. It would be improper here

here to wander into a digression touching *Repentance*, only in a word it is then a *Godly Sorrow*, when it proceeds from the memory of Evill; not so much in respect of the *punishment* as of the *staine*. When we grieve more because our sin hath made us *unholy*, then because it hath made us *unhappy*; and not only because we are runne into the danger of the Law, but because we are run out of the way of the Law. When it teacheth us to cry, not only with *Pharaoh*, take away this *Plague*; but with Israel in the Prophet, take away *Iniquity*.

Concerning *Griefe* of *Preoccupation*, arising out of a suspitious *Feare* and expectation of Evill, I know not what worth it can have in it, unlesse haply thus, that by fore-accustoming the Mind to Evill, it is the better strengthned to stand under it: For Evils by præmeditation, are either prevented or mitigated, the Mind gathering strength and wisedome together to meet it. And therefore it is prudent advise of *Plutarch*, that wee should have a prepared Minde, which when any Evill falleth out, might not be surprised by it. To say as *Anaxagoras* did when he heard of the death of his Sonne, *scio me genuisse mortalem*, I know that I begat a mortall Sonne. I know that my riches had wings, and that my comforts were mutable. Preparednesse composeth the Minde to patience. *Vlysses* wept when he saw his Dogge, which he did not when he saw his Wife: he came prepared for the one, but was surprised by the other.

Præcogitati mali mollis ictus. Sen. Epist. 77. Vid. Cic. Tusc. qu. l. 3.

Plut. de Tranq.

Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem,
Et perferre soror potero.

Had I foreseene this Griefe, or could but feare it, I then should have compos'd my selfe to beare it.

Which is the reason why Philosophers prescribe the whole course of a Mans Life, to be only a meditation upon Death; because that being so great an Evill in it selfe, and so sure to us, it ought to be so expected, as that it may not come sudden, and find us unprepared to meet the King of Terrour. For it is in the property of custome and acquaintance, not only to alleviate and asswage evils (to which purpose *Seneca* speakes, *perdidisti tot mala si nondum misera esse didicisti*, thou hast lost thy afflictions if they have not yet taught thee to be miserable) but further as *Aristotle* notes, to work some manner of delight in things, at first troublesome and tedious; and therefore hee reckoneth mourning amongst pleasant things, and teares are by Nature made the witnesses as well of Ioy as of Griefe.

Consolatio ad Helviam.

Rhet. l. 1.

Odiss. l. 5.

Καὶ τότε δὴ κλαῖεν ἐὸν πάτριον αἶσαν ἰδοῦσα
Ἀκτὴν· δακρυόεν δὲ κατὰ βλεφάρων ἤϊε νᾶμα.

He kist the shore, fast teares ran from his eyes,
When he his native Countrey first espyes.

And *Seneca* (whither Philosophically or Rhetorically) obserues, that obstinacy and resolvednesse in

in griefe, doth ſo alter the nature of it, *ut fiat tandem infelicis animi prava voluptas dolor.* That at length it turnes into a kind of pleaſant paine, ſure I am the Apoſtle biddeth us count it *Ioy, when wee fall into temptations.*

Et quadam etiam dolendi volupt. Plin. l. 8. ep. c. 8.

The laſt preſence of Grief was *Reall*, when ſome ponderous evill either of Affliction or of Sinne, the loſſe of ſome good wherein we delighted, the diſappointment of ſome hope whereon we relyed meeting with impotency in our ſelves, to remove what we ſuffer, to recover what wee loſe, to ſupply what we want, doth bruiſe and lie with a heavy weight upon the tendereſt part of Man, his Soule and Spirit. And in this I cannot find conſidered meerly in it ſelfe any worth at all (it being nothing elſe but the violation and wounding of Nature) but in order to the effects which it produceth, it may have ſundry denominations, either of a ſerviceable, or of a corrupt affection. I ſhall but briefly name them, and paſſe over to the next.

The profitable effects are principally theſe: Firſt, as it is an inſtrument of publique adminiſtration & diſcipline. It is as it were both a Schoolmaſter and a Phiſitian, to teach and to cure: ſo the Philoſopher telleth us, that by pleaſure and pain, Children are trained up unto Arts and Sciences, the Rod being unto the Mind, as a Rudder unto a Ship: ſo the Prophet *David* putteth chaſtiſement and inſtruction together: *Bleſſed is the man whom thou chaſteneſt, and teacheth out of thy law*, and again, *It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learne thy Commandements.* Therefore God

Clem. Alex. Pedag. l. 1. c. 8.

Ethic. l. 10. c. 1. Calamitatis remedia. Sen. de Tranq. l. 1 c. 9. Pſal. 94. 12. Pſal. 119. 71. Ier. 22. 21.

Grande do'orii lugentium miſer ſq; vtilt ſoleri ia rebus.

the Law in the *Wilderneſſe*, where the people were in want and under diſcipline: to note that *Griefe* is a good inſtrument unto learning; for after in their proſperity they would not heare.

Ethic. l. 2. c. 3.

And as it is a means to *teach*, ſo it is a means to *cure* too; for therefore paine is uſually made the matter of puniſhment, that as Men offend by ſinfull pleaſure, ſo they may bee amended by wholſome ſorrow. [illegible] Cures are uſually wrought by contraries.

Sen. de otio, Sapient. c. 4.

Epiſt. 67.

Againe, it doth by *Experience* ſtrengthen and harden, making both wiſe and able, for enduring further calamities, *quos Deus amat, indurat & exercet.* God exerciſeth and traineth thoſe whom he loves, bringing them up *non in delicijs ſed in aſtris*, not in Paradiſe, but in a Wilderneſſe. Now

Ethic. l. 3. c. 8.

as the Philoſopher ſpeaketh, [illegible] Experience is a kind of fortitude and armour, whereby a man contemneth, [illegible] many things which are indeed, but *terriculamenta*, skar-crowes to ignorant and weake minds. Whereas when paines have wrought patience, and patience experience of an iſſue and eſcape, that experience armes the Soule unto more patience in new aſſaults. For if Gold were a rationall creature, having paſt through the fire and kept its own Nature unviolate, it would never after be the leſſe afraid of the fire. And as *Plutarch* excellently ſpeaketh, A wiſe Man ſhould be like gold, to keep his Nature in the fire. Strangers diſlike many things in a place, which thoſe, that are home-born, and uſed unto, do eaſily digeſt: thus the Apoſtle

Οὐ δεῖ δὴ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ σωματικὰς ἐπιτηδεύσεις ἐν φαύλῃ διαγωγῇ, &c. Eurip. Hel. Vid. Plut. l. de Adulat. & Amic. Conſol. ad Apollonium Plut. de Aud.

argueth,

argueth, God hath delivered, and doth deliver; therefore he will deliver. So *Vlysses* in *Homer*. 2 Cor. 1. 9. 10.

Τέτλαθι δὴ κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποθ' ἔτλης, Odyss. ε 222.
Ἦμα δὲ μοῦνον ἔειπε.

I'le beare with a firme mind, what ere comes more,
Having endur'd so many Griefes before.

And elsewhere on the same manner he incouraged his companions on the Sea.

Ὦ φίλοι οὐ γάρ πω κακὸν ἀδμήτες ἴομεν, &c. Odyss. μ 208.

Sirs, w' are not now to learne what sorrowes are,
Having felt so many; and this now by farre
Comes short of that which we endured then,
When the proud Cyclops *shut us in his den:*
Yet that we scap't, he of his prey did misse,
Hereafter we shall joy to think of this.

* Thus as Iron which hath passed through the fire, being quenched, is harder than it was before: so the Mind having passed through troubles, is the more hardened to endure them againe. And therefore it is wise advice which learned Men give, to let Griefes have a time to breath, and not to endeavour the stopping of them, while they are in *Impetu*, and in their first rising. As Phisitians suffer humours to ripen, and gather to some head, before they apply medicines unto them. When time hath a little concocted Griefe, and experience hardened and instructed Nature to stand

* Plut. de Ad. & Amic. & de Sanit. tuendâ. Vt Crudum adhuc vulnus medentium manus reformidat, deinde patitur, atq; ultro requirit. Sic Recens animi Dolor consolationes rejicit: at q; refugit, mox desiderat & clementer admotis acquiescit. Plin. Ep. l. 5. c. 16. Vid Plut. Cons. ad Apoll.

stand under it. It doth then willingly admit of those remedies, which being unseasonably applyed it rejecteth and resisteth.

Ovid. de Remed. Amor. l. 1.

Quis matrem nisi mentis inops in funere nati
Flere vetat? non hoc illa monenda loco est.
Cum dederit lachrymas animumq; expleverit aegrum,
Ille dolor verbis emoderandus erit.

Who would forbid a Mother then to mourne,
When her Sons ashes are warme in his urne?
But when she's cloyd with tears, & sorrow's rage
Is over, Counsell then may Griefe asswage.

Whereas before it doth rather exasperate than allay it. For of all Passions, this of Griefe doth lest admit of a simple cure from the dictates of Reason, except it have a time given it too, wherein it may like unto * new Wine, *defervescere*, slack, and come to its just temper again.

Ἔστι γὰρ οἶνος καὶ νέος πολὺ γ' ἀκμάζων ἡδύς· ἀλλ' ἐὰν χρόνος παρέλθῃ, πικρὸς ἀνθρώποις ἀποφαίνεται ἀκρασίᾳ τε ἀνωφελεῖ.
Alexis.

The last profitable effect is *feare* and suspition, care or sollicitousnesse to avoid those evils which oppresse our Nature; a cautelous discourse and consultation of reason, how it may either escape or prevent the evils which Experience hath taught it to decline, as a burnt child the fire. For all Passions so long as they collect reason, and set that on work, are of good use in the minds of Men; and indeed, the counsels and communion of right reason alone, grounded on and guided by Religion, are only that *Nepenthes* and medicine against Griefe, which who so mixeth and

Of this medicine we read in *Homer.*

and applyeth aright, ſhall not ſpend nor load himſelfe with unuſefull ſorrow. Thus as Bees doe poiſe themſelves with little gravell ſtones, that they may not be carried away with the wind, which the Poet hath elegantly expreſſed:

Odiſſ. 4. 211. Plin. l. 21. c. 21. Plutarch. Sympoſ. l. 1. c. 1. Macrob. l. 7. c. 1 Clem. Alex. in Protrept. Nazian. Carmin. innubili patrin ad filium.

Sæpe Lapillos,
Vt Cymba inſtabiles fluctu jactante ſaburram
Tollunt, his ſeſe per inania nubila librant.

Georg. 4. Plutarch. lib. de ſolert. Animal.

As Ships with ballace, ſo the little Bee
With gravel's pois'd, that he may ſteady flee.

So patience and wiſedome in the bearing of one ſorrow, doth keep the mind in a ſtable condition againſt any other. A man doth never overgrieve, that keeps his eares open to counſell, and his reaſon to judgement above his Paſſion.

Iliad. 7. 65.

The evill effects of griefe commonly followes the exceſſe of it, and they reſpect the *Reaſon*, the *Will*, and the *Body*, in the *Reaſon*, it worketh diſtractions, irreſolution, and weakneſſe, by drawing the maine ſtraine of it, rather to a feareſull contemplation of it's owne miſery, then to a fruitfull Diſcourſe how to avoide it, for as the motions of a wounded Body, ſo the Diſcourſes of a wounded Minde are faint, uncertaine and tottering.

ὦ τλῆμον ἐγὼ τῶν μεγίστων πημάτων πρὸς τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἄλλων ἐπόψιος, πατρὶς ἁ ἐμὰ πρὸς τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἁλίσκεται ἐμπρησθεῖσα δορίτοις ἀνδράσιν, &c. Eurip. Hecab.

Secondly, in the *Will*, it worketh firſt *Deſpaire*, for it being the propertie of *griefe* to condenſate and as it were on all ſides beſiege the Minde, the more violent the Paſſion is, the leſſe apparant are the Paſſages out of it. So that in an extremity

tremity of anguish where the Passages are in themselves narrow, and the reason also blind and weake to finde them out, the Minde is constrained having no Object but it's owne paine to reflect upon, to fall into a darke and fearefull contemplation of it's owne sad estate, and marvellous high and pathetical aggravations of it, as if it were the greatest which any man felt. Not considering that it feeles it's owne sorrow, but knowes not the weight of other mens. Whereas if all the calamities of mortall men were heaped into one Storehouse, and from thence every man were to take an equall portion. *Socrates* was wont to say that each man would rather choose to goe away with his owne paine.

And from hence it proceedeth to many other effects, fury, sinfull wishes and execrations both against it selfe and any thing, that concurred to it's being in misery, as we see in Israel in the Wildernesse & that mirror of Patience *Iob* himselfe; and thus *Homer* bringeth in *Vlysses* in despaire under a sore tempest bewailing himselfe.

Numb. 14. 2. *Iob* 3. 1. *and* *Ier.* 20. 14. *Isai.* 8. 21.

Odiss. 5 306.

Τρὶς μάκαρες Δαναοὶ ἠδὲ τετράκις οἳ τότ' ὄλοντο, &c.

Thrice foure times happy Grecians who did fall
To gratifie their friends under Troy wall.
Oh that I there had rendred my last breath,
When Trojan darts made me a marke for Death,
Then glorious Rites my Funerals had attended,
But now my life will be ignobly ended.

Another evill effect is to *indispose* and disable for

for *Dutie*, both becauſe *Griefe* doth refrigerate (as the Piloſopher telleth us) and that is the worſt temper for action; and alſo diverts the Minde, from any thing, but that which feeds it, and therefore *David* in his ſorrow forgot to eate his bread, becauſe eating and refreſhing of Nature is a mitrigating of Griefe, as *Pliny* telleth us. And laſtly, becauſe it weakneth, diſtracteth and diſcourageth the Minde, making it ſoft and timerous, apt to bode evils unto it ſelfe.

Ariſt. Prob. Sect. 11. Queſt. 13. Iliad. 130. Μεγάθυμοι δ' ἥ τοσσοῦτ' ἐνῶμ.

——*Crudelis ubique luctus ubique pavor.*

Dolor Cibo. linitur. Plin. l. 22. c. 14.

Griefe and feare goe uſually together.

And therefore when *Æneas* was to encourage his friends unto Patience and action, he was forced to diſſemble his owne ſorrow.

——*Curiſque ingentibus ager*
Spem vultu ſimulat, premit altum corde dolorem.

Æneid. 2.

Although with heavy cares and doubts diſtreſt,
His looks fain'd hopes and his heart griefes ſuppreſt.

And it is an excellent deſcription in *Homer* of the fidelity of *Antilochus* when he was commanded to relate unto *Achilles*, the ſad newes of *Patroclus* death.

Æneid. 1. Conſilium vultu regit & ſpem fronte ſerenat. Æneid. 4.

——Ἀντίλοχος δ' ἐτέρωθι μάθε κακὸν ἄγγελον ἦλθε.

When Menelaus *gave him this command,*
Antilochus *aſtoniſhed did ſtand.*

Smitten with dumbnesse through his griefe and feares,
His voyce was stopt, and his eyes swamme in teares.
Yet none of all this griefe did duty stay,
He left his Armes whose weight might cause delay.
And went, and wept, and ran, with dolefull word,
That great Patroclus *fell by* Hectors *sword.*

* In a tempest saith *Seneca*, that *Pilot* is to be commended, whom the shipwracke swalloweth up at the Sterne, with the Rudder in his hand.

And it was the greatest honour of *Mary Magdalene*, that when above all other, she wept for the losse of Christ, yet then of all other she was most diligent to seeke him.

Lastly, in the body there is no other Passion that doth produce stronger, or more lasting inconveniences by pressure of heart, obstruction of spirit, wasting of strength, drynesse of bones, exhausting of Nature. Griefe in the heart, is like a Moath in a garment, which biteth asunder, as it were the strings and the strength thereof, stoppeth the voyce, looseth the joynts, withereth the flesh, shrivelleth the skinne, dimmeth the eyes, cloudeth the countenance, deflowreth the beauty, troubleth the bowels, in one word, disordereth the whole frame.

Now this Passion of griefe is distributed into many inferiour kindes, as *Griefe* of *Sympathy* for the evils and calamities of other men, * as if they were our owne, considering that they may likewise befall us or ours which is called *mercy*, griefe of *repining* at the good of another man, as if his happinesse

In Naufragio Rector laudandus quem obruit mare Clavum tenentem. Seneca ad Helv. lib. c. 6. Arist. Eth. 2. Ovid Rhodia. Vide Odyss. 9. 703. 716. Iliad. χ. 460. Damascen. de Orthodox fid. l. 3. c. 14.

* Ἐπαινῶμεν δὲ τὸν ἄριστον κυβερνήτην ὃν ἡ ναῦς ἐν τῇ πρύμνῃ ἀπολλύει τὸ πηδάλιον κατέχοντα. Sophoc. Ajax a Sed videt in gratos intabescitq; videndo successus hominum; carpitq; & carpitur unâ supplicium q; suum est Ovid. Met. 2. Infixum est mortalibus naturâ vetustem alterius felicitatem aegris oculis intro spicere Tac. Hist. l. 2. Aut sibi malum quid aut alteri bonum Evenit, Bion ad malevolum quendam quem tristem offendit, Apud. Lavr.

happineſſe were our miſery: As that Pillar which was light unto Iſrael to guide them, was darkneſſe unto the Egyptians, to trouble and amaze them, which is called *Envie*. Griefe of [b] *Fretfulneſſe* at the proſperity of evill and unworthy men, which is called *Indignation*, griefe of *Indigence* when we finde our ſelves want thoſe good things which others enjoy, which we envie not unto them, but deſire to enjoy them our ſelves too, which is called *Emulation*, griefe of *Guilt* for evill committed, which is called *Repentance*, and griefe of *Feare* for evill expected, which is called *Deſpaire*, of which to diſcourſe would be over-tedious, and many of them are moſt learnedly handled by *Ariſtotle* in his Rhetoricks. And therefore I wall here put an end to this Paſſion.

[b] *Prov.30.21. 22.Pſal 73.12. 13.Iob.21.7. Eccles 10.5, 6,7. Marmorta Licinus Tumulo jacet & Cato parvo.Pauperiem nubo. Patricios omnes opibus cum provocet unus quo tondente gravis Iuvenis mihi barba ſonabat,&c. difficile eſt Satyram non ſcribere. Iuvenal.Satyr.1. Vid.Ariſtot. Ethic.lib.2. & Mag.Moral.l.1. Vid.Suidam in Voc.Zelos.*

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the affection of Hope, the Object of it, Good Future, Poſſible, Difficult, of Regular and Inordinate Deſpaire.

THe next Ranks and Series, is of *Iraſcible Paſſions*, namely thoſe which reſpect their Object, as annexed unto ſome degree of *Difficulty*, in the obtaining, or avoiding of it, the firſt of which is *Hope*, whereby I underſtand an earneſt and ſtrong in-

clination and expectation of some great good apprehended as *possible* to be obtained, though not by our owne strength, nor without some intervenient *Difficulties*. I shall not collect those prayses which are commonly bestowed upon it, nor examine the contrary extreames of those who declaime against it, making it a meanes either of augmenting an unexpected evill, before not sufficiently prevented, or of deflowring a future good too hastily pre-occupated, but shall onely touch that dignity and corruption which I shall observe to arise from it, with reference to it's Objects, Causes, and Effects.

Iliad. ζ. 794. ἐυελπὶς ἐπὶ μεγάλῳ ἔργῳ. Suidas. ἐυελπὶς ἐπὶ μεγάλοις ἔργοις. Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 2. Spes quasi pes animi. Isid. Hispal. Orig. lib. 7. c. 2.

Concerning the *Object* or fundamentall cause of *Hope*, It hath these three conditions in it, That it be a *Future*, a *Possible*, a *Difficult Good*.

Contemplatio est spes in hac spatio per fidem, non Representatio. Nec possessio sed expectatio. Tertull. de Resur. cap 23. Rom. 8. 24.

First, *Future*, for good present is the Object of our sense, but *Hope is of things not seene*, for herein is one principall difference betweene divine *Faith*, and divine *Hope*, that Faith being ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων. The *substance of things hoped for*, hath ever respect to it's Object, as in some manner *present* and *subsisting* in the promises and first fruits which we have of it, so that the first effect of *Faith* is a present Interest and Title; but the operation of *Hope* is waiting and expectation, but yet it will not from hence follow, that the more a man hath of the *presence* of an Object, the lesse he hath of *Hope* towards it, for though Hope be swallowed up in the compleat presence of it's Object, yet it is not at all diminished but

Hebr. 11.

encreased

encreaſed rather by a partiall preſence, and as in Maſſie bodies though violent motions be in the weakeſt, as being furtheſt from the ſtrength that impelled them, yet naturall are ever ſwifteſt towards the Center, as neareſt approaching unto the place that drawes them: ſo in the *Hopes* of men, though ſuch as are violent and grounde ſſe proove weaker and weaker, and ſo breake out at laſt into emptineſſe and vapour. In which reſpect *Philoſophers have called *Hope* the dreames of waking men; like that of the Muſitian whom *Dioniſius* deceived with an empty promiſe, of which I ſpake before: yet thoſe that are ſtayed and naturall, are evermore ſtrong, when they have procured a larger meaſure of preſence and union to their Object, *Quo propius accedimus ad ſpem fruendi eò impatientius caremus.* The nearer we come to the fruition of a good, the more impatient we are to want it.

*Ariſt. apud Laertium l. 5. Plato apud Cal. Rhod. l. 12 c. 2. Ariſt Ethic. lib. 9 & Plutarch. de Audit. Plin. Epiſt. lib. 6. Epiſt. 1. 2 Pet. 3. 12.

And the reaſon is becauſe *Goodneſſe* is better knowne, when it is in an nearer view of the underſtanding, and more unite thereunto. And the more we have of the knowledge of goodneſſe, the more we have of the Deſire of it, if any part be abſent. Beſides all greedineſſe is attractive, and therefore the more we know of it, the faſter we haſten to it. And it is the nature of good to encreaſe the ſenſe of the remainders of evill. So that, though the number of our defects be leſſened by the degrees of that good we have obtained unto, yet the burthen and moleſtation of them

them is increased, and therefore the more possession we have of good, the greater is our wearines of evill, and the more Nature feeleth her defects, the more doth she desire her restauration.

The next condition in the Object of our *Hope* is *possibility*, for though the will sometimes being inordinate may be tickled with a desire of impossibilities, under an implicite condition, if they were not so, yet no hope whither regular or corrupt can respect it's object under that apprehension. It worketh two passions most repugnant to this, hatred and despaire, the one being a proud opposition, the other a dreadfull flight from that good, in which the mind perceiveth an impossibility of attaining it. Now the apprehension of possibility is nothing else but a conceit of the convenience and proportion, betweene the true *meanes* unto an end hoped, and the *strength* of those *powers* which are to worke or bestow them; or if they be such ends as are wrought without any such meanes, by the bare and immediate hand of the worker, it is an apprehension of convenience, betwixt the *will* and *power* of him that bestoweth it.

Here then because I finde not any arguments of large discourse in the opposite passion, (unlesse we would passe fró natural or morall unto Theologicall handling thereof) we may observe what manner of *despair* is only regular & allowable, I mean that wch in matters of importance drives us

out

out of our ſelves, or any preſumption and opinion of our own ſufficiency. But that deſpaire which riſeth out of a groundleſſe unbeliefe of the *Power*, or diſtruſt of the *Goodneſſe* of a ſuperiour Agent (eſpecially in thoſe things which depend upon the Will and Omnipotency of God) hath a double corruption in it, both in that it defiles, and in that it ruines Nature: *defiles*, in that it conceives baſely of God himſelf, in making our guilt more omnipotent than his Power, and ſinne more hurtfull than he is good: *ruines*, in that the minde is thereby driven to a flight and damnable contempt of all the proper means of recovery.

Of this kind of *Deſpaire*, there are three ſorts: The one *Senſual*, ariſing out of an exceſſive love of Good, Carnal, and Preſent; and out of a ſecure contempt of Good, Spiritual, and Future. Like that of the Epicures, *Let us eat and drink* while we may, *To morrow we ſhall die*: The other *Sluggiſh*, which diſ-hearteneth and indiſpoſeth for Action, cauſing men to refuſe to make experiments about that wherin they conclude before hand that they ſhall not ſucceed: The third *Sorrowfull*, ariſing from deep and ſtrong apprehenſions of Feare, which betrayeth and hideth the ſuccours upon which Hope ſhould be ſuſtained: as in the great Tempeſt wherein Saint *Paul* ſuffered ſhipwrack; when the Sunne and Starres were hid, and nothing but Terrour to be ſeene: *All Hope that they ſhould be ſaved, was taken away.*

1 Co. 15.

Deſperationem debilitati, experiri nolunt quod ſe aſſequi poſſe diffidunt. Cic. in Orat. ad Brutum.

Act. 27. 20.

The laſt condition in the object of *Hope*, was *Difficulty*, I mean in reſpect of our own abilities,

for the procuring of the Good we hope for; and therefore Hope hath not only an eye to *Bonum*, the good desired; but to *Auxilium* too, the help which conferres it. No man waiteth for that which is absolutely in his own power to bestow upon himselfe; *Omnis expectatio est ab extrinseco*, all Hope is an attendant Passion, and doth ever rely upon the *Will* and *Power* of some superiour causes, by dependance whereupon it hath some good warrant to attaine its desires.

Spes perficiendi, si vires, pecunia, consilium, scientia, apparatio. Cic. de Invent. ad Herenn.

And thus in Divine Hope, God is in both respects the Object of it, both *per modum Boni*, as the *Good* Desired, *& per modum Auxilii*, as the *Ayde* whereby we enjoy him. So that herein all those Hopes are corrupt & fooliſh, which are grounded either on an error concerning the *Power* to help in some assistants; or cõcerning the *Will* in others (as indeed generally a blinde and mis-led judgement doth nouriſh Passion;) Of the former sort, are the Hopes of base & degenerous minds in their depẽdance upon second and subordinate means, without having recourse to the first supreme Cause; wch is to trust in lying vanities; for every man is a lyar, either by Impotency, whereby he may faile us; or by Imposture, whereby he may delude us.

Iob 31. 24. *Isa.* 17. 5. *Psal.* 62. 9. *Rom.* 3. 4. *Iob* 6. 15, 16.

Of the other sort, are the Hopes of those who presume on the helps and wils of others, without ground & warrant of such a confidence; whence ariseth a sluggish and careleſse security, blindly reposing it selfe upon such helps, without endeavouring to procure them unto our selves.

And this is the difference betweene Despaire and

and Presumption: Hope looketh on a good future, as possible indeed in it selfe; but withall as difficult to us, and not to be procured but by Industry and labour. Now Despaire leaveth out the apprehension of possibility, and looketh onely on the hardnesse: on the other side, Presumption never regardeth the hardnesse, but buildeth onely upon the possibility. And this is *spes mortua*, that dead Hope, which by the rule of opposition, wee may gather from the life of Hope, spoken of by S. *Peter*: For a lifely Hope worketh such a tranquillity of minde, as is grounded on some certainty and knowledge; it is *Pax Luminosa*, a Peace springing out of Light; but dead Hope worketh a rest grounded onely on ignorance, such as is the security of a dreaming prisoner, which is rather senselesnesse than Peace: and this is *Tenebrosa Pax*, a Peace springing out of Darknesse; for a true Peace is *quies ex fide*, a beleeving rest; but counterfeit is only *quies ex somno*, a sleeping or dreaming rest. The Peace which comes from a living Hope must have these two properties in it, tranquillity and serennity: otherwise it is but like the rest of *mare mortuum*, whose unmovableness is not Nature, but a curse.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the causes of Hope, Want, and Weakenesse together; Experience and Knowledge. In what sence Ignorance may be said to strengthen, and Knowledge to weaken Hope: Examples quicken more than Precept. Provision of Ayds: the uncertainty of outward means to establish Hope, Goodnesse of Nature, Faith and Credulity, wise Confidence.

THe next things to be considered, are the *causes* of this Passion: the first impulsive cause of *Hope* is our *Want*, & our *Weakenesse* put together; the one driving us *ad Bonum*, to the *Object*; the other *ad Auxilium*, to the Aid (and whereſoever there is *Indigence*, there is *Impotence* likewise.) Now in what man ſoever we finde theſe two unſupplyed, there is the root and fundamentall ground of Hope; notwithſtanding for the defects of other conditions, the creature may be carried to the quite oppoſite Paſſion, out of an apprehenſion of an inevitable ſubjection unto evill, and utter baniſhment from the ſountaine of good. So then of thoſe three eſtates of man; the eſtate of *Fruition*, which is their *Sabbath* and reſt; the eſtate of *Travell*, which is the day

of

of worke, and the eſtate of *damnation*, which is the *night* of deſpaire: in the firſt we have the accompliſhment; in the third the finall overthrow; in the ſecond the exercife of our Hopes:) becauſe in that alone our *Indigence* may by Gods fulneſſe be filled, and our *Impotence* by his Will and Power ſupplyed. In which reſpect, all men have roome for Hope to enjoy *God* their laſt *Good*; though not a hope of *Confidence*, aſſurance, and *Expectation*, which is peculiar only unto the godly (who alone have a preſent intereſt in his promiſes;) yet ſuch a generall Hope as may well ſuffice to ſtop the mouth of any temptation, whereby we are ſolicited to undervalue the Power, or to conclude the unwillingneſſe of God to help us.

The next cauſe of Hope is *Experience* and knowledge, both in the nature of the thing hoped for, and of the means conducing to the attainment thereof. For notwithſtanding it may often fall out, that ignorance of things, and the not try-all of our ſtrength or others oppoſition, or of the difficulties of the Object, may with hot and eager minds, worke preſumptions of ſucceſſe, and an empty and ungrounded Hope (which is the reaſon why young men and drunken men are both obſerved by *Ariſtotle* to be εὐέλπιδες, men of ſtrong Hopes) being naturally or by diſtemper bold and opinionative: even as on the other ſide, ſtrength and acuteneſſe of underſtanding; becauſe it ſees ſo farre into the Object, workes often diffidence, ſlowneſſe and irreſolution in our Hopes: as *Pliny* out of *Thucydides* obſerves; and the Philoſopher

Rhet. l. 2. c. 12. Ethic. l. 3. c. 8.

Lib. 4. ep. 7. Rhet. l. 2. c. 13.

likewise of old men, that they are [illegible] men slow in their Hopes, because of great experience;) yet for all this, if we do observe it, both the former of these proceeds from some opinion of knowledg, as the later doth from some opinion of ignorance: For of drunken men, and those whom in the same place he compares unto them, *Aristotle* saith, they are therefore confident, *quia se putant superiores*, because they believe much in their owne strength. And of young men hee saith in the same place of his Rhetoricks, [illegible] they are peremptory in the opinion of their owne knowledge; whereas, on the other side, as a lame man placed upon some high Tower, can overview with his eye more ground, than hee hath hope to overrun with his feet in a whole day: so men that have attained unto some good pitch of knowledge, & are withall not insensible of their own weaknes, out of the vastnes of distance which they discover between themselves and their end, doe easily frame unto themselves as narrow Hopes, as they doe large desires; but then this proceeds not from that knowledge which we have properly, but only as it serves to discover unto us, how much knowledge we want.

So then properly *knowledge* and *experience* is the cause of *Hope*; experience I say, either of the conquerableness of the Object by our owne means: or of the sufficiency of the Power, and readiness of the Will of him from whom wee expect further assistance: For as there is lesse casualty, and by consequence, more presumption to be had of

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an event of art than of fortune (the one proceeding from a gouern'd, the other from a blind and contingent cause) so consequently there is greater hope & confidence to be given to the successe of an enterprise, grounded on experience, than of one ignorantly and rashly adventured on. *Experience*, being as the Philosopher obserueth, the Root of Art, as unexperience is of fortune.

Πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ πάντα καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ. *Chilo apud Laert. l. 1.*

Now this *Experience* may be such, either as our selves have had, or such as we have obserued other men to haue; that which we haue from our selues is the most forcible to induce this affection, because every man is the best measure of his owne abilities. And it is that which puts forth influence and force into all our actions; nothing could more assure the hopes of *David* in his encounter with *Goliah*, than an experience formerly had against creatures every way as formidable, a Lyon and a Beare, wherein notwithstanding they were the sheep of *Iesse*, and not of *God* that were endangered. Thus the eye of Faith and Hope looketh both backward upon the memory of actions past, and forward with courage and resolution on second enterprises: For though in some cases it be requisite with Saint *Paul* to forget that which is past, when the remembrance of it may be an occasion of sloath, wearinesse, and distrust; yet there may a happy use be made of a seasonable memory in matters of difficulty, wherein haply our former successefull resolutions and patience may upbraid our present fears, and sharpen our languishing and sluggish Hopes. *O passi graviora*, was the

Met. l. 1. c. 1.

least

best Argument which hee could have used to put his fellowes in confidence of that which hee added:

——*Dabit Deus his quoq; finem.*

Since other greater griefes you have found ease, Doubt not, but God will put an end to these.

And in that great battell between *Scipio* and *Hannibal, ad amnem Ticinum*; though the victory by reason of the excellency of the Generall, fell to the adverse part; yet the Romane Generall could not have used a more effectuall perswasion unto *Hope*, than when hee told his souldiers that they were to enter on a warre with those men who were as much their slaves as their enemies, as being such whom they had formerly themselves overcome, *Cum iis est vobis pugnandum quos priore bello terrâ, mariq; vicistis.* You are to joyne battell with those whom in the former warre you conquered both by Land and Sea. A strong inducement; though that in such a case, the *feare* of a second overthrow would more necessitate the one, than the *hope* of a second victory perswade the other to courage and resolution. As we see in the hot battell between the Greekes and the Trojans, when *Hector* had driven the Grecians into their ships, and set some of them on fire, which is thus elegantly described by *Homer*:

Τὸν

Τῶν δ' ὑπερεμνήσατο ἑ φ' ἑὸν ἦτορ ἑκάστου
Ὄφρα ἴδοιτο φίλτερον ὃν' ἐν νηυσὶ λίποιεν
Τρῶες δ' ἀλκτῆρι δμηθέντε. Iliad. 704.

These were the mutuall motions did engage
The minds of Greeks and Trojans on this rage.
The Grecians all despair'd to escape the blow,
Deeming themselves neer to an overthrow.
But former victory in those of Troy,
Kindled a Hope another to enjoy.
They boldly promis'd to themselves the day,
The Grecians ships to burne, and then to slay,
Thus hope of victory inflam'd the one,
Th'other were more inflam'd, 'cause they had none.

Quondam etiam victis redit in Præcordia, virtus, victoresque cadunt. Æneid. 2.

Forsan miseret melioraque sequetur. Æneid. 12. Etiam si spes non subesset, necessitas tamen stimulare deberet. Q. Curt. l. 4.

That *Experience* from others, which may enliven and perfect our *Hope*, in the applying their examples and successes to our owne encouragements. For since the nature of most men is like that of flocks, to tread in one anothers steps (Precidents having the same precedence to reason in vulgar judgements, which a living and accompanying guide hath to a Mercuryes finger in a Travellers conceipt; the one only pointing too, but the other leading in the way. And as I finde it observed, that running mettall will sooner melt other of its owne kind, than fire alone: So the examples of vertue will sooner allure and prevaile with the minds of men, to frame them to the like resolutions, than a naked and empty speculation of Precepts. It hath pleased Nature to make man, not onely a morall, but a sociable creature, that so

so when his *Hopes* towards good should languish and grow slacke by any conceived prejudices against the *reason* of *Precepts*, they may againe be strengthened by the common and more obvious and common sense of *examples*.

Horace. *Magnos viros, non Schola Epicuri sed contubernium fecit. Sen. Ep. 6.*

Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures,
Quam quæ sunt oculis Commissa fidelibus——

Those things more sluggishly our minds excite,
Which enter at the eares, than at the sight.

Sight which is the sense of Example, is oftner imployed in the government of our Passions, than *Hearing*, which is the sense of *Precept*. And therefore when the Poet would fit an advise for the person of *Ascanius*, hee doth not bring any tedious, thorny, morall discourse; but he works upon that affection which is most predominant in ingenuous and noble Natures.

——Te animo repetentem exempla tuorum,
Et Pater Æneas, & Avunculus excitet Hector.

Recont the brave examples of thy bloud,
And what thou hast in them seen great and good,
Let be thy Patterne, that the World may see
Father and Vncle both alive in thee.

For though an Argument from Example, to prop a fainting Hope be weakest in respect of convincing demonstration; yet it is strongest, in respect

reſpect of morall and perſuaſive inſinuation, as inferring greater deſcredit upon a ſluggiſh and unneceſſary deſpaire. And therefore they were brave inſtructions which *Agamemnon* gaue unto *Menelaus*, when he commanded him to goe into the Army of the Grecians, and animate them unto the battell.

Φίλησιν δ' ὅ τ' ἄνσσων ἔπος ἠδὲ ἐγείρησιν ἕκαστον
Πάτρονδε τε γενὲς ἐνιπεῖν ἀνδρα τ' ἔπεσσιν
Fallas verbis, &c.

Run through the Army, cry, encourage all,
Mind them of their Progenitors, and call
Each by his Name, prayſe them, and let us too
What we command to others, our ſelves doe.

Non convenit, qui illum ad laborem impellerim, nunc me ipſum fugere. Terent. Heaut. Quo major fuero, tanto plus laborabo. Maximum apud Iul. Capitolinum. Iliad. α 67. Si quid injungere inferiori velis, id prius in te ac tuos ſi ipſe ſtatueris facilius omnes obedientes habeas. Liv. lib. 26.

It is true indeed that ſome men are bleſſed with a greater excellency of gifts than others; yet we are not to thinke that any man was ever made, as *Seneca* ſpeaks of *Cato*, *In convitium humani generis*, for a reproach of mens weakneſſe, rather than for an example and incouragement of their actions: or for aſtoniſhment rather than emulation unto others. This being one end of Nature, in framing men of great vertues, not onely that wee might wonder and beleeve, and know that the ſame things which for the greatneſſe of them, are the objects of our admiration, may as well for their poſſibility be the objects of our Hope; and the incouragements of our induſtry.

The third cauſe of *Hope*, may be large furniture with, or ſtrong dependance upon the *aſſiſtant means*

of what is hoped for. Helps in any enterprize are in stead of head and hands, to advance a mans designe, which likewise is elegantly expresst by *Diomedes* and *Sarpedon* in *Homer*:

Iliad. a 222, &c.

—— Κη' αἴ τις μοι ἅμ' ἕσπετο τοῦδε ἕκητι
Μᾶλλον θαρσαλέος κε μαχήσατο δυσπεμπέλοιο
Σοῦ τε πάρ' ἐστάμενος, &c.

μ 410.

If any second would accompany,
My hopes and courage would the greater be:
For when two joyne, the one may haply note
What the other overpass'd; or if he knew it,
His counsell would be weake, and his mind slow,
When he should execute what he do's know.

And according as these means, which wee rely upon, have more or lesse power or certainty in them; they are foundations of a more Regular or Corrupt *Hope*, such are wealth, friends, wit, policy, power, or the like. All which can be causes onely of a *hope* of *probability*, but not of certainty; because they are all means which are subject to miscarriage, and are also subject to the Providence of God, who only can establish and give finall security to our hopes, as being such an Assistant, in whom there is neither weaknesse nor mutability, which should move him to disappoint us.

All other ayds have two ill qualities in them; they have *wings*, and therefore can easily forsake us; and they have *thornes*, and therefore if we leane too hard on them, they may chance in stead of helping, to hurt us. The best promises which

2. Chron. 28. 20, 21. Ezek. 29. 6, 7.

earthly

earthly Aydes can make, are bounded by a double condition.

Εἰ δέκηεν τελέσαι τό γ' ἐμὶ φρεσὶν ἠδὲ καὶ ἔπλετο. Iliad. ξ 391.

If the thing lye within my power to doe,
And divine Providence permits it too.

Here then we may discover Corruption in this Passion, when the mind ready upon every present apprehension to play the Prophet in forecasting future events, shall out of weake grounds, and too high a conceipt of those means which it hath, so build unto it selfe peremptory imaginations for the future, as that thereby it is made in it selfe light & opinionative, and upon occasion of disappointment, is to seeke of that patience to sustaine it, which by a wise intermixtion of feare and caution might have been retained.

And as there is an errour in the trust and affiance, so there may be in the use of those means: For though divine *Hope* hath but one Anchor to rest upon, and therefore hath but one manner of being produced; yet these *lower Hopes*, of which I speake, doe alwaies depend upon the concurrence of divers means, and those likewise have their reference unto divers circumstances. And therefore those which have not the wisdome of combining their Aydes, and of fitting them unto casuall occurrences, may to no end nourish in themselves imaginary and empty presumptions. And this is that which maketh all worldly hopes so full of

Horat.

lightnesse and uncertainties, *Leves spes & ceri amines*, as the Poet calleth them; because it may fall out, that the neglect of but some one circumstance; the not timeing or placing our actions right; the not accommodating our means to the variety of of occasions; the miscarrying in some one complement or ceremony; the having of our minds, either too light and voluble; or too fixed and constant; or too spread and wandring; or too narrow and contracted; or too credulous and facile; or too diffident and suspitious; or too peremptory, resolute, or hasty; or too slow, anxious, and discursive; or too witty and facetious; or too serious and morose, with infinite other the like weaknesses (some whereof there is not any man quite freed from) may often notwithstanding the good store of other ayds, endanger and shipwrack the successe of our endeavours: so that in the prosecution of a hope, there is something alike industry, to be used as in the tryall of Mathematicall conclusions, the Mediums whereunto are so touched and dependant upon one another, that not diligently to observe every one of them, is to labour in vaine, and have all to doe againe.

Ἐλπὶς ἐκ πίστεως ἀναθήσεως. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2.

A fourth cause of *Hope*, may be *Goodnesse and facility of Nature*, whereby we finde a disposition in our selves of readinesse, to further any mans purposes and desires, and to expect the like from others; for it is the observation of *Aristotle*, touching young men, *suâ ipsorum innocentiâ cæteros metiuntur*. Their own goodnesse makes them credulous of the like in others. For as every mans

Rhet. l. 2. c. 12.

prejudice

prejudice loves to find his owne will and opinion: ſo doth his charity to find his owne goodneſſe in another man. They therefore who are ſoft and facile to yeeld, are likewiſe to beleeve, and dare truſt them whom they are willing to pleaſure. And this indeed is the Rule of Nature, which makes a mans ſelfe the *Patterne* of what it makes his Neighbour the *Object*.

Now from this facility of Nature proceeds a further cauſe of *Hope*; to wit, *Faith* and *Credulity*, in relying on the promiſes which are made for the furtherance thereof: For promiſes are obligations, and men uſe to reckon their obligations in the Inventory of their eſtate: ſo that the promiſes of an able friend, I eſteem as part of my ſubſtance. And this is an immediate Antecedent of Hope, which according as the Authority whereon it relies, is more or leſſe ſufficient and conſtant, is likewiſe more or leſſe evident and certaine.

And in theſe two, the Corruption chiefly is not to let Iudgement come betweene them and our Hopes.

For as he ſaid of Lovers, we may of Hopes too, that oftentimes *ſibi ſomnia fingunt*, they build more upon Imagination than Reality. And then if what *Tacitus* ſpeakes in another ſenſe, *fingunt, creduntq;* if our facility faine aſſiſtances, and our credulity rely upon them, there will iſſue no other than Ixious Hope, a Cloud for *Iuno*. And therefore *Ariſtotle* out of an eaſineſſe to Hope, collects in young men, an eaſineſſe to be deceived, credulity very often meets with Impoſtures. And hee elſe- *Rhet. l. 2.*

elsewhere placeth credulous, modest, quiet and friendly men amongst those who are obnoxious to injuries and abuses. Proud and abusive men making it one of their pleasures to delude and mislead the ingenuity of others: and as once *Apelles*, to deceive the expectation of another with a Curtaine for a Picture.

Rhet. l. 1.

The last cause (which I shall but name) of *Hope*, is *wise confidence*, or a happy mixture of *boldnesse*, *Constancy*, and *Prudence* together; the one to put on upon an enterprize; the other, to keep on when difficulties unexpected do occurre; and the third, to guide and mannage our selves amidst those difficulties: For as he said in studies, so wee may in actions likewise (when thus swayed and ballanced) *Altiùs ibunt, qui ad summa nituntur*. The further wee set our aimes, the more ground wee shall get, and then,

Quintil. l. 12. in Proem. Magna indolis signum est sperare semper. Elor. l. 4.

——— *Possunt quia posse videntur.*

When a man thinks, this I can doe,
By thinking, he gets power too.

And unto this doth the Historian attribute all the successe of *Alexanders* great victories, *Nihil aliud quã benè ausus vana contemnere*, his confidence judging them feacible, did by that means get through them. And though it was venterous; yet as the case might be, it was wise counsell which we finde in the same Historian, * *Audeamus quod credi, non potest ausuros nos, eo ipso quod difficillimum videtur,*

Liv. l 19.

* *Liv. l. 25.* Τολμᾶν δεῖ καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ μὴ τύχῃ. *Eurip. Hec.*

videtur, facillimum erit. Let us ſhew our courage in adventuring on ſome difficult enterprize, which it might have been thought wee would not have attempted, and then the very difficulty of it will make it the more eaſie: For our enemies will conclude that our ſtrength is more than they diſcover when they ſee our attempts greater than they could ſuſpect. Thus men teach children to dance in heavy ſhooes, that they may begin to conquer the difficult in the learning of the Art. And therfore the Philoſopher telleth us, that *Spiritus indomitus* bold men, are men of Hope; for boldneſſe ſuffers not a man to be wanting to himſelfe: and there are two Principles which incourage ſuch men upon adventures; the one, *audentes fortuna iuvat.* That reſolution is uſually favoured with ſucceſſe; or if it miſſe of that * *Magnis tamen excidit auſis*; yet the honour of attempting a difficulty, is more than diſcredit of miſcarriage in it.

Difficiliora debent eſſe quæ exercent, quò ſit levius ipſi illud in quod exercent, Quintil. l. 11. cap. 2. Ariſt. Ethic. l. 3. c. 7. Aſtead. 10.

** Ovid. Met. l. 2 Tutius ergo per plana, ſed humilius & depreſſius itur, frequentior currentibus, quam reptantibus lapſus, ſed hi non labentibus nulla laves, illis nonnulla laves etiâ ſi labantur. Plin. l. 9. ep. 26.*

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Effects of Hope: Stability of Mind: Wearinesse, arising not out of Weaknesse, Impatience, Suspition, Curiosity; but out of Want, Contention, and forth-putting of the Mind. Patience under the Want, Distance, and Difficulty of Good desires, Waiting upon Ayde expected.

THe Effects of *Hope* follow, which I will but name: The first is to free the Mind from all such Anxieties as arise out of the Floating, Instability, and Fearefulnesse thereof: For as the Philosopher telleth us, Fearefull men are ἀνέλπιδες, hard of *Hope*: and in this property, Hope is well compared unto an Anchor; because it keeps the Mind in a firme and constant temper, without tottering and instability: for though there be but one Hope joyned with Certainty as depending upon an immutable promise all other having ground of Feare in them; yet this should be only a Feare of *Caution*, not of *Iealousie* and Distrust; because where there is Distrust in the means, there is for the most part Weaknesse in the use of them; and hee who suspects the Ayde which he relyes on, gives it just reason

Philosophi quidam erant, qui a spe dicti sunt, Elpicistæ qui nihil esse pronunciarunt quod vitam Sympos. l. 4. q. 4 magis contineret atq; spes. Vid. Plut.

reaſon to faile and to neglect him. And therefore *Ariſtotle* hath ſet Hope and Confidence together, as was before noted, ἐλπὶς ἐγγὺς πίστεως ἐστί, a Good Hope is grounded on a Beleefe, and alwaies worketh ſome meaſure of Affiance in the means unto it.

A ſecond Effect of *Hope*, is to worke ſome kind of Diſtaſte and *Wearineſſe* in our preſent condition, which according as it is good or evill, doth qualifie the Hope from whence it ariſeth: for there is a diſtaſte that ariſeth out of *Weaknes*; like that of *Iob*, *My Soule is weary of my life*; *I am a burthen unto my ſelfe*. Another that ariſeth out of *Want*, That which ariſeth upon *Weaknes* is a fickle and unconſtant mutability of the Mind, whereby it deſireth a continuall change of condition: which affection is wrought either out of *Impatiency* of oppoſition, whence the Mind upon the firſt difficulty which it meets with, is affrighted and diſcouraged; or out of a *Sharpneſſe of Apprehenſion*, diſcovering Inſufficiency in that wherein it deſired content; or out of an *Errour*, and too high Eſtimation fore conceived, which in the tryall diſappointing our *Hopes*, and not anſwering that Opinion, begins to be neglected as weake and deceitfull: or laſtly, out of *Curioſity* and Search, when wee ſuppoſe that thoſe things which cannot in their nature, may at leaſt in their varieties, number, yeeld ſome content: and as Sands, which are the ſmalleſt things aſunder; yet being united, grow great & heavy: ſo theſe pleaſures, which are alone light and worthleſſe, may by their multi-

Iob 10.1.7.20

Spes inanes quæ in medio ſpatio frangũtur & corruũt & ante in ipſo curſu obruuntur quam portum conſpicere poſſunt. Cicer. de Orat. l. 3.

tude bring weight & satisfaction with them. Although herein the Minde is likely most of all to find *Solomons* Vanity; the Vnion of things subordinate, and which have no Cognation each to other (which is the property of worldly delights) working rather Distraction than Tranquillity in the Mind; this *Wearinesse* then which springeth from the Vnstaydnesse and Impotency of our affections, is not that which I make the Effect of a proper *Hope* (as being an opposite rather to true contentment of Mind, a vertue established, and not overthrowne by Hope) the *Wearinesse* then, which is wrought by the forecast and providence of a Minde possessed with Hope, is that which is grounded upon the knowledge and feeling of our emptinesse and wants, which therefore we long to have removed: like that of *David*, *Wo is me that I am constrained to dwell in Meseeh*; wherupon followeth,

Psal.120.5.

Ἔλλειψις παρὰ τὸ ἐλλιπὲς ἢ ἐλλείπειν μέση.
Etymolog. Studium cum spe senescit. Patercul.l.1. Acuit industriam eum spes injecta est, &c. Cic. ad Heir.l.4.
Ἐλπὶς ἀφ' ἡλίου λαμπὰς ἐλπὶς τὸ μέλλοντος· ἀγαθῆ ἀφορμὴ πρᾶξις ἢ λόγου αἴτιον τοῦ πράττειν ἀγαθόν.
Max. Tyr. dissert.33.

The third Effect of *Hope*, which is an earnest contention of the Minde, in the pursuit of that Good, which should perfect our Natures, and supply our Wants. And this desire Saint *Paul* calleth *Gemitus Creaturæ*, the Groaning of the Creature: which is set downe as a Consequence of the *Earnest Expectation of the Creature*: and indeed there is not any Passion, which doth so much imploy, and so little violate Reason, as this of *Hope* doth, it being an exciting Passion, which moveth every Principle to its proper and speedy operation for gaining that perfection which the Mind so earnestly breathes after; & the want wherof doth work such weaknes in it.

The

The last Effect of Hope, is a *Contented Repose and Patience* of the Mind, resting it selfe in a quiet Expectation of the things hoped for, and yet not exhibited. And this *Patience* is threefold; a *Patience* under the *Want*; a *Patience* under the *Distance*; and a *Patience* under the difficulties of our desired Good; which holds especially in these Hopes (and those are almost all) which depend upon the will and disposition of another, whose pleasure it behooveth us in matters which are not of debt and necessity, rather to attend, than by murmuring and discontent to provoke him, and disappoint our selves. Hasty therefore and running Hopes are as improper in their Nature, as they are commonly vaine and empty in their successe. Hee that Beleeves, and must by Faith depend upon Externall help, must not make haste, but be content to have his Expectations regulated, not by his owne greedinesse, but by anothers will.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of the Affection of Boldneſſe. What it is. The Cauſes of it, ſtrong Deſires, ſtrong Hopes, Aydes, Supplyes, Reall, or in Opinion. Deſpaire and Extremities, Experience, Ignorance, Religion, Innocency, Impudence, Shame, Immunity from danger, Dexterity of Wit, ſtrength of Love, Pride or greatneſſe of Mind and Abilities. The Effects of it, Execution of things adviſed, Temerity, &c.

SO little in love have I ever bin with this affection of *Boldnes* (as I find it mannaged by many, who make no other uſe of it, then children do of ſtraw, with which they ſtuffe empty clothes, that they may looke like men) as that when firſt I writ this Tractate, I paſſed it over rather as a Vice, than an Affection of the Soule, and ſaid nothing of it. And being no more friends with it now then I was then, I ſhould be contented to have left it out ſtill. But that I would not have the Treatiſe defective in ſuch a member, whereof there may be ſo good and ſo ill uſe made, as experience ſheweth us there is of this. For as **Plutarch*

Plut. in Nicia. Νόθα μαθήσεα καὶ ἄ λόγῳ. Homer.

notes

notes of Ægypt, that it bringeth forth *multa venena, & multa ſalubria*, many Good things, and many Bad: like thoſe Creatures, ſome parts whereof are poyſon, and others reſtorative: ſo may wee ſay of the Men in whom this Affection is predominant, that they are uſually Inſtruments either of much Good, or of much Evill to the places that nouriſh them: as once *Themiſtocles* his Tutor ſaid of him. The beſt mixture that I can call to mind of this Paſſion, was in *Hannibal*, of whom the Hiſtorian tels us, That he was marvellous *Bold* to put upon Dangers; and yet marvellous *Wiſe* in managing of them: His courage not working Temerity, nor precipitating his reſolutions: And his counſell not working ſlowneſſe, nor retarding his courage.

Plut. in Themiſtoc.

In Hannibale plurimum audaciæ ad capeſſenda pericula plurimũ Conſilij inter ipſa pericula erat. Liv. l. 21.

Boldneſſe then or Confidence, is (as the Philoſopher deſcribes it) a Hope joyned with fancy and opinion, that thoſe things which are ſafe for us, are neer at hand; and thoſe which are hurtfull, either are not at all, or are afarre off, and cannot ſuddenly reach us: Or it is an Affection whereby we neglect Danger for the procuring of ſome difficult and Good thing, which wee earneſtly deſire and hope for, in Confidence to overcome and breake through that danger: For Confidence of Victory is that which maketh a man boldy to proſecute the Danger which oppoſeth him in his Hopes of Good. So that two things belong unto the formality of this Paſſion. 1. *Vehemency of Hope*, whatſoever ſtrengthneth that, cauſeth this, as Power, Experience, Friends, neerenes of Ayds, and

Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

Vid. Aquin. 22 æ quæſt. 45. art. 3

and the like. 2. *Excluſion of Feare*, whatſoever removeth that, increaſeth this: As Diſtance from Danger, Freeneſſe from Enemies, Cleernes from Injuries, &c.

The *Object* of this Paſſion is twofold. The Primary and Principall Object is ſome difficult worke under the Relation of a needfull Medium, to the obtaining of a Good vehemently Deſired and hoped for. The *ſecondary* Object, is ſome Evill and Danger, which ſtanding between our Hope, and the Good for which we Hope, is by the vehemency of our Hope, as it were removed and deſpiſed in our Eyes. *Good* earneſtly *deſired*, and *Evill* confidently *deſpiſed*, are the things about which this Affection is converſant.

The Cauſes of this Affection are ſo many the more, becauſe it is apt to be excited by clean contrary Reaſons.

The *fundamentall* and *principall* Cauſe of it, is *ſtrength of Deſire*, working vehemency of Hope, and impatiency of Reſiſtance, or Reſtraint from the thing deſired: For Luſt when it hath once conceived, will at laſt bring forth and finiſh, and ruſh forward to that after which it longeth, which the Philoſopher calleth ὁρμὴν, and Saint *Peter* ἐκχυσιν, a pouring out of Paſſion, and the Prophet a *Breaking forth* and violent Eruption, a raſh and Head-ſtrong præcipitancy, which like a Torrent venters upon any thing that withſtands it. The Philoſopher inſtanceth for this particular in adulterers, ὅτι ἀνὰ ὁλίγον τολμηρὸν πᾶν τὸ ἡδονικόν. Who adventure on many bold Attempts for the ſatisfaction of their Luſt.

Iam. 1.14,15.

Ariſt. Eth. l.7.c.8.
1. *Pet.*4.4.
See my treatiſe on the Sinfulneſſe of Sin. *p.*167.
*Hoſ.*4.2.
*Jer.*6.7.
8.6.
*Eth. l.*3.*c.*11.

But

But becauſe where there are ſtrong Deſires, there may be weake Hopes, and great Feares, The one Diſcouraging, the other Deterring from the Proſecution of them, therefore to the emboldening of thoſe Deſires, other particular Cauſes doe uſually concurre. Some whereof I ſhall enquire after.

1 Then *ſtrong Hopes*, and Ready, Preſent *Aydes* and ſupplies proper to the End, which we would advance are Excellent meanes to generate Boldneſſe. Great Aydes as the Catts *Vnum magnum*, or *many* Aydes, that if one faile another may Hold. As greatneſſe of wealth, friends, power, ſtrength. And theſe in a Readineſſe and *neare* at hand. *In ſubſidio ſtare*, as the Philoſoper expreſſeth it, as the Trojans being beſieged when *Æneas* with his Armie drew neare, gathered courage above their feares.

Aux. { magna. multa. vicina.

Rhet. l. 3. c. 5.

——*Clamorem ad ſidera tollunt,*
Dardanidæ muris; ſpes addita ſuſcitat Iras
Tela manu iaciunt.

Æneid. 10.

joyes,
They all climb'd up the wals, thence fill'd with
Shouted as loud, as if they meant the noyſe
Should wake the Stars, hopes added ſtir'd up Ire
And their Darts flew as ſwift as any fire.

And in Scriptures we are often quickened unto courage againſt the Difficulties of our Chriſtian Warfare by the *Greatneſſe* and the *neareneſſe* of the *Aydes*, and the *Reward* which we Hope

1 Ioh. 4. 4. Heb. 10, 36, 37. Iam. 5. 8. Revel. 22. 12.

for. Yea, so strong a power hath Hope over the Resolutions of men that even the froth, and dreame, and fancy of it in drunken men, maketh them as the Philosopher noteth marvellous ventrous upon dangers, which Reason and sobriety would have taught them to feare. *Solomon* tels us of a Drunkard lying on the Top of a Mast, and I have my selfe seene a Drunken man climbe to the Top of a Steeple. Which boldnesse proceedeth in such men from weakenesse and wilfulnesse of selfe-conceit, and Opinion, for commonly that strength, which a Drunken man looseth in his *Reason*, he gathers in his *fancy*, and as his judgement weakens, his Opinion encreaseth. And we shall never finde men more confident in their affirming, then when they know not what they affirme.

Now upon this Ground, that *Hope* is the great Quickner unto *Courage*, It was, that *Alexander* used it as an Argument to his Souldiers against the Persian, when he saw them come into the field cloathed so richly, that their Armes were much rather a *Prey* to the Greekes, then a *Defence* unto themselves, in which respect *Homer* thus derides *Amphimachus*.

Θὴρ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἰάχων ἐπ' ἰὼ βέβη αἰπὺ

Νίκης ἐλπόμενος· ἦ οἱ μὴ ἐκφάσθαι ἀνάγκη πολλά.

In glittering Gold, like a faire Damsell, clad

He came to fight: Vaine man why art so mad

To

Διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν εἶναι τὸ θαρραλέον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐλπιδωτικὸν. *Ethic. l. 3. c. 11.* *Prov. 23. 34.*

ἰσχυροποιοῦσι τὰ ἐλπιζόμενα καὶ φαινόμενα. *Ethic. l. 7. c. 10.*

Praedam virum quam Hostem incruentum deuicit. Liv. lib. 9. Iliad. β 873. Plutarch lib. de Homero.

Quàm minimum si incorpore tuo spoliorum plus sit computant quàm operunt. Senec. Epist. 14.

To thinke that Iron is kept backe by gold?
Thou bring'ſt the price, for which thy ſelfe art ſold.

Suetan. in Iulio 67.

And yet upon a contrary Reaſon, I finde one of the greateſt and wiſeſt Commanders of the world *Iulius Caſar*, requiring of his Souldiers to carry Gold about them that the feare of looſing that, might make them the more conſtant to their Reſolutions.

Contrary unto this we ſhall often obſerve, that *Deſpaire* and *Extremities* doe put men upon bold adventures. As no men fight more deſperately then Cowards when they cannot flie, as the Hiſtorian noteth of *Cn. Piſo* a Confederate of *Catiline*, that by poverty he became deſperate, and thereby emboldened unto that attempt, wherein he might either riſe by the ruine of others (having neither merit nor Hope to riſe by their favours) or at leaſt not be ruined without company. [b] As that which ſhakes a Tree, doth often ſerve to ſettle and faſten it: So many times dangers and [c] extremities doe excite ſtrength, as in the height of a Fever or Frenzie, men ſhew more ſtrength and agility of body, then in their perfecteſt Health. And as they ſay of [d] Beaſts, they bite with more venome and indignation when they are wounded, and ready to die. And therefore *Homer* expreſſeth the Dying of wounded Enemies by biting of the Ground; ſo utmoſt extremities of miſeries make men put out the more boldneſſe in either Revenge or new Attempts, becauſe they may be better, but they

a *Summæ Audaciæ egent, factioſus quem adperturbandam remp. Inopia, ac mali mores ſtimulabant.* Saluſt.

b *Plutarch. in Numa.*

c *Sæpè contemptum hoſtis cruentam certamen edidit.* Liv. lib. 21. *Spes deſperatione quæſita* Patrc. lib. 1. *Iguaviam neceſſitas acuit, & ſpei ſæpè deſperatio cauſa eſt.* Q. Curt. l. 5. *Dant animum ad loquendum liberè ultima miſeria* Liv. lib. 29.

d *Maximè mortiferi eſſe ſolent morſus morientium Animalium.* Florus Iuli Capitol. in Maximino.

cannot be worſe. a And it is a kinde of Impunity to be ſo low as that a man hath not a condition to fall from.

a *Impunitatis genus eſt non habere pœnæ locum Scnec.*

b *Morienſque recepit. Quas nollet victurus aquas.*

In a famine a man will eat and drinke that which in plenty he could not have the courage to looke on. And this cauſe of boldneſſe is thus expreſſed by the Poet when he ſheweth how the Youth of Troy, ſeeing their Citie burnt and ſacked, grow unto a Deſperate Reſolution.

b *Lucan. Æntid. 1.*

c — *fortuna miſerrima Tuta eſt nam timor eventus deteriorꝰ abeſt. Ovid de Pont. l. 3. Eleg. 2.*

Sic Animis Iuvenum furor additus: Inde Lupicen
Raptores atra in Nebula quos improba ventris
Exegit Cæcos rabies, catuliq; relicti
Faucibus expectant ſiccis, per Telaper hoſtes
Vadimus haud dubiam in mortem——

Thus youth did rage deſpairing of their lives,
Like Wolves of Prey whom extreame hunger drives
From their yong thirſty whelps, through darkeſt ſtorms;
Through darts and foes we ruſh on our owne harmes
And being ſure to die dare that, which feare
With Hope of Life would force us to forbeare.

Vide viget de re militar. l. 3. c. 21.

Another cauſe of Boldneſſe is *Experience*, when a man hath often done a thing with ſucceſſe, often ſeen Dangers and eſcaped them. As Marriners at ſea, found other men, upon as ſmall hopes as he himſelfe hath, to goe through the like matters without doubt or heſitation. For *examples* doe

Ἀεὶ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐλπίσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς κινδύνους ἄγει. Ethic. l. 3. c. 11. Θαρραλέα γὰρ ἐκ παρασκευῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῦσι. Eurip. Rhes.

doe put Life, Hope, and Emulation into men, as we noted before, and we are encouraged ſometimes rather to[a] erre in good company, then to goe right alone, and this Argument Æneas uſed in the Poet.

Vos & ſcyllæam rabiem, penituſq; ſonantes
acceſtis ſcopulos, Vos & Cyclopea ſaxa,
Experti: revocate Animos, maſtumq; timorem
Mittite———

You by Charibdis, and by Scylla ſayl'd, (vail'd.
Where waves through rocks did ſound, nor hath pre-
'Gainſt you, that worſer Rocke the Cyclops denne,
Then caſt off feares, and ſhew your ſelves brave men.

And as Experience, ſo on the contrary ſide *Ignorance* is as uſuall a cauſe of Confidence, as we ſee Children will put their finger in the fire, and play with Serpents, as not acquainted with any hurt they can doe for them. We may too often meet with men like waters or veſſels, which the ſhallower and emptier they be, doe make the lowder noyſe, and make uſe of other mens Ignorance to gaine Boldneſſe and Credit to their owne. To which purpoſe it is a grave expreſſion of the Poet.

———Οἱ γὰρ ὦ σοφὸς
Φῶτες, παρ' ἰχλὺν μυκτηρίσαι λέλεγμ.

Thoſe whom wiſe men know for Dull
With vulgar eares are wondrous Muſicall.

[a] *Vel error honeſtus eſt magnos duces ſequentibus Quint. lib 1. cap. 6.*

Ἐμοῦς ἰς ἀληθῶς ἀλόγους. *Lat. 1. in Ariſtip. Ethic. l. 3. c. 8. & 10. Plin. l. 4. Ep. 7. Quo moriture rum, majoraq; viribus audes? fabit te incautum pietas tua Æn. 10. De Audetid puerili vid. Val. Max. l. 3. c. 1.*

Eurip. Hyppol.

And as Flies are esteemed very Bold Creatures, because they often returne to the same place: so the boldnesse of these kinde of Speakers is usually discovered in vaine and emptie Tautologies, which is the reason why (as the Orator noteth) they are usually more copious then far Learnedner men, *Quia docti is est Electio & modus*, because able Speakers use choice and Iudgement in what they produce.

Iliad. 638.

Quintil.

Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

Another Cause of Boldnesse in attempts may be *Religion*, and a Confidence of Divine Direction unto what we doe. *Iehu* his pretence unto zeale, was that which caused him to walke furiously. And in this case as the Historian speakes, *Melius vatibus quam Ducibus parent.* Men are apter to be led by their *Prophets* then by their *Captaines*. And we finde when God would encourage his People in their warres, he gave them signes and assurances for their faith to relie upon above their feares that where *Reason* saw cause of Doubting, *Faith* might see all Defects supplied in God, so to *Gideon*, to *Ahaz*, to *Hezekiah*, and others, and the Church complaines of the want of them in their times of Calamity. *We see not our signes, neither is there amongst us any Prophet, or any one that knoweth how long.* When *Iosuah* did fight, *Moses* did pray, and *Israel* was more encouraged by the intercession of the one, then by the valour of the other. And the Philistines were never more affrighted, then when *Israel* brought forth the Arke of God against them, for as *Ajax* said in the Poet,

Q. Curt. lib. 4. De Impetu Animorum divinitus excitato vid Plutareh. in Coriol. Iudg. 6. 36. Isai. 7. 11. 12. 2 Reg. 19. 29. 2 Sam. 5. 24. Psal. 74. 9. Exod. 17. 11. 1 Sam. 4. 7, 8.

—— εἰ γε θεὸς
βούλεται, φύγεν αἲ χαὶ ἐπαὶ τὸν χρείονα.

Sophocl. Ajax vid. Ezek. 21. 21.

—— *If God will fight,*
He can make weak men put the ſtrong to flight.

And therefore *Tolumnius* the Soothſayer having received happy *Auguria*, doth thereupon grow to Reſolutions of courage.

Hoc erat, Hoc votis, inquit, quod ſæpè petivi,
Accipio, agnocoſq; Deos; me, me duce, ferrum
Corripite ò Rutili.

Æneid. 12. —— Priſcum de more Latinis Auſpicium; tum bella parant mentesque deorum Explorant ſuper Eventu, &c. Sil. Ital. lib. 5.

This, This is that which in my chiefeſt thought
I ſtill deſir'd, and now finde what I ſought;
The Divine Tokens I embrace and ſee;
Come Souldiers, Take your ſwords and follow me.

Unto this Head of Religion belongeth *Innocency*, as a moſt excellent cauſe of *Boldneſſe*; for the *Righteous is bold as a Lyon*, which careth not though a multitude of Shepheards come out againſt him. And the Philoſopher tels us that they who have done no wrong unto others, are confident of ſucceſſe in their Attempts, beleeving that they ſhall finde no Enemies, becauſe they have provok'd none. A notable Example, whereof wee have in M. *Publius Furius* the Roman Conſul, who was ſo confident of his owne Integrity in publike Adminiſtration, that being deputed by lot to governe the Province of Spaine, hee choſe the two bittereſt Enemies that

Prov. 21. 1. Iſai. 31. 4. Vid. Iliad. 9. 23. Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

Val. Max. l. 3. c. 7. vid. haud diſſimile Exemplum Catonis. Plutarch. de util. ex Hoſtib. capiend.

that he had in the City to be Coadjutors with him in that Dispensation. Whereunto may be added the Answer which *Drusus* gave to him who would have contrived his house for secrecie, when hee told him that hee could wish his house were pervious and transparent that his privatest Actions might be seene in publick.

And as Religion and Innocencie, so on the other side *Deboishnesse* and *Desperateneesse* of living doth implant a marvellous Boldnesse in the Mindes and faces of men, when they have no Modesty or shame to restraine them. As we see in Gypsies, Parasites, Jugglers, θαυματοποιοὶ, *neurospastæ*, and such like. And therefore such kinde of men both in Scripture and in other writings, are said to have faces of brasse and necks of Iron, whorish and impudent foreheads that cannot blush or be ashamed; and these words, ἀναίσχυντος, ἀναισχυντία, ἀναίδεια, we shall finde for synonymies and of equall signification, whereof the former signifie Despaire, Impudence, and the other Boldnesse.

Againe, as Impudence, so *Shame* and feare of Disgrace is a great Cause of *Boldnesse*, in vertuous and honourable Attempts; for there is no Man of generous principles, but will much rather chuse an honourable danger than a sordid safety, and adventure his *Person* before hee will shipwrack his honesty or *good name*, choosing ever to regulate his Behaviour rather by a *morall* than a *naturall* feare, to give an account of himselfe rather to those that love his *vertues*, than to those who love his *fortunes*. In one word standing

Κακὸν ἐπὶ κακῷ ἐπὶ Homerum sæpè. Jer. 3. 3. Isai. 48. 4. Ezek. 16. 30. Os ferreum, &c. in Pisonem. Iul. Pollux. l. 3. c. 28. Plutarch. in Alcib. vid. Theophrast. περὶ ἀναισχυντ. Arist. Ethic. l. 3. cap. 9.

Πολυθαμβὲς μὲν γὰρ τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἀνθρώπινον ἀναίδειαν. Silentium illud obstinatum, fixi in terram oculi —— & pudor intutæ indicia luis ingentes malum Irarum ex alto animo cientis judicis erant. Liv. lib. 9.

ding more in awe of mens *Hearts* than of their *Hands*, and ſhunning more a *Juſt Reprehenſion* than an *Vnjuſt Injury*. And to this purpoſe it is gravely obſerved by the Hiſtorian, that the diſhonour which the Romans ſuffered, *ad furcas Caudinas*, was that which procured their adverſaries a bloudy overthrow afterwards, *quia Ignominia nec Amicos parat, nec Inimicos tollit*. Their ſaving of the lives of the Romans to bring Ignominy upon them, being eſteemed not a benefit, but a ſcorne: a very like example we have hereunto in the ſervants of *David*, abuſed and put to ſhame by *Hanun* the ſonne of *Ammon*. And thus the Poet expreſſeth the courage of *Dares* revived by the fall which hee had from *Entellus*:

At non tardatus caſu, nec territus heros,
Acrior ad pugnam redit, & vim ſuſcitat ira,
Tum pudor incendit vires & Conſcia Virtus.

Dares no whit diſmay'd, renewes the fight
With a more eager force, wrath doth excite
The ſtouter courage, Shame with Valour met,
Inflam'd his minde, and did his weapon whet.

2. *Sam.* 10. *Mixtus dolor & pudor armat in Hoſtes.* *Aneid.* 10. *Tunc cede malus, ſed contra audentior ito.* *Aneid.* l. 5. *Ariſt.* Eth. l. 3. c. 11.

Another cauſe of Boldneſſe, is *Immunity* from Danger, or at leaſt a *Verſatilouſneſſe* and *Dexterity* of wit to evade it, or ſhift through it. And therefore though cunning men dare not alwaies ſecond their contrivances with Execution, nor let their hand goe in Equipage with their wit; yet commonly men of vigorous fancies are ſo far in love

Qui ad fraudē callidi ſunt, nō tantum audent quantum excogitant. *Cic. pro Cluentio.*

with their owne conceptions, that they will many times venture upon some hazards, to bring them into act, trusting the same dexterity to bring them out of Danger, which hath at first made them to adventure on it: as *Darius* was wont to say of himselfe, that in a pinch and extremity of perill, hee was ever wisest: and *Sylla* gave the same judgment of himselfe, that he came off best in those businesses, which he was the most suddenly put upon, which also I finde observed in the Character of our *Henry* the seventh (who hath had the felicity above all his Predecessors, to have his lineaments drawne by the ablest pen that hath imployed it selfe in our Story) that his wit was ever sharpened by Danger, and that he had a greater *Dexterity* to *evade*, than *Providence* to *prevent* them.

Another cause of Boldnesse (as I have formerly noted on that Passion) is *strength of Love*, as we see weake Creatures, in defence of their young ones, will set upon those that are strong, and the Tribune in *A. Gellius*, out of Love either of his Country, or of Glory, did not only advise, but himselfe undertake the executing of a service, wherein hee was before-hand certaine to perish. And the same Author telleth us of *Euclide*, a Desciple of *Socrates*, who ventured in a disguise upon the evident danger of his Life to enjoy the Discourses and Counsels of his Master.

Lastly Pride, *greatnesse of Minde* or Parts, and opinion of Merit; especially if it meet with discontentednesse and conceits of being neglected, doth very often embolden men to great and new

Attempts:

Plat. Apoph.

Plut in Sylla. ἐπίβουλον ἐν τῷ ἐπιτυχεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν. Sopb. Antig.

Audaces facit ebat Amor. Ovid Met. 4.

A. Gell. l. 3. c. 7.

A. Gell. l. 6. c. 8. Vile est corpus ni qui magnâ gloriam quærunt. Liv. l. 2.

Attempts: For it is a very hard thing when great *Abilities* and vaſt *Hopes* meet together, to governe them with moderation. Private Ends being in that caſe very apt to engage a mans parts, and to take them off from publicke ſervice unto particular advantage. And therefore I take it, there is no temper of Minde that will with that evenneſſe and uniformity of proceeding, or felicity of ſucceſſe, promote publicke and honourable Ends, as *Height of Abilities*, with *moderation of Deſires*; becauſe in that caſe a man can never ſtand in his own light, nor have any miſt or obſtacle between his Eye and his End.

Now from this ground I beleeve did ariſe that *Maxime* of ſome of the States of Greece noted by *Tully*, and at large debated by the Philoſopher, *Nemo de nobis unus excellat*, that they would not have any one man to be notoriouſly eminent in abilities above the reſt, and thereupon inſtituted *Oſtraciſme*, or an honourable Banniſhment, as a reſtraint either to abate the exceſſive worth of eminent men: or to ſatisfie and aſſwage the Envy which others might conceive againſt them, who are apt to hate the vertues which they can onely admire: or laſtly, to prevent the dangers which greatneſſe of parts taking advantage of popularity and vulgar applauſe, might haply venture to bring upon things. Vpon this ground the Ephe ſians expelled *Hermodorus*; and the Athenians, *Ariſtides*, becauſe he was too juſt for the reſt of the people. As one Voice in a Conſort, which is loud above the proportion of the reſt, doth not adorne,

Cic. Tuſc. q. l. 5. Ariſt. Polit. l. 3. c. 13. Plut. in Alcib. & Ariſtid. ex Nicia. Eandē virtutē & oderant & mirabantur. Liv. l. 5.

but disturbe the Harmony; and therefore usually men of great parts, have lien either under *Envy* or *Iealousie*. Mens minds out of I know not what malignity, being apt to suspect that that will not be used unto Good, which might be abused unto Evill, which *Tacitus* noteth to have been the quality of *Domitian*, and *Ammianus Marcellinus* of *Constantius* towards men of the greatest worth.

Tacit. vit. Agr. Ammian. l. 15.

Now according to the difference of this Affection in different men, so it worketh two different Effects.

Θαρσῶ μὲν πλεόνεσσι λιλαίεται ἀμφιπεσέσθαι ἀνδρῶν ἐν πολέμῳ, ἢ ἄνευ λαοσσόου μάχεσθαι.
Iliad. v. 170.
Θαῤῥεῖν χρὴ ἐπεσσόμενον ἀγαθὰ μεζόνως μέγα.
Sapo. El. Hr. Liv. l. 23.
Semper in prælio ij maximè est periculum qui maximè timent, Audacia promptis est. Sal. st. Cat. Thuc. l. 7. p. 15.
a Male se sapienti hostis metuat quæ stulti cupiunt audent omnia audentè conitentur Hannibal. Liv. l. 22. Arist. Eth. l. 3. c. 7.
Novi gaisos in pace leones in prælio Cervos. Terent. de Cerv.

1 There is a *Happy* and *Discreet* boldnesse, which doth not anticipate, but second and attend the mature counsels of the minde, and doth first call out and stirre up it selfe by wisedome, before it proceed unto Action or Execution: like the Boldnesse of the Lyon, which is *slow*, but at last *prospers* in what it undertakes. For after Counsell hath ripened Resolutions, Boldnesse is then the best Instrument to accomplish them, and in that case, *quo minus timoris, minus fermè periculi*, as the Historian speaks. The lesse feares are, the lesse also are their dangers, and the greater their Confidence, the surer their successe:

—Ἐτ πρὶν πυρήφενι ἰάδον Ἀχαιοί.

The Greeks by venturing did enjoy
Their ten yeares wish, and gained Troy.

2 There is a *a hasty and rash Boldnesse*, which beginning too speedily without *Counsell* doth usually end too *Cowardly*, without *Courage*; for rash men

men whom the Philoſopher cals θρασυκαρδους men made up of confidence and feare, are bold and boaſting before a Danger, but in it very timorous, or at leaſt inconſtant. *Lyons* in peace, but *Harts* in warre, as *Tertullians* Proverb hath it. [a] Like thoſe of whom *Livy* and *Florus* tell us, That they were more than men in the onſet, and leſſe than women in the iſſue, melting away from their Reſolutions like Snow.

And another ill property of the Raſhneſſe of this Paſſion is, That it will expoſe a man to more danger than the ſucceſſe which it aimes at can compenſate: as he that fiſhes for a Gudgeon with a golden hooke: or as *Vlyſſes* who went backe to the Cyclops his denne to fetch his cap and girdle which he had left behind him.

Another is, that it makes men *Overvalue themſelves*, and ſo undertake things too hard for them to endure or hold out in. Like [b] *Menelaus* in the Poet, who would venture to fight with *Hector* or *Ariſtoxenus* in *Tully*, who being a Muſitian, would needs determine in queſtions of Philoſophy.

Laſtly it hath a property as we ſay, to *breake the Ice*, and to give the firſt onſet upon dangerous Attempts, which is a thing of very perillous conſequence, not only to the Author, but many times to the publick Peace too, [c] forward, exulcerated, and ſeditious ſpirits, being too ready to follow what they dare not begin.

[a] *Liv. l. 10. & l. 38 Flor. l. 2 c. 4. Temeritas ubi primũ impetũ effudit, velut quadam animalia amiſſo acuto torpet. Q. Curtius. l. 4. Cum ultimi diſcriminis tẽpus advenerit in ſolicitudinẽ verſa fiducia eſt. lib. 5. c. 3.*

[b] *Plut. in Cat. & Iliad. 2. 97. 112 Tuſc. q. l. 1.*

[c] *Propterè ſequi quæ piget inchoare. Tacit. Magnus Author ad ſeditionem quã Animus deerat. Liv. l. 25.*

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Passion of Feare: the Causes of it; Impotency, Obnoxiousnesse, Suddennesse, Neerenesse, Newnesse, Conscience, Ignorance of an Evill.

Vide Laert. in Zenon. l. 7.

THe opposite Passion to this of of Hope is *Feare*: which being an Equivocall Passion, and admitting of many different kinds, can scarse have any whole and simple definition to explaine it. There is a Vertuous Feare; a Feare of Sinne and Shame; an Intellectuall Feare of *Admiration*, when the excellency of the Object dazleth our Eye; a Feare of *Reverence*; an *Astonishing* Feare, by reason of the *Newnesse*; and an *Oppressing* Feare, by reason of the *Neerenesse* and Inavoydableness of the Evill feared. It is a Griefe, Trouble, Flight, Aversation of some approaching Evill apprehended, either as destructive, or as burthensome to our nature, and not easily resistable by our strength: For the qualification of the Object thereof, because it is in all circumstances like that of Hope (save in the Evill of it) I shall therefore forbeare to touch it, and shall onely in briefe consider the Dignities and Defects thereof in its Causes and Effects.

Fear is an humbling & debasing Passion, which alwaies

alwaies importeth ſome manner of ſervitude and ſubjection in whom it reſideth; So then as in the former Paſſion of *Hope* I noted the fundamentall cauſe thereof to be *Weakneſſe* and *Want*: ſo likewiſe in this of *Feare*, the Root and firſt Principle is *Weakneſſe* and *Subjection*; whereof the one implyes a diſability in us to reſiſt, the other a neceſſity to undergoe an evill.

Hence it is that wee feare the diſpleaſure of Great men; or the Power of Vnjuſt men; or the Competition of Popular and Plauſible men; or the Cunning of Cloſe and Malitious men; or the Revenge of Provoked men; or the Guilt of Injurious men that have wronged us already: becauſe in all theſe caſes there is ſome notice of Weakneſſe and Subjection in us: ſo that Feare is of all other a naked Paſſion: For as Nakedneſſe hath three evill properties; to diſable for Defence; to expoſe to Injury; and from both to work ſhame in the conſciouſneſſe of our dejected condition: So likewiſe *Feare* hath three properties; to make us *Impotent* and *Obnoxious*; and from both theſe to beget *Shame*. For though his ſpeech was true, *Rubor eſt virtutis color*, that Shame and Vertue have the ſame colour (which makes it ſeeme a companion rather of Perfection than of Weakneſſe; yet indeed it is rather a ſigne of a mind vertuouſly diſpoſed in teſtifying the quicke apprehenſiveneſſe of its own defects, than any Adjunct of Vertue it ſelfe.

Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

Diogenes apud Laert. l. 6. Πᾶς ἐρυθριᾷ τὶς μὴ ἀνήρ. *Menander.*

So then the Roots of this Paſſion are *Weakneſſe* and *Subjection* both together; ſo that where either condi tion

condition is wanting, there is not any proper ground of Feare, and therefore wee see sundry times strength takes off the yoake of Obedience, not only in the civill government of men, but in the naturall government of creatures by men, to whom by the law of Creation they were all made subject; yet the strength of many of them hath taught them to forget their originall Subjection, and in stead of Fearing, to terrifie man their lord; and when ever we tame any of them, and reduce them to their first condition: this is not so much an act of our *Dominion*, wherby we awe them, as of our *Reason*, whereby we deceive them; and we are beholding more therein to the working of our Wit, than to the prerogative of our Nature; and usually every thing which hath knowledg enough to measure its owne abilities; the more it hath of *Strength*, the lesse it hath of *Feare*; that which *Solomon* makes the strongest, the Apostle makes the fittest to expell Feare, to wit, Love.

So likewise on the other side, *Immunity from Subjection* in the midst of Weakenesse removes *Feare*. Of this we may give an instance in guilty persons, who notwithstanding their Weakenesse; yet when once by the priviledge of their Sanctuary or mercy of their Iudge they are freed from the obligation of the Law, though not from the Offence; their former Feares doe presently turne into Ioy and Gratulations: and that is the reason why Good men have such Boldnesse, Confidence, and Courage, that they can bid defiance unto Death; because though they be not quite deliveted from the

the Corruption; yet they are from the Curſe and Condemnation of Sinne, though by reaſon of their Weakneſſe they are not delivered from the mouth, yet they are from the teeth and ſtings of Death; though not from the Earth of the Grave; yet from the Hell of the Grave; though not from Sinne; yet from the Strength and Malediction of Sinne: the Law our Adverſary muſt be ſtrong, as well as our ſelves weake, if he looke for Feare.

The Corruption then of this Paſſion, as it dependeth upon theſe Cauſes is, when it ariſeth out of too baſe a conceit of our owne, or too high of anothers ſtrength; the one proceeding from an errour of Humility, in undervaluing our ſelves; the other from an errour of Iudgement or Suſpition in miſtaking of others. There are ſome men who as the Oracle ſpeaks of deſpairing Wits, *De viribus ſuis peſſimè merentur*, who are too unthankfull unto Nature in a ſleight eſteeme of the abilities ſhee hath given them, and deſerve that Weakeneſſe which they unjuſtly complaine of: The ſight of whoſe Iudgment is not unlike that of Perſpective Glaſſes; the two ends whereof have a double repreſentation; the one fuller and neerer the truth; the other ſmaller and at a farre greater diſtance: So it is with men of this temper, they looke on themſelves and others with a double prejudice; on themſelves with a Diſtruſting and Deſpairing Iudgement, which preſents every thing remote and ſmall; on Others with an Overvaluing and Admiring Iudgement, which contrariwiſe preſents all perfections too perfect. And by this

means between a selfe-dislike, and a too high estimation of others, truth ever fals to the ground, and for revenge of her selfe, leaves the party thus distempered, alwaies Timorous. For as Error hath a property to produce and nourish any Passion, according to the nature of the subject matter which it is conversant about: so principally this present Passion; because Errour it selfe is a kinde of *Formido Intellectus*, a Feare of the Understanding: and it is no great wonder for one Feare to beget another. And therefore when Christ would take away the Feare of his Disciples, he first removes their prejudice: Feare not those that can kill the Body onely, and can doe no more. Where the overflowing of their Feares seemes to have been grounded on the overiudging of an adverse power. Thus much for the Root and Essentiall cause of Feare: these which follow, are more casuall and upon occasion.

Præ cæteris Hostibus timentur Repentini. Ammian. Marc. l. 28.

Whereof the first may be the *Suddennesse of an Evill*, when it ceiseth upon (as it were) in the Dark: for all Darkenesse is comfortlesse; and therefore the last terrible Iudgement is described unto us by the Blackenesse and Vnexpectednesse of it, by the Darkenesse of Night, and the Suddennesse of Lightning. All Vnacquaintaince then and Ignorance of an approaching Evill, must needs worke Amazement and Terrour: as contrarily a foresight thereof worketh Patience to undergoe, and Boldnesse to encounter it: as *Tacitus* speaks of *Cæcina*, *Ambiguarum rerum sciens eoq; intrepidus*, that hee was acquainted with difficulties, and therefore

Mala præviso fiunt Leviora. Cic. Tusc. q. l. 3. Annal. l. 1.

not

not fearfull of them. And there is good reaſon for this, becauſe in a ſudden daunt and onſet of an unexpected evill, the ſpirits which were before orderly carried by their ſeverall due motions unto their naturall works, are upon this ſtrange appearance and inſtant Oppreſſion of danger ſo diſordered, mixed, and ſtifled, that there is no power left either in the Soule for Counſell, or in the Body for Execution: For as it is in the warres of men, ſo of Paſſions, thoſe are more terrible, which are by way of Invaſion, then of Battell, which ſet upon men unarmed and uncompoſed; then thoſe which find them prepared for reſiſtance: and ſo the Poet deſcribes a lamentable overthrow by the Suddennes of the one ſide, and the Ignorance of the other:

Invadunt urbem ſomno vinoq; ſepultam.

They do invade a City all at reſt,
Which ryot had with ſleep and Wine oppreſt.

Dum ea parte qua muros diruta erat ſtationes armatas opponunt: Quintius nullo ab ea parte, quæ minimè ſuſpecta erat, impetu facto ſcalis capit. Liv. l. 32.

And this is one reaſon why men inclinable to this Paſſion, are commonly more fearfull in the Night than at other times; becauſe then the Imagination is preſenting of Objects not formerly thought on, when the ſpirits which ſhould ſtrengthen, are more retyred, and Reaſon leſſe guarded.

And yet there are Evils too, which on the other ſide more affright with their long expectation and traine, than if they were more contracted

and speedy. Some set upon us by stealth, affrighting us like lightning with a sudden blaze: others with a traine and pomp like a *Comet*, which is ushered in with a streame of fire, and like Thunder, which hurts not only with its danger, but with its noise: and therefore *Aristotle* reckoneth ἐμφάσεις, the signes of an approaching evill amongst the Objects of Feare.

Sect. Ep. 14.

Another cause of Feare may be the *Neerenesse of an Evill*, when we perceive it to be within the reach of us, and now ready to set upon us: For as it is with Objects of Sence in a distance of place: so it is with the Objects of Passion, in a Distance of Time; *Remotion* in either, the greater it is, the lesse present it makes the Object; and by consequence, the weaker is the impression there-from upon the faculty: and this reason *Aristotle* gives why Death, which else where he makes the most terrible evill unto Nature, doth not yet with the conceit thereof, by reason that it is apprehended at an indefinite and remote distance, worke such terrour and amazement: nor so stifle Reason and the Spirits, as Objects farre lesse in themselves injurious to Nature; but yet presented with a determined *Neerenesse*. And the reason is plaine, because no Evill hurts us by a simple apprehension of its Nature, but of its *Union*: and all *Propinquity* is a degree of *Union*. For although *Futurition* be a necessary condition required in the Object, which must inferre *Feare*; yet all Evill, the lesse it hath *de Futuro*, the more it hath *de Terribili*: which is the reason, why that Carnall Secu-

rity,

curity, which is oppoſed to the Feare of God, is deſcribed in the Scripture, by putting the Evill Day farre from us, viewing as in a Landskip and at a great diſtance the terrour of that Day. And if here the Atheiſts Argument be objected, Let us eat and drinke, for to morrow wee ſhall die: Where the propinquity of Ruine is made an Inducement unto Ryot. Wee muſt anſwer, that an Atheiſt is here in both right and vaine, in that he conceiveth Annihilation, or never more to be the beſt cloſe of a wicked life; and therefore moſt earneſtly (though moſt vainly) deſireth that it may be the iſſue of his Epicuriſme and Senſuality. And here briefly the Corruption of Feare in this particular is, when it takes advantage by the approach of Evill, to ſwell ſo high as to ſinke Reaſon, and to grow bigger than the Evill which it is afraid of.

——— *propiuq; periclo*
It Timor, & major Martis jam apparet imago.

Æneid. 8. *In metu & pericula plura & majora videntur metuê ibus cum creditur facilius, tum fingunter impunius Cic. de Divinat.* 1. 2.

Their Feare gets cloſer than the thing it feares,
Warres Image bigger than it ſelfe appeares.

For as it is a ſigne of diſtemper in the Body, when the unequall diſtribution of nouriſhment and humours cauſeth ſome parts to exceed their due proportion of greatneſſe: ſo is it likewiſe in the faculties of the Minde, when the Inferiour grow high and ſtrong; if Reaſon raiſe not it ſelfe to ſuch a proportion, as ſtill to maintaine and

manage its authority and government over them. But this is to be observed only of the Rising and Strength, not of the Humility and Descent of Reason: For though it be fit for the power of Reason to keep it selfe up above rebellion; yet is it not necessary that it should stoup and sinke according to the lowneſſe or sordidneſſe of any Passion. As in the Body, though we would have all parts increase alike; yet if one part by distemper grow weake, wee require in the rest a fellow-feeling, not a fellow-languishing; yea indeed in both cases, where the inferiour part is weaker, it is the course of Nature and Art to fortifie the higher; because in a Superiour there is required as well a power to quicken and raise that which drooopeth, as to suppresse and keep under that which rebelleth.

Another cause of Feare may be *Newneſſe of Evill*: When it is such, wherewith neither the Minde it selfe hath had any preceeding encounter, whereby to judge of its owne Strength; nor any example of some other mans prosperous issue to confirme its hopes in the like successe: For as before I noted out of the Philosopher, Experience is in stead of Armour, and is a kind of Fortitude, enabling both to judge and to beare troubles: for there are some things which he elegantly calleth them, τὰ κενὰ φοβητρα, *Empty Dangers*: *Epictetus* calleth them, μορμολυκεῖα καὶ προσωπεῖα, Scar-crowes, and Vizors, which children feare only out of Ignorance: as soone as they are knowne, they cease to be terrible. As the log of timber which was cast

* *Ne fama aut rem in majus extolleret aut militū animos rerū novitate terreret. Instin. l. 14.*

* Κατάληξις φόβου ἐν φαντασίᾳ ἀσυνήθους λύπης ἢ ἀφορισμὸς ἀπὸ παραδόξου φαντασίας. *Clem. Alex. strom. l. 2. Eth. l. 3. c. 7. Arrian Epist. l. 2. c. 1.*

Nam veluti pueri trepidant, atq; omnia Cæcis in tenebris metuunt: ita nos in luce timemus. Lucr.

caſt into the pond, did with the firſt noiſe exceedingly affright the Frogges, which afterwards when it lay quietly, they ſecurely ſwam about. And this Ignorance and Inexperience is the cauſe that a man can ſet no bounds to his Feare. I *grieve* for ſo much Evill as *hath* befallen me; but I *feare* ſo much as *may* befall me; and the more ſtrong and working my *Fancy*, the greater my *Feare*; becauſe what I cannot meaſure by *Knowledge*, I meaſure by *Imagination*; the figments of Fancy do uſually exceed Truth.

Plin. l. 8. ep. 18. Vereor omnia, imaginor omnia quæq; natura metuenda eſt, ea maximè mihi quæ maximè abominor, fingo.

And from this *Ignorance* likewiſe it is, that Timorous men are uſually *Inquiſitive*, as the Philoſopher notes; and ſo the Prophet expreſſeth the Feare of the Idumeans in the Warre, *Watchman! What of the Night? Watchman! What of the Night?* Feare uſually doubleth the ſame queſtions, as Griefe doth the ſame Complaints. Therefore men in a fright and amazement, looke one another in the face; one mans countenance, as it were asking counſell of another: and once more from hence grow the *Irreſolutions* of Timorous men, becauſe they know not what to doe, nor which way to fly the things they feare: in which reſpect they are ſaid to fly from an Enemy *ſeven wayes*, as ever ſuſpecting they are in the worſt. *Pavidei ſemper Conſilia in incerto*, they never can have fixed and compoſed Counſels: and it is the uſuall voice of Men in their Feares, I know not what to do, I know not which way to turne my ſelfe; *Trembling of Heart*, and *Fayling of Eyes*, Blindneſſe and Aſtoniſhment: *Ignorance* and *Feare*

Plin. l. 6. ep 4. Vid. Sen. ep. 13. Prob. §. 14. q. 15.

Iſa. 13. 8. 21. 11. Jer. 51 31. Gen. 42. 1. Μαλλον ουκ ειδως ποτε φοβηθω μαλλον ἢ ἐπιστας. Schol. in Septu. Deut. 28. 25. In magna difficultatibus ſæpe præſentia fugimus tanquam maximè periculoſa. Plut. in Mario. Deut. 28. 28. 95.

Feare, doe thus usually accompany each other. And therefore the Stoicks make [illegible] and [illegible] a sluggish Affection of Minde, whereby a man shrinketh backe, and declineth businesse, because of difficulty of danger which hee observeth in it; and a Tumultuary and distracted frame of Mind, not knowing which way to take, to be amongst the kinds of this Passion of Feare. The Poet speaking of the Sabine Virgins, whom the Romane youth snatched away, and tooke to them for Wives, hath thus elegantly described this distraction of Feare.

Lert. in Zenon. l. 7.

Ovid. de Arte Amandi. l. 1.

Vt fugiunt aquilas timidissima turba Columbæ,
Vtq; fugit visos agna novella lupos:
Sic illa timuere viros sine lege ruentes,
Constitit in nulla qui fuit ante Color.
Non Timor unus erat, facies non una timoris
Pars laniat Crines, pars sine mente sedet.
Altera mœsta silet, frustra vocat altera matrem,
Hæc queritur, stupet hæc, hæc fugit, illa manet.

As weake and fearfull Doves the Eagle flie,
And tender Lambs when they the Woolfe espie:
So the affrighted Sabine Virgins runne
Pale and discolour'd, Romane youth to shunne.
Their Feare was One, but Feare had not One look,
Part here sit reav'd of sense, part there doth pluck,
And teare their haires, One silent mourns, another
With a successeleſſe Outcry cals her Mother.
One moanes, the fright another doth amaze:
One flies for Feare, for Feare another staies.

Now

Now the reaſons why *newneſſe* of evill doth thus work *feare*, may be many. For firſt, all *Admiration* is a kind of *feare*: it being the property of man, not only to feare that which is *Againſt*, but that alſo which is *above* our Nature, either in regard of *naturall and civill dignity*, which worketh a *fear of Reverence*; as to parents, governours, maſters; or in regard of *Morall Excellency* and *Exceſſes* above the ſtrength of the faculty, which worketh a *Feare of Admiration*. Now then it is the property of every thing, that brings novelty with it to worke more or leſſe, ſome manner of *admiration*, which, (as the Honour of this ages learning cals it) is a *broken knowledge*, and commonly the firſt ſtep, which we make in each particular Science: & therfore *children* are moſt given to *wonder*, becauſe every thing appeareth *New* unto thē. Now then when any evill ſhall at once fright our nature, & poſe our underſtanding, the more our Ignorance doth *weaken* our *Reaſon*, the more doth it *ſtrengthen* our *Paſſion*.

Againe, though ſuch evils may happily be in themſelves but ſleight, yet the very *ſtrangeneſſe* of them will worke an opinion of their *greatneſſe*: for as that of *Seneca* is true, *Magnitudinem rerum conſuetudo ſubducit*: that uſe makes ſmal eſteem of great things: ſo it will follow on the contrary ſide, that Novelty makes evill appeare greater, as the way which a man is leaſt acquainted with ſeemes the longeſt.* And therfore the Romans did uſe themſelves unto their gladiatory fights and bloody ſpectacles that acquaintance with wounds and blood might make thē the leſſe fear it in the wars.

Advancement of Learning.

ωφὶς ἐλάτ᾽ ἐυπροσδόκητα καὶ θαυμαζόμενα μᾶλλον. Laert. in Zenon. l. 7. Plutarch, de Aud. Ὁ ἀπροσδόκητος φόβος τὴν ὀργὴν. Metaph. l. 1. c. 2

Nat. Quæſt. l. 7. c. 1.

* Iul. Capitol. in Maximo & Balbino. Vid. Lipſ. Saturn.

And lastly, such is the imbred cautelousnesse of Nature in declining all noxious things, and such is the common suspition of the Minde, whereby out of a tendering of it's own safety, it is willing to know every thing before it make experiment of any, and thereby it is made naturally fearfull even of harmlesse and inoffensive things (*Omnia tuta timens*, much more then of those which bring with them the noyse and face of evill.

Now the coruption of this passion herein is, when it falleth too soone upon the Object, and snatcheth it from the understanding before that it hath duely weighed the nature of it; when as *Aristotle* speakes of *Anger*) that it runs away from reason with an *halfe message*, so the Object shall be pluckt away from the understanding with an *halfe judgement*. For when a man hath but an halfe and broken sight, like him in the Gospel, he will be easily apt to judge men as big as trees, and to passe a false sentence upon any thing which he feares.

Another cause of *Feare* may be *Conscience* of evill and guiltinesse of minde, which like mud in water, the more it is stirred, doth the more foule and thicken: *For wickednesse, when it is condemed of it's owne witnesse is exceeding timorous, and being presed with conscience, alwayes forecasteth terrible things*; and as the Historian speaketh of Tyrants, so may we of any other wicked men, *Si recludantur mentes, posse aspici laniatus & ictus*, their mindes with lust, cruelly and uncleane resolution, being no lesse torne and made raw, then the body

wisd. 17. 11.

Tacit. Anal. lib. 6.

flight

with ſcourges: Every vicious man hath a double flight from God, a flight from the Holineſſe, and a flight from the Iuſtice of his will. *Adam* firſt *eates*, and next he *hides*: as ſoone as he hath tranſgreſſed the Covenant, he expects the Curſe, and therefore wee ſhall ſtill obſerve that men are afraid of thoſe whom they have injured. * *Alcibiades* having provoked the Athenians, was afraid to truſt them, ſaying, It is a fooliſh thing for a man when he may flie, to betray himſelfe into their hands from whom he cannot flie. And therefore they who would have us feare them, deſire nothing more then to be privie to our guilts, and to know ſuch crimes of us, as by detecting of which, they have it in their power to bring either infamie or loſſe upon us.

* *Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. 13. c. 38.*

Scire volunt ſecreta domus, atque inde Timeri.

Inven. Satyr. Charmidis vitrici qui verrem tempore quo vult. Accuſare potuiſſe, &c.

Into our ſecret crimes they pry, that ſo
We may feare them, when they our vices know.

And therefore innocency is the beſt Armour that any man can put on againſt other mens malice or his owne feares: For the righteous are bold as a Lion.

Prov. 28. 1.

Other cauſes of Feare might here be obſerved which I ſhall but intimate. As we feare active and buſie men, becauſe if they be provoked, they will ſtirre and looke about to revenge themſelves.

Minus timebant Epaminondam. Διὰ φιλοπραγμοσύνην. *Plutarch. Plutarch. de Curioſitate.*

We feare likewiſe Delators, becauſe they are inquiſitive and pry into the ſecrets of others. *Plutarch* compares them unto cupping glaſſes

which draw ever the worst humours of the body unto them, and to those gates through which none passed but condemned and piacular persons. We may liken them unto flies, which resort onely to the raw and corrupt parts of the body, or if they light on a sound part, never leave blowing on it, till they dispose it to putrefaction. For this is all the comfort of malevolent persons, to make others appeare worse then they are, that they themselves, though they be the worst of men, may not appeare so.

We feare also abusive and Satyricall wits, which make use of other mens names, as of Whetstones to sharpen themselves upon.

Horat. l. 1. Sat. 4.

Omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas,
Fanum habet in cornu, longe fuge; dummodo risum
Excutiat sibi, non hic cuiquam parcet amico.
Et, quodcunq; semel Chartis illeverit, omnes
Gestiet a furno redeuntes scire, lacuque,
Et pueros, & anus———

These all hate Poets, feare to suffer scorne
From those curst wits, which carry hay in horne.
Shun them, they wil not spare their deerest friend
to make th^{e}selves sport. Th^{e} what they have pend
Th'are big with, till old wives & boyes that goe
From Ovens and from washpooles know it too.

Ὁι σκληροὶ, ὑπονοητικοὶ, καὶ μνησίκακοι. Arist. Rhet. l. 2.

Lasty, we feare, close, cunning; and suppressed malice, which like a skinn'd wound doth wrankle inwardly: Crafty, insinuative, plausible men, that

that can ſhrowd and palliate their revengefull purpoſes, under pretexts of love. I formerly noted it of *Tiberius*, and [a] *Ælius Spartianus* obſerveth it of *Antoninus Geta*, that men were more afraid of his kindneſſe then of his anger, becauſe his uſe was to ſhew much curteſie there where he intended miſchiefe.

And [b] *Cæſar* was wont to ſay that he was not afraid of *Antony* and *Dolabella*, bold adverſaries, but of *Brutus* and *Caſſius*, his pale and leane enemies, who were able to ſmoother there paſſion, till they had fit opportunity to act it. The Italians (they ſay) have a Proverb wherein they promiſe to take heed themſelves of their enemie, but pray to God to deliver them from their friend. And this as it is of all other the moſt dangerous and the moſt unchriſtian, ſo is it the moſt unworthy and ſordid diſpoſition of minde, (I cannot finde wordes bad enough to character it [c] by) which at the ſame time can both flatter and hate, and with the ſame breath praiſe a man, and undoe him. And therefore the [d] Philoſopher telleth us that a magnanimous man is φανερόμισος & φανερόφιλος. Such an one as doth boldly profeſſe as well his diſpleaſure as his love, eſteeming it timorouſneſſe to ſtifle and conceale his affections.

Of all Chriſts enemies, *Iudas* when he kiſſed him, the *Herodians* when they praiſed him, and the Devill when he confeſs'd him were the worſt and ill-favouredeſt. A leproſie was ever uncleaneſt when it was whiteſt, and Satan is never more

a Fuit ejus Immanitatis Antoninus ut ſi præcipuè blandiretur quos ad necem deſtinabat, ut ejus magis blandimentum timeretur quàm Iracundia. Spartian. in Geta.

b Plutarch. in Cæſare. Iraque tegitur nocet. Sen. Med.

c Pſal. 62. 4. 55. 21. 10. 8, 9, 10.

c Peſſimum inimicorum genus Laudantes. Tac. Turpe eſt odiſſe quem Laudes. Sen. de Ira lib. 3. c. 29.

d Ariſt. Eth. c. lib. 4. cap. 8. Τοῦτο δοκεῖ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι.

wicked or more ugly then when he puts on *Samuels* Mantle. Hatred when it flatters, is the moſt miſhapen monſter. Like thoſe poiſons which kill men with laughing; or like the Philiſtines treſpaſſe-offering, Mice, and Emerauds made of gold.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of the Effects of Feare, ſuſpition, Circumſpection, Superſtition, Betraying the ſuccours of Reaſon, Feare Generative, Reflecting, Inward, weakning the faculties of the Minde, Baſe Supition, wiſe Caution.

I Proceed to conſider ſome of the *Effects* of this Paſſion, whereof the firſt may be *Suſpition* and Credulity, which either other mens rumors, or our owne working Imagination frameth untoit ſelf. Which effect of Feare the Hiſtorian hath wiſely obſerved, *Retineri comeatus dum Timet, Credit*, what he feared that he beleeved. And in another place ſpeaking of the ſtrange relations, which had been made of Monſters, his Iudgement on the report is, *Viſa, ſive ex metu credita*. It was uncertaine whether they had beene really

Tacit. lib. 4.

Annal. lib. 2.

really ſeen or beleeved out of Feare. For as timorous men are by their own ſuſpicion ready to frame unto themſelves new terrours, and to feare where no feare is, which the Poet hath obſerved.

Quæ finxère Timent.

——they are afraid,
Of fancies which themſelves have made.

Εμπ' ἀ χρεὼν τὸν ἀναίσθητον.
κακόν.
ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τὴν φρένα ταρασσόμενος.
Menand.

So are they ready likewiſe to beleeve the apparition of their owne braine for reall terrours: For *Tacitus* his ſpeech is here likewiſe true: *Fingunt Creduntque*, firſt they feigne, and then they beleeve.

Now the Reaſon hereof may be, Firſt, the generall Impreſſion of Nature, which being ſubject unto Infinite dangers, hath therefore given it a wiſedome of providence, and circumſpection to foreſee thoſe evils, which cannot by dexterity be ſo eaſily ſhifted off, as they may at a diſtance be prevented; ſo that wee finde even in the moſt cleare and undiſturbed order of our operations toward any new thing (though not apprehended as noxious and offenſive to our Nature) untill it be better underſtood, a ſecret drawing back and feare leaſt it ſhould prove hurtfull unto us; how much more then when it is once prepoſſeſſed with paſſion: For as cloth once died from it's naturall white, will take no other but a darker colour: So minds once ſteeped in the bitter[a] humours of this melancholique paſſion, will ſeldome

Quorum in alterius manu vita poſita eſt, ſæpius illud cogitant quid poſſit is cujus in diſtione ſunt quàm quid debeat facere. *Cic. pro quinctio.*

[a] *De Timore ita melancholico unde quædam apud Gal. Rhodig. l. 9. cap. 26.*

dome admit of any, but more blacke and feare-full conceits. b And from this suspition of feare it is that timerous men are usually cruell when they gaine any advantage. Their jealousie teaching them to doe that unto others which they feare from them.

A second Reason may be, becaus̃e in feare the minde of man is drawne to a neerer sense of it's weaknesse, and to a more prejudicate apprehension of the adverse power: and therefore it is a true observation, c *Prona ad Religionem perculsa semel mentes, &c.* Mindes once possessed with feare-full conceits, are most forward in sacrifices, and Religious Ceremonies, to avert the evils, which they expect. So that as *Tacitus* on another occasion speakes, *Inclinatis ad credendum.* So I may say, *Inclinatis ad timendum animis loco omnium, etiam Fortuna,* When the minde is once drooping, things which before passed away as matters of course and casualty, are now drawne within the compasse of presages and Emphaticall evils.

But here by the way we are to remember that this *credulity of feare* is to be understood with respect to it's owne suspition, otherwise in regard of those strengthening helpes which are given against it, it is ever *Incredulous: O thou of little faith! why doest thou feare?*

Now this effect of Feare is generally in it selfe a corruption of it: For though I would have a mans dangers make him provident and solicitous in the forecasting future evils out of a sound and sober conjecture, according as are the

b *Quod de Conjuratio observavit Ammian Marcell. lib.16. de Artaxerxe Plutarchus de Medea Euripid. in Medea. De Domitiano Tacitus quidam nunquam magis quam cum erubescerunt Timendi sunt. Senec. Ep.11.*

c *Tacit. Annal. lib.1. Vid. Plutarch. de superstitione Et lib. contra Epicur. Max. Tyrius dissertat.4. Clem. Alex. Strom. lib.7. p.512. Hist. lib.2.*

the likelihoods of their event, and not have him flatter himselfe in a careleſſe ſecurity, nor divert his Minde from ſuch unwelcome and penſive thoughts, like *Vitellius* in *Tacitus*, who in the neere approach of his fatall ruine, was *Trepidus dein Temulentus*, one houre Fearfull, and the next Drunken, ſmothering in himſelfe every thought of enſuing danger, and enduring nothing but *Iucundum & Laſurum*; that which was pleaſing, though harmefull to him; yet I would not have the mind tormented with ungrounded Fancies, and preoccupate Evils to be no further effected than in our braine, becauſe hereby it is made ſoft and irreſolute, tumultuary and confuſed, and both wayes much indiſpoſed and diſabled for Action.

Another ill Effect of Feare, is a *Diſlike* of whatever means Reaſon preſents for the freeing of us, whence iſſue Inconſtancy and continuall Change of Reſolutions, hating all Counſels when they are preſent, and recalling them when they are too farre paſt: which Effect is elegantly deſcribed by the Author of the Booke of *Wiſedome*, who ſaith that *Feare is a betraying of the Succours which Reaſon offereth*: a ſubmitting of them to the falſe interpretations of a crooked and prejudicate ſuſpition, which overcuriouſly diſcovering Weakneſſe in all means, and making uſe of none, doth thereby betray Nature into the hands of Danger. * They ſay of a certaine Fiſh, that it hath a Sword, but it hath not a Heart: a perfect Embleme of Feare, which though you put into Armor, yet you cannot give it Courage. And

* *Themiſtocles apud Plut. apophth.*

† therefore as he said, an army of Lyons led by a Hart, would doe lesse service than an army of Harts led by a Lyon, because in that case Feare would betray her owne succours. And this I finde a frequent observation, that *Pavidis consilia in incerto.* Feare ever dazleth the Eye, and blindeth the Mind in all her Counsels: and *Timor etiam auxilia reformidat.* It is afraid of the very succors that are offered. And therefore it is noted as a great mastery of *Vlysses* over his Feares, that he could thinke and wisely advise what to do.

† Cinabrias ib. & Orat. 2. de fortit. Alex. Arist. Οὐ δὲ λέων ἡγούμενος ἐλάφων στρατὸς ἐμμενεῖ δόρατι. Sept. Œdip. Syr. Tac. Ann. l. 3. & Cur. Omnia tuta timent. Non minus præsidium suum quàm hostes metuunt discrimine tanto. Liv. l. 1. Ænead. l. 3.

——— *Nec talia passus Vlysses,*
Oblitusq; suis est Ithacus discrimine tanto.

Although with Feares oppreſt; yet he had not
The Cares and thoughts of his own peace forgot.

Now the reason of this may bee first, because *Feare* is a Multiplying and *Generative* Passion, ever producing motions of its owne Nature. Hee which feares danger from anothers power, will easily feare Errours or Impotency in his owne ayds: and it is * common with men to thinke themselves *Vnwise*, when they feele themselves *Vnhappy*; & this very thought that they are so, doth I know not by what Fascination make them so. So that as a chased Buck, when he flyes from the Dogges, doth many times fly into the Net which was spread for him: so when our Feares drive us from one mischiefe, the often hamper and intangle us in another.

Πρὸς τὰ πάθη τὰς ὁρμὰς ποιοῦνται παρασκευάζοντα. In quam sed usu receptum, quod honesta consilia, vel turpita, prout mala aut prospere cedentia vel probantur, vel reprehendentur. Plin. l. 5. ep. 21. Arrian. Epict. l. 2. c. 1.

Againe

Againe it is the property of *Feare*, to make us euer reflect upon our own Weaknes, & (as I ſaid) not only to preſent it, but to worke it: as the Sun when it diſcloſeth unto us the Glorious Lights of the one part, is commonly it ſelfe hid in the other part of the Heavens: as contrarily, when it ſhineth on the Earth, it hides the Starres: ſo it is in thoſe two Offices of Reaſon; the Tranſient and Reflexive act, that whereby we looke Outward on others; or Inward on our ſelves, ſpecially where there is Paſſion to withdraw and pervert it; as the one is ſtronger, ſo commonly the other is weaker: which is true moſt of all in this Paſſion of Feare, wherein the more we ſee of dangers from outward oppoſitions, the leſſe we ſee of inward ſtrength for reſiſtance. Inſomuch that great minds, when they meet with great dangers, are oftentimes ſtaggered, as the Poet intimates, when *Ajax* came forth to battell:

Τρῶας δ' ὀτρύνει ἀνὰ δηϊοτῆτα γεγωνὼς. *Iliad.* 2. 262.
Ἕκτορι δ' αὖτ' ἄρα θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι πεπάλτο.

Feare had the other Trojans all oppreſt;
Yea Hectors *heart panted within his breaſt.*

A third Effect may be a Weakneſſe of the Faculties of the Minde, and the Spirits in the Body; whereby the one is made unfit for Search or Counſell; the other for Service or Execution. And hence (as *Plutarch* noteth) it imports in the Greeke, a Binding or Shutting up, and ſo withdrawing and indiſpoſing the Soule for Action. *Plut. de Sup.*

And such Actions, as Feare forceth a man upon, are presumed to be so weake and unnaturall, that it is a Maxime in the Law, *Per metum gesta, pro non ratis habentur*: Those things which wee doe in Feare, are void and invalide to binde, when the Feare which forceth them is removed. And as it is in the Civill State, so it is in the Morall Common-wealth of the Soule, there are three principall wayes to inferre Weakenesse, Forreign Incursions, Intestine Tumults, and an Emptying of the Parts, all which are to be seen in an Extremity of Feare. Where first two things are to be granted, one concerning the Body, and the other the Mind. The first is, that the Spirits being of the most strong, subtle, and quicke motion, are the principall Instruments of Entercourse, either in Negotiation to, or Service from Reason: the other, that the Mind being of a Spirituall and Elevating Nature, retaines then the perfectest power of Operation, when it least of all suffers the Incursion of grosser Passions, which yet I understand not of all manner of Ministry and Admixtion of Appetite, with Reason (as if the Regular motions of inferiour powers did not serve to sharpen the Counsels of the higher) but onely of Invasion and Tyranny.

Which granted, wee may observe all the three former causes of Weakenesses in an Extremity of *Feare*. For first there is a Confused and Unserviceable mixture of *Passion* and *Reason*: The *Passion* with too much outrage and assault breaking in, and distracting the advices of *Reason*, which is

Forreigne Incurſion: For, though theſe two are not parts of a different *Regiment*; yet they are of a different Nation (if I may ſo ſpeake) the one belonging to the higher, the other to the lower parts or region of the Soule. Secondly, there is *Tumult* and Diſorder amongſt the Spirits, which is *Civill Diſſention*. Thirdly, there is a Retyring of them to the principall Caſtle or Fort, the Heart, whereby the Outward Quarters are left Naked and Vngarriſon'd; which though it be a ſtrengthning of the Better, yet it is a Weakning of the Major part, and this anſwereth unto Emptying or Vacuity. By all which, both Reaſon is made unfit for Counſell (all the Conceipts therof being choaked and ſtifled with a diſorderly throng of Spirits and Paſſions) and the Body likewiſe is ſo benummed, that though our diſcourſe were entire, yet it could not be there ſeconded with any ſucceſſefull ſervice. And hence are thoſe many ill Effects of Feare upon the Body, whiteneſſe of Haire, Trembling, Silence, Thirſt, Paleneſſe, Horrour, Gnaſhing of Teeth, Emiſſion of Excrements. The Outward parts being overcooled, and the Inward melted by the ſtrength of the Spirits retyring thither. Which *Homer* hath thus deſcribed, ſpeaking of a Coward.

Cæl. Rhodig. l. 7. c. 47. Plut. de Hom. Arift. Prob. Sect. 27. § 1, 2, 3.

His Colour comes and goes, nor doth he ſet
Long in one place; he croucheth to his feet;
His Heart pants ſtrong, and intercepts his breath,
His Teeth doe gnaſh with, but the thoughts of Death.

Iliad. N. 280. Colorem mutat Polypus, quia Timoris Anim. Plat. l. 4. q. 19.

Brave men are still the same, not much agast,
When the first brunt of their Attempts is past.

Where by the way we may obserue what *Seneca* also tels us, that *Feare* doth usually attend the † *beginnings* of great enterprizes, even in the worthiest men. Which mindeth me of one more, (and that an usefull and profitable) Effect of this Passion, I meane * *Care*, *Wisedome*, and *Caution*, which ever proceeds from a Moderate Feare, which is a Dictate of Nature. And therefore the weakest Fishes swim together in shoales, and the weakest Birds build in the smallest and outermost boughes, which are hardest to come unto. And we may obserue that Nature hath made the weakest Creatures swiftest: as the Dove, the Hare, the Hart: and the † say that the Hare is very quicke at hearing, and sleepeth with his Eyes open, every way fitted to discouer danger before it surprise him. For as in Religion, a Feare that is governed by the Word of God, so proportionably in Morality: a Feare grounded by the Word of Reason, is the Principle of Wisedome. As Security and Supineneſſe is the Root of Folly, which *Tiberius* replyed to the petition of *Hortulus*, wherein he requested of the Senate a Contribution from the publicke Treasury to recover the honour of his Family, which now was sunke and began to wither. Industry saith hee will languish, Idleneſſe will increase, if no man have Feare or Hope in himselfe: but all will securely expect a supply from others; in themselves lazy and burthensome

† *Arist. Prob.* 27 q.3. *Vid. Sen de Ira, l.2. c.3. Plut. in Arato.* * Βουλευτικωτατοι *Arist. Rhet. l.2. Vid. Poll. l.3. c.8.* * Φοβερώτερος τῶν πολεμίων ἐλευθερώτερος *Laert. in Zenon. Ælian. de Anim. l.8. c.18. l.4. c.8.*

† *Plut. Symp. l.4 q.5. Homerum viros fortissimos sæpe inpugna describit armatos. Et Hannibal in tot pugnis nunq. ã vulneratus. Plut in Pelopida, & in Marcello. Languescit industria ubi cẽ detur Socordia, si nullus ex se metus aut spes: Securi omnes aliena subsidia expectabunt, sibi ignavi, nobis graves. Annal. l.2.*

thenſome unto us : and it is the judgement of *Tacitus* upon one of the wiſeſt Policies, which ever that Emperour practiſed, I meane his writing to the Legions abroad, *Tanquam adepto principatu*, as if he were already Emperour, when at home in the Senate he uſed only Modeſty and Refuſals, That he did it out of *Feare*, ſo wiſe a Counſellor was his Paſſion unto him. And we find that ſome *great Commanders have cauſed their Skout-watches to be unarmed, that Feare might make them the more vigilant. And therefore this Paſſion is the Inſtrument of Diſcipline, ſeaſoning the Minde, as ground Colours doe a Table, to receive thoſe beauties and perfections, which are to bee ſuperinduced.

*Paulus Æmil. apud Plut. Apoph. l. 44.

*Vide Clem. Alex. Pædag. l. 1. c. 9. Plin. l. 6. ep. 17.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of that particular Affection of Feare, which is called Shame. What it is. Whom we thus feare. The ground of it, Evill of Turpitude, Injustice, Intemperance, Sordidnesse, Softnesse, Pusillanimity, Flattery, Vaine-glory, Misfortune, Ignorance, Pragmaticalnesse, Deformity, Greatnesse of Minde, Unworthy Correspondencies, &c. Shame, Vitious and Vertuous.

φόβος αἰσχύνης. Arist. Eth. l.4. c.15.

Διὸ καὶ ἰσχυρογνώμονι τις αἰσχύνοιτο, &c. Arist. Rhet. l.2.c.6.

φόβος ὑποψίας δόξης χάριν. Damascen. de Orthod. fid. l.2.c.15.

A. Gell. l.9. c.6.

Ὁ δὲ ἥκιστα ἴσα ἐφίεται ἢ ἐπὶ ἔσω Iliad. Σ 214.

BEsides this generall Consideration of the Passion of *Feare*, there is one particular thereof, which calleth for some little observation; namely, *Shame*, which is a *Feare of just Disgrace*, and Reproof in the Minds of those, whose good opinion wee doe or ought to value, as hee said in the Poet,

Πολυδάμας μετ' ὀπίσσω εἰλυγχέα πεύθεται.

Now those whom we thus feare, are *wise men*, (for so *Polydamas* is said to looke behind and before him.) *Aged* men, and all whose presence wee reverence as Parents, Rulers, Counsellers, Friends: Any whom we our selves *Admire*, or who Admire us. We feare disgrace with those whom we Admire, because their judgement of us, is in our own Apprehension, a kind of Touch-stone, which if we

we cannot ſuffer the Tryall off, argues us to be but corrupt and uncurrant Mettall. And wee feare it with thoſe who Admire us, becauſe as every man is willing to ſee his face when it is cleane, in that Glaſſe which repreſents it faireſt: ſo when it is foule, of all others he ſhunneth that moſt. In the former caſe we are in danger to miſſe of what wee deſired; in the other, wee are in danger to ſhipwracke what we before inioyed.

Wee are apt to be aſhamed with our *Friends*, becauſe their opinion wee value, and with our *Enemies*, becauſe theirs we feare; with our Friends, becauſe they are Grieved; with our Enemies, becauſe they are delighted with that which ſhames us.

Againe wee feare in this Regard, Rigid and *Severe Men*, who are not ready to forgive, nor to put Candide and Charitable Conſtructions upon what we doe. Therefore when *Cato* was preſent (who was *virrigida Innocentia*, a ſterne and ſevere Cenſor of the manners of Men) none durſt call for the obſcœne ſpectacles of their *Floralia*, being more awed by the Authority of the man, than allured by the pleaſure of the Playes.

Liv. l. 39. Val. Max. lib. 2. c. 10 Vid. etiam lib. 4. cap. 5.

Likewiſe Buſy and *Gazrulous* men, becauſe they enquire into our Crimes, and having diſcloſed, do divulge them. For which cauſe wee feare in this caſe the *Multitude*, becauſe an ill name is like an ill face, the broader it is drawn, and the more light it hath about it, it appeares the more deformed. As a little Gold beaten into thin Leaves: a little Water drawn into a thin ſteeme and vapor, ſeems

Ad Antonium Imperium modeſtè πῶς ἂν πραττοιεν l. Ep. xviii. l. 7. c. 8.

wider than it was at first: so even lesser Crimes being multiplied through the mouthes of many, do grow into a spreading cloud, and obscure a mans name. For hee is presumed to be void either of wisedome or modesty, that doth not feare many Eyes. We feare *Innocent* and Vertuous Men, their presence aweth us from Liberty of Sinning, and maketh us blush if they deprehend us in it, because *Examples* have a proportionable Authority over the Heart of Man, as *Lawes* have, which wee doe not trespasse without Feare. And therefore the Philosopher adviseth to live alwaies so, as if some grave, and serious and severe person were ever before us, to behave our selves *sub Custode, & Pedagogo*, as under the Eye of a Keeper, because such a mans conversation will either regulate ours, or disgrace it. Vitious men do the lesse feare one another, by how much they stand in need of mutuall pardon, as we finde *Stertorius* (if I forget not) giving those souldiers of the Enemies army their lives, who had but one Eye, hee being himselfe *Monophthalmos*.

Ser. Ep. 11, & 25.
Cydias orator Athenis fuit apud Aristotelem.
Rhet. l. 2. cap. 6.
Et Perse adunco naso prædito is dicebat hibent quod Cyrus talis esset Plutarch. Apoth. Aristid. stat. de Parabibegmate.

Againe we feare *Envious* and malevolent persons, because such looke upon our Actions with prejudice; and as *Momus*, when he could not finde fault with the face in the Picture of *Venus*, picked a quarrell at her Slipper: so these men will ever have somthing either in Substance or Circumstances of our Actions, to misreport and expose to scandall.

Lastly we feare those in this respect, whose *Company* we shall most be used unto, because that leaves

leaves us not time wherein to forget our Errours, or to fortify our ſelves againſt them. It makes a man live ever under the ſenſe of his Guilt. In which reſpect *Catomajor* was wont to ſay, That a man ſhould moſt of all reverence himſelfe, becauſe hee is ever in his owne ſight and Company. *Plutarch Apoph.*

The Fundamentall Ground of this Affection, is any Evill that hath either *Guilt*, or any kinde of *Turpitude* in it, or any ſignes and ſuſpitions thereof, reflecting either on our ſelves, or any of ours, whoſe reputation we are tender of. And thus the Apoſtle telleth us, that all *Sinne* is the matter of *Shame*, when it is revived with a right judgement. *What fruit had you then in thoſe things whereof you are now aſhamed.* That which hath *Emptineſſe* in the Beginning, and *Death* in the End, muſt needs have *Shame* in the middle. But though all Sinne with reſpect to Gods Eye and Iudgement doth cauſe Shame yet in the Eye of men, thoſe cauſe it moſt which have any notable & more odious *Turpitude* adhering unto them. As either obſcene or ſubdolous, and diſhoneſt Actions when they are detected, forging of Deeds defacing Records, counterfeiting of names or ſeales, ſuborning of Witneſſes, making uſe of ingenious Profeſſions, as Cloakes to palliate, and inſtruments to provoke Abuſive and Illiberall practiſes. *Aſhamed.* *a Sueton in Veſp. c. 23 vid. Quæ ſom apud Caſaub. in Theophr.* *Vid. Orat. Bandurica apud Dion. l. 62.*

Such are all kinde of *Sordid Actions* or Behaviours, as Gaine raiſed out of deſpicable Commodities, (as a *Veſpatian* ſet a vectigal or exciſe upon Piſſe) and the Philoſopher tels us of ſome that made [b] gaine of the dead. Such are alſo the *Theophraſt.*

Livings which by sordid ministers, Panders, Bawdes, Curtezans, [a] Parasites, Iuglers, [b] Delators, Cheaters, Sharkes, and shifting Companions make unto themselves, such the Poets misse.

[a] *Vid. Dessd. Herald. digress. l. 1. c. 21.*
[b] *Vid. Tilm. Percy. Taci. Annal. l. 4.*

——[c] *Populus me sibilat at mihi plaudo*
Ipse domi, simul ac nummos contemplor in arcâ.

[c] *Horat. l. 1. Sat. 1. Vid. Plaut. Aulul. act. 2. Theophrast. de Melancholy.*

The people hisse me all abroad,
But I at home my selfe applaud.
When in my Coffers I behold,
That which none hisse at, heapes of Gold.

Many particular Causes there are which are apt to excite this affection, some whereof I shall briefly name as.

First *Sloth*, and shrinking from such labour, which those that are better, older, weaker, more delicate then our selves doe willingly undergoe. Thus *Menelaus* in the Poet seeing the Grecians as fearefull to undertake a single combat with *Hector*, as they were ashamed to deny it, did thus upbraid their Cowardize.

[illegible]

[d] *Iliad. 7. 97.*

Ὦμοι ἀνανδοτέρη, Ἀχαΐδες οὐκέτ' Ἀχαιαί, &c.

O vere Phrygum conjux, non Phrygia pharetræ Aurige. Ibid. 9.

What Grecian soldiers turn'd to Grecian dames?
That can digest so great, so many shames?
What not a man of Greece (O fowle disgrace)
Dare meet or looke proud *Hector* in the face?
Well, sit you downe Inglorious, Heartlesse men,
Turn'd to your first water and earth: yet then:

Ile

Ile take up Armes; for Victories laſt End,
Doth not on Our, But Divine will depend.

In like manner *Hector* rebuketh the baſeneſſe of *Paris* in flying from *Menalaus*.

Ἦ οἷ ἦσθα μάχεσφι, καὶ ἂν κλέος ἔφθιτο, &c.

Trim Warriour, tell me what thy Lute can doe,
What *Venus* Graces, comely heire, ſweet hew,
When thou ſhalt wallow in the duſt? Th'art far,
Fitter to weare *Stone-coat*, then Coat of War.

Iliad. 3. 55. λοιγὸν ἀνῶν Vocat lapides quibus Adulterix ex Antiquo more obrui debuiſſet. Mingotus. Quam unique comparatum eſt ij qui minus habent, ut ſemper aliquid addant diuitibus. Terent. Eborm.

Againe, any thing which argueth *puſillanimity* or littleneſſe of minde is a juſt ground of ſhame, as to recount curteſies & upbraid them, & therefore he ſaid in *Seneca*, *Non tanti eſt vixiſſe*. That his life was leſſe worth, then to be ſo valued to him, in daily Exprobrations, and that his blood with leſſe trouble to him might have beene let out at his veines, then to be every day diſordered, and called up into his face. To receive continuall Gifts, and be ever craving from our inferiours, burthenſome to thoſe who can leſſe beare it.

Hereunto referre all *Light* ludicrous and *ridiculous* behaviour, wherein if a Grave or ſerious man be deprehended, it rendreth him ſuſpected of a minde that can flag and leſſen, and therefore *Ageſilaus* being ſo taken playing with his childe made his Apologie for it, and deſired his friend not to thinke light of him, till he had children of his owne, for love will teach Greatneſſe of Mind to deſcend.

Plutarch. Apoph. Lacon. παιδιὰ. *Vid. Plutarch. & Theophraſt. Terent. Eunuchum Act* 2. *Scen.* 2. *Act.* 1. *ſcen.* 7. *& Plauti Artotrogum in milit. Glor.*

Alſo all ſordid Arts of *Flattery*, which prai-

ſeth, imitateth, creepeth, changeth, complieth, transformeth it ſelfe to all ſhapes to get a living, and like Crowes pulleth out mens eyes, with praiſes that it may after more ſecurely make a prey of them, *Fœdum crimen ſervitutis*, as the Hiſtorian well cals it, A ſervile and filthy Crime.

Any thing which argueth *vanity*, and windineſſe of minde, as [a] Arrogance, and vaineglorious Oſtentation, aſcribing to our ſelves things which belong not unto us, intruding into the learning Lands, acheiements of other men, as hee who called all theſhips in the harbour at Athens his owne. *Labore alieno magnam partam gloriam verbis ſapè in ſe tranſmovet.* Whereunto belong Abſurd, and unuſuall Affectations in words or faſhions, mimicall and fantaſticall geſticulations frothy and ſuperficiall Complements, Strange and exoticke Habits, which are uſually the ſcum of Light, and unſetled mindes, and ever expoſe them to contempt. In ſo much that *Alexander* himſelfe eſcaped not the Imputation of Lenity, when he followed the faſhions of thoſe Countries which he had ſubdued.

Misfortune and decay in the outward Ornaments of Life, for it is not in mens fortunes, as in their monuments wherein [b] Ruine doth many times conciliate Reverence.

Nil habet Infelix Paupertas durius in ſe
Quam quod ridiculos homines facit——

[a] *Vid. Theoph. de Ambitioſi. Plauti milit Glor. Ariſt. Eth. l. 4. c. 13. Val. Max. l. 9. c. 15. Plutarch. l. De Alex. fortunâ in fine.*

[b] *Curios jam dimidios naſumq; minorem Corvini & Galbam aut vitulo, naſq; parentem Inveni.*

Vnhappy Poverty hath nothing worſe,
Then that it maketh men ridiculous.

And therefore men of ſunk and broken eſtates are aſhamed to live there, where they have beene formerly in Credit and Eſtimation, as *Hecuba* complaining in the Tragædie.

Τῶ γὰρ ἀρθὲν ἰσχὺν ἀιδῆμ' ἔχω·
ὁ τῶν πάροιθε πτῶχόν' ἐς ὄμμα νέῳ, &c.

Euripid. in Hec. Magnum dolorem habet unde cum honore deceſſerit eodem cum ignominia reverti. Cic. pro L. Murænâ. Αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐς ὅσον ἐν μεγάροισιν ἀνὴρ ἵκηται πλοῦτος. *Iliad. B. Artium peccata artificibus pudori ſunt &c. — Sen. Ep. 97.*

In this my broken and dejected caſe,
Pardon me, if I ſhame to ſhew my face.
To Polymeſtor, *whoſe Eyes once have ſeene,*
Me, a now ſpoyled Captive, then a Queen.

Againe, *Ignorance* and Ineptitude in our own proper functions and miſcarriage in our owne Arts and profeſſions, is an Exprobration, either of indiligence, or of weakneſſe. As want of proficiancy in a Student, of Elocution in an Orator, of Military wiſedome in a Souldier, &c. And therefore a Phyſitian will ſeldome ſtay to ſee his Patient buried, he uſually departs before the ſicke man, becauſe Funerals are *Convicia Medicorum.* Yet all Ignorance is not matter of diſgrace, for ſome things there are below the inquiry, or Studies of ſome men. And therefore though *Tully* tels us that when *Themiſtocles* declined the Lute, he was eſteemed more Ignorant then became a perſon of quality, yet it was a brave Apologie which he made for himſelfe, That

Cic. Tuſc. qu. lib. 1.

That though he knew not to handle a Lute, yet he knew to conquer a Citie. And *Gelo* when others after a Feast sang to an Instrument, called for his great Horse, and did excellently manage that. And as it was a cautelous Answer which *Favorinus* gave touching *Adrian* the Emperour, who had censured him in his owne profession of Grammer. That he durst not be learnedner then he who commanded thirtie legions; so it was a ruer answer which another Artificer gave in the like case unto a Prince. God forbid Sir that you should know things of so meane a quality, better then I who owe my subsistence unto them.

Plutarch. ex alibi & Ipbicrates apud Plutarch.

Spartian in Adriano.

Plutarch.

And as Ignorance in our owne, so *Intrusion* and Vsurpation of other mens offices, is a ground of shame, especially if they be such as wherein we descend the below the Dignity of our places or professions, as when men of liberall condition apply themselves unto the businesse of sordid persons. For every man is intrusted with the Dignity of his place, he is to be not onely the possessor, but the Protector of it, which when he betraies, it doth justly Revenge it selfe upon him with contempt and disgrace.

Dignitas in indigno, ornamentum in Luto Salcian. de Gub. lib. 4.

Againe, any notorious externall *Deformities*, and *Dehonestamenta corporis*, especially if there be any thing of our owne, either guilt or servility in them. The Grecians taking notice of the ill shape and worse conditions of *Thirsitis*, are said to looke on him with derision and laughter, then when they had other occasions of sadnesse. And when *Vlysses* his Companions were by *Circe* transf-

Sidon. Apoll. l. 3 Ep. 13. Iliad. B. Vid. Vos. Rhet. part. 1. p. 78. 79 Odyss. x. Sever. de Ira lib. 3. c. 17. 29.

transformed into ſhape of Swine, they wept and were aſhamed of their owne deformities. And the Poet deſcribeth *Deiophebus* whom *Menelaus* had diſmembred,

——*Pavitantem & dira tegentem*
Supplicia. *Æneid.6.*

Afraid of being knowne, carefull to hide
His mangled wounds, that they might not be (ſpide.

And we finde how carefull men were to cover any of theſe notes and prints of Infamy, or ſervility, which perſons either extremely vicious, or in bondage were marked withall, for infamous or ſervile perſons were wont ſo to be branded. *Vid. Athenæum lib.6. Val. Max. l.6. c.8. §.7. Sueton. Calig. c.27. Lipſ. l.2. Elect. c.15.*

Many times *Greatneſſe of Minde* is a cauſe of Shame, either for ſomething which ſuch a man ſuffereth in himſelfe, or in thoſe that are neare unto him, ſuch was that of the Romanes, *Ad furcas Caudinas*, of which the Hiſtorian giveth this obſervation.

Their obſtinate ſilence, Eyes faſtened to the Earth, Eares refuſing all comfort, Faces aſhamed to behold the light, were certaine Evidences of a minde deeply reſolved upon Revenge. And of *Maximinus*, of whom the Hiſtorian telleth us, that out of a Deſire to conceal his Ignoble birth, he ſlew all, even the beſt of his friends, which were Conſcious unto it. So poverty meeting with Pride doth often ſuffer conflicts with this

Silentium obſtinatum fixi in terram oculi ſurdæ ad omnia ſolatia aures & pudor intuendæ lucis, ingentem molem iratum ex alto animo cientis judicia erant. Liv. l.9. Capitolin. Max.

Passion of shame, when penury denies that which Luxury and Pride demaunds.

Iuvenal. ——*Quid enim majore Cachinno*
Excipitur vulgi quam pauper Apicius?

Who without much irrision can endure,
To see a Beggar a proud Epicure?

Pet. Victor in Artic. Rhet. l. 2. Againe, Acquaintance and *Intimacy* with *Infamous* persons is noted by the Philosopher amongst the Grounds of shame, and therefore it was upbraided unto *Plato* that *Calippus*, the Murtherer of his hoste had been bred in his Schoole.

Plutarch. l. de capiendo ex Hostib. utilitate. And to *Socrates*, that he was resorted unto by *Alcibiades*, a factious and turbulent Citizen, and to *Themistocles* that he held correspondence, and intelligence with *Pausanius* a Traitour; and we finde how fatall the favour of *Sejanus* after his fall, was to many of his friends, that no wonder if every man not onely out of Indignation, but out of feare too cryed out.

Tacit. Annal. l. 5. & 6.

Iuvenal. Sat. 10. ——*Nunquam si quid mihi credis amavi*
Hunc hominem.

Such being the impotent and immoderate Passions of many men to trample on the fame persons in their calamity, whom in their greatnesse they almost adored, as he said,

Ἀρὶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἐν δίκῃ ἐπαινέσαι.

Who

When the Oake is fallen that ſtood,
Then every man will gather wood.

Terent. Adelph.

Laſtly, not onely things ſhamefull to themſelves, but ſuch as are ſignes, and Intimations of them doe uſually beget this Affection. As *Æſchinus* in the Comædian, bluſhed when he ſaw his Father knocke at the doore of an infamous woman, becauſe it was a token of a vicious intenſion. And therefore *Cæſar* was wont to ſay. That hee would have thoſe that belonged unto him free, as well from *Suſpicion*, as from *Crime*, for we ſhall never finde that a man who is tender of his *Conſcience* will be Prodigall of his *Credit*, and he who is truely fearfull of incurring Cenſure from himſelfe by the Guilt of a Crime, will in ſome proportion be fearfull of incurring cenſure from others by the ſhew and ſuſpition of it; for as a Good Conſcience is a Feaſt to give a man a cheerfull heart; ſo a good name is an oyntment to give him a cheerefull Countenance.

Sueton. in Cæſar.

There is a Twofold ſhame, The one *Vertuous*, as *Diogenes* was wont to ſay, That Bluſhing was the colour of Vertue, The other *Vicious*, and that either out of *Cruelty*, as *Tacitus* and *Seneca* obſerve of *Domitian*, that he was never more to be feared then when he bluſhed. Or elſe out of *Cowardize*, when a man hath not ſtrength enough of Countenance, to out-face and withſtand a Vicious ſolicitation, as it was ſaid of the men of Aſia, that they had out of tendernes of face, expoſed them-

Τυφλὸν ἐν τῷ ἐρυθριᾶν ἡ ἀρετή. *Laert. in Diogen.*

Sævum ille vultum & rubor quo ſe contra pudorem muniebat. Tacit. in Agric.

selves to much inconvenience, because they could not pronounce that one Syllable, *Noe*. It was a better Resolution, that of *Zenophanes*, who being provoked unto some vitious practise, confessed himselfe a Coward at such a Challenge, as not daring to doe dishonestly.

I will conclude this matter with that Excellent Similitude wherwith *Plutarch* beginneth it, in that golden book of his, touching the same Argument. That as Thistles, though noxious things in themselves, are usually signes of an Excellent Ground wherein they Grow, so shamefastnesse thought many times a weaknesse, and betrayer of the Minde, is yet generally an Argument of a soule, ingenuously and verttuously disposed.

Quidam nunquam magis quam cum erubuerint Timendi sunt. quasi omnem verecundiem effuderint. Sylla tunc erat violentissimus cum faciem ejus sanguis invaserat. Sente. Epist. 11. Plutarch. de vil. Pudore

CHAP.

CHAP. XXX.

Of the Affection of Anger. The Diſtinctions of it. The Fundamentall Cauſe thereof, Contempt. Three kindes of Contempt, Diſ-eſtimation, Diſappointment, Calumnie.

NOw proceed to the laſt of the Paſſions, *Anger*, whereof, in it ſelf a ſubject of large Diſcourſe, yet being every where obuious, I ſhall not ſpeake much. I intend not therefore diſtinctly to handle the ſeverall kindes of this Paſſion, which *Ariſtotle* in his *Ethicks* hath given us, [a] which are a ſharpe Anger, and an Hard or Knotty Anger. And Saint *Paul* who likewiſe gives us Three kindes of it. Whereof the firſt I may call a [b] cloſe and buried anger, which he names bitterneſſe, the other a violent [c] burning Anger, which he calls *Wrath*, and the laſt a Deſiring and purſuing Anger, which ſeemeth to have it's [d] derivation from a word which ſignifies to Deſire, and therefore is defined by *Ariſtotle* to [a] be ὄρεξιν, & by the [b] Stoicks ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν, words of proſecution and purſute. For theſe differ not Eſſentially or formerly amongſt themſelves, but onely in diverſity of Degrees, and in order to the diverſe conſtitutions of the

a Ethic. lib. 4. cap. 11.
b Ὀργὴ βάθος μῖσος ἐστί τοι. Vid Damaſc. de Orthod. fid. lib. 2. c. 16. Cœle Rhodig. lib. 12. c. 57. Ἐστι δὲ μῆνις μνήμη τραυμάτων ἐν χρόνῳ βαθυνομένη. Inveterata plumbea, alta mente repoſita vindicta occaſionem tacitè expectans; μνησικακία δὲ ἐστὶ λύπη τοῦ μὴ τετυχηκέναι τιμωρίας. Hieron.
c Non vultu alienatus non verbis commotior, adeo iram conſiderat. Tacit. de Tiber. Annal. l. 2.
d Severus commotione animi Stomachi cholera vomere ſolebat. Ælius Lampridius in Severo.

Subject wherein they lodge, and of the habits wherewith they are joyned.

In which reſpects we might obſerve ſeverall other ſhapes of this Affection. For there is the [a] Anger of a Waſpe, which is an Haſty, Pettiſh, and Fretfull Anger, proceeding from a nature [b] Leavened and habituated with Choler, which is preſently ſtirred and prouoked. And there is the Anger of a [c] Lion, which is ſlow, but ſtrong & ſevere, thus Elegantly deſcribed by [d] *Homer*.

Iliad. 17. 259. unde Crabrones irritare apud Plaut. *Amphit. Nunc in Fermento tota eſt, ita target mihi.* Plaut. *Caſin.*

[c] *Pectora qui fremitu pleraque; gementes nec capere Irarum fluctus in pectore poſſunt.* Luer. l. 3.

[d] *Iliad.* 17. 167.

———Ὁ δ' ἀμφὶς μὲν ἀνίζει
ἴσχεται, οὐδ' ὅπη πρῶτ' ἐπιδὺς ἀνδρὸς ἀρήξῃ
ἀμφὶ βοῶν, ἰάλλει δὲ μεγαθύμους, οἵ ῥ' ἄμφὶ ἑοῖσι
γίγνονται, &c.

He firſt walkes by with ſkorne, but when ſwift youth,
Vrge him with Darts, then with devouring mouth
He turnes againe, and at his lips is ſeene
A boyling foame, while his ſtout heart within
Rouſeth it ſelfe with [a] *groanes: and round about*
His Tayle, beating his ſides and loynes, cals out
And wakeneth proud Revenge. Thus ſtir'd he flies
Right on with red and fierie ſparkling eyes
To kill or to be kill'd———

[a] *Dolor Excitat. Irae Aeneid.* 2. *Immanique, oculos infecerat Irâ Claud. Multa in Ira terribilia & Ridicula.* Plut.

There is further a Cowardly verball and ridiculous Anger, like that of Whelps, which barke aloud, but run away from the thing which Angers them. Which ſpendeth it ſelfe onely in ſtormes of empty Expreſſions, rather pleaſing then puniſhing thoſe whom they light on, and rendering the perſon that uſeth it a very

or

or Skarre Crow, formidable to children, but to men ridiculous, like *Geta* in the Comedian.

Ruerem, agerem, raperem, tunderem, proſternerem.

Terent. Adelph. Act. 3. Scen. 2.

There is a grave and ſerious Anger, like that of *Agamemnon*. An inſolent and boaſting Anger, like that of *Achilles*. A ſullen and ſtubborne Anger like that of the Romane Armie diſgracefully uſed by the Samnitians. A cruell and raging Anger, like that of *Scylla*, who in an exceſſe of fury, vomited up blood, & died. And thus *Saul* is ſaid to [b] have breathed out threatnings, and bin exceeding mad againſt the Church. A Revengefull and impatient Anger, as that of [c] *Cambyſes* who being reprooved by *Prexaſpes* for his Drunkenneſſe, confuted the reproofe with this act of Cruelty, he ſhot the ſonne of his Reproover thorow the heart, to prove the ſteaddineſſe of his hand. An Anger of Indignation at the honour and proſperity of unworthy perſons, as that of the Roman Nobility, who ſeeing *Cn. Flavius*, a man of meane Condition, advanced to the Prætorſhip, threw away their golden Rings, (the ſignes of their honour) to teſtifie their juſt Indignation. The Poet thus Elegantly expreſſeth the like againſt *Menas*, made of a Slave a Freeman by *Pompey*.

Iliad. a.

Liv. lib 9. Val. Max. l. 9. cap. 3. Act. 9. 1. 26. 11. a Ita ſpirat ſanguinem Senec. Thyeſt.

Δεινὰ δ' ἀνα πνεῖ μένος. Homer.

αἰθέρι δ' ἀπτῆνα χολὰ πολιὴν κατέπεμπε. Theocrit. Idyl. 1.

Ira Cadat naſo rugoſq; Senna Perſe Satyr. 5.

b Herodot. Thalia. Val. Max. l. 9. c. 3. § 3 Plin. lib. 33. cap. 1. Horat. Epod. Od. 4.

Videſne Sacram metiente te viam
Cum bis ter ulnarum togâ
Vt ora vertat huc & huc euntium
Liberrima Indignatio?

Sect. 11.

Sectus flagellis hic triumviralibus
Praconis ad fastidium,
Arat falerni mille fundi jugera
Et appiam mannis terit.

When thou paceſt up and downe
In thy long Gowne,
Seeſt thou how the people fret
To ſee thee Iet?
How with Indignation bold,
They cannot hold
To ſee a man, ſo lately plow'd
With ſcourges low'd,
Vntill at length the weary Cryer,
Began to Tyre,
Dreſſing a thouſand Acres now
With Horſe and Plow?

Laſtly, an Anger of Emulation, or a diſpleaſure againſt our ſelves for comming ſhort by our negligence of the perfections of other men whom haply by induſtry we might have equalled. As *Themiſtocles* profeſſed that the Trophie of *Miltiades* would not ſuffer him to ſleepe. And *Cæſar* wept whē he read the atchiements of *Alexander*, as having not at his age done any memorable thing. And *Thucydides* hearing *Herodotus* recite a Hiſtory which he had written, brake forth into a ſtrange paſſion of weeping which the Hiſtorian eſpying thus comforted his Father you are a happy man to be the Father of ſuch a Son, Ὁ ἐρῶσιν ἴσχει τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς τὰ μαθήματα. Who is carried with ſuch a vehement affection unto Learning.

Plutarch. Apothog.

Plutarchus in Cæſare.

Suidas in Thucidide.

But

But to paſſe over theſe particulars, I ſhall in the generall content my ſelfe with a brieſe Conſideration of the Cauſes and Effects of this Paſſion.

The Fundamentall and Eſſentiall Cauſe of Anger, is Contempt from others meeting with the love of our ſelves. Whether it be diſeſtimation and undervaluing of a mans perſon, or diſappointment of his purpoſes, or ſlandering his good name, or any other way of caſting injury on him. or any of theſe particulars being impaired (if by ſuch on whom we may hope to receive revenge) doe worke not only Anxiety and Griefe (which is a motion of flight) but hope alſo and deſire to eaſe it ſelfe, if not in the recovery of its own loſſe, yet in the comfort of another mans: For Calamity (as the Hiſtorian ſpeaks) is ever either querulous or malignant, *Cum ſuo malo torquetur, quieſcit alieno.* When it feels it ſelfe wrung and pinched, it quickly proceeds either by juſtice or revenge to pleaſe it ſelfe in † retaliation.

For the former of theſe, as it is the common property of Man with all other Creatures to love himſelfe: ſo it is his particular deſire alſo, being *Animal Sociale & Politicum*, to be Loved by others; becauſe hereby that Love of himſelfe, which proceedeth from Iudgement and Reaſon, is confirmed. For every man doth more willingly beleeve that, whereunto he hath farther authority to perſuade him. And therefore though Love be not ſiniſterly ſuſpitious, nor too envious in interpreting a mans owne, or a friends actions and behaviour; yet that Love, which is not blind and furi-

Deſpectus tibi ſum, nec qui ſim quæris Alexi.

At Ego quæ Diuûm incedo Regina, Iouisq; Et Soror & Coniux, and cum gente tot annos, Bella gero, & quiſquam numen Iunonis adoret. Præterea Aenead. 1.

Q. Curt.

Καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως ἐστὶν ἐν ἀνάγκαις εὖ ἀκούειν καὶ ἐν κακοῖς μέμφεσθαι.

Sophoc. Ajax, Εἰ δ' ἀγανακτῶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς ἐγὼ δόξω μέν σοι ἀνόητος εἶναι. Hiſtor. vi. lib. 2.

Si mihi parcit, quæ vult dicere tu quæ non vult audiet. Terent. Andr.

ous, will be ever ready to submit it selfe unto the opinion of stayed and indifferent judgements, because it is conscious to it selfe, how easily it may miscarry, if it rely upon its owne censure, wherein Reason, Affection, and Prejudice are mixed together.

Now then when a man already strongly possessed with a love of his owne or his friends person or parts, shall find either of them by others sleighted and despised; from whose joynt-respect he hoped for a confirmation of his judgement: therehence ariseth not onely a † *Griefe* to see his Expectation deceived, and his Opinion undervalued; but withall a * *Desire* to make knowne unto the persons, who thus contemne him by some manner of face or tongue, or hand, or heart, or head, *Revenge*, (for all these may be the instruments of our *Anger*) that there is in him more courage, power and worth than deserves so to be neglected. Which Passion in a word, so long as it submits it selfe to the government of Reason, is then alwaies allowable and right, when it is grounded on the Pride and Insolency of others, who unjustly contemne us. And then Irregular and Corrupt, when it proceeds from the root of Pride and Ambition in our selves, which makes us greedy of more honour from others, than their judgements or our owne worth suffers them to afford us.

To this branch of Contempt may bee referred *Forgetfulnesse* of friends and acquaintance, whereby we upbraid them with obscurity and distance, as well from true worth, as from our affection: For

† *Ignoscit Iræ dura is dolor ossibus ardet.* Ænead. 9. *Affectus nunquam sine tormento sui violentus, quia dolorem cum inferre vult, patitur, &c.* Val. Max. l. 9. c. 3. *Dolor addidit Iram.* Ovid. Met. 12.

* *Spes addita suscitat Iras.* Ænead. 10.

Omnia quæ curant, meminerunt, ſaith *Tully*: and *Ariſtotle* to the ſame purpoſe. Thoſe things which wee doe reſpect, doe not lye hid and out of our ſight.

Next hither may be referred all *Vngrateſull* perſons, who ſleight thoſe favours which they have received from other mens bounties, and out of a ſwelling and height of ſtomacke, cannot endure to acknowledge any obligations; but deſire to receive benefits, as Corrupt men take Bribes in the darke, and behind their backs, that ſo neither others, nor (if it were poſſible) their owne eyes might be witneſſes unto it: For as *Tacitus* ſpeaks, *Gratia oneri habetur*; ſuch is the pride of ſome men, that they diſdaine not to be overcome in any thing, though it be in kindneſſe. And therefore *Vbi multum beneficiâ antevenêre, pro gratia odium redditur*, ſaith the ſame Author: When they finde themſelves overloaden with Love, the beſt requitall which their high minds can affoord, is hatred: which cannot but worke a double *Anger*; an Anger againſt our ſelves and our owne weakneſſe in the choice of ſo unfit a ſubject for the placing of our benefits; and an Anger at that contemptuous Pride, which ſo baſely entertained them.

Ejectū, littore egentem. Excepi, & regni demens in parte locavi. Amiſſam claſſem Socios a morte reduxi. Heu furijs incenſa feror, &c. Æneid. 4.

Hither alſo we may referre thoſe Locked and Cloſe men, who even to their friends are ſo reſerved, and keep every thing ſo ſecret, as if none were worthy, to whoſe Iudgement or Truſt they might commit themſelves.

Hitherto likewiſe are referred Acceptation of perſons in equallity of merit with unequall re-

spect, negligence of outward ceremony and behaviour; and generally what ever else may worke an opinion that we are undervalued.

The second branch of this first Fundamentall Cause was an *Hindering* of the projects and purposes of another, which is not only a *Privative* (as the former) but a *Positive* and Reall Injury, which includes that other, and addes unto it, as being not only a sleighting, but an assault upon us; not an Opinion only, but an Expression of our weaknesse; a course so much the more likely to insence nature, and make it swell, by how much violent and oppositition, is more sensible in motion than in rest. So that these two former Injuries, I thinke I may well compare to a Banke, and to a Bridge, or some other stops to a River in his course: Whereof the former doth *Confine* the River, and not *Oppose* it, as not hindring it in its direct and naturall motion (which it rather helpeth by more uniting the parts) but only in a motion Laterall and indirect, which nature intended not; and therefore herein we see not any manifest fretting and noise, but only a secret swelling and rising of the water, which breaks not into outrage and violence: But the Latter resisting the naturall course of the streame in its owne Chanell, and standing directly crosse, where the Nature should passe, makes it, not only in time to overswell on all sides, but in the meane time works in it great tumult & noise.

Spumens, & fervens, & ab Obice Sævior ibit.

It

It ſoames and boyles, and with a raging force,
Fights with all Obſtacles, that ſtop its courſe.

So of theſe two Degrees of *Contempt* in *Anger*; the former as being onely a *Confining* and Limiting Contempt, which ſhuts up a mans worth within too narrow and ſtrait a judgement, works indeed a ſecret ſwelling of the Heart with Indignation at the conceipt of ſuch diſeſteem; but this breaks not out into that clamour (as S. *Paul* cals it) that noiſe of Anger, as the other doth, which ariſeth out of a direct oppoſition againſt our counſels or actions.

Vnto which oppoſition may be reduced all manner of injurious proceeding, which tends to the prejudice and diſappointing of any mans ends; whether it be by cloſenes and undermining, as cheats and couzenages in the preventing of lawfull; or by other politicke wiſedome in hindering unlawfull ends; or whether by open and profeſſed Oppoſition, as in matters of Emulation, Competition, Commodity, and the like; or laſtly, whether it be ſuch as takes notice, and diſcovers ends which deſired to be undiſcerned. And therefore *Tacitus* reckoning the ambiguous and cloſe ſpeeches of the Emperour *Tiberius*, ſayes that it was *Vnicus Patrum metus ſi intelligere viderentur*, the Senate feared nothing more than to diſcover that they underſtood him; which is the ſame with his judgement after: *Eò acrius accepit recludi quæ premeret*, nothing did more exaſperate him than to

Quem ego credo manibus, pedibuſq; obnixè omnia fallarum magis id agere niſi ut incommodet quam, &c. Cornut. Aud. Act. 1 Sc. 1.

Annal l. 1.

ſee thoſe things taken notice of, which he deſired to ſuppreſſe and diſſemble. Both which were true in *Scaurus*; one of the Senatours, who adventuring to colle& *Tiberius* his willingneſſe of accepting the Empire, in that he did not forbid by his Tribunitiall Authority the relation thereof by the Conſuls, did thereby procure his utter and implacable hatred.

But of all Contempts, the laſt of the three is greateſt; that I meane, which immediately violates our *Reputation* and Good name; becauſe it is a derivative and ſpreading injury, not only diſhonouring a man in private and reſerved opinion, but in the eyes and Eares of the World; nor only making him odious in his life, but in his memory. As there is in a man a double Deſire; the one of *Perfecting*; the other of *Perpetuating* himſelfe: which two anſwer to that double honour of our creation, which we loſt in our firſt Father; the honour of *Integrity* in Goodneſſe; and the honour of *Immunity* from Corruption: So there may bee from the violation of theſe ſundry degrees of Anger, or any other burthenſome Paſſion wrought in us. But when in injury we find them both aſſaulted, and not only our parts and perſons (which belong to our perfection) privily undervalued; but our name and memory (which belong to our prepreſervation) tainted likewiſe, we cannot but be ſo much the more inſenced, by how much perpetuity accumelates, either to weaknes or perfection: But of this Fundamentall cauſe of anger enough.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of other Cauſes of Anger: firſt in regard of him that ſuffers wrong: Excellency, Weakneſſe, ſtrong Deſires, Suſpition. Next in regard of him who doth it; Baſeneſſe, Impudence, Neereneſſe, Freedome of Speech, Contention, Ability. The Effects of Anger, the Immutation of the Body, impulſion of Reaſon, Expedition, Precipitance. Rules for the moderating of this Paſſion.

THoſe which follow, are more Accidentall: whereof ſome may be conſidered *ex parte Patientis*, on the part of him that ſuffers; and ſome *ex parte Inferentis Injuriam*, on the part of him that doth the Injury. Touching the patient or ſubject of an Injury, there are three Qualifications, which may make him more inclinable to *Anger*, upon ſuppoſition of the Fundamentall Cauſe, *Contempt*: and the firſt of theſe is *Excellency*, whether Inward from *Nature*, or Accidentall from *Fortune*: For hereby men are made more jealous of their Credit, and impatient of Abuſe, as well perceiving that all Injury implies ſome degree both of *Impotency* in the

Κυριώτατα δὲ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων. Arist.

Θυμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐν διατριβαῖς καὶ πότοις. Iliad. a.

the *Patient*, and of *Excellency* (at least conceited) in the Agent. As *Aristotle* speaks, ὑπερέχειν οἴεσθαι ὑβρίζοντες, that Injurious men are commonly highly conceited of their owne *Excellency*, which cannot well stand with the height and distance of that minde which is possessed with his owne good opinion: and this cause the Poet intimates in those words:

Rhet. l. 2. c. 2.

Antad. 1.

——— Manet altâ mente repôstum,
Iudicium Paridis, Spretæq; injuria formæ.

A deep and lasting Discontent is bred
To see their Beauties undervalued
By a weake wanton Iudgement.

It wrought a deep Indignation in the Minds of *Power* and *Wisedome* to see a weake and wanton Iudgement give Beauty the precedence in their Emulation. Which undervaluing of worth, how much it is able to possesse a man with Griefe and Fury: the one example of *Achitophel* alone may discover, who upon the rejection of his counsell, when he was too low to revenge himselfe on *Absalon*, executed his Anger on his owne necke.

The second Qualification of the subject is *Weaknesse* and Defect, when the mind finds it selfe assaulted in those things, wherein it is most of all Deficient: which *Aristotle* hath observed, when he tels us, that † *Sicke* men, Poore men and Lovers are commonly most subject to this Passion: It being as great a paine, and a greater contempt to rub and provoke an old wound, than to make a new.

† *Arist. Rh. l. 2. Vlin. nat. hist. l. 22. c. 24.* Ἔτι γὰρ πάσχουσι τοῦτο καὶ οἱ ἐν ἀρρωστίαις καὶ πενίαις καὶ ἔρωτι. *De pauperibus. Theocr. Idyll. 1.*

new. That injury which proceeds againſt men of high and eminent quality, cannot poſſibly pierce ſo deep as that which is exerciſed upon open and naked weakneſſe: becauſe the former proceeds only from ſtriſe and emulation; but the other from inſultation and pride: the one is only a diſeſteem; but the other a contumely and exprobation: the one is a conflict of judgements, but the other a conflict of paſſions; and therefore likely to be the greater. For a neglect of worth and good parts (unleſſe, as ſometimes it falleth out, it proceeds from Baſeneſſe and Ignorance) is an injury from Worth alſo: but a Neglect, and deſpiſing men already downe, is an injury from ſtomacke and height of mind; wherein the party offended cannot labour ſo much to cleere it ſelfe from the Imputation, as to revenge it ſelfe for it.

Another reaſon why *Weakneſſe* the better diſpoſeth a man to Anger, may be, becauſe ſuch men are moſt *Tender* to feele an injury, moſt *Suſpitious* to feare it, and moſt *Interpreting* to over-judge it. All which being circumſtances of aggravation to increaſe a wrong, are likewiſe good means to adde degrees and heat unto our Paſſion.

Laſtly, to give a reaſon of both theſe two former cauſes together, it may be a Diſappointment and Fruſtrating of Expectation: For men of eminency and worth, expect rather Approbation and Imitation than Contempt. And men weake and defective, expect Compaſſion to cover, and not Pride to mocke, and ſo double their wounds: and both theſe are in ſome ſort debts of Nature,

Omnes quibus res ſunt, minus ſecunde, magis ſüt, neſcio quo modo ſuſpitioſi ad Contumeliã omnia accipiũt magis propter ſuam impotentiam ſe ſẽper credunt neglẽgi. Ter. Adelph. Act. 4. Sc. 3: Pueri inter ſe quam pro levibus noxijs ita gerunt? quapropter? quia enim qui eos guberuat animus infirmum geriũt. Ide. Heeyr. Act. 3. Sc. 4.

——Minuti ſemper, & infirmi eſt animi exiguiq; voluptas ultio. Iuven. Sat. 13. Iracundiores ſunt Incolumibus languidi fœmina maribus, &c. Amm. Mar. lib. 27. Vid. Cauſin. de Eloquent. l. 8. c. 29. Plutarch. Πῶς ἀσφαλῶς δύναται τις ὀργίζεσθαι. Sophoc. Ajax. Sen. de Ira. l. 2. c. 21.

it being the Law of Reason to honour Merit, as it is the Law of Mercy to cover Nakednesse: and for both I am sure it is the Law of Charity, as not to vaunt or be puffed up in our selves: so neither to rejoyce or thinke evill of another: and we may well conceive Anger will be strong, when it thinks it selfe lawfull.

Vnto this particular of *Weaknesse* wee may also reduce that which the Grammarian hath observed on *Virgil*, *Plus Irarum advenit, cum in manus non potest venire, cui iraſcimur.* Anger is increased when it cannot reach the thing with which it is angry. And therefore the chaining up of Woolves and Mastives enrageth them, because it restraineth them; which the Poet hath excellently described.

Aneid. 9.

Ac veluti pleno Lupus insidiatis ovili,
Cum fremit ad caulas, ventos perpessus & imbres
Nocte super media: tuti sub matribus agni
Balatum exercent. Ille asper & improbus irâ
Sævit in absentes, collecta fatigat edendi
Ex longo rabies, & sicca sanguine fauces.
Haud aliter Rutilo muros & castra tuenti
Igneſcunt Iræ, & durus dolor ossibus ardet.

(whet

As a fierce woolfe with winds, storms, midnight,
When in close folds the secure lambs do bleat,
Barks at his absent prey with the more Ire:
When rag'd and deceiv'd Hunger doth him tyre.
So *Rutilus* seeing his foes all safe,
Doth vex and boyle with the more burning chafe.

For

For it is a great torment to an Enemy, when he can finde no in-let nor advantage againſt him, whom he hates. *Vid. Plut. de capiend. ex hoſt. utilitat.*

Another cauſe of Anger may be *ſtrong Deſires:* For alwaies vaſter and more exact our deſires are, it is ſo much the harder for them to be pleaſed or ſatisfied. And therefore as the Philoſopher notes, Luxurious men are uſually tranſported with Anger, becauſe men love not to be ſtopped in their pleaſures: and hence as *Plutarch* obſerves, men are uſually moſt angry there, where their deſires are moſt converſant: as a Country-man with his Bayliffe; or an Epicure with his Cooke; or a Lover with his Corrivall, becauſe all theſe croſſe men in that which they moſt love. Now ſtrength when it is oppoſed, is collected and gathered into the more exceſſe; as we ſee in Winds or Rivers, when they meet with any thing which croſſeth their full paſſage. Οὐ χαλεπὸν ὑπολῦσαι. *Lucian.* *Rhet. l. 10.* *De Ira. lib.*

The laſt Qualification of the Subject, whereby he is made more Inclinable to this Paſſion, is a ſuſpitious, apprehenſive, and interpreting fancy, ready to pick out injury where it cannot be juſtly found; and (that its Anger may be imployed) to frame occaſions unto it ſelfe. And therefore tis wiſe adviſe of *Seneca*, *Non vis eſſe Iracundus? ne ſis Curioſus.* He which is too wiſe in his judgement on other mens Errours, will be eaſily too fooliſh in the nouriſhing of his owne Paſſion: and its commonly ſeen in matters of cenſure and ſuſpition, the more ſight and reaſon goes out, the leſſe uſeth to abide within. Now is it hard for a man, if *Sen. de Ira. l. 3. c. 11.*

if he be peremptorily possessed with this opinion; yet he is a common subject of others contempt, to find our, either in defects of Nature, or rudenes of custome, habit, education, temper, humour or the like, some probable ground or other for exception; which yet when it is further inquired into, will prove rather strangenesse than injury.

And this is generally a Corruption of Anger: First, because it is hereby oftentimes unjust, either in fastning it selfe there where it was justly neglected: for we may ever observe that Suspition proceeds from Guilt, and none are more jealous of being neglected than those that deserve it: as it is observed of some reproachfull speeches, which a Senatour was accused to have uttered against the honour of *Tiberius*: *Quia vera erant dicta credebantur*. His suspitious mind was persuaded that they had been spoken, because hee was conscious that they had been acted; and therefore (as was before noted) it was the custome under such men to avoid all manner of Curiosities, and search into things done by them, which might easily be subject unto sinister judgement; and rather to affect Ignorance with Security, than to be ruined with wisedome. And next it is corrupt, because it is rash and hasty, being led by a halfe judgement, the worst guide to a headlong and blind Passion.

The next degree of causes is of those which qualifie the *Agent*, or him that worketh the injury, and there may be amongst many other, which cannot be reckoned, these generall ones.

First

First *Baſeneſſe*, which works a double cauſe of Anger: One for an injury of Omiſſion, in neglecting thoſe reſpects which are required in men of meane and inferiour ranke towards their ſuperiours: Another for a poſitive enquiry in the evill exerciſed againſt them. And many times the former alone is a cauſe of Anger, without the later: For this diſtance of perſons doth quite alter the nature of our Actions, inſomuch that thoſe demeanors, which are commendable and plauſible toward our equals, are rude and irreverend toward thoſe that are above us: and this is that which makes the wrath of God in the Scripture to bee ſet out ſo terrible unto us: becauſe of the infinite diſtance between the Vnmeaſurable Glory of the Maker of the World, and the baſeneſſe of ſinners; and therefore the compariſon which uſeth to bee made for the defence of Veniall ſinnes, that it is altogether unlikely that God, infinitely more merciful than men, ſhould yet be offended at that which a mans neighbour would pardon him for, as a fooliſh angry word, or the ſtealing of a Farthing, or the like, is without reaſon: becauſe between man and man there is a Community both in nature and weakneſſe; and therefore,

Hanc veniam, petimuq; damuq; vicißim.

Becauſe we both our Errours have,
We pardon give, and pardon crave.

But it is an Argument of infinite Inſolence

in a vile Creature for feeding it own Corruption and ſelfe-love in a matter of no value to neglect one command of him, who by another is able to command him into Hell, or into nothing.

The next Quality in the Injurer, which may raiſe this Paſſion is Impudence, either in words or carriage. And the reaſons hereof may be:

Firſt, becauſe as *Ariſtotle* obſerves, all Impudence is joyned with ſome Contempt, which is the Fundamentall and Eſſentiall Cauſe of Anger.

Secondly, becauſe all Impudence is bold, ſtiffe and contentious, which are all incitements to this Paſſion. For as Shame being a Degree of Feare works an acknowledgement of our owne weakneſſe; and therefore a ſubmiſſion to the power wee have provoked, which as *Ariſtotle* obſerves) procureth from beaſts themſelves lenity and mercy: So Impudence in all other things being contrary to it, muſt likewiſe produce a contrary Effect.

Rhet. Lib. c. 3. Corpora magnanimis ſatis eſt proſtrare Leoni. Pugnaſ num finem, cum jacet hoſtis habet Ovid. Triſt. lib. 3. Eleg. 5.

Thirdly, thoſe things which we Impudently do, we do willingly likewiſe. And therefore wee ſhall obſerve in the Scripture how reigning ſins that is, thoſe which are done with greedineſſe of the appetite, and full conſent of the will, are ſet forth by the names of Stubbornneſſe, Rebellion, whoriſh Fore-head, Braſſe, and Yron. Now nothing doth more aggravate a wrong then this, that it proceeded from the will of man. And the reaſons are,

Firſt, becauſe a mans *Power* is in his *Will*: but

Paſſions

Paſſions and other blind Agents, when they work ungoverned, are our Imperfections, and not our Power; and therefore the eaſier borne withall.

Secondly, to a Plenary, Spontaneous Action, (ſuch as I take moſt of Impudence to be) there are required *Antecedenter*, Deliberation, Approbation, and Aſſent, and *Conſequenter*, Reſolution, Perſeverance, and Conſtancy. All which, as they take away the two principall conditions required unto Lenity; Confeſſion and Repentance: ſo likewiſe doe they adde much to the weight of an injury, becauſe an action which is thus exerciſed, is a worke of the whole Man, and imployes a perfect conſent thereunto: ſo a perfect and compleat enmity toward the perſon offendeth thereby. Whereas others are but the wrongs of ſome part, ſuch as are of thoſe of the wil, led by an ignorant; or thoſe of Paſſion, led by a traduced Vnderſtanding; and they too not of a part regular, but of an Vnjointed and Paralyticke part, which followes not the motion of a ſtayed reaſon; and therefore as they proceed from more diſorder in our ſelves, ſo doe they worke leſſe in the party offended.

Another thing which may raiſe and nouriſh this Paſſion, is any degree of *neer Relation* between the parties; whether it be Naturall by Conſanguinity; or Morall, by Society, Liberality, or any other friendſhip. For as it is prodigious in the Body Naturall to ſee one member wrong and provoke another: ſo in Vnions Civill or Morall, it is ſtrangely offenſive to make a divulſion. Therefore we are more angry for the neglect offered us by

Sen. de Ira. Lib. 2. c. 31.

by friends, or those of whom we have well deserved, than by enemies or † strangers. No wounds go so deep as those we receive in the house of our friend.

† *Iob.*19.19. *Zach.*13.6. *Psal.*41.9. 55.12.

And the reason why this difference between men neerly referring each other should worke a greater Anger between them, is: First, because herein we may finde that which before I observed as a furtherance to this Passion, Disappointment, and frustrating of Expectation: For in this case, we expect Sympathy & not Division. Secondly, because all Anger is a kind of dis-joyning or Divulsion of things before joyned: there therefore, where is the greatest Vnion, must needs bee the strongest and most violent separation; as in the Body, the Divulsion of Soule is more horrible than of an Arme, or some other member; because the one is an Essentiall, the other onely an Integrall Vnion: and so it is with those who are by bloud or friendship made one; as the dividing of them is more strange and violent, so doth it produce a stronger Passion.

Another cause of this Passion in respect of the Injurer, may be a too great Freedome and indiscreet use of speech; especially if it be in way of correction and rebuke: For as *Solomons* speech is true, *Mollis responsio frangit Iram*, a soft answer pacifies wrath: so on the contrary it is true likewise, *Dura Correptio unit Iram*; that an harsh rebuke knits it. Anger is by nothing more nourished than by much speaking, though not in the party that speaketh; because Speech is to Anger, like Teares

to

to Griefe, a ſpending and venting of it, yet alwayes in another, unto whom we miniſter farther matter of offence. To which purpoſe, is that ſpeech of *Syracides*. *Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heape not wood upon his fire.*

Another Cauſe, which I ſhall obſerve is contention and Difference, whether it be in Opinions or in Inclinations: becauſe this muſt needs be ever joyned with ſome undervaluing of another mans choice and judgement; which if it be not ſeaſoned with much ſobriety, will eaſily induce a man to beleeve, that it proceeds not from Zeale to Truth, but from a humour of Oppoſition. Wherewith many men are ſo farre poſſeſſed, that one muſt hardly dare to ſpeake the truth in their company for feare of endangering it and them. Like *Chryſippus* in *Laertius*, who uſed to boaſt that hee often wanted Opinions, but thoſe once gotten, he never wanted Arguments and Sophiſmes to defend them.

The laſt cauſe which I ſhall note of this Paſſion is in him, who offends us, his very Abilities, when we ſee them neglected: for this provokes to more diſpleaſure, then naked impotency. Weakneſſe, when it miſcarries, is the object of Pitty: but ſtrength, when it miſcarries, is the object of Anger.

——— ——— δ' αἰὲν ἐγὼν
ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐῶν ἀπάνευθε μάχεσθαι
λήθῃς ἐὼν, ὀΐω δὲ τεμαχήσειν σε καὶ ἄλλον. *Iliad.* 17.

I should not blame unworthy and base spirits
To sling and shrinke from Battle: but for men its
So to forget themselves, for you to be
Vnlike the men you are, What man can see
Such weaknesse, and not wonder, chide, debate;
Till you your selves doe your owne Errours hate.

Vnto all these we might adde some others which the Philosopher toucheth, as neglect of our Calamities, or rejoyeing at them, or divulging them, or bringing readily the report of them unto us, receiving the report of them with pleasure. Or lastly, representing the Signes which may bring into minde the memory of any injuries done us. As the Levite sent the parts of his Abused Concubine up and downe unto the Tribes of Israel to move them unto Indignation. So *Antony* in the funerall Oration upon *Iulius Cæsar* produced his robe stained with the blood which *Brutus* and *Cassius* had shed, to worke a detestation of that fault in the people.

σύμπασιν ἀγγέλοις κακῶν ἐπιτ. Vid. quæ de hac re habet Nuncius apud Sophoc. Antig.

Diod. lib. 44.

Now concerning all these causes together (because it would be too tedious to gather particular circumstances of dignity and corruption from all of them) we are to conclude that Anger, as it ariseth from any of them, is then onely Regular and Iust, when it keepes these conditions.

I First, that it still observe proportion and conformity to the rules of Love: otherwise it is not *Ira in Delictum*, but *Ira in fratrem* not against the Crime but the person of my brother: for we know

know the nature of this passion is to be Transient to goe out from us on our brother and reforme him: not Immanent to worke upon our selves and deforme us: I meane by soyling the habite of Charity, which ought alwayes to remaine inviolate.

2 Secondly, that it keepe likewise due proportion unto judgement, and that unto a true judgement, and a whole judgement; otherwise it is not onely to be Angry with our brother, but, which is farther, to be angry with him unadvisedly. Iudgement then must be true first, that is, cleare, setled, and untransported; and that likewise in two actions; in the Act of Interpretation, which reacheth unto the Injurie; and in the Act of Direction or Government, which reacheth unto the Passion.

3 And next it must be a whole judgement: and that in both the former. It must judge fully of the nature and circumstances of the injury, which ever receives it degrees of Intention or remission, not from the matter of the Act, but from some particular Qualifications and Circumstances joyned thereunto.

Secondly, it must judge fully of the Act of Passion, not onely in Informing, *quod sit*, that Reparation of our selves is lawfull; but *quomodo* too, in the manner and forme how to undertake it. Because as Passion, being without Reason in it selfe, wants the tongue of judgement to inform it what to do; So, being blinde, it wants the hand of judgement to leade it in the doing of it: and

Ira de Causa est Ira cundia de vitio. Μῆνιν ἔσπ ἰρηὶς φάρμακον ὀργή.

this I take to be the proper way of governing this Passion. But that which was once prescribed by *Athenodorus* the Philosopher, unto *Augustus* to repeate over the Alphabet between the Passion and the Revenge, is too boyish and slight, as diverting the minde from the occasion to some other trifle, which is onely to cozen and not to conquer our distemper: and therefore though it may for a time allay it, yet this is but as the cures of Empericks, which give present ease, but search not into the roote, nor leave such an habit within, as shall in after occasions limit the unrulinesse of such distempers, like those odours which use to raise men out of a fit of the falling sicknesse, but doe not all cure them of the disease.

Dandi mihi spatium Liv. Ita Romani patres a Iurandi lenitate cohibentes prius domo exire. Iubebant, ut esset deliberandi spatium. Vid. Plut. qu. Rom. q. 28. Vid. Plutarch. περὶ ἀοργησ.

Now to speake a word or two of the Effects of this Passion: they are such as are wrought, either in our selves or others. Concerning the former, they are either outward effects, which reach to our bodies, or inward, which reflect upon Reason.

Those on the body are clamour (as Saint *Paul* cals it) in the Tongue, Tumour and Inflammation in the Heart, Fire in the Eyes, and Fiercenesse and Paleneſſe in the Countenance, and a sensible alteration in the whole man. The use or deformity of all which depend upon the subordination of Passion unto Reason, or Dominion over it. For if it be Governed and obedient, there is an excellent use of these alterations in the body (which will not then be permitted to be excessive) namely the testification of our just displea sure)

displeasures at an offence received, and the inlivening or sharpning of us (if occasion require to the prosecution of further lawfull redresse; for though I would not have a man in his passion suffer a Metamorphosis, and turne his face into a torment punishing himselfe as much with Deformity, as his adversary with feare; yet neither can I like that close and dissembled, that politique and stomacke Anger, which cunningly shrowds it selfe under a calm and serene countenance; which being unnaturall to this passion (whose property it is, *Non insidiari sed palàm agere*, not to worke by way of Ambush and Stratagem, but visibly) will quickly degenerate into Malice and Rancour.

Vid. Cent. de Jra lib. 2. c. 35. Vos quoq; si media speculam spectetis in Jrâ. Cognoscat faciem vix satis ulla suam Ovid. de Arte Amandi. lib. 3. Vid. Plutarch. Plumbeas iras gerunt Plaut. Ethic. lib. 7.

The Inward Effects of this Passion, is an Excitation of Reason, to judge of the wrong and meanes of Redresse, which is then Regular, when it is done Ministereally and by way of service to the whole; but most corrupt and dangerous, when it is done by prepossession, transporting, confounding, or any other way tainting of Reason; which is to make it a party rather then a Iudge.

Ὅτ' ἰφίλοι πολλὸν φρένας ἠλάσατο.

Which makes sometimes a Wise man breake
Into Distempers wilde and weake.

In which ill office there is not any Passion more busie and fruitfull then this of Anger by reason of it's suddennesse, and of it's violence: both which are strong meanes to smother or

divert Reason, as we see in *Tiberius* himselfe, who though a man of a close and sad judgement, and of most reserved Passions (insomuch as he lived in them and nourished them a long time before either their working or discovery) yet when he was provoked by *Agrippina*, to a more violent Anger then usuall, his Passion we see for the time altered his nature. *Et veram occulti pectoris vocem elicuit, Num ideo laederetur, quia non regnaret.* He brake forth into words, strange and unusuall from so close a disposition; to wit, Whether she were wronged because she did not reigne? which is *Tacitus* his observation upon the Anger of that man.

Virtus incitat ad periculà subeunda, Ethic. lib. 3. c. 11. Θυμὸς εὐπειθὴς λόγου. Vid. Col. Rhod. l. 22. c. 53. l. 7

The last Effect is expedition and Dexterity in executing those means which Reason judgeth needfull for satisfying our selves against the person that hath offended us, wherein it's assistance, while it is Regular, is of excellent use in mans actions, because it makes bold and resolute. But here one maine corruption is to be avoided, Precipitancy and impatience of Delay or Attendance on the determination of right reason: which makes it commonly runne away with an halfe or a broken judgement. In which respect *Aristle* in his Ethicks very elegantly compares it to a hasty servant, that goes away posting with halfe his errand: and to Dogs, wch, as soon as ever they heare a noise, barke presently before they know whether it be a stranger at the doore, or no: so Anger attends Reason thus long, till it receive warrant for the justnes of seeking redresse, & then

ſuddenly haſtens away without any further liſtening to the rules of *Decorum* and *Iuſtice*, which it ſhould alwayes obſerve in the proſecution thereof: Leſt while it is too intent on his owne right, it fall in that extreame which it pretendeth to revenge, the wronging of another.

There is not any Paſſion which ſtanderh more in need of *Moderation* then this doth, both becauſe it is one of the frequenteſt which we are troubled with, and the moſt unruly, as that which can over-beare the reſt, and, of all other, hath the leaſt recourſe to [a] Reaſon, being haſty, Impetuous, full of Deſires, Griefe, Selfe-love, Impatience, which ſpareth no [b] perſons, friends or foes, no things, animate or [c] in animate, when they fit not our fancy. And therefore [d] Grammarians tell us that it hath its name *Ira* from *Ire*, becauſe a man in his *Anger* uſually goeth away from his *Reaſon*, and as his Anger ſlackens, he is ſaid, *ad ſe redire*, to returne again unto himſelfe. And therefore thoſe men in whom Reaſon is moſt predominant, are leaſt tranſported by this Affection, and moſt often diſpleaſed with themſelves for it. It was a ſtrange commendation given to [a] *Theodoſius* Iunior, that never any man ſaw him Angry; And ſuch a power had [b] *Lycurgus* over himſelfe, that when an inſolent young man had done him no leſſe injury then the ſtriking out of one of his Eyes, by lenity and manſuetude hee convinced and gained him. [c] And *Pericles* that great Stateſman and Orator of Greece, being all the day reviled by an Impure companion, com-

a Ὁ λογισμὸς ἐκφέρεται χρόνιον, ὀμμὴ πλῆσιν ἐς ὄψιν καθίστησιν. *Thucyd. lib. 2.*

b *Plutarch. de cupiditate.* *Sen. de Ira lib. 3. cap. 28.* & *Ibid. 8.*

c *Ipſum tempeſtivum qui vincendi Ennopigum. Iuven. Sat. 10. Plut. de Ira.*

d *Donat. & Cal. Rhod. l. 12 c. 53.*

a *Socrat. lib. 7. c. 22.*

b *Plutarch. in Lyc.*

c *Plut. in Pericle.*

commanded his servant at night to light him home unto his house * nothing more obvious then Examples of this kinde.

That we may therefore so marinage this Passion as to be *Angry but not sinne*, it will be requisite.

1 To let it have an Eye *upward*, as *Moses* did, whonever expressed any other Anger that wee read of but zealous, and Religious, when the injury directly aimed at God and his honour. It is very improbable that any thing will move too fast upward.

2 To convert it *Inward* into a selfe-displicency and severity towards our owne Errours, for the more acquainted any man is with himselfe, the lesse matter he will finde of Anger with other men, as having so much both *to doe*, and *to blame* at home. Anger ever ariseth from the Value which wee set upon our selves, which will ever then be most modest, when we take of it the fullest view.

3 Follow it not too *Close*, joyn not too soon, nor too hastily with it, though it may be *used* sometimes, it must never be *incouraged*, being over-bold and forward of it selfe. And therefore as many drugges must be prepared before wee may dare to use them; so we must take heed of dispatching this affection without its due corrective. It must first be schooled before it be imployed, as men bridle their horses before they ride them. It is not good drinking in muddy water so soone as it is stirred, give it time to subside and settle.

4 Keepe

* Senec. de Ira lib. 3. c. 12 & 38. Plut. de ferâ num: vidictat.

Sicut aquile et leones inter ambulandum ungues intro avertunt. Vid. Plu. de curios: Sen. de Ira, lib. 2. cap. 28. Indignatio a nimo [illegible] Ira L. 3. [illegible]

Plutarch de Aud. poet.

4 Keepe it not *long*, it is the Spawne of Malice and Contention, and time will hatch it. It is a Corroding thing which will fret and ſtaine the Veſſell in which it is kept. Let not the Sunne goe downe upon it, 'tis ill being in the darke with ſo bad a Leader. It may paſſe through the heart of a wiſe man, but it *Reſteth onely in the boſome of Fooles*.

5 Remove the *Occaſions* of it, withdraw Fuell from ſo catching a Flame. They ſay of Turpentine, and ſome other like things. That they will draw and ſucke Fire unto them. Certainely of all Fire there is none ſo ductile, ſo ſequacious and obſequious, as this of Wrath. It was not ill done therefore of *Cotys* and *Auguſtus*, To cauſe thoſe curious Veſſels to be broken of purpoſe, which having beene accidentally broken might have made a breach likewiſe upon the diſcretion of their owners.

Plut. Apopt. Sen. de Ira lib. 3. c. 40. Cal. Rhod. l. 12. c. 52.

6 Give not an eaſie Eare to *Reports*, nor an Eaſie entertainement to *ſuſpicions*, bee not greedy to know who or wherein another hath wrong'd thee. That which wee are deſirous to know, or apt to beleeve, wee ſhall be the more ready to revenge. *Curioſity* and *Credulity*, are the Handmaides unto Paſſion. *Alexander* would not ſee the woman after whom he might have Luſted: Nor *Cæſar* ſearch *Pompeyes* Cabinet, leſt he ſhould find new matters of Revenge. He choſe rather to make a Fire of them on his Hearth, then in his Heart. In-

Sen. de ira l. 2. c. 22, 23, 24.

Plut. in Alex. & l. curioſit. Dion. Caſſ. l. 41.

juries unknowne doe many times the lesse hurt; when I have found them, I then begin to feele them, and suffer more from mine owne discovery then from mine enemies attempt.

7 Bee *Candid* in Interpreting the things wherein thou sufferest. Many times the glasse through which I looke, makes that seeme formidable, and the wave, that crooked, which in it selfe was beautifull and straight. Haply thou art Angry with that which could not intend to hurt thee, Thy Booke, thy Penne, the stone at which thou stumblest, the winde or raine that beates upon thee: bee Angry gaine, but with thy selfe, who art either so *bold* as to be Angry with *GOD*, or so *foolish*, as to be Angry with *nothing*. Thou art displeased at a Childish or an Ignorant miscarriage, Call it not Injury but *Imprudence*, and then pitty it. Thou art Angry with Counsell, Reproofe, Discipline; why doest thou not as well breake the Glasse in which thy Physitian Ministreth a potion unto thee. Bee Angry with thy sinne, and thou wilt love him that takes it from thee. Is hee that adviseth thee thy Superiour? Thine Anger is undutifull, is hee thy friend, thine Anger is ungratefull.

Sen. de Ira lib. 2. c. 26.

8 Give Injuries a *New Name*, and that will worke a new Affection. In blinde Agents call it Chance, in weake Persons, Infirmity, In simple, Ignorance, in wise Counsell, in Superiours,

periours, Diſcipline, In-equals, Familiarity, in Inferious, Confidence, where there is no other conſtruction to be made, doe as *Ioſeph* and *Devid* did, call it *Providence*, and ſee what God ſayes to thee by it. Get a minde converſant with high and noble things, the more heavenly, the leſſe Tempeſtuous.

Minimas rerum diſcordia turbat pectora ſumma tenent Lucan. *Vid. Sen. l. 4. c. 33. Sen. de Ira l. 2. c. 25. 26.*

9 Be not *Idle*, *Sluggiſh*, *Luxurious*, wee are never more apt to bee Angry, then when we are ſleepy or greedy. Weake reſolutions and ſtrong Deſires are ſenſible of the leaſt exaſperation, as an empty ſhip of the ſmalleſt Tempeſt.

Againe be not *over-buſie* neither, That man can hardly bee maſter of his Paſſion that is not maſter of his imployments. A minde ever burdened, like a Bow alwayes bent muſt needes grow impotent, and weary, the fitteſt preparations to this diſtemper. When a mans buſineſſe doth not poiſe, but preſſe him, there will ever bee ſomething either undone or ill-done, and ſo ſtill matter of Vexation. And therefore our Mindes as our Veſſels muſt bee unloaded, if they would not have a Tempeſt hurt them.

Plutarch. περὶ ἀοργ. Senec. l. 3. c. 6. Sen. de Ira l. 3. cap. 16.

Laſtly, wraſtle not with that which pincheth thee. If it bee ſtrong it will hurt, if cunning, it will hamper and entangle thee. Hee that ſtrives with his burden makes it heavier. That Tempeſt breakes not the ſtalkes of Corne, which rends aſunder the armes

——χαλεπώτερα ἔσται ἐπὶ μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτείνεται· μὴ διάστασιν αὐτῷ ἀφῶμεν ἀπὸ λόγου. *Sopb. Antig. Plut. Sympoſ. l. 4. q. 2.*

of an Oake, the one yeelds, the other withstands it. An humble weakneſſe is ſafer from injury, then a ſtubborne ſtrength.

I have now done with the Paſſions of the Minde. And briefly proceede to thoſe Honours and Dignities of the Soule of Man which belong unto it in a more abſtracted Conſideration.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of the Originall of the Reasonable Soule, whether it be immediatly Created and Infused, or derived by Seminall Traduction from the Parents. Of the Derivation of Originall sinne.

THe dignity of *Man* in respect of his *Soule* alone, may be gathered from a consideration either of the *whole*, or of the *parts* therof. Cõcerning the whole, we shall consider two things; Its *Originall*, and its *Nature*. Concerning the *Originall* of the *Soule*, divers men have diversly thought; for, to let passe the Opinion of [a] *Seleucus*, who affirmed that it was educed out of the Earth, and that [b] of *Origin* and the *Platonists* who say that the Soules of men were long agoe created, and after detruded into the Body as into a Prison: There are three Opinions touching this question. The first of those who affirm the *Traduction* of the *Soule* by *generation*, some of which so affirm because they judged it a *Corporeall* substance, as did [c] *Tertullian*. Others because they beleeved that one spirit might as easily proceed from another, as one fire or light be kindled by another: as [d] *Apollinarius*, *Nemesius*, and divers in the Westerne Churches, as S^t. *Hierome* witnesseth. The second, of those who deny the naturall Traduction, and say that the

a *Philastri de Hæres. Seleuci, &c.*

b *Iustinian. Tract. ad Menam contra Orig. Hieron. Epist. ad Marcell. & Anastasiam Theophyl. Alex. Ep. Pasc. 2. Anastat. Sinuita Anagog. contemp. lib. 11.*

c *Aug. de Hæres. 86. cp. 157 de Gen. ad lit. l. 10. c. 25. Tertull. de Anima c. 5. 6. 7. 22. 25. 27.*

d *Hieron. Epist. ad Marcellinum. Nemesius de natura hominis l. 2. Luciferian. apud Aug. Hæres. 81.*

Soule is by *Creation* infused into Bodies, organiz'd and prædispoſed to receive them; of which Opinion among the Ancients were [e] S^t. *Hierom*, [f] *Hilarie*, [g] *Ambroſe*, [h] *Lactantius*, [i] *Theodoret*. [k] *Æneas Gazeus*, and of the moderne Writers the *major* part. The third is of thoſe who doe *hæſitare*, ſtick betweene both, and dare affirme nothing certaine on either ſide, which is the moderation of [l] S^t. *Auguſtine* and *Gregory* [m] the great, who affirme that this is a queſtion incomprehenſible, and unſolvable in this life. Now the only reaſon which cauſed S^t. *Auſtin* herein to hæſitate, ſeemeth to have been the difficulty of traducing *Originall ſinne* from the Parents to the Children. For ſaith he (writing unto S^t. *Hierome* touching the Creation of the Soule) If this Opinion doe not oppugne that moſt fundamentall faith of *Originall ſinne*, let it then be mine, but if it doe oppugne it, let it not be thine.

Now ſince that Opinion which denieth the *Traduction*, ſeemeth moſt agreeable to the ſpirituall ſubſtance of the ſoule, I ſhall here produce ſome few reaſons for the *Creation*, and ſolve an argument or two alledg'd for the *Traduction* of the Soule, reſerving notwithſtanding unto my ſelfe, and others, the liberty and modeſty of S^t. *Auſtins* hæſitation, which alſo I finde allowed by the Holy Ghoſt himſelfe. Eccleſ. 11. 5.

Two things there are of certainty in this point. 1. That the ſoule is not any corporeall Maſſe or ſubſtance meaſurable by quantity, or capable of ſubſtantiall augmentation. 2. That the

e *Hieron. ep. ad Pam. contra Ioan. Hieruſ.*
f *Hilar. de Trin. l. 10.*
g *Ambroſ. de Noah & Arca. c. 4.*
h *Lactant. de opt. Hom. c. 9.*
i *Theod. de curand aegr. affect. ſer. 4.*
k *Æneas Gaz. in ſuo Theophraſte.*
l *Aug. ep. 7. 28. 157. & Retract. l. 1 c. 1. de Gen. ad lit. 10. & de anima.*
m *Greg. l. 7. ep. 53.*

the *Traduction* of one thing out of another, doth connotate these two things, That the thing traduced doth derive Being from the other, as from its original principle; & that this derivation be not any other manner of way, but *Ratione seminali, & per modum decisionis*, by a seminall way, and the decision, seperation, or effluxion of substance from the other: which things being laid, The Arguments against *Traduction* are these.

First, the testimonies of Holy Scripture, calling God the *Father of spirits*, as our naturall Parent the *Father of our bodies*, *Job* 33. 4. *Eccles.* 12. 7. *Esa* 57. 16. *Num.* 16. 22. 27. 16. *Heb.* 12. 9. *Zach.* 12. 1. which though they doe not according to the judgement of S^t. *Aug.* conclude the point by infallible consequence, yet doe they much favour the probability of this Opinion.

2. To have Being by *Traduction*, is, when the soule of the Child is derived from the soule of the Parent, by the meanes of Seed: but the Seed of the Parent cannot reach the Generation of the soule, both because the one is a Corporeall, the other a Spirituall substance, uncapable of Augmentation, or Detriment. Now that which is *spirituall*, cannot be produced out of that which is corporeall: neither can any Seed be discinded or issue out from the soule, being *substantia simplex, & impartibilis*, a substance simple, and indivisible.

3. That which is *separable* from the body, and can subsist and work without it, doth not depend in its Being or making upon it; for if by the Gene-

ration of the Body the soule be generated, by the corruption of the Body it would be corrupted, for every thing that is generable, is corruptible. But the Soule can subsist and work without the Body, therefore it doth not from corporeall generation derive its Being.

4. If the Soule be seminally traduced, it must be either from the body, or from the soule of the Parents, not from the Body, for it is impossible for that which is not a body, to be made out of that which is a Body, no cause being able to produce an effect out of its owne spheare, and more noble than it selfe, not from the soule, because that being a spirituall and impartible substance, can therefore have nothing severed from it by way of substantiall seed unto the constitution of another soule.

5. If there be nothing taken from the Parents, of which the soule is formed, then it is not traduced by naturall generation: but there is nothing taken from the Parents, by which the soule is formed; for then in all Abortions and miscarrying Conceptions, the seed of the Soule would perish, and by consequence the soule it selfe would be corruptible, as having its Originall from corruptible seed. These and divers other the like arguments are used to confirme the doctrine touching the Creation of the Reasonable Soule. Unto which may be added the judgement and testimony of some of the forecited Fathers. S^t. *Hierome* telleth us that the Originall of the soule in mankinde is not as in other living

Hieron. ad Pammach. & in l. 32. Eccles. 12. Contr. Rufinum l. 2. c. 1. 2. & dialog. de Origin. Anim. inter opera ejus Tom. 2.

living creatures. Since as our Saviour ſpeaketh, *The Father worketh hitherto.* And the Prophet *Eſai* telleth us, That *hee formeth the ſpirit of man within him, and frameth the hearts of all men*, as it is in the Pſalmes. And ſo *Lactantius* (whom I doe wonder to finde numbred amongſt the Authors that affirme the Traduction of the ſoule, by *Ruffinus*, and the Author of the Dialogue amongſt the works of *Hierome*). It may be queſtioned (ſaith he) whether the ſoule be generated out of the Father, Mother, or both. Neither of all three is true, Becauſe the ſeed of the Soule is not put into the Body by either, or both of theſe. A Body may be borne out of their Bodies, becauſe ſomething may be out of both contributed; but a Soule cannot be borne out of their Soules, in as much as from ſo ſpirituall and incomprehenſible a ſubſtance nothing can iſſue forth or be ſevered for that uſe. So alſo S^t. *Hilary*, The Soule of man is the work of God; the generation of the fleſh is alwayes of the fleſh. And againe, It is inbred and an impreſs'd Beliefe in all, that our Soules have a divine Originall: And in like manner *Theodoret*, God (ſaith he) frameth the Bodies of living creatures out of Bodies ſubſiſting before; but the Soules, not of all creatures, but of Men only hee worketh out of nothing that had beene before.

Hilar. de Trin. l 10. & in p. 62.

Againſt this Doctrine of the Soules Originall, The principall argument is drawn from the conſideration of *Originall ſinne*, and the propagation thereof, which alone was that which troubled

Athenag. de Reſur. Gerund. de Eccleſ. dog. c. 13.

Aug. ep. 28.

and staggerd S. *Augustine* in this point. For if the Soule be not naturally traduced, how should Originall sinne be derived from *Adam* unto it? And if it were not in the loynes of *Adam*, then neither did it sinne in his loynes; whereas the Apostle expresly telleth us, that by one Man sinne came into the world, and that in one all have sinned; and that not only by imputative participation, but by naturall Propagation, deriving an inhærent habituall pollution, which cleaveth inseparably to the soule of every man that entreth into the world, and is the fruit of *Adams* loynes.

Unto which Argument to omit the different resolutions of other men touching the pollution of the Soule by the immediate contact of the flesh, and the Parents attinging the ultimate disposition of the Body, upon which naturally followeth the Union of the Soule, (God being pleased to work ordinarily according to the exigence of second causes, and not suffering any of them to be in vain for want of that concurrence, which he in the vertue of a *first and supreame cause* is to contribute unto them.) I shall set downe what I conceive to be the Truth in this point.

First then, it is most certaine that God did not implant *Originall sinne*, nor take away *Originall righteousnesse* from Man, but man by his Prævarication and Fall did cast it away, and contract sin, and so derive a *defiled nature* to his posterity. For as *Macarius* excellently speaketh, *Adam* having transgressed, did lose the pure possession of his Nature.

Aug. de Civit. Dei. l. 13. c. 14.

Macar. Ho. 12.

Secondly,

Secondly, Originall injuſtice as it is a ſinne, by the default and contraction of Man, ſo it is alſo a puniſhment by the ordination, and diſpoſition of Divine Juſtice. It was mans ſinne to caſt away the Image of God; but it is Gods juſt judgement (as hee hath that free diſpenſation of his owne Gifts) not to reſtore it againe in ſuch manner as at firſt he gave it unto that nature which had ſo rejected and trampled on it. *Aug. contr. Jul. l 5. c 3.*

Thirdly, In this *Originall ſinne*, there are two things conſiderable, The *Privation* of that Righteouſneſſe, which ought to be in us; and the *luſt* or *Habituall concupiſcence*, which carrieth Nature unto inordinate motions. The *Privation* and want of Originall juſtice is meritoriouſly from *Adam*, who did voluntarily deprave, and reject that Originall rectitude which was put into him, which therefore God out of his moſt righteous and free diſpoſition is pleaſed not to reſtore unto his Nature in his poſterity againe. In the *habituall luſt* are conſiderable theſe two things ἐνεργείᾳ The ſinfull *diſorder* of it; And ἀνταποδόσει the Puniſhment of ſinne by it. Conſider it is as a Puniſhment of *Adams* firſt Prævarication; and ſo, though it be not efficiently from God, yet it falls under the Order of his Juſtice, who did moſt righteouſly forſake *Adam*, after his wilfull fall, and leave him in the Hand of his owne Counſell, to tranſmit unto us that Seminary of ſinne which himſelfe had contracted.

But if we conſider it *as a ſinne*, we then ſay that the *immediate* and *proper* cauſe of it, is *lapſed nature*

whole

whole and entire by Generation and Seminall Traduction derived upon us. But the *Remoter cause* is that, from which wee receive and derive this Nature. *Nature* I say first *fallen*; for unto Nature Innocent belonged Originall Righteousnesse, and not Originall sinne.

2. *Nature derived* by ordinary generation as the fruit of the loynes, and of the womb. For though Christ had our Nature, yet hee had not our sinne.

3. *Nature whole and entire*. For neither part (as some conceive) is the Totall spring and fountain of this sinne. For it is improbable that any staine should be transfused from the Body to the Soul, as from the foule vessell to the cleane water put into it. The Body it selfe being not Soly and alone in it selfe corrupt and sinfull; else, all Abortions and miscarrying conceptions should be subject to damnation. Nothing is the seat of sin which cannot be the seat of Death the wages of sinne.

Originall sinne therefore most probably seemeth to arise by *Emanation*, partiall in the parts, totall in the whole; from Mans *Nature* as *guilty*, *forsaken*, and *accursed* by God for the sinne of *Adam*. And from the parts not considered absolutely in themselves, but by vertue of their concurrence and *Vnion*, whereby both make up one compounded Nature. Though then the Soule be a partiall subject or seat of Originall sinne; yet wee have not our sinne and our soule from one Author; because sinne followes not the

the *part*, but the *Nature* whole and entire. And though we have not from our Parents *Totum naturæ*, yet we have *totam naturam*, wee have our whole nature, though not every part of our nature. Even as *whole Christ* was the Son of *Mary*, who therefore by vertue of the Communication of properties in Christ, is justly called Θεοτοκος, *the Mother of God*, against the Nestorians in the Councell of *Chalcedon*. Though in regard of his divine Nature, he was without beginning; & the reason is, because the integrity of Nature ariseth from the *Vnion* of the two parts together, which is perfected by *Generation*; so then wee say that *Adam* is the Originall, and *meritorious* cause. Our next *Parents*, the instrumentall and *immediate* cause of this sinne in us, not by way of Physicall Emission or Transmigration of sinne from them to us, but by secret *contagion*, as S. *Augustine* speaks. For having in the Manner aforesaid from *Adam* by our Parents received a nature, most justly forsaken by God, and lying under the Guilt and Curse of the first prævarication, from this *Nature* thus *derived*, as *guilty* and *accursed* doth immediately and intimately flow Habituall pollution. So then Habituall Concupiscence is from *Adam* alone *meritoriously* by reason of his first prævarication. From *Adam* by the mediation of our *Parents seminally* by naturall *generation*. And from *Nature generated* not as Nature, but *as* in *Adam guilty*, *forsaken* and *accursed*, by secret and ineffable *Resultancy* and *Emanation*. This is that which I conceive of this Great difficulty, not

Contr. Julian. l. 5. c. 14.

unmindfull in the meane time of that speech of S. *Augustine*, That there is nothing more *certaine* to be knowne, and yet nothing more *secret* to be understood than *Originall sinne*. For other Arguments to prove the Traduction of the Soul, they are not of such moment; And therefore I passe them by, and proceed to the consideration of the Soule in its Nature.

Nihil peccato originali ad prædicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius. Aug. de morb. Eccles. cap. 22.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Image of God in the Reasonable soule, in regard of its simplicity, and spirituality.

CONcerning the dignity of the soule in its nature and essence, Reason hath adventured thus farre, to confesse that the soule of man, is in some sort a spark and beame of divine brightnesse. And a greater and more infallible Oracle hath warranted that it was *breathed* into him by God himselfe, and was made after his *Image and likenesse*, not substantially, as if there [a] were a Real Emanation and Traduction of the Soule out of God; which were blasphemous and impious to conceive: but only by way of Resemblance, and imitation of Gods properties in mans originall created nature, which is more notable in him, than in the other parts of the world; there is indeed in all Gods works some kind of image, and lineaments, and footsteps of his glory.

Macrob. de somno Scip. p. 1. c. 14. divinæ particulæ auræ. Χαρακτηρα Θεου, Philo.

[a] *Vid. contra hanc impietatem decretum concil. Bracar. cap. 5. μηποτε ουσιας τινος ἀπορροιαν. Damasc. de orth. fid. lib. 2. cap. 12.*

Ignem est illis vigor & cælestis Origo.

Deus

Deum namq; ire per omnes
Terraſq; Tractuſq; maris Cœlumq; profundum, &c.
For all the tracts of Earth, of Sea, and Sky,
Are filled with divine immenſity.

The whole world is a great * book, wherein we read the praiſe, glory, power, and infiniteneſſe of him that made it, but man is after a more peculiar manner called εἰκὼν and δόξα *the image and glory of God*; the greater world is only Gods workmanſhip, wherein is repreſented the wiſdom and power of God, as in a building the Art and cunning of the workman; but man (in the originall purity of nature) is beſides that, as wax, wherein was more notably impreſſed by that divine ſpirit (whoſe work it is to ſeale) a ſpirituall reſemblance of his owne goodneſſe and ſanctity. Againe, the greater world was never other than an *Orator* to ſet forth the power and praiſes of God; but he made the ſoule of man, in the beginning as it were his *Oracle*, wherein he faſtned a perfect knowledge of his law and will, from the very glimpſes and corrupted Reliques of which Knowledge of his Law, ſome have beene bold to call men γενεὰν θεοῦ, *the kindred of God*, And *Senec. Liber Animus & Diis cognatus*; which is the ſame with that of *Aratus* cited by S. *Paul* τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν, *for wee are his off-ſpring*, yea *Euripides* (as *Tully* in his * *Tuſculans* obſerves,) was bold to call the ſoule of man, by the name of God; and *Seneca* will venture ſo farre too. *Quid*

* Βίβλος θεοῦ. *Orig. apud Euſeb. de præpar. Evang. lib. 6. c. 11.*

Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum. Ovid. Met. 1.

In aliis creaturis eſt ſimilitudo dei tantùm per modum veſtigii; in Sola Rationali Creatura per modum imaginis. Vid. Aquin. part. 1. qu. 93. art. 6.

Ἐμπνεύσει τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ σοφίας.
Philo. apud Euſeb. de præpar. Evang. lib. 7. cap. 18.

Πλάσμα θεοῦ λογικὸν, κατ' εἰκόνα γενόμενον τῆς ἀϊδιότητος ἀυτοῦ. *Greg. Nyſſen. Serm. 1. in verba illa faciamus hominem, &c.*

Θεῖον ὁ νοῦς. *Ariſt. Ethic. lib. 10 c. 7.*

Deorum cognatione tenetur. Cic. de Divin. lib. 1. & lib. de Amicit. porphyr. apud Euſeb. de prep. Evang lib. 11. cap. 28.

* *Lib. 1. Clem. Alex. in fine lib. 4 Stromat. Ipſe etiam Cic. in ſomnio Scipio.*

Senec. ep. 31. & 41.

aliud vocas animum quàm deum in humano corpore hoſpitantem. But to forbeare ſuch boldneſſe, as (it may be) one of the Originals of heathen Idolatry: Certaine it is, that there are (as *Tully* many times divinely obſerves) ſundry ſimilitudes betweene God and the minde of man. There are indeed ſome Attributes of God, not only incommunicable, but abſolutely inimitable, and unſhadowable by any excellency in mans ſoule, as immenſity, infiniteneſſe, omnipotency, omniſcience, immutability, impaſſibility, and the like; but whatſoever ſpirituall, and Rationall perfections the power & bounty of God, conferr'd upon the ſoule in its firſt Creation, are all of them ſo many ſhadowes and repreſentations of the like, but moſt infinite perfections in him.

Vid. Aug. de Gen. ad lit. lib. 6. c. 12. Ambroſ. Hexam. lib. 6. c. 8. Tertul. lib. 2. contra Marcio. cap. 5. 9. 16. Clem. Alex. in Protreptic. p. 30. Baſil. Hexam. Homil. 10.

The Properties then and Attributes of God, wherein this Image chiefely conſiſts, are firſt theſe three. *Spirituality* with the two immediate conſequents thereof, *Simplicity* and *Immortality*, in which the ſoule hath partaked without any after corruption or depravation. Concerning the former, it were vaſt, and needleſſe, to confute thoſe * ſundry opinions of ancient Philoſophers, concerning the ſubſtance of the ſoule; many whereof *Tully* in the firſt of his *Tuſculans* hath reported; And *Ariſtotle* confuted in his firſt *de Anima*. Some conceived it to be blood, others the braine, ſome fire, others ayre; ſome that it conſiſts in Harmony and Number; and the Philoſopher *Dicæarchus*, that it was nothing at all but

* Vid. Theodoret. Serm. 5. de Natura Hom. & Nemeſ. cap. 2. Seu. Nyſſen. lib. de Animâ. Plutarch. de placitis Philoſoph. l. 4. c. 2. Tertul. de Anim. Senec. Nat. qu. l. 7. c. 24

but the body diſpoſed and fitted for the works of life. But to let theſe paſſe as unworthy of refutation, and to proceed to the truth of the firſt property.

There are ſundry naturall reaſons to prove the * *Spirituality* of the ſoule; as firſt, the *manner* of its *working*, which is *immateriall* by conceiving objects, as *univerſall*, or otherwiſe purified from all groſneſſe of matter, by the Abſtraction of the *Active underſtanding*, whereby they are made in ſome ſort proportionall to the nature of the Intellect Paſſive, into which the ſpecies are impreſſed.

Secondly, its in *dependance* on the body, in that manner of working; for though the operations of the ſoule require the concurrence of the *common ſenſe* and *imagination*, yet that is by way only of conveyance from the *object*, not by way of aſſiſtance to the elicite and immediate act. They only preſent the *ſpecies*, they doe not qualifie the *perception*. *Phantaſmata* are only *objecta operationis*; the objects they are, not *inſtrumenta operandi*, the inſtruments of the ſoules working. The *Act of underſtanding* is immediatly from the ſoule, without any the leaſt concurrences of the body thereunto, although the things whereon that act is fixed and converſant, require, in this eſtate, bodily organs to repreſent them unto the ſoule; as light doth not at all concurre to the act of ſeeing, which ſolely and totally floweth from the viſive faculty, but only ſerves as an extrinſecall aſſiſtance for qualification of the *Medium* and ob-

* *Vid. Nemeſ. de Anim. cap. 2. Claudian. Mamercum de ſtatu Animæ. lib. 2. Plotin. apud Euſeb. de præparat. Evang. l. 15 c. 21 Damiſc de Orthod. fide. l. 2. c. 12 Plutarch. lib. de placitis Philoſoph. lib. 4. c. 2. 3. Aug. lib. de quantitate Animæ.*

Lib. 3. de Anim. cap. 5.

ject that muſt be ſeene. And this reaſon *Ariſtotle* hath uſed to prove, that the underſtanding, which is principally true of the whole ſoule, is not mixt with any body, but hath a nature altogether divers there-from, becauſe it hath no bodily organ, as all bodily powers have, by which it is enabled to the proper acts that belong unto it. And hereon is grounded another reaſon of his, to prove the *Soule immateriall*, becauſe it depends not on the body in its operations, but educeth them immediately from within it ſelfe, as is more manifeſt in the *Reflexion* of the ſoule, upon its owne nature, being an operation (as hee expreſly ſpeaketh) *ſeperable there-from*, the ſoule being not only *actus informans*, a forme informing, for the actuating of a body, and conſtitution of a compound ſubſtance, but *actus ſubſiſtens* too, a forme ſubſiſting; And that *per ſe*, without any neceſſary dependance upon matter. It is an act, which worketh as well in the body, as whereby the body worketh.

Ibid. cap. 6.

Another reaſon of *Ariſtotle* in the ſame place, is the difference betweene *Materiall* and *Immateriall powers*. For (ſaith he) all bodily cognoſcitive faculties doe ſuffer offence and dammage from the too great excellency of their objects, as the eye from the brightneſſe of the Sunne, the eare from the violence of a ſound, the touch from extremity of heat or cold, and the like. But the *underſtanding* on the contrary ſide is perfected by the worthieſt contemplations, and the better enabled for lower enquiries. And there-

fore

fore *Ariſtotle* in his *Ethicks*, placeth the moſt compleat happineſſe of man, in thoſe heavenly intuitions of the minde, which are faſtned on the divineſt and moſt remote objects; which in Religion is nothing elſe, but a fruition of that beatificall viſion (which, as farre as Nature goes, is call'd the *contemplation of the firſt cauſe*) and an eternall ſatiating the ſoule with beholding the Nature, Eſſence, and glory of God.

Another reaſon may be drawn from the condition of the *Vnderſtandings Objects*, which have ſo much the greater conformity to the ſoule, by how much the more they are divine and abſtracted. *Hoc habet animus argumentum ſuæ divinitatis*, (ſaith *Seneca*) *quòd illum divina delectant*. This argument of its divineneſſe hath the minde of man, that it is delighted with divine things; for if the ſoule were corporeal, it could not poſsibly reach to the knowledge of any, but materiall ſubſtances, and thoſe that were of its owne Nature; otherwiſe we might as well ſee Angels with our eyes, as underſtand any thing of them in our minds. And the ground of this reaſon is, that axiome in Philoſophy, that all reception is *ad modum recipientis*, according to the proportion and capacity of the receiver. And that the objects which are ſpirituall and divine, have greateſt proportion to the ſoule of man, is evident in his Underſtanding and his will, both which are in regard of truth or good unſatisfiable, by any materiall or worldly objects, the one never reſting in enquiry, till it attaine the perfect knowledge,

ledge, the other never repleniſhed in deſire till it be admitted unto the perfect poſſeſsion of the moſt divine and ſpirituall good: to wit, of him who is the firſt of Cauſes, and the laſt of Ends.

From this Attribute of *Spirituality* flowes immediatly that next of *Simplicity*, *Vnity*, or *Actuality*; for Matter is the root of all perfect compoſition, every Compound conſiſting of two Eſſentiall parts, *matter* and *forme*. I exclude not from the Soule all manner of compoſition; for it is proper to *God* only to be abſolutely and perfectly ſimple: But I exclude all *Eſſentiall compoſition*, in reſpect whereof the Soule is *meerely Actuall*; And ſo I underſtand that of *Tully*, *Nihil eſt Animus admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex.*

Ariſtot. de Anima lib. 3. cap. 6.

Tuſcul. q l. 1. & lib. de Senectut.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of the Soules immortality proved by its ſimplicity, independance, agreement of Nations in acknowledging God and duties due unto him, dignity above other Creatures, power of underſtanding things immortall, unſatiableneſſe by objects Mortall, freeneſſe from all cauſes of corruption.

AND from this *Simplicity* followes by a neceſſary & unavoydable conſequence, the third property ſpoken of, * *Immortality*, it being abſolutely impoſſible (as *Tully* excellently obſerves, & it is the argument of *Jul. Scaliger* on this very occaſion) for any ſimple and uncompounded Nature to be ſubject to death and corruption; For (ſaith *Tully*) *Interitus eſt diſceſſus & ſecretio ac direptus earum partium quæ conjunctione aliqua tenebantur.* It is a ſeparation (and as it were) a divulſion of parts, before united each to other, ſo that where there is * no Union, there can be no ſeparation; and by conſequence no death nor mortality.

Another reaſon may be the ſame which was alledged for the *ſpirituality* of the ſoule, namely *independance in operation*, and therefore conſequently in *Being* upon the body. And that In-

* *vid. Plutarch. lib. de placit. Philoſoph. 4. c. 7 quæ ex Seneca in unum collegit Dionyſ. Gothofrid. in locis ex ipſo Theologicis. Titul. de Animo. Cicer. Tuſc. qu. lib. 1. Cato major, ſive de ſenect. & de Amicit. Iſtam materiam fuſè tractarunt. Aug. Tom. 1. Euſeb. de præpar. Evang. lib. 11. ex Platone porphyr. &c. Nemeſ. Ænea Gazæus in Bed. Eraſt. Contravent. Alii.*

* *Nihil poteſt perdere eſſe quod non perdat actum per quem eſt: Iſtæ autem formæ* [*vide*] *nõ poſſunt perdere actum per quem ſunt, quia ſibi ipſis ſunt Actus. Nihil autem poteſt ſeipſum perdere. Contravent. lib. 1 de Immort. Animæ.*

dependance is manifest, First, because the acts of the soule are educ'd immediately in it selfe, without the Intercedence of any organ whereby sensitive faculties work. Secondly, because the soule can perceive and have the knowledge of truth of *universals*, of *it selfe*, of *Angels*, of *God*, can assent, discourse, abstract, censure, invent, contrive, and the like; none of which actions could any wayes be produced by the Intrinsecall concurrence of any materiall faculty. Thirdly, because in *Raptures* and *Extasies*, the soule is (as it were) drawne up above and from the body, though not from *informing* it, yet certainely from borrowing from it any assistance to the producing of its operation. All which prove, that the soule is separable from the body in its Nature, and therefore that it is not corrupt and mortall as the body.

Another reason may be taken from the Universall agreement of all Nations in the Earth in * *Religion* and the worship of some Deity, which cannot but be raised out of a hope and secret Resolution that that God whom they worshipped, would reward their piety, if not here, yet in another life. *Nulla gens adeo extra leges est projecta ut non aliquos deos credat*, saith *Seneca*; whence those fictions of the Poets touching *Elyzium* and fields of happinesse for men of honest and well ordered lives; and places of Torment for those that doe any way neglect the bonds of their Religion.

* *Cum de Animarum aeternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus Hominum aut timentium inferos aut colentium.* Senec. ep 117.

Erg

Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumq; malorum
Supplicia expendunt.

Therefore they exercised are with paine,
And punishments of former crimes sustaine.

For in this life it is many times in all places seene, that those which have given themselves most liberty in contempt of Gods Lawes, and have suffered themselves to be carried by the swinge of their owne rebellious Passions, unto all injurious, ambitious, unruly Practises, have commonly raised themselves and their fortunes more than others, who out of tendernesse and feare have followed no courses but those which are allowed them. And yet these men who suffer so many indignities out of regard to Religion, doe still observe their duties, and in the midst of all contempt and reproach, fly into the bosome of their God: And as *Lucretius* himselfe that Arch-Atheist confesseth of them:

——— Multò in rebus acerbis
Acrius advertunt animos ad religionem.

Their hearts in greatest bitternesse of minde,
Unto Religion are the more enclinde.

Their very terrors and troubles make them more zealous in acknowledging some Deity and in the worship of it. *Hic Pietatis honos?* would not this easily have melted their Religion into nothing, and quite diverted their minds from so fruitlesse a severity, had they not had a strong and indeleble perswasion fastned in their soules, that a state would come, wherein both their Patience should be rewarded, and the insolencie of

their Adversaries repayed with the just Vengeance they had deserved?

As for that Atheisticall conceit, that Religion is only grounded on Policie, and maintained by Princes for the better Tranquillity and Setlednesse of their States, making it to be only *Imperiorum Vinculum*, a Bond of Government, that the Common-weale might not suffer from the fury of minds secure from all Religion, it is a fancie no lesse absurd, than it is impious. For that which hath not only beene observed and honour'd by those who have scarce had any forme of a civill Regiment amongst them, but even generally assented unto by the opinions and practice of the whole world, is not a Law of Policie and civill Institution, but an inbred and secret Law of Nature dictated by the consciences of men, and assented unto, without and above any humane imposition. Nor else is it possible for Legall institutions, and the closest and most intricate conveyances of Humane Policy so much to entangle the hearts of men (of themselves enclinable to liberty) nor to fetter their consciences, as thereby only to bring them to a regular conformity unto all government for feare of such a God, to whose Infinitnesse, Power and Majestie they Assent by none but a civill Tradition. It must be a visible character of a Deitie acknowledged in the Soule, an irresistible Principle in Nature, and the secret witnesse of the heart of man, that must constraine it unto those sundry religious ceremonies (observed among all Nations) wherein even

in

in places of Idolatry, were ſome ſo irkſome and repugnant to Nature, and others ſo voyd of Reaſon, as that nothing but a firme and deepe Aſſurance of a Divine Judgement, and of their owne Immortality, could ever have impos'd them upon their conſciences. And beſides this conſent of men unto Religion in generall, we finde it alſo unto this one part hereof touching the Soules immortality. All the wiſeſt and beſt reputed Philoſophers for Learning and ſtayedneſſe of life, and, beſides them, even Barbarians, Infidels, and ſavage people have diſcerned it. *Adeò neſcio quo modo inhæret in mentibus quaſi ſeculorum quoddam augurium futurorum*, ſaith *Tully*. The Soule hath a kinde of preſage of a future world; And therefore he ſaith, that it is in mans Body a Tenant, *tanquam in domo alienâ*, as in anothers houſe: And is only in Heaven as a Lord *tanquam in domo ſuâ*, as in its owne. *Tuſc qu. l. 1.*

Though in the former of theſe, the ignorance of the *Reſurrection* made him erre touching the future condition of the Body, wherein indeed conſiſts a maine dignity of Man above other creatures. And this Opinion it is which he ſaith was the ground of all that care men had for poſterity, to ſow and plant Common-wealths, to ordaine Lawes, to eſtabliſh formes of Government, to erect Foundations and Societies, to hazard their Blood for the good of their Country; all which could not have beene done with ſuch freedome of Spirit, and prodigality of life, unleſſe there were withall a conceit that the good

thereof would ſome way or other redound to the contentment of the Authors themſelves after this life: for it was a ſpeech ſavouring of infinite Atheiſme.

Εμοὶ θανόντι, γαῖα μιχθήτω πυρί.
When I am dead, and in mine Vrne;
What care I though the World burne?

Tull. Tuſc. qu. lib. 1. Senec. ep. 117.

Now although againſt this preſent Reaſon drawne from the *conſent of men* (which yet Heathens themſelves have uſed) It may be alledged that there hath beene a conſent likewiſe of ſome, That the Soule is nothing elſe but the Eucraſie or good Temperature of the Body, and that it is therefore ſubject to thoſe Maladies, Diſtempers, Age, Sickneſſe, and at laſt Death, which the Body is; as amongſt the reſt *Lucretius* takes much paines to prove: yet the Truth is, that is *Votum magis quàm Judicium*, never any firme opinion grounded on Judgement and Reaſon, but rather a deſire of the heart, and a perſwaſion of the Will inticing the Underſtanding ſo to determine. For the conſcience of lewd Epicures and ſenſuall minds, being ſometimes frighted with the flaſhes and apprehenſions of Immortality, which often times purſues them, and obtrudes it ſelfe upon them againſt their wills, ſhining like lightning through the chinks & creviſes (as I may ſo ſpeak) of their Soules, which are of ſet purpoſe cloſed againſt all ſuch light, ſets the Reaſon on work to invent arguments for the contrary ſide, that ſo their ſtaggering and fearefull impiety may be ſomething emboldned, and the Eye of their conſci-

conſcience blinded, and the Mouth muffled from breathing forth thoſe ſecret clamors and ſhrikes of feare. The Deniall then of the Immortality of the Soule is rather a *wiſh* than an *Opinion*, a corruption of the Heart and Will, than any Naturall Aſſertion of the underſtanding, which cannot but out of the footſteps and reliques of thoſe firſt ſacred Impreſſions, acknowledge a ſpirituall reſemblance in the Soule of Man unto ſome ſupreame Deity, whom the conſcience in all its Enormities doth diſpleaſe: And therefore it is obſerved that the Mind of an Atheiſt is continually wavering and unſatisfied, never able ſo to ſmother the inbred conſciouſnes of its immortality, as not to have continuall ſuggeſtions of feare and ſcruple. Whereſoever there is an impious Heart, there is alwayes a ſhivering judgement.

Bacon Eſſay of Atheiſme.

Another Reaſon of the Soules immortality may be drawne from the dignity and prehemineence of Man above other Creatures: for hee is made Lord over them, and they were ordained to be ſerviceable to him, and Miniſters for his contentments: which dignity cannot poſsibly ſtand with the Mortality of the Soule. For ſhould not many other Creatures farre exceed Man in the Durance of their being? And even in their time of living together, how ſubject to weakeneſſes, ſickneſſe, languiſhing, cares, feare, jealouſies, diſcontents, and all other miſeries of Mind and Body, is the whole Nature of Man, of all which, other creatures feele the leaſt diſturbance?

Οὐ μὲν γάρ τι οἵ ἐστι ἐλεγχινέες ἀνδρες. *Iliad. p. 446.*

Are

Are not Men here, beyond the rest, the very proper subjects and receptacles of misery? Is not our heart made the Naturall center of feares and sorrowes? and our Minds, as it were, Hives to entertaine numberlesse swarmes of stinging and thorny Cares? Are wee not Vassals and Slaves to many distempered passions? Have not our very Contents their terror, and our Peace disturbance? Are not all our Comforts, wherewith wee strive to glut and stuffe our selves here, the glorious Vanities, and golden delusions and cosenages of the world? And how miserable must their miseries be, whose very happinesse is unhappy? And for Reason, what comfort could wee finde in it, when it would alwayes be presenting unto us the consideration of an eternall losse of all our contentments, and still affright us with the dark and hideous conceit of Annihilation? Mortality and Corruption makes Unreasonablenesse a Priviledge; And in this case the Beasts would be so much the more happy than Man, by how much the lesse they know their owne wretchednesse. An Atheist would be in this life farre happier than he is, if he could bring himselfe to have as little Reason as he hath Religion.

Another Reason may be taken from the Nature of Mans reasonable Faculties. To every Power in Man, as God hath assigned a peculiar operation, so likewise hath hee given it Objects of equall extent thereunto, which are therefore able to accomplish its naturall desires, whereby it

Diogenes vocare solebat ἀνθρώπους ἀντὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Laert. lib. 6. Nisi ἀνθρωπος ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ. Solon ad Croesum. vid. Theodoret. Serm. 5. de natura Hom. & Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 3. p. 316. 317. Edit. Hieron.

it fasteneth on them. And for this cause from the Nature of the Objects, wee easily rise to know the Nature both of the Faculties and Essence; for from the Essence flowes naturally the Faculty, from the Faculty is naturally educed the Operation, which requires naturally Objects proportionall, convenient, satisfactory, and of equall extent. Where therefore no mortall object beares full convenience, nor is able to satiate and quiet the Faculty, there it and the Essence, from which it flowes, are both immortall. Now we see sensitive Powers finde in this life full satisfaction, as the Sight from all the Variety of Colours, the Eare of sounds, and the like: only the Reasonable Parts, the Understanding, and the Will can never be repleniſhed in this estate of Mortality. Have they as great and wide contentments, as the whole frame of Nature can here afford them; still their pursuites are restlesse, still they find an absence and want of something, which they cannot finde. *Orbis Alexandro angustus*; In this case every man is like *Alexander*. This world wherein wee now converse, is too straight and empty to fill the vastnesse, and limit the desires of the Soule of Man. Only the sight and possession of God, the most infinite good, can satisfie our Understandings and our Wills. For both these Faculties (as all others in *suo Genere*) ayme at *summum*. The Understanding is carried *ad summam Causam* to the *first of Truths*; the Will *ad summum Bonum* to the *last of Ends*; and therefore he only which is the First and the Last,

Fecisti nos ad te, & irrequietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te. Aug. Confes. l. 1. c. 1. vid. Ibid. lib. 4. cap. 10. 12. de Trinit. lib. 13. cap 8. Omnis mihi Copia quæ Deus meus non est, Egestas est. Confess. lib. 13. c. 8. Vid. etiam de Civ. Dei. lib. 8. cap. 8. lib. 11. c. 13. l 12. c 1.

can satisfie these two searching and unquiet faculties. *Hi motus Animorum atq; hæc certamina.*

These are the Motions, this the strife
Of Soules, aspiring unto life.

All the Knowledge we heap up here, serves only as a Mirrour wherein to view our ignorance, and wee have only light enough to discover that wee are in the dark. And indeed, were there no Estate wherein Knowledge should receive a Perfection, and be throughly proportioned to the Heart of man, The labour of getting the Knowledge wee have, and the vexation for the want of what wee have not, and the griefe of parting so soone with it, would render the vexation of it farre greater than the content.

Hoc est quòd palles? cur quis non prandeat hoc est?
Is this the fruit, for which we fast?
And by pale studies sooner waste?

Do we toyle and sweat, and even melt our selves away for that which wee sooner forsake than finde? Doe wee deny our selves the contentments and satisfactions most agreeable to our corporeall condition, being without hope of accomplishing our wishes in another estate? It is naturall for gaining of Knowledge to hasten unto that whereby we loose both it and our selves? and to labour for such a purchase, which like lightning is at once begun and ended, yea indeed sooner lost than gotten? Certainly were man not conscious of his owne immortality, there could

could be no ſtronger inducement to ſottiſhneſſe, luxury, riot, ſenſuality, and all other unbridled practiſes. It is regiſtred for the impiety of Atheiſts; *Let us eat and drink, for to morrow wee ſhall dye.*

Another Reaſon may be framed after the ſame manner, as was that to prove the *Spirituality* of the Soule from the manner of its operation. And it is grounded on thoſe two ordinary Axiomes in Philoſophy, That *every thing is received according to the quality of the Receiver*, and that *every thing hath the ſame manner of Eſſence, as it hath of operation.* Now the Soule of Man can eaſily receive impreſsions and conceits of immortality, and diſcourſe thereupon: therefore alſo it is in its owne Eſſence and nature immortall. Wee ſee even betweene things meerely corporeall, as the *Object* and the ſenſitive *Organ*, how ſmall a diſproportion works incapacity. Much more muſt it be found in ſo great a difference as would be betweene immortality of Objects and corruption of the Soule that worketh on them. We cannot picture an Angel or Spirit, nor make any immateriall ſtamp in a piece of wax, ſince a *corporeall* ſubſtance is capable of none but corporeall impreſsions. And therefore wee ſee that even amongſt Bodies, the more pure and ſubtile they are, the more are they exempted from the perception of the quickeſt and moſt ſpirituall ſenſe, the ſight. Now the mind of man in Underſtanding, is but as wax to the ſeale, or as a Table and Picture to an Object which it repreſents: which

is the ground of that Paradox in *Ariſtotle*, that in underſtanding the Soule is (as it were) made the Object that is underſtood. Becauſe, as the Wax, after it is ſtamped, is in ſome ſort the very Seale it ſelfe that ſtamp'd it, namely *Repreſentativè*, by way of Image and reſemblance; ſo the Soule, in receiving the ſpecies of any Object, is made the picture and image of the thing it ſelfe. Now the underſtanding, being able to apprehend immortality (yea indeed apprehending every corporeall ſubſtance, as if it were immortall, I meane by purging it from all groſſe materiall and corruptible qualities) muſt therefore needs of it ſelfe be of an immortall Nature. And from the latter of thoſe two Principles, which I ſpake of, namely, that the quality of the *Being* may be gathered from the Nature of the *Operation*, *Ariſtotle* inferres the *ſeparability* and *independance* of the underſtanding on the Body, in the third *de Animâ* afore-named: For the Soule being able to work without the concurrence of any bodily Organ to the very act it ſelfe (as was before ſhewed) muſt needs alſo be able to ſubſiſt by its owne nature, without the concurrence of any matter to ſuſtaine it. And therefore hee ſaith in the ſame place, that *the underſtanding* is *ſeparable*, *uncompounded*, *impaſſible*; all arguments of *immortality*. Other reaſons are produced for the proofe hereof, taken from the cauſes of corruption, which is wrought either by Contraries working and eating out Nature; or by Defect of the Preſerving cauſe, as light is decayed by abſence

ſence of the Sunne; or thirdly by corruption of the ſubject whereon it depends. None whereof can be verified in the Soule. For firſt, how can any thing be contrary to the Soule, which receiveth perfection from all things? for *Intellectus omnia intelligit*, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, yea wherein all Contraries are reconciled and put off their Oppoſition? For (as a great man excellently ſpeaketh) thoſe things, which deſtroy one another in the *World*, maintaine and perfect one another in the *Minde*; one being a meanes for the clearer apprehenſion of the other. Secondly, God, who is the only Efficient of the Soule (being elſe in it ſelfe ſimple and indiviſible, and therefore not capable of death, but only of Annihilation) doth never faile, and hath himſelfe promiſed never to bring it unto nothing. And laſtly, the Soule depends not, as doe other Formes, either in Operation or Being, on the Body, being not only *Actus informans*, but *ſubſiſtens* too, by its owne abſolute vertue.

Mornay of Chriſtian Religion. Chap. 14.

CHAP. XXXV.

Of the Honour of Humane Bodies by Creation, by Resurrection; of the Endowments of Glorified Bodies.

Vid. Cal. Rhodig. lib. 2. cap. 9. 10. 11. Aug. de Gen. ad lit. l. 6. c. 12. &c. Platonicâ sententiâ Carter, Apostolicâ Templum. Tertul. de Anim. Tertull. de Carne Christi. Vid. Aug. lib. 7. de Trinit. cap. 6.

AND now, that this particular of *immortality* may farther redound both to the Honour and comfort of Man, I must fall upon a short digression touching mans *Body*: wherein I intend not to meddle with the Question, How mans Body may be said to be made after the *Image of God* (which sure is not any otherwise, than as it is a sanctified and shall be a Blessed Vessell, but not as some have conceited, as if it were in Creation *Imago Christi futuri, nec Dei opus tantum, sed & Pignus*: As if Christ had beene the patterne of our Honour, and not wee of his Infirmity, since the Scripture saith, Hee was made like unto us in all things, and that he Assumed our Nature, but never that we were, but that we shall be like unto him) not, I say, to meddle with this, I will only briefly consider the Dignity thereof in the particular of *immortality*, both in the first *structure*, and in the last Resurrection of it. The Creation of our Bodies, and the Redemption of our Bodies, as the Apostle calls it. What Immunity was at first given, and what Honour shall at last be restored to it. In which latter sense it shall certainly be *Secundum Imaginem*, after his Image, who

who was *Primitiæ* the Firſt fruits of them that riſe. That as in his Humility his Glory was hid in our Mortality, ſo in our Exaltation our Mortality ſhall be ſwallowed up of his Glory. And for the firſt eſtate of Mans Body, we conclude in a word: that it was partly Mortall, and partly Immortall: *Mortall* in regard of poſſibility of Dying, becauſe it was affected with the mutuall Action and Paſſion of corruptible elements: for which reaſon it ſtood in need of reparation and recovery of it ſelfe by food, as being ſtill *Corpus Animale*, and not *Spirituale*, as S^t. *Paul* diſtinguiſheth, a Naturall, but not a Spirituall Body. But it was *Immortall*, that is, Exempted from the Law of Death and Diſſolution of the Elements, in vertue of Gods Covenant with man, upon condition of his Obedience. It was Mortall *Conditione Corporis*, by the Condition of a Body; but immortall *Beneficio Conditoris*, by the Benefit of its Creation; elſe God had planted in the Soule ſuch naturall deſires of a Body wherein to work as could not be naturally attained; For the Soule did naturally deſire to remaine ſtill in the body. In the naturall Body of *Adam* there was no ſin, and therefore no death, which is the wages of ſinne.

Aug. de Gen. ad lit. lib. 6. cap. 25. de Civ. dei. l. 13. c. 19 Vide quæ fuſe & erudite diſſerit Georg. Zeemun. Tract. de Imag. Dei. cap. 8 ſect. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5 —.

I come now to the Redemption of our Bodies already performed in *Pignore & in Primitiis*, In our Head, & in ſome few of his Members, *Enoch*, *Elias*, and (as is probable) in thoſe dead Bodies which aroſe to teſtifie the Divine power of our crucified Saviour; and ſhall be totally accompliſhed

Eph. 4 30. plished at that *day of Redemption*, as the same Apostle calls the Last day: that day of a full and finall Redemption, *when Death, the last enemy, shall be overcome.* Luk. 21. 28. And well may it be called a *day of Redemption*, not only in regard of the *Creature*, which yet groaneth under the Malediction and Tyrannie of sinfull Man: nor yet only in respect of *Mans Soule*, which, though it be before admitted unto the purchased Possession of the Glorifying Vision, and lives no more by Faith alone, but by sight, shall yet then receive a more abundant fulnesse thereof, as being the day of the Manifestation and plenary discovery both of the Punishing Glory of God in the Wicked, and of his Merciful and Admirable Glory in the Saints: but also and (as I think) most especially in respect of the Body. For there is, by vertue of that Omnipotent Sacrifice, a double kinde of Redemption wrought for us: The one *Vindicative*, giving us *Immunity* from all spirituall dangers, delivering us from the Tyrannie of our Enemies, from the Severity, Justice, and Curse of the Law; which is commonly in the New Testament called simply Λύτρωσις and Ἀπολύτρωσις, a Deliverance from evill; The other *Purchasing*, or Munificent, by not only freeing us from our own wretchednesse, but farther conferring upon us a Positive and a Glorious Honour, which S^t. *John* calls ἐξουσία, a Power, Priviledge, Prerogative, and Title unto all the Glorious Promises of Immortality: which likewise S^t. *Paul* calls Ἀπολύτρωσις τῆς περιποιήσεως, the *Redemption of a purchased Possession*, and

Luk. 1. 68. Heb. 9. 12. Luk. 21. 28. Rom. 8. 23. Eph. 1. 7.

Ioh. 1. 12.

Eph. 1. 14.

and a *Redemption unto the Adoption of Sonnes.* Now then the Laſt day is not Totally and Perfectly a *day of Redemption* unto our Soules in either of theſe ſenſes, ſince they are in this life delivered from the Malediction of the Law, from the Wrath of the Judge, from the Tyrannie of the Enemie, from the Raigne of Sinne, and by Death freed not only from the Dominion, but from the Poſſeſſion, or Aſſault of the Enemie; not only from the Kingdome, but from the Body of Sinne; and is withall in good part poſſeſſed of that Bliſſe, which it ſhall more fully enjoy at laſt. But our *Bodies*, though before that Great day they partake much of the benefits of Redemption, as being here ſanctified veſſells, freed from the Authority and Power of the Devill, World, Fleſh, and from the Curſe of Death too, wherein they part not only with life, but with ſinne; yet after all this doe they want ſome part of either Redemption: as namely to be raiſed and delivered from that diſhonour and corruption, which the laſt Enemie hath brought upon them: and to be Admitted into thoſe Manſions, and inveſted with that Glory, whereby they ſhall be Totally poſſeſſed of their Redemption. In a word, the Soule is in its ſeparation fully delivered from all Enemies, which is the firſt; and in a great meaſure enjoyeth the Viſion of God, which is the ſecond part or degree of mans Redemption. But the Body is not till its Reſurrection, either quite freed from its Enemie, or at all poſſeſſed of its Glory. I meane in its ſelfe, though it be in its

Head, who is *Primitiæ & Pignus Reſurrectionis*, the firſt fruits and earneſt of our Conqueſt over Death.

Touching the Dignity of our Bodies, though there be more comfort to be had in the Expectation, than Curioſity in the enquirie after it; yet what is uſually granted, I ſhall briefly ſet down. And firſt, it ſhall be Raiſed a *whole entire and perfect Body*, with all the parts beſt fitted to be Receptacles of Glory; freed from all either the Uſherers in, or Attendants and followers on the Grave, Age, Infirmity, Sickneſſe, Corruption, Ignominie, and Diſhonour: And ſhall riſe a true, whole, ſtrong, and honourable Body. For though every part of the Body ſhall not have thoſe peculiar uſes, which here they have, ſince they *neither eat, nor drink, marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the Angels of God*: yet ſhall not any part be loſt: *Licet enim officiis liberentur, judiciis retinentur*: Though they are freed from their Temporall ſervice, for which they were here ordained, yet muſt they be reſerved for receiving their judgment, whether it be unto Glory, or unto Diſhonour.

Tertull.

The ſecond Dignity is that Change and Alteration of our Body from a *Naturall* to a *Spirituall Body*, whereby is not meant any Tranſubſtantiation from a Corporeall to a Spirituall ſubſtance: For our Bodies ſhall, after the Reſurrection, be conformable unto Chriſts body, which, though glorious, *was not yet a Spirit, but had fleſh and bone, as we have.* Nor is it to be underſtood of a thinne,

Vid. Aug. de Civ. Dei. lib. 13. cap. 20. & 23. & Epiſt. 146.

a thinne, Aereall, Inviſible Body (as ſome have collected) ſince Chriſt ſaith of his Body, after he was riſen, *Videte, Palpate.* Whereſoever it is, it hath both its quantity, and all ſenſible qualities of a Body Glorified with it. It is a ſtrong Argument, that it is not there, where it is not ſenſible; And therefore the Doctrines of *Vbiquity*, and Tranſubſtantiation, as they give Chriſt more thã he is pleaſed to owne, an Immenſity of Body; ſo doe they ſpoyle him of that, which hee hath beene pleaſed for our ſakes to aſſume; Extenſion, Compacture, Maſſineſſe, Viſibility, and other the like ſenſible Properties, which cannot ſtand with that pretended miracle whereby they make Chriſts Body (even now a Creature, and like unto ours in ſubſtance, though not in qualities of Corruptibility, Infirmity, Ignominie, Animality) to be truly inveſted with the very immediate properties of the Deity. True indeed it is, that the Body of Chriſt hath an efficacie and operation in all parts of the world; it worketh in Heaven with God the Father by *Interceſſion*; amongſt the bleſſed Angels by *Confirmation*; in Earth, and that in all ages, and in all places amongſt Men, by Juſtification, and Comfort; in Hell amongſt the Devils and Damned, by the Tremblings and Feares of a condemning and convicting Faith. But Operation requireth only a preſence of Vertue, not of Subſtance. For doth not the Sunne work wonderfull effects in the bowels of the Earth, it ſelfe notwithſtanding being a fixed Planet in the Heaven? And why ſhould not the

Sunne of Righteouſneſſe work as much at the like diſtance, as the Sunne of Nature? Why ſhould he not be as Powerfull Abſent, as he was Hoped? Or why ſhould the Not preſence of his Body make that uneffectuall now, which the Not exiſting could not before his Incarnation? Why ſhould we miſtruſt the Eyes of *Stephen*, that ſaw him in Heaven, at ſuch a Diſtance of place, when *Abraham* could ſee him in his own bowels through ſo great a Diſtance of Time?

That Speech then, that the Body ſhall be a Spirituall Body, is not to be underſtood in either of thoſe former ſenſes: but it is to be underſtood firſt of the more immediate Union and full *Inhabitation* of the vertue and vigour of Gods Spirit in our Bodies, quickning and for ever ſuſtaining them without any Aſſiſtance of Naturall or Animall qualities, for the repairing and augmenting of them in recompence of that, which by labour and infirmity, and the naturall oppoſition of the Elements, is daily diminiſhed. Secondly, it ſhall be ſo called in regard of its *Obedience* & Totall Subjection to the Spirit of God, without any manner of Reluctance and diſlike. Thirdly, in reſpect of thoſe *Spirituall qualities*, thoſe *Prerogatives of the Fleſh*, with which it ſhall be adorned, which are

Firſt, a *Shining* and Glorious *Light*, wherewithall it ſhall be cloathed as with a Garment: for *the Juſt ſhall ſhine as the Sunne in the Firmament*. Now, this ſhal be wrought firſt by vertue of that *Communion*, which wee have with Chriſt our Head,

Head, whoſe Body, even in its Mortality, *did ſhine like the Sunne, and had his cloathes white as light.* And ſecondly, by *diffuſion* and *Redundancie* from our Soule upon our Body, which by the Beatificall Viſion, filled with a Spirituall and unconceiveable brightneſſe, ſhall work upon the Body, as on a Subject made throughly Obedient to its Power unto the Production of alike qualities.

De mirâ vi Animæ in Corpus, vide Cœl Rhodig. lib. 11. cap. 15. 16.

The ſecond Spirituall Property ſhall be *Impaſſibility*, not in reſpect of *Perfective*, but in reſpect of annoying, diſquieting, or *deſtructive Paſſion.* There ſhall not be any Warre in the members, any fighting and mutuall languiſhing of the Elements; but they ſhall all be ſuſtained in their full ſtrength by vertue of Chriſts Communion, of the Inhabitation of the Spirit, of the Dominion of the Glorified Soule. There ſhall be no need of reſt, or ſleepe, or meat, all which are here requiſite for the ſupply of our Infirmities and daily defects, and are only the Comforts of Pilgrimage, not the Bleſſedneſſe of Poſſeſſion. For although Chriſt after his Reſurrection did eat before his Diſciples, yet this was none otherwiſe done, than that other, the Retaining of his wounds, which was only for our ſakes; that our Faith touching the Truth of his Body, might not be without theſe viſible and inferiour Witneſſes, by which he was pleaſed to make his very Glorified fleſh a proportioned Object to our fraile ſenſe and faith, that ſo wee might thence learne confidently to rely for our ſelves as well on the Benefit of his Exaltation, as of his Humility. Or

De Civ. Dei. lib. 14.

it was done (as S^t. *Auguſtine* ſpeaks) *Non ex Neceſſitate, ſed ex Poteſtate*: as the Sunne is ſaid to draw and ſuck up ſtanding waters: *Non Pabuli Egeſtate, ſed Virtutis Magnitudine*, Not to Nouriſh, but to Manifeſt its vertue.

Thirdly, the Body ſhall be a *ſtrong and beautifull* Body, throughly able to miniſter unto the Soule any ſervice, wherein it ſhall imploy it, and ſhall be no longer, as it is now, the clogge and luggage thereof. It ſhall likewiſe be free from all blemiſh and deformity (which ever ariſeth out of the diſtemper & diſcord of the Elements) (as it is by good probability conjectured) reduced unto a full, comely and convenient ſtature, even in thoſe, who were in their Death contemptible, Infants, lame, diſmembred, or any other way diſhonoured with the miſeries of corruption; *Naturæ, non injuriæ reddimur*, we ſhall be reſtored to our *Nature*, but not to our *ſhame*; the Duſt ſhall ſtill retaine and bury our diſhonour, and it ſhall be one part of our Glory to be made fit for it.

Ita nihil periturum de Corpore ut nihil deforme maneat in Corpore. Vid. Aug. Enchirid. c 91. & de Civ. Dei. lib. 22. cap. 19. 20. Tertul. de Reſur. vitia detrahentur, Natura ſervabitur. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 22. cap. 17.

The laſt quality of our Bodies, which I ſhall obſerve, is a perfect *ſubtilty* and *agility*, beſt befitting their ſervice for the Soule in all ſpeedy motion; which ſurely ſhall be there ſo much the more requiſite, than here on earth, by how much Heaven is a more ample and ſpacious Country. And thus while the Body is made an attendant on the Soules glory, it is likewiſe a partaker of it. Unto theſe, adde the ſweet Harmony of the Affections, the exact and exquiſite Operation of the ſenſes,

ſenſes, the Bodily communion and fellowſhip of the Saints, and, above all, the Eternall Corporeall viſion of that moſt ſacred Body, whence all ours derive their degrees of Honour, whoſe preſence were truly and without any Hyperbole able to make Hell it ſelfe a Place of Glory: how much more that Country, and thoſe Manſions, where the Soule likewiſe ſhall be ſwallowed up with the immediate viſion and fruition of Divine Glory. Our Soules are not here noble enough to conceive what our Bodies ſhall be there.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Of that part of Gods Image in the Soule, which anſwereth to his Power, Wiſedome, Knowledge, Holines. Of Mans Dominion over other Creatures. Of his Love to Knowledge. What remainders we retaine of Originall Iuſtice.

THe other Properties or Attributes of God, of which Mans Soule beareth an *Image* & dark reſemblance, are thoſe, which according to our Apprehenſion ſeeme not ſo Intrinſecall and Eſſentiall as the former. And they are ſuch as may be either generally collected from the Manifeſtation of his *works*, or more particularly from his *word*. Theſe, which referre unto *his Works*, are his *Power* in Making and Ruling them; his *Wiſedom* in Ordering and

and Preserving them; his *Knowledge* in the Contemplation of them: and of these it pleaseth him at the first to bestow some few degrees upon mans Soule.

Concerning the Attribute of *Power*, most certaine it is that those great parts of Gods workmanship, *Creation*, and *Redemption*, are incommunicably belonging unto him as his owne Prerogative Royall. Insomuch that it were desperate blasphemy to assume unto our selves the least resemblance of them. Yet in many other proceedings of Gods works, there is some Analogie and Resemblance in the Works of Men. For first, what are all the motions and courses of *Nature*, but the Ordinary works of God? All formes and intrinsecall Motive Principles are indeed but his Instruments; for *by him we live, and move, and have our being*. And of all other works, mans only imitate *Nature*: as *Aristotle* observes of the Works of *Art*, which peculiarly belong unto Man (all other Creatures being carried by that naturall instinct, which is Intrinsecally belonging to their condition, without any manner of Art or variety.) The Resemblances of Nature in the Works of Art are chiefly seene in these two Proportions: First, as Nature doth nothing in Vaine, but in all her Works aymes at some End, the *Perfection*, or the *Ornament*, or the *Conservation* of the Universe (for those are the three ends of Nature subordinate to the Maine, which is, the Glory of the Maker) so likewise are the works of Art all directed by the understanding to some

one

one of those ends; either to the perfection of Men, such are all those, which informe the Vnderstanding, and governe the life: or to his Conservation, as those directed to the furthering of his welfare, and repairing the decayes, or sheltering the weaknesses of Nature: or lastly to his Ornament, such as are those Elegancies of Art, and Curiosities of Invention, which, though not necessary to his Being, yet are speciall instruments of his delight, either Sensitive or Intellectuall.

The second Resemblance, is betweene the Manner and Progresse of their Workes: for as the Method of nature is to proceed, *ab imperfectioribus ad Perfectiora*, and *per determinata Media ad suum Finem*; So Art likewise as is plaine in those which are Manuall) by certain fixed rules, which alter not, proceeds to the producing of a more perfect effect, from more rough and unformed beginnings, by the help of Instruments, appropriated to particular services. But this, because it limits Mans dignity, as well as commends it, I forbeare to speake of. Though even herein also we doe seeme to imitate God, who in his great worke of Creation did proceed both by succession of Time, and degrees of Perfection; only it is *Necessity* in us which was in him his *Will*.

To come therefore nearer, it is observable, that in the first Act of Gods power, in the Making and Framing of the World, there was Nothing here below created properly, immediatly, and totally, but the Chaos and Masse, or the

Earth without forme, and voide, out of the Obedience whereof, his Power did farther educe and extract those Wonderfull, Various, and Beautifull Formes, which doe evidently set forth unto the Soule of Man, the Glory and Majestie of him that made them. By a small Resemblance of this manner of Working, Man also in those Workes of Art, peculiar to him from other Creatures, doth *ex Potentia Obedientiali* (as the Schooles call it) out of the Obedience and Subjection of any proposed Masse produce, *Non per Naturam sed per Imperium*, not out of the Nature of the Subject, but by the command of Reason sundry formes of Art full of Decency and Beauty.

And for *Government*, I meane Subordinate, and by Derivation or Indulgence, it is manifest that all Creatures inhabiting the World with him were subdued unto Man; and, next unto the Glory of the great Maker, were ordained for his service and benefit*. And therefore, when ever wee finde any of them hurtfull and Rebellious, wee cannot but remember that the occasion thereof was our owne disloyalty; they doe but Revenge their great Masters wrong, and, out of a Faithfull care and jealousie to Preserve his Honour, Renounce their Fidelity and Obedience to a Traitour*. And indeed how can we looke to have our Dominion intire over Beasts and inferiour Creatures, when by continuall Enormities we make our selves as one of them?

This

* *V.d. Tertul. de Resurrect. c. 26. Ambros. Hexam l. 6. c. 6. Nyssen. Orat. 1. In faciamus hominem &c. Aug. de Gen. ad lit. lib. 3. c. 20. Damasc. de Orthod. fid. l. 2. cap 30. Sanctius hit animal mentis quæ capacius alitæ Detrat adhuc, & quod Diminuris in cæteris posset Natus Homo est Ovid Met. l. 1. Nota per precatum Homo defervit cum sub quo esse debuit subditus est cui supra quæ esse debuit. Aug. Tract 8. in Joan.*

Continued by the Generall *Providence of God*, whereby hee is pleaſed to preſerve things in that courſe of Subordination wherein firſt hee made them, and like a gracious Prince, to continue unto Man the uſe of his Creatures, even then when hee is a priſoner unto his Juſtice. *Renewed*, by the *Promiſe* and Grant made againe unto *Noah*. And there is a Double Promiſe under which wee may enjoy the Creatures, the one a *Morall Promiſe* made unto *Induſtry*, as, *The Diligent hand maketh Rich*; and, *hee that Ploweth his Land, ſhall have Plenty of Corne*: the other an *Evangelicall Promiſe* made unto *Piety*, and Faith in Chriſt, whereby is given unto Chriſtian men both a *freer uſe* of the Creatures than the *Jews* had, and a *purer uſe* than the *wicked* have. For, *unto the Cleane all things are Cleane.*

And this Grant of God doth ſometimes ſhew it ſelfe *extraordinarily*, as in the Obedience of the Crowes to *Eliah*, the Viper to *Paul*, the Lyons to *Daniel*, the Whale to *Jonah*, the Fire to the three Children, and the trembling and feare of wilde Beaſts towards many of the Martyrs: Alwayes *Ordinarily*, in ordering and diſpenſing the courſe of Nature ſo, as that Humane Society may be preſerved, both by power in ſubduing the Creatures which hee muſt uſe, and by wiſedome in eſcaping the Creatures which hee doth feare.

Euſeb. lib. 8. c. 7. Ignis Polycarpum non tetigit. Euſeb. l. 4. c. 14.

Now for the ſecond Attribute, * *Wiſedome*, there

* *Gen. 1. v. ult. Eccles. 7. 30.*

Col. 3. 10.
Gen. 2. 19. 23.

* Ioh. 1. 5.
Eph. 4. 17. 18.
Rom. 3. 13.
Col. 1. 21.
Prov. 22. 15.

there is also a remainder of the Image thereof in Man: for albeit, the fall and corruption * of Nature hath darkned his eyes, so that hee is enclined to worke Confusedly, or to walk as in a Maze, without Method or Order (as in a Storme the Guide of a Vessell is oftentimes to seek of his Art, and forced to yeeld to the windes and waves) yet certaine it is that in the minde of Man there still remaines a Pilot, or Light of Nature; many Principles of Practicall prudence, whereby (though for their faintings a man do's often miscarry and walke awry) the course of our Actions may be directed with successe and issue unto Civill and Honest ends. And this is evident, not only by the continuall practise of Grave and Wise men, in all States, Times, and Nations; but also by those sundry learned and judicious Precepts, which Historians, Politicians, and Philosophers have by their naturall Reason and Observation framed for the compassing of a Mans just ends, and also for Prevention and disappointment of such inconveniences as may hinder them.

Lastly, for the Attribute of Knowledge, It was doubtlesse after a most eminent manner at first infused into the Heart of Man, when hee was able by Intuition of the Creatures to give unto them all Names, according to their severall Properties and Natures; and in them to shew himselfe, as well a Philosopher, as a Lord. *Hee filled them*, sayth *Siracides*, *with the*

the Knowledge of Vnderſtanding. And herein, if wee will beleeve *Ariſtotle*, the Soule is moſt neerely like unto *God*, whoſe infinite Delight is the Eternall Knowledge and Contemplation of himſelfe, and his Works. Hereby, ſaith hee, the Soule of man is made moſt Beloved of God, and his minde, which is Allied unto God, is it ſelfe Divine, and, of all other parts of Man, moſt Divine. And this made the Serpent uſe that Inſinuation only, as moſt likely to prevaile, for compaſſing that Curſed and miſerable project of Mans ruine. By meanes of which Fall, though Man blinded his underſtanding, and robd himſelfe of this, as of all other bleſſed habits, I meane of thoſe excellent Degrees thereof, which he then enjoyed: yet ſtill the Deſire remaines Vaſt and impatient, and the purſuit ſo violent, that it proves often præjudiciall to the eſtate both of the Body and Minde. So that it is as true now, as ever, that Man is by Nature a Curious and inquiring Creature, of an Active and reſtleſſe Spirit, which is never quiet, except in Motion, winding it ſelfe into all the Pathes of Nature; and continually traverſing the World of Knowledge. There are two maine Deſires naturally ſtamped in each Creature; a Deſire of *Perfecting*, and a Deſire of *Perpetuating* himſelfe. Of theſe *Ariſtotle* attributeth in the higheſt degree, the latter unto each living Creature, when he ſaith, that of all the works of living Creatures, the moſt naturall is to Generate the like: and his Reaſon is διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐ τὸ θεῖον μετέχειν ἐ ἀθανατ. Becauſe hereby

Ethic. l. 10.

Lib. 2. de Anim. c. 4.

hereby that Immortality (the Principall end (as hee there supposeth) of all naturall Agents) which in their owne Individuals they cannot obtaine, they procure by deriving their Nature unto a continued off-spring and succession. But (though in regard of life it hold true of all) Man notwithstanding is to be exempted from the universality of this Assertion. And of himselfe that other desire of *Perfection*, which is principally the desire of Knowledge (for that is one of the principall advancements of the Soule) should not only in a Positive sense, as *Aristotle* hath determined in the Entrance to his Metaphysicks, but in a Superlative degree be verified, that He is by nature desirous of Knowledge. This being the Principall thing (to use *Aristotle* his owne reason) whereby Man doth [illegible] Partake of *Divinity*, as I observed before out of *Aristotle* himselfe. And the reason of the difference betweene Man and other Creatures in this particular is: First, Because Man hath not such necessary use of that former desire, as others have, in regard of his owne Immortality, which takes away the Necessity of Propagation to sustaine his Nature. And secondly, because Knowledge, the Perfection of the Soule, is to Man (as I may so speake) a kinde of *Generation*, being of sufficientie to exempt the Person, endued therewith, from all injurie of Time, and making him to survive and out-live his owne Mortality. So that when the Body hath surrendred unto each Region of the World those Elements and Principles,

ciples whereof it was compos'd, and hath not so much as Dust and Cinders left to testifie that Being, which once it had, then doth the Name lie wrapped in the Monuments of Knowledge, beyond the reach of Fate and Corruption.

The Attributes of God, which are manifested more especially in his Word, though sundry, yet (as farre forth as they had ever any Image in Man) may be comprized in this more Generall one of *Holinesse*. Whereby I understand that Absolute and Infinite Goodnesse of his Nature, which is in him most Perfect, Pure, and Eternall. Of which, though Man according to that measure, as it was unto him communicated, was in his great Fall utterly rob'd and spoyl'd, as not being able in any thing to resemble it, or to retaine any the least Prints of those Pure and Divine Impressions of Originall Righteousnesse; yet still there remaines, even in depraved and Polluted Nature some shadowes thereof: There is stil the *Opus Operatum* in many Actions of Mortality, though the Obliquity of the Heart, and Ignorance of the true end, whether it should be directed, take away the Goodnesse and the Sanctity thereof. The top and highest pitch of Nature toucheth the bottome and lowest of Grace. We have in us the Testimonies, though not the Goodnesse of our first estate; the Ruines of a Temple to be lamented, though not the holy Places thereof to be Inhabited. It is true indeed those great endowments of the most severe and illightned Heathen, were indeed but glorious

miseries and withered Vertues, in that they proceeded from a depraved Nature, and aymed at sinister and false ends: yet withall both the corruption of them proves their precedent losse (which also the Heathen themselves espied in their distinction of Ages into Golden and Iron times:) And likewise the pursuit and practice of them (though weak, imperfect, corrupt) imply manifestly that there was much more an Originall Aspiring of Nature in her perfection to be like her Maker in an absolute and universall Purity. Now in this Rectitude and Perfect Regularity of the Soule in this divine Habit of Originall Justice did man most eminently beare the Image and Signature of God on him. And therefore notwithstanding we continue still Immortall, Spirituall, Reasonable; yet we are said to have defaced that Image in us by our hereditary Pollution. And hee alwayes recovereth most thereof, who in the greatest measure repaireth the ruines, and vindicateth the Lapses of his decayed estate, unto that prime Originall Purity, wherein he was Created.

These are the Dignities of the Soule considered wholy in it selfe. In all which it farre surmounts the greatest perfections, which the Body or any Faculty thereof are endowed withall. And yet such is the preposterous and unnaturall baseneſſe of many men, that they are content to make their Soules vassals to their owne Servant. How do they force their Understandings, which in their owne worthiest objects, those deepe and

Divine

Divine Contemplations, are as drowzie as *Endymion*, to ſpend and waſte themſelves in proud, luxurious, vaniſhing Inventions? How doe they enthrall that Supreame and Architectonicall Power in Mans little World, his Will, to the Tyrannie of ſlaviſh appetite, and ſenſuall deſires? as if they ſerved here but as Cookes to dreſſe their owne Bodies for the Wormes? Strange is it that Man, conſcious to himſelfe of Immortality and of an Heroicall and Heavenly complexion, that hath received ſuch immediate Impreſsions of God, and is the very Modell of all Natures Perfections, ſhould ſo much degrade himſelfe, as to doat only on that part, which is the vaſſall and ſlave of Death. If there were no other miſchife which ſinne did the Soule but to debaſe it, even that were argument ſufficient for noble ſpirits to have it in deteſtation. For man being in honour, and which underſtandeth not, is like the beaſts that periſh.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of the Faculty of Vnderstanding. Its operations outward upon the Object, Inward upon the Will. Of Knowledge, What it is. The naturall Desire and Love of it. Apprehension, Iudgement, Retention requisite unto right Knowledge. Severall kindes of Knowledge. The Originall Knowledge given unto Man in his Creation. The Benefits of Knowledge. Of Ignorance Naturall, Voluntary, Penall. Of Curiosity. Of Opinion; the Causes of it, Disproportion betweene the Object and the Faculty, and an Acute Versatilousnesse of Conceits. The benefit of Modest Hesitancie.

NOw it followes to speak of the parts or principall powers of the Soule, which are the *Vnderstanding*, and the *will*. Concerning the Understanding, the Dignity thereof, though it may partly be perceived in the *Latitude* and excellent Variety of its *Objects*, being the whole world of things (for *Ens & Intelligibile* are reciprocall, *& omnia intelligit*, saith *Aristotle* of the

Arist. de Anim. lib. 3.

the understanding) yet principally it proceeds from the *Operations* of it both *Ad extra* in respect of the *Objects*, and *ad intra* in respect of *the Will.* The one is a *Contemplative*, the other a more *Practique* office, whereby the speculations of the former are accommodated unto any either Morall or Civill Actions. Those which respect the Objects, are either Passive, or Active Operations. *Passive* I call those first Perceptions and apprehensions of the Soule, whereby it receiveth the *simple* species of some Object from immediate Impression thereof by the Ministry of the Soule; as when I understand one Object to be a Man, another a Tree, by Administration and Assistance of the Eye, which presents the Species of either.

Another sort of Passive Operations (that is of such as are grounded on Impressions received from Objects) are *mixed Operations* of Compounding, Dividing, Collecting, Concluding, which wee call *Discourse.* Of all which to speake according to their Logicall Nature, would be impertinent. Their Excellencie chiefly stands in the End whereunto they move and serve, which is *Knowledge*; of the which, I shall therefore here speak a few things.

Knowledge is the Assimilation of the Understanding unto the things which it understandeth, by those Intelligible Species which doe Irradiate it, and put the power of it into Act. For as the beames of the Sunne shining on a glasse

Aquin. part. 1. q. 14. a. 2.

glasse, doe there work the Image of the Sunne: so the species and resemblances of things being convayed on the Understanding, doe there work their owne Image. In which respect the Philosopher saith, That the Intellect becommeth All things by being capable of proper impressions from them: As in a Painters Table, wee call that a face, a hand, a foot, a tree, which is the lively Image and Representation of such things unto the eye.

Aristot. de Anim. lib. 3. cap. 4. & 5.

There is not any Desire more noble, nor more Naturall unto a Man (who hath not like *Saul* hid himselfe amongst the stuffe, and lost himselfe in the Low and perishing provisions for Lust) than is this *Desire of Knowledge*. Nature dictating to every Creature to be more intent upon its Specificall than upon its Genericall perfection. And hence it is that though *Man* be perfectest of all Creatures, yet many doe excell him in sensitive Perfection. Some in exquisitenesse of Sight; others of Hearing; others of Taste, Touch, and Smell; others of Swiftnesse and of Strength; Nature thereby teaching us to imitate her in perfecting, and supplying of our Desires, not to terminate them there, where when wee have made the best Provision wee can, many Beasts will surpasse us: but to direct our Diligence most to the improving of our owne specificall and rationall perfection, to wit, our Understandings. Other Faculties are tyred, and will be apt to nauseate, and surfet on their Objects.

Vid. Plin. lib. 7. in Proem. Et Lactant. de Opific. Dei. c. 2, 3. Et Cæl. Rhodig. lib. 2. cap. 9.

But

But *Knowledge* as knowledge, doth never either burden or cloy the Minde, no more than a Covetous man is wearied with growing Rich: And therefore the Philosopher telleth us that Knowledge is the * *Rest of the Understanding*, wherein it taketh delight as a Thing in its naturall Place.

And so great is this Delight, that Men have ventured on much Trouble to procure it. * As *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Democritus*, travelled into remote Countries to gather Knowledge, as *Salomon* sent to *Ophir* for Gold. And as it makes adventurous to undertake Troubles, so it helps men to beare them. A true lover of Knowledge will hardly be over-borne with any Ordinary distresse, if it doe not violate, and restraine that particular appetite. If hee may enjoy the Delights of Learning, hee will be very moderately affected with his other restraints. *Archimedes* was not sensible of the losse of *Syracuse*, being wholly intent upon a Mathematicall Demonstration. And *Demetrius Phalereus* deceived the Calamity of his Banishment by the sweetnesse of his Studies. A Man is never afflicted to the Quick, but when hee is punish'd in his most Delightfull Affections, of all which the most predominant in Rationall men is this of Knowledge.

And therefore as the first Creature God formed was *Light* (to shew that all his Works were made in Wisedome, that they might

* Τὸ γὰρ ἀριστον ἡ τέλος τις διανοιας νόησις ἡ θεωρία λεγομένη. *Aristot. Physic. l.7.c.3.Text.20.* ἕξις ἐπιστημὴ. *Clem. Alex. Strom lib.2.* Τὸ πόθος τῆς γνώσεως ἀνάπαυσις ἐστι. *Clem. Alex. paed.lib.1 c.6.*

* *Vid. Valer. Max. l.8.c.7. Theodoret.Serm. de fide.Clem. Alex.Strom.lib.1. p.322,323.*

Cicero de finibus lib. 5.

set forth and manifest his Glory) so the first motion of *Adam* after his Creation was towards *Knowledge*. By his Exercise of Knowledge hee shewed Gods Image in him, and by the Ambition after more hee lost it: As no Man sinnes easier than in the Thing which hee best loves. And for this cause wee may observe that Christs frequentest Miracles were shewed in opening the Eyes of the blind, and the Eares of the Deafe and Dumb. His Mercies being perfect, extended themselves on those Faculties which are the chiefe Instruments of *Knowledge* in Men which they most love.

Malunt homines mente lamentari quàm lætari in Amentiâ. Aug. Civ. Dei. l 11. c. 27.

And this love of *Knowledge* is seene evidently in this, that men had rather have sober Calamities, than mad pleasures, and more freely choose cleare Intellectuals with miserie, than disturb'd with mirth. Many Men better content themselves with but a crazie body, for the fruition of their studies, than to purchase a better Health at so great a Price as the losse of Learning.

But the Principall Excellencie of *Knowledge* is this, That it guideth the Soule to *God*; and so doth all kinde of Right Knowledge in divers respects. For first, there is scarce any Science properly so called, which hath not its *Arcana* to pose and amaze the Understanding, as well as its more easie Conclusions to satisfie it. Such as are in Philosophie, those

thoſe *Occult Sympathies and Antipathies*, of which naturall Reaſon can render no Account at all: which overcomming the utmoſt Vigour of humane Diſquiſition, muſt needs enforce us to beleeve that there is an Admirable Wiſedome that diſpoſeth, and an infinite Knowledge that comprehendeth thoſe ſecrets which we are not able to fathome.

Againe, ſince the *Knowledge* of Things is either of their *Beings*, or of their *Properties* and Operations: And Nature abhorreth the Motion of proceeding [a] *in Infinitum*: in either of theſe, neceſſary it is, that the Minde of man [b] tracing the footſteps of naturall things, muſt by the Act of *Logicall Reſolution* at laſt ariſe to him who is the fountaine of all *Being*, the Firſt of all *Causes*, the Supreame over all *Movers*, in whom all the reſt have their Beings and Motions founded. And this the Lord in the Prophet hath delivered unto us [c]. *I will heare the Heavens, and the Heavens ſhall heare the Earth, and the Earth the Corne and Wine, and they Jezreel. Jezreel* cannot ſubſiſt without Corne and Wine, ſhee cries to them to help it. Theſe cannot help without the Earth to produce them, they cry to that to be fruitfull. The Earth can bring forth nothing of it ſelfe without Influence, benignity, and comfortable ſhowers from the Heavens, it cries to them for ayde. [d] The Heavens cannot give Raine nor Warmth of them-

a Ἡ φύσις φεύγει τὸ ἄπειρον, *Ariſt. de Generat. Animal. lib.* 1. *cap.* 1. Οὐ δὲ εἰς ἄπειρον βαίνομεν, ἀλλὰ στήσομεν τῶν ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν τι ἑκάστου αἴτιον ἵνα τῶν ἀπείρων. *Ariſt. Phyſic. lib.* 7. *cap.* 1. *Text.* 3.

b *Vid. Juſtin. Martyr. qu. ad Grat. qu.* 3. *Tertull. Apol. cap.* 17. 18. *De Reſurrect. carnis cap.* 12. *Contra Marcion. lib.* 1. *cap.* 17. 18. *Baſil Hexam. Homil.* 1. *Aug. Confeſſ. lib.* 10. *cap.* 6. *Irenæ-*

us. lib. 2. *cap.* 9. *Theophil. Ad Antol. lib.* 1. c *Hoſ.* 2. 21. 22. d *Jer.* 14. 22. *Iob* 38. 34–37.

selves, without him who is the Father of Raine, and the Fountaine of Motion. So that here are three notable Things to be observed, The *Connexion* and Concatenation of All second Causes to one another; The *Cooperation* of them together for the good of the Church; and the *Subordination* of them all to *God*, unto whom at length the more accurate Inquiry into them doth manuduct us. And this Subordination standeth in foure things: 1. All things are Subordinate unto God in [a] *Being*. Hee only hath Being *per Essentiam*, By Absolute, and Originall Essence; all other things *per participationem*, by derivation and dependance on him. 2. [b] In *Conservation*. For God doth not make his Creatures as a Carpenter doth his House, which can after stand by it selfe alone: but having our very *Being* from him, that *Being* cannot *Be* or *Continue* without His supportance, as light in the house dependeth both in Being and in Continuance upon the Sunne. 3. In regard [c] of *Gubernation* and providence; for All things are by his Wisedome guided unto the Ends of his Glory. And even those Creatures which flie out of the Order of his Precepts, doe fall into the Order of his Providence. Lastly, in Regard of [d] *Operation*. For in him wee live and move, hee worketh Our works for us; Second Causes cannot put forth any Causality till he be pleased to concurre with them.

Againe, since wee finde that all other Creatures

a *Vid. Plutarch. lib. de* El
Exod. 3. 14.
Isai. 40. 17.
Act. 17. 28.
Rom. 11. 36.
1 Cor. 8. 6.
Col. 1. 16. 17.
Heb. 1. 2.
b Nehem. 9. 6.
Iob 12. 10.
Psal. 104. 29.
Isai. 40. 24.
c Mat. 10. 29.
Prov. 16. 4.
Gen. 48. 28.
Act 4. 27. 28.
d Act 17. 28.
Isai. 26. 12.
Iob 10. 8.
Psal. 139. 15. 16.
1 Cor. 12. 6.
Isai. 10. 5.

tures have, anſwerable to the Inſtincts and Appetitions which Nature hath Grafted in them, proportionable Objects of equall Latitude in goodneſſe to the Faculties which are carried unto them; It muſt needs be reaſonable that that be not wanting to the Excellenteſt of Creatures, which all the reſt doe enjoy. Since then the ſupreame Appetite of the Reaſonable Soule is Knowledge, and amongſt all the Creatures there never was yet any found able to fill and ſatisfie this Deſire; But that ſtill there is both roome for more Knowledge and Inquirie after it: And beſides, all the Knowledge of them is accompanied with Vnquietneſſe, and labour (as the Beaſt firſt ſtirres the mudd in the water with his feet before hee drink it with his Mouth) from hence it infallibly followeth that from theſe leſſer Objects, the Soule be carried at the laſt to *God*, The Adequate and * Vltimate End and Object of all our Deſires, as *Noahs* Dove was carried back to the Ark, when ſhee found no place for the ſole of her foot to reſt on.

Againe, when wee ſee things which have no knowledge, work ſo regularly towards an End, as if they knew all the way they were to goe, wee muſt needs conclude they are guided by a Mighty wiſedome, and Knowledge without them, as when an Arrow flyeth directly to the Mark, I am ſure it was the Hand of a skilfull Archer that directed it.

* *Vid. Aug. Confeſſ. lib. 1. cap. 1. & lib. 4. cap. 10. 12. & lib. 13. cap. 8 De Trin. lib. 8. cap. 3. Dr. Feild* of the Church. *lib. 1. cap. 1. Hooker.* Eccleſiaſticall Pol. *l. 1. ſect. 11.*

Vnto the Perfection of *Knowledge*, after due and proper Representation of *Objects* in themselves, or in their Causes, Effects, Principles, unto the Minde; There are in the *Subject* three things requisite.

Representatio rerum. Judicium de Rebus Representatis, Aquin. 22æ. qu. 173. Art. 2.

First, Cleareneſſe of *Apprehenſion*, to receive the right and diſtinct Notion of the Things represented, as the cleareneſſe of a Glaſſe ſerveth for the Admiſſion of a more exact Image of the face that looks upon it, whereas if it be ſoil'd or dimm'd, it rendreth either none, or an imperfect ſhape.

Secondly, Solidity of *Judgement* to try and weigh the particulars, which wee apprehend. That out of them wee may ſever for our uſe the pretious from the vile; for Knowledge lies in Things as Gold in a Mine, or as Corne in the Straw; when by diligent inquiry after it, wee have digged it up, and threſh'd it out, wee muſt then bring it to the fire, and fanne, to give it us purified from droſſe and levity. And this in Speculation anſwereth unto the generall vertue of *practicall prudence* in Morality, whereby wee weigh the ſeverall Mediums unto the true Ends of life, and accordingly ſelect and proſecute the Beſt.

Muſe itaq. dictæ Iovis & Mnemoſynes filiæ. Cæl. Rhod. l. 11. c. 10.

Thirdly, Fidelity of *Retention*; for hee is not likely to grow Rich, who puts up his Treaſure as the Prophet ſpeaks, into a * *bag with holes*. For as Nature hath given to the Bodies of men for the furtherance of corporeall ſtrength, and nutriment,

* *Hag. 2. 6.*

triment, a *Retentive power* to claſp and hold faſt that which preſerveth it, untill a through concoction be wrought; ſo proportionably is the Faculty of *Memory* given to Reaſon, as a meanes to conſolidate and enrich it. And *fluxes*, as in the Body, ſo in the Minde too, are ever Arguments and Authors of Weakneſſe. Whence it comes to paſſe that in matter of Learning many of us are faine to be Day-labourers, and to live from hand to mouth, being not able to lay up any thing. And therefore in the choice of fit perſons to breed up unto Learning, wee ſhould take a like courſe as wiſe Architects doe in choice of fit timber for Building. They chooſe firſt the ſtraiteſt and that which hath feweſt knots, and flawes in it; which in the mind anſwereth unto clearenеſſe, and evenneſſe of Apprehenſion. For a cleare minde, like ſtrait and ſmooth timber, will work eaſieſt. Next, they take the heart and ſtrongeſt ſubſtance, and cut out the ſap: becauſe that is beſt able to beare the weight that ſhall be laid upon it: And this anſwers unto Maturity and firmneſſe of Judgement. Laſtly, they doe not take Sally, or Willow, or Birch, and ſuch other Materialls as are quickly apt to putrifie and weare away, but ſuch Timber as is laſting and Retentive of its Nature, as Oake and Elme, which may make the Superſtruction of the nature of the Foundation, ſtrong and laſting: and this anſwereth to that excellent Faculty of the Minde, a *Rationall memory:*

memory: from which one particular (I think more than any other) doe ariſe thoſe vaſt differences of felicity and infelicity in the mindes of men addicted to the ſearch of Knowledge. Strange was the unhappineſſe of *Calviſius Sabinus* in *Seneca*, who being at vaſt charges in matter of learning, was not yet able to retaine faſt the Names of *Achilles*, or, *Vlyſſes*: But, as his Paraſite was wont deridingly to adviſe him, wanted a Grammaticall Attendant to gather up the fragments which his Memory let fall. And *Curio* the Orator in *Tully*, was wont when hee had propoſed three things in an Oration, to forget ſome one or other of them, or to add a fourth; yea *Meſſala Corvinus* forgat his owne name, as *Pliny* telleth us. And as wonderfull on the other ſide hath beene the felicity of ſome others. [a] *Seneca* the father could repeat two thouſand words together in their Order. [b] *Cyrus* and *Themiſtocles* could call all their Souldiers by their Names, (by which one Art of Curteſie [c] *Otho* aſpired unto the Empire) [d] *Adrian* could read a Book which hee never ſaw before, and after recite it by memory; and of the Emperour [e] *Julian* it is ſaid, that hee had drunk *Totum memoriæ dolium*, the whole veſſell of memory. To ſay nothing of [f] *Simonides*, and *Apollonius Tyanus*, who in their old age, the one at 80, the other at a 100 yeeres old, were very famous for the exquiſiteneſſe of their memories; nor of *Cyneas*, *Charmidas*, *Portius Latro*, and divers others, who have beene admired

Sen. Ep. 27. Vid. etiam Cæl. Rhod. l. 11. c. 10.

Vt Grammaticos haberet Antiſtites.

Cicero in Bruto & in Oratore.

Plin. l. 7. cap. 24.

a *M. Senec. Controverſ. lib. 1. in Prolog.*
b *Plin. l. 7. c. 24. Quintil. lib. 11. cap. 2. Val. Max. lib. 8. cap. 7. ſect. 15.*
c *Alex. ab Alex. lib. 6. cap. 18.*
d *Ælii. Spartian. in Adriano.*
e *Ammian. Marcell. lib 16.*
f *Plin. Supra. Suidas in Apoll. Voſſ. Inſtit. Orat. l. 6 c. 6. ſect. 2.*
g *De quibus mentio apud Plinium & M. Senecam & Quintil. ut ſupra.*

mired for this happy Quality. Now unto this Felicity doth conduce, a Methodicall and orderly Diſpoſition of minde, to digeſt and lay up things in their proper places. It was eaſier for *Cyrus* to remember men in an *Army* than in a *Throng*. And hence hath proceeded the *Art of Memory* invented as *Pliny* tells us by *Simonides*, and perfected by *Metrodorus Sceptius*, conſiſting in the committing of ſeverall Heads of matter unto diſtinct places, whereof *Quintilian* diſcourſeth in his Oratory Inſtitutions.

Of Knowledge there are ſeverall ſorts, according to ſeverall conſiderations, with reſpect to the *Ends* of it. Some is *Speculative* for the improving of the Minde, as Phyſicall, Metaphyſicall, and Mathematicall Knowledge. Others *Practicall* for faſhioning, and guiding of the manners and conditions of Men, as Ethicall, Politicall, Hiſtoricall, Military Knowledge. Some *mixt* of both, as *Theologicall* Knowledge, conſiſting in the ſpeculation of Divine *Verities*, and in the direction of Divine *Duties*. Some *Inſtrumentall*, being only ſubſervient unto others, as Grammaticall, Rhetoricall, Dialecticall learning. In regard of *Order*, ſome *Superiour*, others *Subalternate*, as Muſick to Arithmetick, Opticks to Geometry. In regard of their *Originall*, ſome *Ingrafted*, as the ſupreame *Principles* of Verity, and implanted notions of Morality, which is called the *Law of Nature*, and *written in the Heart of all men*, Rom. 2. 14. 15. Other *Ac-*

quired, and by search and industry laboured out of those *Principles*, and the others which are taught us. Other *Revealed* and Divinely manifested to the Faith of Men, whereof the supreame *Principles* are these two. 1. That *God* in his Authority is *infallible*, who neither can be deceived, nor can deceive. 2. That the things delivered in Holy Scriptures, are the Dictates, and Truths, which that infallible Authority hath delivered unto the Church to be beleeved, and therefore that every supernaturall Truth there plainely set downe *in terminis*, is an unquestionable Principle; and every thing by evident consequence and deduction from thence derived, is therefore an undoubted Conclusion in Theologicall and Divine Knowledge. In regard of the *manner* of Acquiring, some is *Experimentall*, A Knowledge of Particulars; and some *Habituall*, a generall knowledge growing out of the reason of Particulars. And those Acquired either by *Invention* from a mans Industry, or by *Auscultation* and Attendance unto those that teach us. In regard of *Objects*, some *supreame*, as the Knowledge of *Principles* and Prime Verities, which have their light in themselves, and are knowne by evidence of their owne Tearmes. Others *derived* and deduced by argumentation from those Principles, which is the Knowledge of *Conclusions*. In regard of *Perfection*, *Intuitive* Knowledge, as that of Angels whereby they know

know things by the View; and *Diſcurſive*, as that of Men, whereby wee know things by Ratiocination. In regard of *Order* and Method, *Syntheticall*, when wee proceed in Knowledge by a way of Compoſition from the Cauſes to the Effects; and *Analyticall*, when wee riſe up from Effects unto their Cauſes, in a Way of Reſolution.

With this noble Endowment of Knowledge, was the Humane Nature greatly adorned in its firſt Creation: So farre forth as the Neceſſity of a happy and honourable life, of the Worſhip and Communion with God, of the Dominion and Government over the Creatures, of the Acquaintance with himſelfe, and of the Inſtruction of his Poſterity, did require Knowledge in him. For wee may not think that God, who made Man in a perfect ſtature of Body, did give him but an Infant ſtature of Minde. God made all things *exceeding Good*, and Perfect; and therefore the perfection naturally belonging unto the Soule of Man, was doubtleſſe given unto it, in its firſt Creation. Hee made Man *right* and ſtraight; and the Rectitude of the Minde is in *Knowledge* and light; and therefore the Apoſtle telleth us, that Our Renovation in Knowledge is *after the Image of him that Created us*, Coloſſ. 3. 10. Without Knowledge hee could not have given fit Names, and ſuteable to the Natures of all the Creatures which for that purpoſe were

De iſtâ Materiâ fuſiùs diſputant Scholaſtici ad l. 2. diſt. 23. & ad part 1. Tho qu. 94. & Perer. in Gen. 2 19 20. l. 5 diſput. 1. de Amplitud. & Excellent. Scient. Adami.

brought unto him. Hee could not have awed and governed so various, and so strong Creatures, to preserve Peace, Order, and Beauty amongst them. Hee could not have given such an account of the substance and Originall of *Eve*. Of the End of her Creation to to be the Mother of all living men as hee did. *Experimentall Knowledge* hee had not but by the Exercise of his Originall light upon particular Objects, as they should occurre. Knowledge of *future Events* hee had not, it being not Naturall, nor Investigable by imbred light, but Propheticall, and therefore not seene till Revealed. *Secret Knowledge* of the Thoughts of Men, or of the Counsells of God hee could not have, because *secret things belong unto the Lord*. But so much light of *Divine Knowledge* as should fit him to have Communion with *God*, and to serve him, and obtaine a blessed life; so much of *Morall Knowledge* as should fit him to converse in Love as a Neighbour, in Wisedome as a Father, with other men; so much of *Naturall Knowledge* as should dispose him for the Admiring of Gods Glory, and for the Governing of other Creatures over which hee had received Dominion; so much wee may not without notable injurie to the perfection of Gods Workmanship, and to the Beauty and rectitude of our first Parent, deny to have beene conferred upon our Nature in him. The Benefits

nefits of which ſingular Ornament of Knowledge, are exceeding Great. Hereby wee recover a *largeneſſe of Heart*, for which *Salomon* is commended, 1 Reg. 4. 29: Able to diſpatch many Buſineſſes, to digeſt and order Multitudes of Motions, to have mindes ſeaſoned with generous and noble reſolutions; for that diſpoſition is by the Philoſopher called μεγαλοψυχία, Greatneſſe of Minde. Hereby wee are brought to a Juſt *Contempt of ſordid* and wormie Affections. It is Darkneſſe which makes Men grope, and pore, and looke onely on the things before them, as the Apoſtle intimates, 2 Pet. 1. 9. Illightned mindes ſee a greater luſtre in Knowledge than in the fine Gold, Pro. 3. 14. 15. The Excellencie of Evangelicall Knowledge made Saint *Paul* eſteeme every thing in the World beſides *as Dung*, Phil. 3. 8. As the light of the Sunne ſwallows up all the petty light of the Starres: ſo the more noble and ſpacious the Knowledge of Mens mindes is, the more doth it dictate unto them the Contempt of thoſe various and vulgar Delights which bewitch the fancies of ignorant Men. It diſpoſeth Men for *mutuall Communion*, and helpfull Societie: for without Knowledge every Man is *feræ Naturæ*, like Birds of prey, that flie alwayes alone. Neither is it poſſible for a man to be ſociable, or a member of any publick Body, any further than hee hath a proportion

Quod Plinio, & aliis obſervatum de Cæſare; & Ælio Spartian. de Adriano.

Vid. Aqu. 22æ. qu. 188. Art. 6. in C.

tion and meaſure of Knowledge: Since Humane Society ſtandeth in the communicating of mutuall notions unto one another. Two men that are Deafe, and Dumb, and Blinde, deſtitute of all the Faculties of gaining or deriving Knowledge, may be together, but they cannot be ſaid to have ſociety one with another. To conclude, hereby we are brought *neerer unto God*, to admire him for his Wiſedome, and Power; to Adore him for his Greatneſſe, and Majeſtie; to Deſire him, and work towards the fruition of him, for his light and Glory; becauſe in the Viſion of Him conſiſteth the Beatitude of Man.

This *Knowledge* is corrupted foure manner of wayes. Firſt, By the Contempt of it in *Ignorance*. Secondly, By the Luxuriouſneſſe and Wantonneſſe of it in *Curioſity*. Thirdly, By the Defect and uncertainty of it in *Opinion*. Fourthly, By Contradiction and Oppoſition unto it in *Error*.

There is a three-fold Ignorance wherewith the Minds of men may be blinded and defaced. The one is a *Naturall Ignorance*, which of Divine Things, ſo farre forth as thoſe things are *Spirituall*, is in all men by Nature; for the *Naturall Man* neither *Receiveth* with Acceptation, nor with Demonſtration *diſcerneth* the things of the

Deum ſcire nemo poteſt niſi Deo docente. vid. Iren l. 4. c. 14. Hilar. de Trin. lib. 1. & 5. In tantum vi debilitus in quantum ſimiles erimus. Aug. Ep. 6. Vbi ad profunditatem ſacramentorum pervenitum eſt, omnis Platonicorum caligavit ſubtilitas. Cypr. de Sp. Sanct. Aug. de Predeſt. cap. 8. & de Doctr. Chriſtian. l. 2 c. 6.

Spirit

Spirit of God; And the Reaſon the Apoſtle gives, becauſe they are *ſpiritually diſcerned.* For as the Eye is fitted to diſcerne light by the Innate property of light and Cognation which it hath thereunto, without which the Eye could no more perceive Objects of light than it can of ſounds: ſo the Minde cannot otherwiſe receive ſpirituall Objects, than as it hath a ſimilitude to thoſe Objects in a ſpirituall diſpoſition it ſelfe; whence that Expreſſion of S^t. *John*, *wee ſhall be like unto him, for wee ſhall ſee him as hee is.* Spirituall Things doe exceed the weakneſſe of Reaſon, becauſe they are *above it*, and ſo cannot be *diſcerned*; And they doe oppoſe the corruption of Reaſon, becauſe they are *againſt it*, and ſo cannot be *Received.*

There is likewiſe in many Men much Naturall Ignorance, even in Morall and Natural things. For as in the Fall of Man our Spirituals were loſt, ſo were our Naturals weakned too, as wee finde in the Great Dulneſſe of many men in matters of learning, in ſo much that ſome have not beene able to learne the Names of the firſt Letters or Elements.

Vid. Hieronad. verſ. Iovin. l. 2.

Cal. Rhod. l. 11. cap. 10.

Againe, there is a *Voluntary* Ignorance (of which wee have before ſpoken) whereby Men doe wilfully cloſe their Eyes againſt Knowledge, and refuſe it; and of this there may be a double ground, The one *Guile*, in Knowledge that

that pertaineth to the Conſcience, when a man chooſeth rather not to know his duty, than by the Knowledge of it, to have his Conſcience diſquieted with Exprobrations of contemning it. The other out of *Sluggiſhneſſe* and Apprehenſions of Difficulty in the Obtaining of Knowledge. When of two Evils, Undergoing of labour, or forfeiting of Learning, a man eſteemeth this the leſſer.

Thirdly, there is a * *Pœnall* Ignorance of which I ſhall not ſpeake, becauſe it differeth not from the Voluntary Ignorance of Spirituall things, ſave onely in the relation that it hath to the Juſtice of God thereby provoked, who ſometimes leaveth ſuch men to their Blindneſſe, that the thing which with reſpect to their owne choyce of it, is a pleaſure, with reſpect unto Gods Juſtice, may be a plague, and puniſhment unto them. Thus the Intellectual Faculty is corrupted in many men by Ignorance.

* Math. 13. 13. Act. 28. 26, 27. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Theſſ. 2. 10. 11 *Ne intell gerent meritum ſuit delictorum. Tertul. Apol. cap. 21. contr. Marc. lib. 3. cap. 6. Cyprian. lib. 1. Ep. 3. Percuſſi ſunt cæcitate ut nec intelligant Delicta nec plangant Indignantis Dei major hæc ira. Cypr. de lapſis. Vid. Aug. qu. 14. Ex Math. & ſuè contra Julian. lib 5.*

In others it is abuſed by *Curioſity*, which may well be called the *Pride*, and the *Wantonneſſe* of Knowledge, becauſe it looketh after *high things* that are above us, and after *hidden things* that

Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 1. ſtatim ab initio Irenæus. lib. 5. cap. 28. Vid. quædem contra hunc ſcientiæ pruritum apud Tertull. de Anim. cap. 1. contr. Marcion. lib. 1. cap. 1. Aug. Ep. 29 & 56. & 78. & 157. Confeſſ. lib. 11. cap. 12. de Gen. ad lit. lib. 2. cap. 9 & lib. 10. cap. 23. Hieron.

are

are denied us. And I may well put these two together, *Pride* and *Luxurie* of Learning. For I beleeve wee shall seldome finde the Pride of Knowledge more prædominant than there where it ariseth out of the curious and conjectural enquiries of Wit, and not out of scientificall and demonstrative Grounds. And I finde the Apostle joyning them together, when hee telleth us of some, who *intruded themselves into Things which they had not seene, and were Vainely puff'd up by a fleshly Minde.* And hee himselfe complaineth of Others, who were *Proud*, and languished about needlesse Questions; as it is ever a signe of a sick and ill-affected stomack to quarrell with usuall and wholsome meat, and to long for and linger after Delicacies which wee cannot reach too. When Manna will not goe downe without Quailes, you may be sure the Stomack is cloyed, and wants Physick to Purge it. I will not here add more of this point, having lately touched it on a fitter Occasion.

In my Sermon of the Peace of the Church, pag. 24. -- 26.

A third Corruption of this Faculty in regard of Knowledge, is in the Fluctuation, wavering, and uncertainty of Assents, when the Understanding is left floating, and as it were *in Æquilibrio*, that it cannot tell which way to encline, or what Resolutions to grow unto; and this is that which in Opposition to *Science*, is called *Opinion:* For *Science* is ever *cum certitudine*, with Evidence and Unquestionable

Consequence of Conclusions from necessary Principles: but *Opinion* is *cum Formidine Oppositi*, with a feare least the contrary of what wee assent unto should be true: And so it importeth a Tender, Doubtfull, and Infirme Conclusion.

Aquin. 22æ. qu. 1. Art. 4. C.

The Causes of *Opinion*, I conceive to be principally two: The first is a *Disproportion* betweene the Understanding and the Object, when the Object is either too bright and excellent, or too dark and base: the one dazles the Power, the other Affects it not. Things too Divine and Abstracted, are to the Understanding *Tanquam lumen ad Vespertilionem*, as light unto a Batt; which rather astonish than informe; and things too Material and Immerst, are like a Mist unto the Eyes, which rather hinder, than affect it. And therefore, though whatsoever hath Truth in it, be the Object of the Understanding; yet the Coexistence of the Soule with the Body, in this present Estate, restraines and Limits the Latitude of the Object, and requires in it, not onely the bare Nature and Truth, but such a Qualification thereof, as may make it fit for representation and Impression by the conveyance of the Sense. So that as in the True perception of the Eye (especially of those *Vespertiliones*, to which *Aristotle* hath compared the Understanding in this estate of subsistence

ſiſtence with the Body) there is required a mixture of Contraries in the Ayre; it muſt not bee too light, leſt it weaken and too much diſgregate or ſpread the ſenſe; nor yet too dark, leſt it contract and lock it up: But there muſt bee a kinde of middle Temper; cleereneſſe of the Medium for conveyance, and yet ſome degrees of Darkneſſe for qualification of the Object. Even ſo alſo the Objects of mans Vnderſtanding muſt participate of the two contraries, *Abſtraction and Materiality.* Abſtraction firſt, in proportion to the Nature of the Vnderſtanding, which is Spirituall. And Materiality too, in reſpect of the Senſe, on which the Vnderſtanding depends in this eſtate, as on the Medium of Conveyance, and that is Corporall. So that where ever there is Difficulty and Vncertainty of Operation in the Vnderſtanding, there is a double defect and diſproportion: firſt in the Power, whoſe Operations are reſtrained and limited for the moſt, by the Body: and then in the Object, which hath not a ſufficient mixture of thoſe two qualities, which ſhould proportion it to the Power. This is plaine by a familiar ſimilitude; an Aged man is not able to read a ſmall Print, without the Aſſiſtance of Spectacles to make the Letters by a refraction ſeeme greater. Where firſt wee may deſcry an Imperfection in the Organ; for if his Eyes were as cleare

and well-disposed as a young mans, hee would be able by his Naturall Power, without Art, to receive the Species of small Letters. And next, there is an Imperfection and deficiencie in the Letters; for if they had the same Magnitude and fitnesse in themselves, which they seeme to have by Refraction through the Glasse, the weaknesse of his power might haply have sufficient strength to receive them without those Helps. So that alwayes the Uncertainty of *Opinion* is grounded on the Insufficiencie of the Vnderstanding to receive an Object, and on the *Disproportion* of the Object to the Nature of the Vnderstanding.

The next Cause of *Opinion* and Vncertainty in Assents, may be Acutenesse and Subtilty of wit, when Men out of Ability, like* *Carneades*, to discourse probably on either side, and poizing their Judgements betweene an equall weight of Arguments, are forc'd to suspend their Assents, and so either to continue unresolved and equally inclineable unto either part, or else, if to avoyd Neutrality, they make choise of some thing to averre (and that is properly *Opinion*) yet it is rather an Inclination, than an Assertion, as being accompanied with feare, floating and Inconstancie.

* *Nullam unquam in disputationibus rem defendit quam non probavit, nullam oppugnavit quam non everterit. Cic. de Oratore. lib 2. Non minoribus viribus contra Justitiam dicitur disseruisse, quam pridie pro Justitia dixerat. Quintil. de Carnead. lib: 12. cap. 1. Plin. lib. 7. cap. 30.*

And

And this indeed, although it be in it ſelfe a defect of Learning; yet conſidering the Eſtate of man, and ſtrict conditions of perfecting the Vnderſtanding by continuall Inquiry (man being bound in this alſo to recover that meaſure of his firſt fulneſſe, which is attainable in this Corrupted Eſtate, by ſweat of braine, by labour and degrees, *Paulatim extundere artes*) I ſay in theſe conſiderations, Irreſolution in Iudgement (ſo it be not *Vniverſall* in all concluſions; for that argues more weakneſſe, than choiſe of conceit; nor *Particular* in things of *Faith* and Salvation, which is not Modeſty but Infidelity) is both Commendable, and Vſefull. Commendable, becauſe it prevents all temper of hereſie (whoſe nature is to † be peremptory.) And both argues Learning and Modeſty in the ſoftnes of Iudgement, which will not ſuffer it ſelfe to be captivated, either to its owne conceits, or unto ſuch unforcible reaſons, in the which it is able to deſcry weakneſſe. And this is that which *Pliny* commends in his friend *Titus Ariſton*, whoſe heſitancy and ſlowneſſe of reſolution in matter of Learning proceeded not from any emptines or unfurniture; but *ex diverſitate Rationũ quas acri magnoq; Iudicio ab origine Cauſiq; primis repetit, diſcernit, expendit*: out of a learned cautelouſneſſe of judgment, which made him ſo long ſuſpend his Aſſent, till he had weighed the ſeverall repugnancies of reaſons, and by that means found out ſome truth whereon to ſettle his conceit. For (as the ſame *Pliny* elſewhere out of *Thucydides* obſerves) It is rawnes & deficiency of learning that

Vid. quæ adverſus Sceptices diſputat Ariſtocles apud Euſeb. de præpar. Evang. l. 14. c. 18.

† *Ad quam cum, ſunt diſciplinam, quaſi tempeſtate delapſi ad eam. Tanquam ad Saxum ad hæreſcunt.* Cic. Acad. q. l. 4. Plin. l. 1. ep. 22.

Lib. 4. ep. 7.

makes bold and peremptory: Demurs and fearfulnes of Resolution, are commonly the companions of more able wits. And for the use of Doubtings: First, they lessen the number of heresies, which are (as I said) alwaies obstinate. And next it gives occasion of further enquiry after the Truth, to those who shall find themselves best qualified for that service. But Heresie comming under the shape of Science, with shewes of Certainty, Evidence, & Resolution (especially if the inducements be quick and subtle) doth rather settle the Understanding, and possesse it with false Assents, than yeeld occasion of deeper search, unlesse it meet with a more piercing judgement, which can through confidence descry weakneſſe. For questionlesse the Errours of Great men generally honoured for their Learning, when they are once wrapped up in the boldnes of Assertions, do either by possessing the judgement with prejudice of the Author, make it also subscribe to the error; or if a more impartiall eye see insufficiency in the ground, the Authority of the man frights and deterres from the opposing of his conceipt. Whereas when mens assents are proposed with a modest confession of distrust and uncertainty: the Understanding is incited both to enquire after the reasons of Diffidence; as also to find out means for a more setled Confirmation and cleering of the Truth.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Of Errours: the Causes thereof: the Abuses of Principles, Falsifying them: or Transferring the Truth of them out of their owne bounds. Affections of Singularity, and Novell courses. Credulity and Thraldome of Iudgement unto others. How Antiquity is to be honoured. Affection to particular Objects, corrupteth Iudgement. Curiosity in searching things Secret.

THe other maine Corruption of Knowledge was *Errour*, whereby I understand a peremptory and habituall assent, firmly and without wavering fixed upon some falshood under the shew of truth. It is *Aristotles* assertion in his Ethicks, that one man may conceive himselfe as certaine of his Errour, as another man of his Knowledge: and this indeed is so much the more dangerous Aberration from Knowledge, by how much it seemes most nearly to resemble it.

If wee enquire after the prime Fundamentall Cause, the Gate by which Errour came first into the World. *Syracides* will tell us in a word, that *Errour* and *Darknesse* had their beginning together with *Sinners*: And the reason is, because sinne

being a partition-wall, and a separation of man from God, who is *Patet Lumiuum*, the Father and Fountaine of all Knowledge; and whose perfections man did at first one principall way by Knowledge resemble, cannot chuse but bring with it darknesse and confusion into the Soule. But I shall enquire rather after the more Immediate and Secondary Causes; some whereof, amongst sundry others, I take to be these:

1 A first and most speciall one is the Abuse of Principles: For the Vnderstanding must have ever something to rest it selfe upon: and from the conformity of other things, thereunto to gather the certainty and evidence of its Assents. For it is the nature of mans minde, since it had at first it selfe a beginning to abhorre all manner of Infinity, *á Parte-Ante* (I meane in Ascending and Resolution) as well of Sciences and Conclusions, as of Entities and Natures, as I before noted. And therefore as the Vnderstanding is not quieted in Philosophicall inquiries about created things, till it have according to their severall differences ranged them severally within the compasse of some Finite Line, and subordinated the Inferiors of every kinde, *Sub uno Summo Genere*, under one chiefe; and rests not in the Resolution of Effects into their Causes, till it come to *Aliquid primum*, in Time, in Motion, in Place, in Causality, and Essentiall Dependance: so likewise it is in *Knowledge* & Truth, notwithstanding a *Parte Post*, downward, our pursuits of them seeme Infinite and Vnlimited, by reason of our owne Infinities, and

Arist. phys. l. 7.

and Æviternity that way; yet upward in the resolving of Truth into its Causes and Originals, the Vnderstanding is altogether Impatient of proceeding in *Infinitum*, and never rests till it finds a *Non ultra*, an utmost linke in the chaine of any Science, and such a *Prime*, Vniversall, Vnquestionable, Vnprovable *Truth*, from whence all Inferiour Collections are fundamentally raised, and this is the Truth of *Principles*: which if it be traduced and made crooked by the wrestings of any private conceipt, mishapes all Conclusions that are derived from it: for if the foundation be weak, the whole edifice totters; if the root and fountain bee bitter, all the branches and streames have their proportionable corruptions.

Now the Abuses of Principles, is either by *Falsifying* and casting absurd Glosses upon them within their owne limits; as when Philosophicall Errours are falsly grounded upon Philosophicall Axiomes, which is *Error Consequentiæ*, or *Illationis*, an Errour in the Consequence of one from the other: or else by transferring the Truth of them beyond their owne bounds, into the Territories (as I may so speake) of another Science, making them to encroach and to uphold Conclusions contrary to the nature of their Subject; which is *Error Dependentiæ*, or *Subordinationis*, an Errour in the Dependance of one on the other. For the former, it hath been alwaies either the subtilty or modesty of errour to shrowd it self under truth; & that it might make its fancies the more plausible, to fasten them upon undenyable grounds, & by a

strange kinde of Chimistry, to extract darkenesse out of light. † *Fraus sibi ex parvis*, (said *Fabius Maximus* in *Livy* upon another occasion.) I will alter it thus, *Error sibi ex principijs fidem præstruit, ut cum magnâ mercede fallat.* * Vnreasonable and groundlesse fancies alwaies shelter themselves under a plausible pretence of truth and ostentation of Reason. † As *Praxitiles* the Painter drew the Picture of *Venus* by the face of his Minion *Cratina*, that so by an honourable pretext he might procure Adoration to a Harlot. * Thus as *Plato* is said, when he inveighed chiefly against Orators, most of all to have played the Oratour (making a Sword of Eloquence to wound it selfe:) So they on the contrary, never more wrong Knowledge, than when they promise to promote it most. It was the custome of that *Scipio*, honoured afterward by the name of his Punicke Conquest, alwaies before he set upon any businesse, as *Livy* reports of him) to enter the Capitoll alone, pretending thereby a consultation with the gods about the justnesse, issue, and successe of his intended designes; and then, *Apud multitudinem, plerumq; velut mente divinitus monitâ agebat*: Hee bore the multitude in hand, that whatsoever exploits hee persuaded them to attempt, had all the Approbation and Vnerring Iudgement of their Deities. What were the ends of this man, whither an Ambitious hope of fastning an Opinion of his owne Divineneesse in the midst of the people, or an happy and politicke imposture, the better to presse those people (alwaies more inclinable to the persuasions

† *Liv. l. 28.*
* *Ex hu eam impugnat, ex quibus constat. Tertull. de Baptis. c. 2. Vid de præscr. c. 36. 39. Sententias per primas communibus Argumentis miniunt. de Anim. c. 2. Inde sumentes præsidia, quò pugnant. c. 50. Omnia adversùs Veritatem, de ipsâ Veritate constructa sunt. Apolog. c. 47.*
† *Clem. Alex. in Protreptic.*
* *Cic. Orat. l. 1. In Irridendo Oratoribus Orator Summus.*

Liv. l. 26. Nec aliter Numa Simulans sibi cum dea Ægeriâ nocturnos congressus esse, apud cand. m. l. 1. Vid. Val. Max. l. 1. c. 2. Plut. in Numa.

ſuaſions of Superſtitions than Reaſon) to a free Execution of his deſignes, it is not here neceſſary to enquire. Sure I am even in matters of greateſt conſequence, there have never been wanting the like Impoſtors, who boldly pretend unto Truth, when they cunningly oppoſe it: as *Iacob* in *Eſau's* Cloathes, robbed *Eſau* of the Bleſſing: or as the Ivy, which when it embraceth the Oake, doth withall weaken and conſume it. And this is a very prepoſterous and perverſe method, firſt to entertaine Corrupt Conceits, and then to *wreſt and hale Principles to the countenancing and protecting of them. It being in the errors of the mind, as in the diſtempers of the palate uſuall with men to find their owne reliſh in every thing they read.

Concerning the other Abuſe, it is an often obſervation of *Ariſtotle*, that Principles and Concluſions muſt be within the Sphære of the ſame Science; and that a man of Learning ought alwaies to be faithfull unto his owne Subject; and make no Excurſions from it into another Science. And therefore he ſaith that it is an equall abſurdity for a Mathematician (whoſe concluſions ought to be peremprory, and grounded on principles of infallible evidence) only to ground them on Rhetoricall probabilities, as it were for a Rhetoritian, whoſe Arguments ſhould bee more plauſible and inſinuative, to leave all unſaid that might reaſonably be ſpoken, except it may bee proved by demonſtrative principles. This leaping *a Genere ad Genus*, and confounding the dependancies

* Scripturarũ eſſe volumus quæ noſtra ſũt. Aug. vid. quæ adverſus hanc Curioſitatis Laſciviam paſſim occurrunt apud Tertull Apol. c. 46, 47. contr. Hermog. c. 1. de præſcr. c. 17. 38, 39, 40 De Reſurrect. c. 40. De ſug. in perſec. c. 6. De Pudic. c. 16. Simplicitatem ſermonis Eccleſiaſtici, id volunt ſignificare, quod ipſi ſentiunt. Epiph. ad Ioan. Hieroſol. Iuſtin Martyr. ad Zenam. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 7. p. 545. D. Aug. contr. Pelag. & Cœleſt. l. 1. c. 42. De Gratia Chriſti.

Πάντα πλέονος ἡ ψευδολογίας ἀξίων τὰ μὴ ἐναίσιμα τῶν ἀναγκαίων λαβεῖν πειρωμένη ἢ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων προφάσεων τὸν λόγον ἐπιδεικνύουσα τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιδεικνύουσα. Clem. Alex. Strom. 6.

cies of Truth, by transferring Principles unto Sciences, which they belong not unto, hath been ever prejudiciall to Knowledge; and Errour hath easily thereby crept upon the weakest apprehensions, while men have examined the conclusions of one Science by the Principles of another. As when Religion which should subdue and captivate, is made to stoop & bow to Reason; and when those Assents which should be grounded upon Faith, and not on meer humane disquisition, shall be admitted according to the conformity which they have with † Nature, and no farther. And hence it is that so many of the Philosophers denyed those two maine Doctrines, of the Creation and Resurrection (*although in some of them the very sight of Nature reacheth to the acknowledgement of the former of those) because they repugned those maine Principles of Nature (which are indeed naturally true, and no farther) that *ex nihilo nihil fit*; Nothing can be made of nothing. And *a privatione ad habitum non datur regressus*; That there is no regresse from a Totall Privation to the Habit lost. And this reason was evidently implyed in that answer, which was given by him, who knew the Root of all Errour, unto the obstinate Opposers of the Resurrection: *Erratis nescientes Scripturas, neq; Potentiam Dei.* Where are intimated two maine Principles of that Mystery of the Resurrection; the *Word*, and the *Power of God*. This later commanding our Assent that it May be: that other, our Assurance, that it Will be. So that wherever there is an

† *Viderint qui Stoicum, & Platonicum, & dialecticum Christianissimè protulerunt.* Tertull. de præscript. c. 7.

* Cic. lib. de Universo. Plat. in Timæo Euseb. de præpar. Evan. l. 11. c. 39. Theod. ser. 4. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 5. Quin & Resurrectionem Philosophi notam (sed ex Hebræorum doctrina) affirmat. Euseb. lib. 11. c. 33. 36. Tertull. de Resurrect. carn. c. 1. Nescio an hoc etiam pertinuerit illa Seneca. qu. l. 3. c. 30

Ignorance

Ignorance of theſe two, and we goe about to examine this or any other Myſtery, rather by a diſputing, than an Obeying Reaſon, the immediate conſequent of ſuch peremptory and prepoſterous courſe, is Errour and Depravation of the Vnderſtanding. *Pythagoras* and his Schollers, out of a ſtrong conceipt that they had of the Efficacy of Muſicke, or Numbers, examining all the paſſages of Nature by the Principles thereof, fell into that monſtrous Errour, that Number was the firſt and moſt Eſſentiall Element in the Conſtitution of all Creatures. Thus as men which ſee through a coloured Glaſſe, have all Objects, how different ſoever repreſented in the ſame colour: So they examining all Concluſions by Principles foreſtalled for that purpoſe, thinking every thing of what nature ſoever to be dyed in the colour of their owne conceipts, and to carry ſome proportion unto thoſe Principles: Like *Antipheron Orites* and others in *Ariſtotle*, who did confidently affirme every thing for Reall, which their Imagination fancied to it ſelfe. But *Tully* hath prettily reprehended this abuſe in that ſatyricall reprehenſion which he gives to *Ariſtoxenus* the Muſitian, who needs out of the Principles of his Art, would conceipt the Soule of man to conſiſt of Harmony, *Haec magiſtro concedat Ariſtotili; canere ipſe doceat*: Let him leave theſe things to *Ariſtotle*, and content himſelfe with teaching men how to ſing: intimating thereby the abſurdity of drawing any Science beyond its owne bounds.

Plut. de placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 3. Laert. in Pyth. Quintil. Inſtit. l. 10. c. 10.

Τὰ ἀντιφαινόμενα λέγων ἀεὶ χρήματα ἢ οὐδὲ μνήμην ἔχοντα: *Lib. de Memor. & Reminiſc. 1*

2. Another Cauſe of Errour may be Affecta-

tion of Singularity, and a Disdaine of being but an accession unto other mens Inventions: or of Tracing their steps: when men shall rather desire to walke in wayes of their owne making, than in the beaten paths which have been troden before them; to be guilty of their owne invented Errors, than content with a derived and imputed Learning; and had rather be accounted the Purchasers of Heresie, than the Heires of Truth, *Quasi nihil fuisset rectum, quod primum est; melius existimari quicquid est aliud*, as *Quintilian* spake elegantly on another occasion: As if nothing had been right, which had been said before; they esteeme every thing therefore better, because new.

Non tam Authoritas in disputando, quàm rationis momenta quærenda sunt, &c. Cic. de Nat. Deor. Li.

3 Another Cause may be the other Extreme (for a man may lose his way, as well by enclining too much to the right hand, as to the left) I mean a too credulous prejudice and opinion of Authority; when wee bow our judgements not so much to the nature of things, as to the learning of men. *Et credere, quàm scire, videtur reverentius*, we rather beleeve, than know what we assent unto. Tis indeed a wrong to the labours of Learned men to read them alwaies with a Cavilling and Sceptical mind; and to doubt of every thing, is to get resolution in nothing. But yet withall, our Credulity must not be peremptory, but with reservation. Wee may not captivate and resigne our judgements into another mans hand. Beleefe, without evidence of Reason, must bee onely there absolute, where the Authority is Unquestionable, and where it is impossible to erre, there onely it

it is Impious to Diſtruſt. As for mens Aſſertions, *Quibus poſſibile eſt ſubeſſe falſum*, what he ſaid of Friendſhip, *Sic ama tanquam oſurus*, Love with that Wiſedome as to remember you may be provoked to the contrary, is more warrantable and advantagious in Knowledge: *Sic crede tanquam diſſenſurus*, ſo to beleeve, as to be ready, when cauſe requires, to diſſent. It is a too much ſtreightning of a mans owne Vnderſtanding, to inthrall it unto any: or to eſteeme the diſſent from ſome particular Authorities, Preſumption and Selfe-conceit. Nor indeed is there any thing which hath bred more Diſtempers in the Body of Learning, than Factions and Sidings. When as *Seneca* ſaid of *Cato*, that hee would rather eſteeme Drunkenneſſe a Vertue, than *Cato* Vitious: So Peripatetieks and Platoniſts, Scotiſts, & Thomiſts, and the reſt (if I may adventure ſo to call them, of thoſe learned Idolaters, in deifying the Notions of Mortall men) ſhall rather count Errour, Truth, than their great Maſters Erroneous. But yet I would not be ſo underſtood, as if I left every man to the unbridled reines of his owne fancy: or to a preſumptuous dependance onely on his owne judgement with contempt or neglect of others. But I conſider a double Eſtate of the Learned; Inchoation and Progreſſe. And though in this latter there be requiſite a Diſcerning Iudgment, and Liberty of Diſſent; yet for the other, *Ariſtot's* ſpeech is true, *Oportet diſcentem credere*, Beginners muſt beleeve. For as in the Generation of man, hee receiveth his firſt life and nouriſhment

Vid. Aug. ep. 6. Lib. de Vtilit. Eccliæ. cap. 19. Cõtra Creſcon. Gramat. l. 2. c. 32. & ep. 111. Cypr. l. 2. ep. 3. ad Cæcilium.

Vid. Theodor. ſerm. 1. de fide & Platon. apud Euſeb. l. 12. c. 1.

from one Wombe, and after takes onely those things, which are by the Nurse or Mother given to him; but when he is growne unto strength and yeares, hee then receiveth nourishment not from Milke onely, but from all variety of meats, and with the freedome of his own choise or dislike: so in the generation of Knowledge, the first knitting of the Ioynts and Members of it into one Body is best effected by the Authority and Learning of some able Teacher (though even of his Tutors, *Cato* being a childe, was wont to require a reason) but being growne thereby to some stature and maturity, not to give it the Liberty of its owne Iudgement, were to confine it still to its Nurse or Cradle. I speake not this therefore to the dishonour of *Aristotle*, or any other, from whose Learning, much of ours, as from Fountaines, hath bin derived. Antiquity is ever venerable, and justly challengeth Honour, Reverence, and Admiration. And I shall ever acknowledge the worthy commendation which hath been given *Aristotle* by a learned man, that he hath almost discovered more of Natures Mysteries in the whole Body of Philosophy, than the whole Series of Ages since hath in any particular member thereof. And therefore he, and all the rest of those worthy Founders of Learning do well deserve some credit, as well to their authority, as to their matter. But yet notwithstanding there is difference betweene Reverence and Superstition; we may Assent unto them as Antients, but not as Oracles: they may have our minds easie and inclinable; they may not have them

Plut. lib. de Audiend. Poetis. Vid. Sen. ep. 64.

Hooker *lib.* 1 §. 6.

Κτῆμα μὲς ἐς ἀεὶ λῶστ' ἀνὴρ ἅπασιν· δεύτερον δ' ὃς αὖ καλῶς. *Arist. Orat. 1. de Rhet.*

them captivated and fettered to their Opinions. As I will not diſtruſt all, which without manifeſt proof they deliver, where I cannot convince them of Errour: So likewiſe will I ſuſpend my beleefe upon probability of their miſtakes: and where I finde expreſſe Reaſon of Diſſenting, I will rather ſpeake Truth with my Miſtreſſe Nature, than maintaine an Errour with my Maſter *Ariſtotle*. As there may be Friendſhip, ſo there may be Honour with diverſity of Opinions: nor are wee bound therfore to defie men, becauſe we reverence them. *Plura ſæpe peccantur dum demeremur, quam dum offendimus*; Wee wrong our Auncеſtors more by admiring than oppoſing them in their Errours; and our Opinion of them is foule and without Honour, if we thinke they had rather have us followers of them then of Truth. And we may in this caſe juſtly anſwer them as the young man in *Plutarch* did his Father when he commanded him to do an unjuſt thing. I wil do that which you would have me, though not that which you bid mee. For good men are ever willing to have Truth preferred above them. *Ariſtotle* his Commendation of his middle Aged men, ſhould be a rule of our Aſſent to him, and all the reſt of thoſe firſt Planters of Knowledge. Wee ought neither to overprize all their Writings by an abſolute Credulity; becauſe they being *Men*, and ſubject to Errour, may make us thereby liable to Deluſion; neither ought we rudely to undervalue them, becauſe being *Great men*, and ſo well deſerving of all Poſterity, they may challenge from us an Eaſines

Κυριῶτατα μὲν ἁπάντων ἀληθεύειν φιλητέον ἀνθρώπους ὄντας. *Ariſt. Ethic. l. 1. c. 4.*

Tacit. Veritas nec mea eſt, nec illius, qui illam. Aug. Confeſſ. l. 12. c. 25.

Rhet. l. 2.

of Assent unto their Authority alone (if it bee only without and not against Reason) as *Tully* professed in a matter so agreeable to the Nature of Mans Soule, as Immortality: *Vt rationem nullam Plato afferret, ipsa Authoritate me frangeret*: Though *Plato* had given no reason for it, yet his Authority should have swayed Assent: I say, not slavish, but with reservation, and with a purpose alwaies to be swayed by Truth, more than by the thousand yeares of *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

Vid. dolorem tam vi[tiosum] quam [illegible] Arist. Met. 1. Immoderata est omnis susceptarum voluntatum pertinacia, &c, Vid. Hilar. l. 10. de Trinit.

4 Another Cause of Errour, may be a Fastning too great an Affection on some particular Objects, which maketh the Minde conceive in them some Excellencies, which Nature never bestowed on them: As if Truth were the hand-maid to Passion: or Camelion like could alter it selfe to the temper of our desires. Every thing must be Vnquestionable and Authenticall, when wee have once affected it. And from this Root, it is probable did spring those various Opinions about the utmost Good of mans Nature (which amounted to the number of two hundred eighty eight, as was long ago observed by *Varro*) which could not but be out of every particular Philosophers conceipt, carrying him to the Approbation of some particular Object, most pleasing and satisfactory to the Corruption of his owne crooked Nature: so that every man sought Happinesse, not where it was to be found, but in himselfe, measuring it by the Rule of his owne distempered and intangled Iudgement; whence could not possibly but issue many monstrous Errours, according as the Minds

Vid. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 19. c. 1.

of

of men were any way transported with the false Delight, either of Pleasure, Profit, Pompe, Promotion, Fame, Liberty, or any other worldly and sensuall Objects. In which particular of theirs, I observe a preposterous and unnaturall course; like that of the Atheist in his Opinion of the Soule and Deity: For whereas in Nature and right Method, the Determinations of the Vnderstanding concerning Happines should precede the pursuit of the Will: they on the contrary side, first love their Errour, and then they prove it; as the Affection of an Atheist leads him first to a Desire, and wish that there were no God (because he conceiveth it would goe farre better with him in the end, than otherwise it is like to doe) and then this Desire allures the Vnderstanding to dictate Reasons and Inducements, that may perswade to the Beleefe thereof; and so what was at first but a wish, is at last become an Opinion: *Quod nimis volumus facile credimus*, we easily beleeve what we will willingly desire. And the reason is, because every man (though by Nature he love Sinne) yet he is altogether impatient of any checke or conviction thereof; either from others, or himselfe; and therefore be his Errours never so palpable, his Affections never so distempered, his Minde never so depraved and averse from the Rules of Reason, he will notwithstanding easily perswade himselfe to thinke he is in the right course, and make his Iudgement as absurd in defending, as his Will and Affections are in embracing vitious Suggestions, *Vitia nostra, quia amamus, defendimus*. When once

once our Minds are by the violence and insinuation of Affection transported into any crooked course, Reason will freely resigne it selfe to bee perverted, and the discourse of the Vnderstanding will quickely bee drawne to the maintaining of either; So easie it is for men to dispute, when they have once made themselves obey.

And another reason hereof is, because as a Body distempered and affected in any part, especially those vitall ones, which diffuse their vertue into the whole, the Weaknesse spreads, and overrunnes all the other, though remotest from it: So likewise the violent motion of partiall and unruly Appetites, which do any waies miscarry by the delusion of Objects, which they fasten upon, immediately derive themselves upon the higher parts of mans Soule, out of the naturall Harmony & consent which they desire to have amongst themselves; but especially doe they labour to winne over the Iudgement unto their side, and thereto hence to get unto themselves Warrant and Approbation. For as where the Vnderstanding is regular, the chiefe Dominion thereof, is over-Affection. And therefore we see alwaies, that men of the most stayed and even Iudgements, have the most unresisted power in the governmene of Passions: So on the other side, when the Affections are strongly enclined to any, either enormous motion in Morality, or Object in Nature, the first Faculty whereon they strive to transferre their prejudice is the Reason, since without the Assent and

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Approbation thereof, they cannot enjoy it with ſuch freedome from diſtractions and feare, as if they were warranted thereto by the Sophiſtry and Diſputes of that Power. Thus as it is uſuall with men of deceitfull palates (as before I touched) to conceive in every thing they taſte the ſame diſagreeing relliſh, wherewith their mouth is at that time diſtempered: So it is with mens Minds prepoſſeſſed with any particular fancy: *Intus Exiſtens prohibet alienum.* They cannot ſee it in its own proper colours, but according as their Conceipts are any way diſtempered and tranſported by the violence of their Affection. And hence in Naturall Philoſophy ſprang that Opinion of *Ariſtoxenus* the Muſitian (which I ſpake of before) that the Soule of Man conſiſted in Harmony, and in an apt Concord, *Velut in Cantu & Fidibus*, between the parts; and *Tully* intimates the reaſon I ſpeake of very prettily: *Hic ab artificio ſuo non receſſit:* this man knew not how to leave his owne Art; & more expreſſly of the ſame in another place: *Ita delectatur ſuis Cantibus, ut etiam ad animum transferre conetur.* Hee was ſo affected with Muſicke, that he transferred it upon the Soule.

5 Another reaſon, which I conceive of Corruption of the Vnderſtanding by Errour, is Curioſity and Puſhing it forward to the Search of things claſped up and reſerved from its Inquiry. Tis the naturall diſeaſe of Mankinde to deſire the Knowledge of nothing more than what is leſt attainable. *Ita Naturâ comparatum eſt* (ſaith *Pliny*) *ut*

proximorum incuriosi Longinqua sectemur; adeo animus rerum Cupido Languescit, cum facili occasio est. It is the vanity of man, as well in Knowledge, as in other things, to esteeme that which is far fetched (as we say) and deare bought most pretious; as if Danger and Rarity were the only Argument of worth. The enquiry after the Estates of Spirits, and separated Soules, the Hierarchies of Angels, and (which is more) the secret Counsels of God, with other the like hidden Mysteries, doe so wholly possesse the Minds of some men, that they disappoint themselves of more profitable Inquiries, and so become not onely hurtfull, in regard of their owne vanity and fruitlesnesse; but also in that they hinder more wholsome and usefull Learnings. And yet Ignorance is of so opposite a nature unto mans Soule, that though it be Holy, it pleaseth not; if there be but Evill (the worst of all Objects) unknowne. The Devill persuades *Adam* rather to make it by sinning, than not to know it.

But wee are to remember that in many things, our searchings and bold speculations must be content with those Silencing, more than Satisfying Reasons. *Sic Natura jubet, sic opus est mundo*: Thus God will have it, thus Nature requires. We owe unto Natures workes, as well our wonder, as our inquiry; and in many things it behooves us more to magnifie than to search. There are as in the countries of the World, so in the Travels of mens wits; as well *Precipitia*, as *Via*; as well Gulfes and Quicksands, as common Seas. Hee that will be

climing

climing too high, or ſayling to farre, is likely in the end to gaine no other Knowledge, but only what it is to have a ſhipwrack, and to ſuffer ruine. Man is of a mixed Nature; partly Heavenly; partly Morall and Earthly; and therefore as to be of a creeping and wormy diſpoſition, to crawle on the ground, to raiſe the Soule unto no higher Contemplations, than Baſe and Worldly is an Argument of a degenerous Nature: So to ſpurne and diſdaine theſe Lower Inquiries as unworthy our thoughts. To ſoare after Inſcrutable Secrets; to unlocke and breake open the cloſet of Nature, and to meaſure by our ſhallow apprehenſions the deep and impenetrable Counſels of Heaven, which we ſhould with a holy, fearfull, and aſtoniſhed Ignorance onely adore, is too bold and arrogant ſacriledge, and hath much of that Pride in it, by which the Angels fell: For *Ero ſimilis Altiſſimo*, I will be like the moſt high, was (as is beleeved) the Devils firſt ſinne: and *Eritis ſicuti Dij*, ye ſhall be like unto God, was I am ſure his firſt Temptation, juſtly puniſhed both in the Author and Obeyor with Darkneſſe; in the one, with the Darkneſſe of Tophet; in the other, with the Darkneſſe of Errour.

Aug. de Gen. ad lit. l. 11. c. 14. & lib. de vera Relig. c. 13. De Civ. Dei. l. 12. c. 6. Hier. Ep. 44. ad Auſon. de Modeſtia, & in c. 14. Iſaiæ. Greg. Moral. l. 14. c. 17. Damaſ. de Orthod. fid l. 2. c. 4.

CHAP. XXXIX.

The Actions of the Vnderstanding, Invention, Wit, Iudgement; of Invention, Distrust, Prejudice, Immaturity: of Tradition, by Speech, Writing: of the Dignities and Corruption of Speech.

HItherto of the more Passive Operation of the Vnderstanding, which I called Reception or Knowledge of Objects. Now follow the more active; which consist more in the Action of Reason, than in its Apprehension: And they are the Actions of *Invention*, of *Wit*, and of *Iudgment*. The former of these hath two principall parts; the *Discovering* of Truth; and the *Communicating* of it. The former only is properly *Invention*; the other a Consequent thereof, *Tradition*: but both much making to the honour of the Faculty. For the former, I shall forbeare any large discourse touching the particular Dignities thereof, as being a thing so manifestly seen in Contemplations, Practises, dispatches in the maintaining of Societies, erecting of Lawes, government of Life; and generally, whatsoever enterprize a man fastens upon, this one Faculty it is, that hath been the Mother of so many Arts; so great Beauty and Ornament

Ornament amongſt men, which out of one world of things have raiſed another of Learning.

The Corruptions then which I conceive of this part of Invention, are,

Firſt, a Deſpaire and Diſtruſt of a mans owne Abilities: For as Corruption and Selfe Opinion is a maine Cauſe of Errour: ſo Diffidence and Feare is on the other ſide a wrong to Nature, in abuſing thoſe Faculties which ſhe gave for enquiry, with Sloath and Dulnes. *Multis rebus ineſt Magnitudo* (ſaith *Seneca*) *non ex naturâ ſuâ, ſed ex debilitate noſtrâ*: and ſo likewiſe, *Multis rebus ineſt difficultas; non ex natura ſua, ſed ex opinione noſtrâ*. Many things ſeem hard & involved, not becauſe they are ſo, but becauſe our ſuſpition ſo miſconceives them. Thus as in an affected and ill diſpoſed Body, every light Weaknes is more felt than a more violent diſtemper, where the Conſtitution is ſtronger. So with fearfull and deſpairing wits, every Inquiry is eſtimated, not according to the nature of the Object, but according to the Diſopinion & ſlender Conceipt which they have of their own Abilities. *Non calcant ſpinas, ſed habent.* It were but ridiculous for a Blind man to complaine of dark weather, when the fault is not in the Aire, but in the Eye.

Another prejudice to this Faculty, is that which I obſerved before on another Occaſion, an Over-Reverend Opinion of thoſe who have gone before us. For when men ſhall ſo magnifie the Gifts of others, that they ſleight and neglect their owne; when out of a prejudicate Conceipt that the Antients have ſufficiently perfected the

Body of more ſerious Learnings, they ſhall exerciſe their Wits (capable of greater imploiments) in degenerate and unuſefull Studies; Knowledge muſt needs be hindred from attaining that Maturity, to which by their owne Inventions it might be rayſed. Thus as it fals out amongſt men of thirſtleſſe Minds in their Fortunes: *Divitiarum abundantia inter Cauſas paupertatis eſt.* Their profuſeneſſe out of their preſent ſtore, with a negligence to recover and new make their Eſtates, drawes them quickly beyond their Fortunes: or as it was in the like caſe amongſt the Romanes in thoſe times of Publique Luxury, and Effeminateneſſe, the valour of their Auncеſtors procuring unto them large wealth, and ſecuring them from forreigne hoſtility, did alſo by the means of that Wealth and Eaſe ſoften and melt their valour, ſo that their Weakneſſe was principally occaſioned by the invincible ſpirit of their Predeceſſors: So it is in the matter of Learning, when we ſpend our time onely in the Legacies that our Fathers have left us, and never ſeeke to improve it by our owne Inventions, the Large meaſures of Knowledge which we receive from them, is by our preposterous uſe made an occaſion of a Large meaſure of Ignorance in other inquiries, wherein their Labours offer greater Aſſiſtance, than diſcouragement. There was not I perſwade my ſelfe amongſt the Ancients themſelves, a greater means of diſcloſing ſo large a meaſure of Truth, than the Freedome of their owne Opinions. For notwithſtanding this Liberty was often the occaſion of

many

many prodigious Births; yet this disadvantage was countervailed with many fruitfull and goodly issues; all which might haply have been undiscovered, had men laboured only in Traditions, and contented themselves with Learning upon Trust. And those more Errours being still examined, were lesse pernicious than fewer beleeved. And even of them I make no question but there hath been good use made by those that have enquired into Truth. For first, there are very few Errours that have not some way or other Truth annexed unto them, which haply might not otherwise have been observed. It is an Errour in that man which shall presume of Gold hid in his Land, to dig and turne it up for no other end, but to find his Imaginary treasure; yet that stirring and softning of the Ground is a means to make it the more fertile. Lastly, this use may bee made even of Errours, when discovered in the Inquiry after Truth, that they let us know what it is not: and it is speedier to come to a Positive Conclusion by a Negative Knowledge, than a naked Ignorance: as hee is sooner likely to finde out a place, who knowes which is not the way, than hee that only knows not the way.

The last Cause of Disability in the Invention may be Immaturity and Vnfurniture for want of acquainting a mans selfe with the Body of Learning: For Learning is a Tree or Body, which in one continued Frame, brancheth it selfe into sundry members: So that there is not onely in the Object of the *Will*: which is the *Good* of things; but

but in the Object of the *Vnderstanding* also, which is their *Truth*, a certain mutuall Concatenation, whereby every part hath some reference unto the other.; insomuch that in the handling of particular Sciences, there are often such occurrences, as doe necessarily require an insight into other Learnings: So that of *Tully* is generally true, *Difficile est pauca esse ei nota, Cui non sint, aut pleraq; aut omnia.* All that addresse themselves either to the Invention of Arts not known, or to the polishing of such as are already found out, must ground their endeavours on the Experiments and Knowledge of sundry kinds of Learning.

Tusc.q.l.2.

For the other part of Invention, which I call Tradition, Communication, or Diffusion, I comprehend it within that perfection peculiar to man from all other Creatures, Oration, or Speech. Wherin I consider a double ministerial reference; the one to the eye; the other to the eare: that is *Vox scripta*, a Visible Voice; this *Vox viva*, an Audible Voice. To which purpose *Scaliger* acutely: *Est quidem Recitator Liber Loquens, Liber recitator Mutus.* The Dignities which this particular confers on man, and wherein it gives him a preheminence aboue other Creatures, are taken from the Ends or Offices thereof; for the worth of every serviceable or Ministeriall Instrument is to bee gathered from the Regularity of its function, whereunto it is naturally instituted.

The end whereunto Living and Organicall *Speech* was principally ordained, is to maintaine mutuall

Arist.Polit. l.1.c.2.

mutuall Society amongſt men incorporated into one Body. And therefore *Tully* well cals it, *Humanæ Societatis Vinculum*, the Ligament and Sinnew, whereby the Body of Humane Converſation is compacted and knit into One.

It would be a long and large labour to ſpeake of the Honour which God hath beſtowed upon our Nature in this noble Gift of Speech, making our Tongue ἑρμῆνα λόγων, as the Poet calleth it, The Meſſenger of Reaſon, and as it were the Pen of the Minde which cloatheth our Conceits with Characters, and makes them obvious unto others. I ſhall not engage my ſelfe on ſo great an Argument, which hath already filled the Volumes of ſo many learned men, who have written ſome Rhetoricall, others morall Inſtitutions and Precepts touching Speech. I ſhall therefore content my ſelfe with but naming ſome few particulars, by Conſideration whereof we may acknowledge the Bounty of God, and Excellency of our Nature, which is attended on by ſo noble a ſervant. *Eurip.*

1 For the Dignity hereof it appeares in this, That whereas in other leſſe Conſiderable Perfections, other Creatures have an Exquiſitenеſſe above man, yet in this man excelleth all other Inferior Creatures, in that he is able to communicate the Notions of Reaſon cloathed in ſenſible Characters unto others of his owne kinde. For though ſome melancholy men have beleeved that Elephants and Birds, and other Creatures have a Language whereby they diſcourſe with one another; yet wee know that thoſe narrow and poore *Vid. Aug. lib. Quæſt. ex Vet. Teſtam. q. 3.*

Voices which Nature hath bestowed on them proceed onely from the Impression of Fancy, and sensitive Appetite to serve themselves, but not to improve one another. And therefore Speech is called λόγος, by the Name of Reason, because it attendeth onely upon Reason. And as by this the Soule of man differeth in Excellency from all other Creatures: so in two things amongst many others (both subservient unto Reason) doth his *Body* excell them too. First, in the Vprightnesse of his Stature, whereby he is made to looke up to Heaven, and from his Countenance to let shine forth, the Impression of that Light which dwelleth within him. For the Face is the Window of the Soule.

Ὀρθὸν μὲν δὴ ἔχει μόνον τῶν ζώων διὰ τὸ τιμιώτατον εἶναι καὶ θειότατον ἐκεῖνο. *Arist. de part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10. Vid. Laurent. Anatom. l. 1. c. 3, 4. Ferr. in G. lib. 2. 7. disp. de præstantiâ. Hum. Corp. q. 1.*

Pronáq; cum spectent Animalia cætera terram,
Os homini sublime dedit, Cælumq; tueri
Iussit, & erectos, ad Sydera tollere Vultus.

Whil'st other creatures downward fix their sight,
Bending to Earth an Earthly Appetite:
To man he gave a lofty Face; might looke
Vp to the Heavens; and in that spatious Booke,
So full of shining Characters, descry
Why he was made, and whether he should fly.

Quint. Instit. l. 2. c. 16. Cæl. Rhodig. l. 3. c. 30. l. 16. c. 13.

Next in the Faculty of *Speech*, which is the Gate of the Soule, through which she passeth, and the Interpreter of the Conceits, and Cogitations of the mind, as the Philosopher speaks. The uses whereof are to convey and communicate the

Συμβολα τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ διανοήματα. *Arist. de Interpret. c. 1. Greg. Nyss. de Hom opificio. c. 9.*

Conceptions

Conceptions of the Mind (and by that means to preſerve humane Society) to derive Knowledg to maintaine mutuall love and ſupplies; to multiply our Delights, to mitigate and unload our ſorrows; but above all to Honour God, and to edifie one another, in which reſpect our *Tongue* is called our *Glory*. *Pſal.* 16. 2. *Act.* 2. 26.

The force & power of Speech upon the minds of men, is almoſt beyond its power to expreſſe, How ſuddenly it can inflame, excite, allay, comfort, mollify, tranſport, and carry captive the Affections of men. *Cæſar* with one word quiets the Commotion of an Army. *Menenius Agrippa* with one Apologue, the ſedition of a people. *Flavianus* the Biſhop of Antioch with one Oration; the fury of an Emperour. *Anaximenes* with one Artifice, the indignation of *Alexander*; *Abigail* with one Supplication, the Revenge of *David*; *Pericles* and *Piſiſtratus* even then when they ſpake againſt the peoples liberty, over-ruled them by their Eloquence, to beleeve and imbrace what they ſpake, and by their Tongue effected that willingly, which their Sword could hardly have extorted. *Pericles* and *Nicias* are ſaid to have ſtill purſued the ſame Ends, and yet with cleane different ſucceſſe. The one in advancing the ſame buſines pleaſed; the other exaſperated the people; and that upon no other Reaſon but this, the one had the Art of Perſwaſion which the other wanted.

Πολλὰ τὴν ἐνοῦσαν δεξιότητα μέρη. *Euripid. Hec.*

Sutton. in Cæſ. cap. 70.

Luc. l. 8.

Πολλὰ τὴν φωνὴν λόγου ἰσχύσαντα ἤδη ἢ καταπραῦναι ἢ ἐξεγεῖραι.

Sophocl. Elect.

Chriſoſt. διαφόρως.

Vid. Cauſin. de Eloq. l. 1. c. 4.

Val. Max. l. 8. c. 9.

Plutar. lib. de Præcept. gerend. Reip.

Ἀλλοτε μὲν τε μύθον ἐπιδδιὰ εἶπε
Ἄλλοτε δὲξ, ἔπεα ἐνηλέα πόλλα.
Ναὶ ῥίγιστα ἔφαεν ἐ ἐπιδδίκια
Κλέπτοντ' οὐ με δοκεῖ ἀ' ἐχὲ δικαίη.

One spake the Right with a slow Tongue,
Another fluently spake wrong.
He left, this stole the Cause, and got
To make you thinke, what you thinke not.

And this power of Speech over the Minds of men is by the Poet, in that knowne passage of his thus elegantly described:

Virg. Æneid.

——— Magno in populo tum sæpè Coorta est
Seditio, sævitq; Animus Ignobile vulgus
Iamq; faces & Saxa volant, furor arma ministrat.
Tum pietate gravem, ac meritis si forte virũ quem
Conspèxere, silent, arrectisq; auribus astant:
Ille regit dictis Animos & pectora mulcet.

When in a Multitude Seditions grow,
And Vlcerated Minds do overflow
With swelling Ire; when stones & firebrands fly,
(As Rage doth every where weapons supply)
Then if some Aged man, in Honor held
For Piety, and Prudence, stand to wield,
And moderate this Tumult: strait wayes all
Rise up with silent Reverence, and let fall
Their Angry Clamors; His grave words do sway
Their Minds, and all their Discontents allay.

The

The Vertues of Speech (whereby it worketh with such force upon the Minde) are many, which therefore I will but name, some *Grammaticall*, as Property, and Fitnesse, and Congruity, without Solæcismes and Barbarousnesse, some *Rhetoricall*, as choice, Purity, Brevity, Perspecuity, Gravity, Pleasantnesse, Vigor, Moderate Acrimony and Vehemency; some *Logicall*, as Method, Order, Distribution, Demonstration, Invention, Definition, Argumentation, Refutation. A right digesting of all the Aydes of Speech; as Wit, Learning, Proverbs, Apologues, Emblemes, Histories, Lawes, Causes, and Effects, and all the Heads or Places which assist us in Invention. Some *Morall*, as Gravity, Truth, Seriousnesse, Integrity, Authority. When words receive weight from manners, and a mans Speech is better beleeved for his Life than for his Learning. When it appeares, That they arise *e solco pectoris*, and have their foundation in Vertue, and not in Fancy. For as a man receiveth the selfe same Wine with pleasure in a pure and cleane Vessell, which he loaths to put unto his mouth, from one that is foule and soiled: so the selfe same Speech adorned with the Piety of one man, and disgraced with the Pravity of another, will be very apt accordingly to be received, either with delight or loathing.

Vid. Voss. Orat. Institut. l. 1. Cassiod. de Eloq. lib. 2. Quint. l. 1. c. 5. & possim alibi. Ἐπαίνου τὸ σωμάτων ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἀγαθὸν. Latrt. in Zen. l. 7.

Vid. A. Gell. l. 1. c. 15.

——— Λογοι εν ἀθέσμοις ἴσα.
Κἂν τὸν Ἀυδρὸς ἐσθλὸς ἢ πονηρὸν βίον.

Eurip. Hecub.

A Speech from Base men, and men of Respect,
Though't be the same, works not the same Effect.

Plut. lib. de Audit. A. Gell. l. 18. c. 13.

And therefore the Spartan Princes when they heard from a man of a disallowed and suspected Life, an Opinion which they approved, They required another man of reputation to propose it: That the prejudice of the person might not procure a rejection of his Iudgement. For wee are apt to nauseate at very good meat, when we know that an ill Cooke did dresse it. And therefore it

Quint. l. 12. c. 1.

is a very true Character which *Tully* and *Quintilian* give of a right Oratour. That he must be *Vir bonus dicendi Peritus*, as well a Good man as a Good speaker. Otherwise though he may speake with admirable wit, to the *fancy* of his hearers, he will have but little power over their *Affections*. Like a fire made of greene wood, which is fed with it as it is fewell, but queneheed as it is greene.

—Οὐ γὰρ ἐμοῦ γε τοῦτ' ἐρεῖν ἐπέστακε, κρεῖσσον τί μεν Sophoc. Ajax.

Lastly, some are *Civill* in Causes Deliberative, or Iuridicall, as Wisedome, pertinency and fitnes to the Nature and Exigence of the End or Matter whereupon we speake. For in that case we are to ponder and measure what we say, by the end whereunto we say it, and to fit it to all the Circumstances incident thereunto. *Paul* amongst the Philosophers disputed with them from the Inscription of their Altar, from the Authority of their *Poets*, and from confessed Maximes of *Reason*, by these degrees convincing them of Idolatry, and leading them to Repentance. But amongst the Iewes hee disputed out of *Scripture*. With *Felix* that looked for money, he disputed of Righteousnesse and Iudgement to come, but amongst the

the Phariſees and Sadduces, of the Reſurrection, that a Diſſention amongſt themſelves might procure a party for him. It is not wiſedome for a man in miſery to ſpeake with a high ſtile: or a man in Dignity with a Creeping. The ſame ſpeech may be excellent in an umbratile Exercitation, which would be too pedanticall, and ſmelling of the Lampe in a matter of ſerious and weighty debate; and that may be dainty meat in one place for the fancy, which in another would be too thinne for the Conſcience. Nature hath guarded and compaſſed in the Tongue with the lips, like a folding Gate, and with the Teeth like a double Hedge, that wee might be admoniſhed to weigh and ponder our words before we produce them.

Μοῦσα μὲν λόγος ἐστὶ ἐπῶν ἐπὶ καλὸν ἰόντων. *Sophocl. Ajax.*

Petulantiæ verborum coercendæ vallum eſſe oppoſitam dentium, &c. A. Gell. l. 1. c. 15.

These are the principall Vertues. And in Oppoſition unto theſe, wee may eaſily collect the principall Corruptions of this Faculty, which I will content my ſelfe with but the naming.

The Vices in Grammer, are Solæciſmes, Barbariſmes, Obſoleteneſſe, Impropriety, Incongruity of Speech. In Rhetoricke, Sordidneſſe, Tediouſneſſe, Obſcurity, Flatneſſe of Conceit, Argueneſſe, and *Minutiæ*, Gawdineſſe, Wordineſſe, and Empty Oſtentation. In Morals, the Vices may be compriſed under theſe two Generals, *Multiloquium* and *Turpiloquium*, Garrulous and Rotten Communication. Laſtly in Civill Reſpects, Levity and Impertinency, like the advices of *Therſites*, Ἀνομοίως πάνυ τι: Many and to little purpoſe.

Vid. Plut. de Garrul. & Theophraſt. Clem. Alex. Pædag. l. 2. c. 7 Stuck. Conviv. l. 4. c. 17. & 19. Cœl. Rhodig. l. 7. c. 26.

But

De Turpiloquio. Clem. Alex Padag. l.2.c.9. Ejus species quæ plurima extra Justitutum nostrum, Vt Blasphemia perjuria, maledicta, jcōmata, Dicteria; Obscœnitates, &c

But besides all these, there is one thing which seemeth to be the most proper Corrupter of this Ornament of Speech, and that is a *Lye*. For as every thing is then most Regular when it retains the purity of its first office and institution: So on the other side it is most depraved, when it deviates from that service, whereunto it was principally ordained. Thus a Picture, though it be never so much in the frame abused, crackt, spotted, or made any other way unvaluable; yet if the resemblance which it beares, be expresse and lively, we still call it a true Picture: whereas if that be a false and deceitfull resemblance (be all other adventitious Ornaments never so exquisite) wee still accompt it False and Corrupt: So it is with the Speech of man, which though of never so great Weaknesse and Insufficiency in other respects; yet if it retain that one property of shaping it selfe to the Conceipts of the Mind, and make levell and proportionable the words with the thoughts, it may still be said to be (though not a good) yet in some respect a Regular Speech, in that it is conformable to the first institution: But be all other Excellencies never so great; yet if it be a false Image of our Intentions, Nature is diverted from her prime End, and the Faculty quite depraved, as forsaking its originall office: and indeed, other Morall Duties of the Tongue do necessarily presuppose this adequation and conformity to the thoughts, which I speake of, without which they are but Hipocrisie, and come within the compasse of the noted Corruption, a Lye: for every Hipocrite is a

Lyer.

Lyer. I confeſſe there are Sinnes of Speech greater than a Lye, in the intention and degrees of their owne Guilt: But herein is the difference: the Tongue may in it (whether Morally religiouſly conſidered) beare a double Irregularity (wherein it differs from other powers.)

Firſt it may be Vnconformable to the Law of right Reaſon, as in all manner of vitious and unſavory Speeches. And the Corruption which hereby it incurres, is common to it with other Faculties, as the diſproportion betweene Evill Thoughts and Reaſon dictating the contrary, worketh Corruption in the thoughts.

And then ſecondly it may be diſproportioned to the Conceipts of the Mind in propoſing them otherwiſe than they are inwardly meant, and this is properly a *Lye*. Which I therefore call the principall Corruption of Speech, not (as I ſaid) becauſe I conceive in it a greater meaſure of heinouſneſſe and Guilt, than in any other Speeches (becauſe all Guilt followes the Incomformity and Remotion from the Law of God and Reaſon; and therein other Speeches, as Blaſphemy, and Sedition, may have a greater meaſure of wickednes) but becauſe in a *Lye* I finde both the forenamed Irregularities, it being a Speech not only uneven to the Conceipts of the Mind; but repugnant alſo to the Will of God, and the Law of Nature.

The next kind of Active Operations were thoſe of *Wit*. The uſe whereof is ſo much the more Excellent, by how much the Wreſtings and

Abuse of it is the more dangerous: I shall sufficiently declare the worth of it, by shewing what it is: For I take not Wit in that common Acceptation, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of Conceipt, whether in Stile or Conference, which like rotten wood in the darke, have more Shine than Substance; whose Vse and Ornament are like themselves Swift and Vanishing; at once both Admired and Forgotten: but I understand a setled, constant, habituall sufficiency of the Vnderstanding, whereby it is inabled in any kinde of Learning, Theory, or Practise, both to sharpnes in Search, subtilty in Expression, and dispatch in Execution. As for that other kinde seen in Panegyricks, Declamatory Discourses, Epigrams, and other the like sudden issues of the braine, they are feats only and sleights, not Duties and Ministeries of the Wit, which serve rather for Ostentation than Vse: and are onely the Remission of the Mind and Vnbending of the thoughts from more severe Knowledge: as walking for recreation is rather Exercise than Travell, although by the violence of the motion, or length of the way there may ensue Sweat and Wearinesse.

Now for the Corrupters of the Wit, though there be diverse; yet none so immediate and certaine as it selfe, if alone: For Wit, though it bee Swift, yet is often Blind. And therefore the faster it hastens in Errour, the more dangerous it is to it selfe. And hence it is, that as Learning was never more bound to any, than those men, who have been eminent in this Faculty, if they

ſwayed it by Moderation and Prudence: So none have been more pernicious and violent Oppugners of Truth, than men beſt furniſhed with Acuteneſſe, when they turned the uſe of it to the ſtrengthning of their owne Fancies, and not ſubmitted it to Iudgement and Examination. As the fatteſt Soiles in Greece cauſed the greateſt troubles; and the Beauty of *Helena*, the ruine of Troy. Wit like Wine is a good remedy againſt the poiſon of the Minde; but being it ſelfe poiſoned, it doth kill the ſooner. There ought to bee for the right diſpoſing of our Inventions, a mutuall reference and ſervice between Wit and Iudgement. It is a vexation of Mind to diſcerne what is right and profitable, and have no inablement to attaine it: and that is Iudgement without Wit. And to have a facility of compaſſing an End, and a working and reſtleſſe fancy, without direction to faſten it on a fit Object, is the onely courſe to multiply Errour, and to be ſtill in Motion, not as in a path, but as in a Maze or Circle, where is continuall toyle, without any proficience or gaine of Way; and this is Wit without Iudgement. They ought therefore, I ſay, to be mutuall Coadjutors each to other. Wit is the Spurre to ſtirre up and quicken the Vnderſtanding: and Iudgement is the Bridle to ſway and moderate Wit: Wit is the Hand and Foot for Execution and Motion; but Iudgement is the Eye for Examination and Direction. Laſtly, Wit is the Sayle and Oare to further the progreſſe in any Inquiry; but Iudgement is the Ballace to

Poise, and the Steere to guide the course to its intended End.

Now the manner of the Iudgements Operation in directing either our Practise or Contemplation is by a discourse of the Mind, whereby it reduceth them to certaine Grounds and Principles, whereunto they ought chiefly to be conformable. And from hence is that Reason which *Quintilian* obserues, why shallow and floating Wits seeme oftentimes more fluent than men of greater sufficiencies: For, saith he, those other admit of every sudden flash or Conceipt, without any Examination; but *apud Sapientes est Electio & Modus*: They first weigh things before they utter them.

The maine Corruption of Iudgement in this Office, is Prejudice and Prepossession. The Duty of Iudgement is to discerne between Obliquities and right Actions, and to reduce all to the Law of Reason. And therefore tis true in this, as in the course of publique Iudgements: That respect of persons, or things, blind the Eyes, and maketh the Vnderstanding to determine according to Affection, and not according to Truth. Though indeed some Passions there are, which rather hood-winke then distemper or hurt the Iudgement; so that the false determination thereof cannot bee well called a Mistake, but a Lye: Of which kind flattery is the principall, when the Affections of Hope and Feare debase a man, and cause him to dissemble his owne opinion.

CHAP.

CHAP. XL.

Of the Actions of the Vnderſtanding upon the Will, with reſpect to the End and Means. The Power of the Vnderſtanding over the Will, not Commanding, but directing the Objects of the Will to bee good and convenient. Corrupt Will lookes only at Good preſent. Two Acts of the Vnderſtanding, Knowledge and Conſideration. It muſt alſo be poßible, and with reſpect to happineſſe Immortall. Ignorance and Weakneſſe in the Vnderſtanding, in proposing the right means to the laſt End.



Itherto of the Actions of the *Vnderſtanding*, *Ad extra*, in regard of an *Obiect*. Thoſe *Ad Intra*, in regard of the *Will*: Wherein the Vnderſtanding is a Miniſter or Counſellor to it, are either to furniſh it with an End, whereon to faſten its deſires: or to direct it in the means conducible to that end. For the *Will* alone is a blind Faculty; and therefore as it cannot ſee the right Good it ought to affect without the Aſſiſtance of an *Informing* Power. So neither can it ſee the right way it ought to take for procuring that Good without the direction

rection of a *Conducting* power. As it hath not Iudgment to discover an *End:* So neither hath it Discourse to judge of the right *Means*, whereby that may be attained. So that all the Acts of the Will necessarily presuppose some precedent guiding Acts in the Vnderstanding, whereby they are proportioned to the Rules of right Reason. This Operation of the Vnderstanding is usually by the Schoole-men called *Imperium*, or *Mandatum*, a Mandate or Command; because it is a *Precept*, to which the will ought to be obedient. For the Rules of Living and Doing well, are the Statutes (as it were) and Dictates of right Reason. But yet it may not hence be concluded that the Vnderstanding hath any Superiority, in regard of Dominion over the Will; though it have Priority in regard of Operation. The Power of the Vnderstanding over the Will, is onely a Regulating and Directing, it is no Constraining or Compulsive Power. For the Will alwaies is *Domina suorum actuum*: The Mistresse of her owne Operation: For *Intellectus non imperat, sed solummodo significat voluntatem imperantis.* It doth only intimate unto the Will, the Pleasure and Law of God: some seeds whereof remaine in the Nature of man. The Precepts then of right Reason are not therefore Commands, because they are proposed by way of Mandate; but therfore they are in that manner proposed, because they are by Reason apprehended to be the Commands of a Divine Superior Power. And therefore in the breach of any such Dictates we are not said properly to offend our Vnderstanding;

ding; but to ſinne againſt our Law-giver. As in Civill Policy, the offences of men are not againſt inferiour Officers; but againſt that ſoveraigne Power, which is the Fountaine of Law, and under whoſe Authority all ſubordinate Magiſtrates have their proportion of government. Beſides, *Ejus eſt imperare, Cujus eſt punire*: For Law and Puniſhment being Relatives, and mutually connotating each the other, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that from that power only can be an impoſition of law, from which may be an Infliction of Puniſhment.

Now the Condition under which the Vnderſtanding is both to apprehend and propoſe any either end, or means convenient to the Nature of the Will, and of Sufficiency to move it, are that they have in them *Goodneſſe, Poßibility*; and in the end (if we ſpeak of an utmoſt one) *Immortality* too. Every true Object of any Power, is that which beareth ſuch a perfect Relation of convenience & fitnes therunto, that it is able to accompliſh all its deſires. Now ſince *Malum* is *Deſtructivum* all Evill is Deſtructive. It is impoſſible that by it ſelfe, without a counterfeit and adulterate face, it ſhould ever have any Attractive Power over the Deſires of the Will. And on the other ſide, ſince *Omne bonum*, is *Perfectivum*; ſince Good is perfective, and apt to bring reall ſatisfaction along with it, moſt certainly would it be deſired by the Will, were it not that our Vnderſtandings are clouded and carried away with ſome crooked miſapprehenſions; and the Will it ſelfe corrupted in its owne Inclinations.

But yet though all mans Faculties are so depraved, that he is not able as he ought, to will any Divine and Perfect Good; yet so much he retains of his Perfection, as that he cannot possibly desire any thing, which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable & destructive to his Nature; since all Naturall Agents ayme still at their owne Perfection. And therefore impossible it is, that either Good should be refused, without any apprehension of Disconvenience; or Evill pursued, without any appearance of Congruity or Satisfaction. That it may appeare therefore how the Vnderstanding doth alwaies propose those Objects, as Good to the Will, which are notwithstanding, not only in their owne Nature, but in the Apprehension of the Vnderstanding it selfe knowne to be evill. And on the contrary, why it doth propose good Objects, contrary to its owne Knowledge, as Evill. We may distinguish two opposite conditions in *Good* and *Evill*: For first, all Evill of Sin, (though it have Disconvenience to mans Nature, as it is *Destructive*; yet) on the other side, it hath agreement thereunto, as it is crooked and *corrupt*. As continuall drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an Hydropticke Body, though most disconvenient to its present welfare. Now then as no man possessed with that disease, desires drinke for this end, because he would dye, though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his Death; but only to give satisfaction to his present Appetite: So neither doth man follow exorbitant and crooked courses, onely that hee may thereby

therby come to Deſtruction (though he is not ignorant of that iſſue) but onely to give way to the propenſion of his depraved Nature. In the ſame manner likewiſe *Goodnes*, though it have the moſt abſolute *Convenience* to man, as it is *Perfective*, & in reſpect of his finall advancement thereby; yet it hath as great a *diſconvenience* toward mans corrupt Faculties, as it is a ſtrait rule to ſquare them by, & in reſpect of its *Rectitude*. As light, though it be in its own property, the perfection of the Eyes; yet to diſtempered Eyes, it works more trouble than delight, becauſe as in Philoſophy, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*: ſo, *Quicquid appetitur, appetitur ad modum appetentis*. So that if the appetite it ſelfe bee by inherent pollution depraved and evill, it cannot but deſire every thing that beares proportion & conformity to its own diſtempers. And this I take to be the maine reaſon, why men of corrupt and irregular deſires, oftentimes faſten Delight on thoſe Objects which they know to be Evill, and are quite averſe from thoſe which yet they aſſent unto as Good.

Ὁ πᾶσι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται τοῦτο τὸ ἧς τὸ τέλος φαίνεται ἅπαντα. *Ariſt. Ethic. l. 3. c. 7.*

To which I may adde another, namely, the Reſolution of a Corrupt Will to yeeld unto it ſelfe all *Preſent Satisfaction*, and not to ſuffer it ſelfe to be ſwayed with the Preoccupation of a *Future Eſtate*: Inſomuch that the ſmall content which mans Nature receiveth from the Actuall fruition of ſome inſtant-conceited Good, prevailes more to draw on Appetite, then the fearfull Expectation of enſuing Miſery, can to deterre from it. And the preſent irkſomneſſe of Pious Duties, have

more power to divert the corrupt Minde from them; then the Fore-conceipt of Eternall bliſſe can have to allure the Mind unto a Delight in them. Hence then it appeares, what I underſtand by that firſt condition, wherewith Reaſon is to propoſe any End or Means to the Will, that it may be deſired; namely, *Sub Ratione Boni*, under the Condition of Good, not alwayes True and Morall; but ſomtimes as it is ſo apprehended by a depraved Vnderſtanding, *Sub concepta Convenientiæ*: as it beares Conformity to the preſent Crooked Eſtate of mans Will: a *Deprâved* Vnderſtanding I ſay, and not alwaies properly and preciſely a *Darkened* Vnderſtanding; *Depraved* by Negle& and *Inconſiderableneſſe*; not darkned by Ignorance and *Blindneſſe*. For there may bee an Irregular Will with a Iudgement rightly informed by Truth. Otherwiſe there could not be any offence of Preſumption and Knowledge. We are therefore to conſider that there is in a Well-ſtayed *Reaſon*, a double A& in the dire&ing of the *Will*. The one reſpe&eth the Nature and Quality of the *Object*: the other, more peculiarly the Circumſtance of *Time*: the one is properly *Knowledge*; the other *Circumſpection*, ariſing out of Meditation, and more cloſe preſſing of the Obje&, which is knowne as Good to the Will, againſt Inſinuations of Senſitive Deſires, which aime onely at the Fruition of pleaſure *preſent*. Firſt, the Vnderſtanding propoſeth to the Will *Felicity*, as an Abſolute and Eternall *Good*, which cannot but be deſired. Next, it propoſeth *means* for the attaining

of

of it; namely, the practiſe of theſe Precepts, which are revealed unto us as neceſſary for purchaſing the End deſired. The *Will* being, beſides its own Corruption, tranſported by the Senſitive Appetite, finds great Irkſomneſſe in thoſe *means*. A reſtraint of al thoſe preſent Ioyes, Delights, Satisfactions, which it inſtantly purſues: it perceiveth that great trouble is to be expected, many Prejudices and Difficulties to be grapled with; a ſevere hand to be held over Paſſions; a narrow Reſtraint to be obſerved towards Mutinous and Rebellious Eruptions of the Minde, fewer inablements for advancing our Fortunes, and infinite other the like bars of preſent contentment; which withdraw the Will, and make it renounce courſes ſo ſevere and diſagreeable to the Liberty it deſires. Hereupon comes the ſecond Act of the Vnderſtanding, *Efficacy* and Weight of *Conſideration*, whereby it compares the Circumſtances of that Difficulty of Good to the Will in regard of the ſmall time, they ſhall continue; with the conſequent and unſpeakable Good, that will in the end enſue there-from, and alſo with the unſufferable Torments that follow the vileneſſe of preſent Pleaſures. Whence the Will is made more inclinable (by the Aſſiſtance of greater Power than its owne) to goe along rather through Thornes with Vertue, than with adulterate and painted pleaſures to daunce towards ruine.

Now of theſe two, the defect of the former works properly a *Blinded* Vnderſtanding; but the Defect of the Latter, namely, an Inſufficiency

and Inefficacy of pondering the Circumstances, and pressing the endlesse Consequence of Good or Evill, works properly a *Depraved* Vnderstanding, in regard of Practicall or Applicative Direction. As a man walking in some deep Contemplation by a Ditch; though his Eyes be open to see a present danger before him, yet may haply fall into it; not out of *Blindnesse*, but out of *Inconsiderateness*, as not fixing his conceipt thereon; but being wholly possessed with other thoughts. In like manner, the Vnderstanding being taken up by the Imposture of the Affections, with the conceit of *present Good*, or *present Ill* in any Object, and thereby being diverted from a serious Inquiry, after the true Rectitude and Obliquity therof, suffers the Will fearfully to plunge it self in danger and misery.

Another Condition, under which an *End* or *Means* are to be proposed by the Will, is *Sub ratione Possibilis*, as a good *Possible*. For if once the Vnderstanding discover Impossibility in any Object, the Will cannot fasten any desire upon it: Since all Appetite is only terminated by that which can replenish and satiate the Power. Now all Satisfaction is by Fruition; all Fruition necessarily presupposeth a Possibility of Acquiring: So that where this is taken away, the Will is left Hopelesse, and therefore Desireless; and therefore we see that the neerer any things comes to Impossibility, the more averse is the Will of most men from it: as is plaine in these things that are perplexed and difficult to ateaine. And if

here

here the wish of him in the Poet be objected:

O mihi praeteritos referat si Iupiter annos?

O that *Iove* would me restore,
The yeares that I have liv'd before.

It may be answered that this was a Wish only, and not a Will. Since that which a man willeth, he doth really endeavour to obtaine.

The last Condition (which is restrained onely to the utmost end of mans desire) is that it bee proposed, *Sub ratione Immortalis*, as an *Immortall Good*. The Endlesnesse of Happinesse is that only which maketh it a perfect End. For the Mind of man naturally is carried to an *Immortality* of *Being*; and therefore also consequently to an *Immortality* of *Happinesse*; it being a necessary Desire of all Naturall Agents, to attaine a Perfection proportionate to the measure of their Continuance. So then mans End must not be only *Good*, but *for ever Good, Totally* and *Eternally*: not onely a Fulnesse of *Joy* in the *nature* of it; but a Fulnesse of *Perpetuity* in the Continuance. Most *perfect* in proportion in the *Spirituality*; most *infinite* in proportion to the *Immortality* of mans Soule. The Frailty and Languishing of any Good, and a Foresight of the losse thereof, with the ablest Minds doth much weaken the Desire of it. And the reason is, because Providence and Forecast is a certaine companion of the humane Nature; and he which is most a man, is most carefull to con-

trive the advancement of his *Future* Estate. It is beastiall to fasten only upon *Present Good*; this being a maine difference between the Vnderstanding, and the Sensuall Appetite, that this respecteth only the present Ioy that is at hand; but that being secretly conscious of its owne Immortality, fastens it selfe upon the remotest times, yea outrunnes all time, and suffers it selfe to bee ever swallowed up with the Meditation and Providence of an Endlesse Happinesse. And therefore the reason that *Aristotle* brings against his Masters *Ideas*, argues an Vnderstanding lesse Divine in this particular than *Plato's* was, when hee saith that Eternity doth no more perfect the Nature of Good, than Continuance doth the Nature of White. For though it be true, that it is not any Essentiall part of *Goodnesse* in it selfe; yet it is a necessary and principall condition to make Goodnesse, *Happines*; that is, an Adequate Obiect to mans Desires; there is not then the same proportion between Eternity and Good, as there is between Continuance and White: For Continuance is altogether Extrinsicall and Irrelative in respect of White; but the Happinesse of man hath an Intrinsicall Connection with Immortality, because mans Vtmost and Adequate Good must be proportioned to the Nature of his Minde (for that is no perfect Good that doth not every way replenish and leave nothing behind it that may be desired) So that man himselfe being Endlesse, can have none End able to limit his desires, but an Infinite and Immortall Good; which hee may

Ethic. l. 1.

may enjoy without any anxiety for After-Provision. I dare say there is not an Atheist in the world, who hath in his Life be-beasted himselfe by setting his Desires onely on Transitory and Perishable goods, that would not on his death-bed count it the best bargain he ever made to change Souls, with one of those whose Diligence in providing for a Future Happinesse, hee hath often in his beastly Sensuality impiously derided.

Now of these two Directions of the Vnderstanding to the Will, in desiring the End or Means, the Corruption is for the most part more grosse and palpable in Assistance to the *Means*, than in the Discovery of the *End*; and farre oftner fayles the Will herein than in proposing an Object to fix its Desires upon. For we may continually observe, how a world of men agree all in opinions and wishes about the same Supreme and Immortall Happinesse, the Beatificall Vision; Every *Balaam* fastens on that; and yet their means unto it are so jarring and opposite, that a looker on would conceive it impossible that there should be any Agreement in an End, where is such notable Discord in the wayes to it. The reason which I conceive of this difference, is the severall Proportion, which the true End and the true Means thereunto beare unto the Will of man. For it is observable, that there is but one Generall Hinderance or Errour about the right End, namely the Ignorance thereof. For being once truly delivered to the Vnderstanding, it carries such a proportion to the nature of the Will (being a most perfect fulfilling

fulfilling of all its wishes) that it is impossible not to desire it; but the disproportion betweene man and the right means of a true End is farre Greater. For there is not only Errour in the Speculation of them, but reluctance in other practique Faculties, proceeding from their generall Corruption in this Estate, and nayling the Affection on the present Delight of Sensuall Objects. First, for the Vnderstanding, I observe therein a double Hinderance concerning these *Means*: *Ignorance* and *Weaknesse*; the one respects the Examination of them; the other, their Presentation or Inforcement upon the Wil. For the former of these, there seemes to bee an equall difficulty between the End and the Means, as proceeding in both from the same Root. But in this very convenience there is a great difference; for the Ignorance of the End is farre more preventable (considering the Helps we have to know it) than of the Means. Not but that there are as powerfull Directions for the Knowledge of the *Means*, as of the *End*; but because they are in their *Number* many, and in their *Nature* repugnant to mans Corrupt Minds. There is therfore more Wearinesse, and by consequence, more Difficulty in the Inquiry after them, than after the *End*, because that is in it selfe but *One*; and besides, beares with it (under the generall Notion of *Happinesse*) such an absolute Conformity to mans Nature, as admits of no Refusall or Opposition: Insomuch that many that know Heaven to be the End of their Desires, know yet scarse one foot of the way thither.

Ignorantia & Difficultas. Aug.

Now

Now beſides this *Ignorance*, when the Knowledge of the *means* is gotten, there are many prejudices to be expected before a free Exerciſe of them. For (as *Ariſtotle* obſerves) amongſt all the Conditions required to Morall Practiſe, *Knowledge* hath the leaſt ſway. It hath the loweſt place in Vertue, though the higheſt in Learning.

There is ſecondly in the Vnderſtanding *Weakneſſe*, whereby it oftentimes connives at the Irregular Motion of the Will, & with drawes it from Examining with a piercing and fixed Eye, with an Impartiall and Bribeleſſe Iudgement, with Efficacy and weight of Meditation, the ſeverall Paſſages of all our Actions, with all the preſent and conſequent Inconveniences of crooked courſes. It were a vaſte labour to runne over all the Oppoſitions, which vertuous means, leading to an Happy End, doe alwayes finde in the ſeverall Faculties of man: how the Will it ſelfe is ſtubborne and froward; the Paſſions Rebellious, and Impatient of Suppreſſion; the Senſes and Senſitive Appetite thwart and wayward, creeping alwayes like thoſe under-Cœleſtiall Orbes into another motion, quite contrary to that which the *Primum Mobile*: Illightened Reaſon ſhould conferre upon them. Sufficient it is, that there is a Diſproportion between the means of Happineſſe, and the generall Nature of Corrupt man. For all Goodneſſe is neceſſarily adjoyned with Rectitude and Streightneſſe (in that it is a Rule to direct our Life) and therefore a *Good* man, is

called an *Vpright* man; one that is every where Even and Strait. To which *Aristotle* perhaps had one Eye, when hee called his Happy man, a *Foure-square* man, which is every where smooth, stable, and like himselfe. But now on the other side, mans Nature in this Estate of Corruption, is a Distorted and Crooked Nature; and therfore altogether unconformable to the Goodnesse which should as a Cannon, direct it to the true and principall End it aymeth at. And this is the reason, why so many men are Impatient of the close and narrow passage of Honesty. For crooked and reeling Movers necessarily require more Liberty of way, more broad courses to exercise themselves in: as wee see in naturall Bodies, a crooked thing will not bee held within so narrow bounds as that, which is strait.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLI.

Of the Conſcience; its Offices of Direction, Conviction, Comfort, Watchfulneſſe, Memory, Impartiality. Of Conſciences Ignorant, Superſtitious, Licentious, Sleeping, Frightfull, Tempeſtuous.

THere remaines yet one higher and diviner Act of the Practicall Vnderſtanding, of moſt abſolute power in man, and that is *Conſcience*. Which is not any diſtinct Faculty of the Soule, but onely a Compounded Act of Reaſon, conſiſting in Argumentation: or a *practique Syllogiſme*, inferring alwaies ſome Applicative and Perſonall Concluſion, Accuſing or Excuſing.

The Dignities whereof are to bee gathered from the Offices of it, and from the Properties of it.

The maine Offices are three; *Direction, Conviction, Conſolation*, whereof the two laſt alwayes preſuppoſe the firſt with a contrary Qualification of Breach and Obſervance.

The *Direction* of Conſcience conſiſts in a Simple Diſcourſe: or (as I may ſo ſpeake) in a *Direct Ray* of Vnderſtanding, gathering Morall or Divine Concluſions from a preſuppoſed habit

of Principles, either from the reliques of our Originall Knowledge naturally impreſt, or by concurrence of Religion and Theologicall Precepts ſpiritually inſpired into the Practique Indgement or hearts of men. The obſervance of which Concluſions it impoſeth upon all thoſe Executive Powers, which each particular Concluſion doth moſt immediately concerne upon paine of hazarding our owne Inward Peace, with that ſweet repoſe and ſecurity of Minde which followes it; and alſo (as the Heathens themſelves have obſerved) upon feare of incurring the diſpleaſure of that God, concerning whom the very light of Nature hath revealed thus much, that as his Penetrating and Searching Eye is able to read our moſt retyred Thoughts: ſo his impartiall and unpreventable Iuſtice hath thunder and fire in ſtore for the Rebellions againſt this Faculty, which he hath made to be, as it were, his Officer and Herauld in all mens hearts.

The two latter of thoſe Offices conſiſt in a *Reflection* of that former diſcourſe upon mens Actions, and according as is diſcovered in them, either an obſervance or neglect of thoſe impoſed Duties: the heate of that Reflection is either Comfortable or Scorching. Now of theſe two; that of Conviction is nothing elſe but a performance of that Equivocall killing promiſe made by the Serpent to our ſeduced Parents; I meane an Opening of their Eyes, to know with deſperate Sorrow the Good they had irrecoverably foregone; and with feare, ſhame and horrour, the Evill

Evill which they plunged themſelves and their whole poſterity into. This one Act it is which hath ſo often confuted that Opinion of *Ariſtotle* touching Death, that it is of all things moſt Terrible; in that it hath it purſued many ſo farre, as that it hath forced them to leap out of themſelve, and to preferre the Terrour of Death and Darkneſſe of the Grave, before the griſly Face of a Convicting Conſcience.

The chiefe Dignity hereof conſiſteth in *Conſolation*, whereby it diffuſeth into the whole man, from a ſecret aſſurance of divine favour (for nothing can throughly calme the Conſcience, but that) a ſweet Tranquillity, ſilent Peace, ſetled Stayedneſſe, and (which is higheſt of all, a raviſhing Contemplation, and (as it were) Pre-fruition of Bliſſe and Immortality.

The properties of the Conſcience (whereby I underſtand the Miniſteries, which it never fayles to execute in man) are as I conceive, principally three; *Watchfulneſſe*, *Memory*, *Impartiality*. It keeps alwaies Centinell in a mans Soule: and like a Regiſter, records all our good and ill actions. Though the Darkneſſe of the Night may hide us from others, and the Darkneſſe of the Mind ſeem to hide us from our ſelves; yet ſtill hath Conſcience an Eye to looke in ſecret on whatſoever wee doe, whether in regard of Ignorance or Hardneſſe. Though in many men it ſleep in regard of Motion; yet it never ſleeps in regard of Obſervation and Notice: it may be Hard and Seared, it can never be Blind. That writing in it which ſeemes

Invisible and Illegible, like letters written with the juice of Lemmon, when it is brought to the fire of Gods Iudgement, will be most cleere. And for the next (if we observe it) there is nothing so much fastened in the Memory, as that which Conscience writes: all her Censures are written with Indelible Characters, never to be blotted out. All or most of our Knowledge forsakes us in our Deaths; Wit, Acutenesse, variety of Language, habits of Sciences, our Arts, Policies, Inventions, all have their period and fate: onely those things which Conscience imprinteth, shall be so far from finding any thing in death to obliterate & raze them out, that they shall be thereby much more manifest; whether they be impressions of Peace or Horrour. The Testimonies of Comfort (if true) are fastened in the Heart with such an Hand as will never suffer them finally to bee taken out: and if they be Accusatory and Condemning, the Heart is so Hard, and they so Deep, that there is no way to get them out, but by breaking or melting the Table they are written in; that only course can be taken to make Conscience forget.

Then thirdly it is a most Bribelesse Worker, it never knows how to make a false report of any of our wayes. It is (if I may so speake) Gods Historion, that writes not Annals, but Iournals; the Words, Deeds, Cogitations of Houres and Moments: never was there so absolute a Compiler of Lives, as Conscience. It never comes with any prejudice or acceptation of persons, but dares

speake

ſpeake truth as well of a Monarch, as of a Slave. *Nero* the Emperour ſhall feele as great a fire burning in his breaſt, as he dare wrap the poore Chriſtians in to light him to his Luſt. There is ſcarſe one part in man, but may be ſeduced, ſave his Conſcience. Senſe oftentimes conceives things which are not; Appetite and Imagination can tranſport the Will, and themſelves both may be drawne by perſwaſion contrary to their owne propenſions; this onely deales faithfully with him, whoſe witneſſe it is, though it bee to the confuſion of it ſelfe and him, in whom it lodgeth. It may I know erre ſometimes and miſtake; but it can never by any Inſinuation be bribed to contradict its owne Iudgement, and regiſter White for Blacke.

The Corruption of Conſcience ariſes principally from two Extremes; the one occaſioned by *Ignorance*; the other by *Sinne* (for I oppoſe theſe two here, as concurring to the Corruption of Conſcience after a different manner) The one is when the want of due Knowledge drawes the Conſcience to finiſter determinations, either in Practiſe or Forbearance. The other when evill Habits and Actions defile the Conſcience. Now both theſe containe under them ſundry Degrees of Corruption.

From Ignorance: Firſt, comes a Fettered and Reſtrained Conſcience, fearfully binding it ſelfe to ſome particular Acts, without ſufficient grounds. Next a Licentious and Indulging Conſcience, giving Freedome to it's ſelfe in ſuch courſes,

course, as whereunto it hath no warrant upon unacquainting it selfe from either.

Then from the other Root there comes: First, a *Dead*, Secure and Sleeping Conscience by Common and Customary Sinnes. A *Pale*, Sweating, and Affrighted Conscience by Atheisticall and Vnnaturall Sinnes:

——Tum frigida mens est
Criminibus; tacitâ sudant præcordia culpa.

The Guilt which from unseen pollution springs,
Cold-sweating Horrour on their bosome brings.

A *Desperate*, Tempestuous and Ravening Conscience from Blasphemous and Open Sinnes. Not but that any of these may come from any Sinne; but that the Quality of some Sinnes doth for the most part carry with it some particular dispositions and kindes of a distempered Conscience. But because all these, as also this whole discourse pertaines to a higher Science, I shall here forbeare to speake more of it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLII.

Of the Will: it's Appetite: with the proper and chiefe Objects thereof, God. Of Superstition and Idolatry. Of its Liberty in the Electing of Means to an End. Of its Dominion Coactive and Persvasive. Of Fate, Astrology. Satanicall Suggestions. Of the manner of the Wils Operation. Motives to it. Acts of it. The Conclusion.

I Proceed to the last Faculty of mans Soul, his Will. Which doth alone governe, moderate, and over-rule all his Actions. The Dignity whereof consisteth in three peculiar Perfections; *Appetite, Liberty, Domination*. The former respecteth an *End*; the two Latter, the *Means* thereunto conducing. The *Desires* are fixed on some *Good* throughly proportion to the wideneſſe of the Heart: then the *Liberty* of the Will grounded on the Direction of the Iudgement, makes choiſe of ſuch Means, as are moſt proper for attaining of that Good: and laſtly, the *Dominion* imployes all inferiour Faculties for the ſpeedy Execution of thoſe Means.

Ariſt. Ethic. l. 1. c. 1. Lib. 8. cap. 5.

Sundry Ends there are, which may bee desired upon particular and conditionall occasions: but the true *Vltimate*, utmost and *Absolute* Good is *God*. All other Ends are *Ministring* and *Subordinate*; he only is Τέλειον & Αὐτάρκες, as *Aristotle* cals his Felicity, the *Supreame* & overruling End; the Fountaine of all other Goods: from the remote participation of whose perfections all other receive that scantling of satisfaction & proportion, which they beare unto mans Will. And therefore some Philosophers have simply called him *Bonum & Bonum Supereſſentiale* the only Self-Sustaining, and Selfe-Depending Good, that is onely able throughly to satiate and repleniſh the unlimited Desires of the Soul of man.

Ethic. l. 1. c. 2.

The Corruptions of the Desires fastened on him, are the two Extremes of Excesse and Defect. The Extremes of Excesse are *Superstition* and *Idolatry*; a worshipping of false gods, or a false worshipping of the True. Both proceeds from the confused mixture of Originall Blindnesse, with the reliques of naturall Knowledge. This latter gives us a sight in the Thesis and Generall, that a God there is to be desired: but touching the Hypothesis, who that God is, with the Circumstances and manner of his Worship, Nature leaveth the Soule by occasion of the latter in a maze of of Darknesse and unavoydable Doubting and Vncertainty. So that Nature gives light enough to discover the *Necessity* of a Duty; but not to cleere the *Means* of Execution. Light enough to enjoyne a walking; but the way being a narrow way,

way, is on every ſide hedged up from her view. The other Extreme of Defect, is either *Atheiſme*, in not acknowledging, or *Ignorance* in not ſeeing, that God whom wee ought to ſerve and deſire. Both which (if *Affected* and Voluntary, as uſually they are) proceed either from Guilt; or a *Conſcionſneſſe* of fearefull Crimes, which make men ſtudy to flatter their diſtracted Spirits in the perſwaſion that no Iudge ſees them; or elſe from a Senſuality and a *Deſire* and purpoſe to give *Indulgence* to themſelves in their evill courſes; thinking like that fooliſh Bird, that there is no Fowler to catch, no ſnare to intrap them, if their Eyes be but ſeiled up, and their heads thruſt into the hedge of their owne darkneſſe: Though herein both the Atheiſts diſcovers Divinity, and the Ignorant perſon Knowledge enough to convince their owne Conſciences, and condemne themſelves.

The Dignity of mans Will in regard of *Liberty*, conſiſteth in the Freedome, which it hath to chuſe or reject Means ordained for the Compaſſing ſome propoſed End, according as the Vnderſtanding ſhall finde them more or leſſe Conducible for the attainment of it. It is, I ſay, a chuſing of the Means: For Election (as *Ariſtotle* determines) is never of the End. Wee doe not *Chuſe*, but *neceſſarily Deſire* to be Happy. The matter of our Happineſſe being propoſed without appearance of preſent inconvenience: becauſe every thing is naturally prone to its owne Perfection, where there are no intervenient diſcommodities

Καλλιστα ἑξις ἡ κατ' ἀρετην. *Zeno apud Laert. l. 6. Vnde Stoici Sapientes, Reges appellabant.* *Ibid. Ethic. l. 3. c. 1.*

to affright it. And yet neither is the Freedome of the Will any whit impaired by such a necessity. For as wee say in Divine Attributes, that God hath perfect Power, though he cannot sinne: So wee may conclude of the Will, it shall in the State of Glory (for then only shall our utmost Good be chosen without any shadow of disconvenience) have perfect Liberty: Notwithstanding it shall never be able to Will an Absence from the Vision of God; since the Liberty of such a Desire would be no Liberty, but Imperfection and Vnnaturalnesse. Now of all other Perfections, this hath, in respect of the utmost End, bin quite Depraved, being now in Corruption, without the Assistance of Spirituall or new Infused Grace, throughly disinabled from seeking means, which may truly lead to the fruition of God, and utterly captivated and inthralled to the Tyranny of Sin. So that this Liberty is left inviolated, onely in Naturall, Morall and in Civill Actions: Concerning which, there is a Law in Nature, even the reliques and indeleble Foot prints of mans first Innocency, which moderates the Elections of the Will for its owne and others Temporall Good.

The *Dominion* and Supreme Command of the Will is onely over those Powers to the Production of whose Operations, it doth by its immediate Authority concurre as an *Absolute Efficient*, or at least, as a *Moving Agent*. It reacheth not therefore so farre as to the Command of the *Vegetative* Power: For we cannot command our Stomacks to digest, or our Bodies to grow, because the Vegetative

vegetative faculties, which were inſtituted not for the proper ſervice of Reaſon, but of Nature; neither reacheth it to an Vniverſall Command of the *Senſes*; but onely by the Mediation of another Faculty, over which it hath more Soveraigne Power: As it can hinder Seeing, not immediately, but by the *Locomotive Power*, by cloſing the Eyes. And the ſame is true of the Inward Senſes; for the Memory and Imagination often faſten upon Objects, which the Deſire of the Will is, ſhould not be any way repreſented unto thoſe Powers: So likewiſe in the *Senſitive Appetite*, when once Objects belonging thereunto, creep upon the Fancy, Irregular motions oftentimes violently reſiſt the Will and the Law of the Members, carrieth men captive from the Law of the Mind. Laſtly, the Will hath no Dominion Abſolute and Soveraigne over thoſe Apprehenſions of the *Vnderſtanding*, which depend on neceſſary and demonſtrative Principles: It can require it not to diſcourſe about ſuch Objects, and divert it; but it cannot make it aſſent unto them contrary to the Evidence of Truth demonſtrated. Briefly then, the Dominion of the Will is partly Mandatory, and partly Perſwaſive. The one is Abſolute, working on meere Paſſive and Obedient Faculties; the other more Conditionall, and upon Suppoſition of Regularity or Subjection in the Inferior Powers. For the Will hath both an *Oeconomicall* Government in reſpect of the Body, and the Moving Organs thereof, as over *Servants*: and it hath a *Politique* or Civill Government towards

Arist. Polit. l. 1. c. 5.

towards the *Understanding*, *Affections*, and *Sensitive Appetite*, as *Subjects*, with which by reason of their often Rebellions, it hapneth to have sundry conflicts and troubles: as Princes from their seditious and rebellious Subjects. So that the Corruption of this Power in the Will, is either *Tyranny* in it selfe, or *Vsurpation* in another; an Abuse of it, and a Restraint of it. The *Abuse*, when the Will absolutely gainsayes the Counsels, Lawes, and Directions of the Understanding, which is wrought by the Allection, Inticing & Insinuation of the *Sensitive Appetite*, secretly winning over the Will to the Approbation of those courses, which are most delightfull to sense: for since the Fall, the sweet Harmony and Subordination of Sense to Reason, and of Reason to God is broken; and the highest Faculties of the Soule become themselves Sensuall and Carnall. And the Restraint when the Will is desirous to obey the Dictates of Reason, or of Grace; and Lust by her tyranny overbeares the Soule, and leads it captive to the Law of Sinne, so that a man cannot do the things which he would. As a Bird whose wings are besmeared and intangled with some viscous slime, though hee offer to flye, yet falleth downe againe.

Now touching the Corruption of the Will in regard of Desire, Liberty and Dominion: there have been heretofore some who ascribed them to Naturall and Divine Causes, and so make the Will to be corrupted only, *ab Extrinseco*, and that Necessarily. The Stoicks, they framed a supreme swaying

swaying Power, inevitably binding it, as all other Agents to such particular Actions by an eternall secret connexion & flux of causes, which they call *Fate*. Astrologers understanding by Fate nothing but the Vniforme and Vnchaugable working of those beautifull Bodies, the Heavenly Orbes, and their Influencies upon Inferiours, annexed unto them a Binding Power Necessarily, though Secretly over-ruling the Practises of men. Inquire the reason, why one man lives conformably to the Law of God and Nature, another breakes out into Exorbitant courses?

Laert. in Zen. Plut. de placit. Philos. l. 1. c. 27, 28. Sen. Ep. 96. A. Gell. l. 6. c. 2.

Anne aliud, quàm ——————
Sydus, & occulti miranda potentia Fati?

What is it else, but Stars Malignity,
And wondrous power of secret Destiny.

It is not to be denyed, but that the Heavens having strong and powerfull Operations on all Sublunary Corporall Substances may in altering the humours of the Body, have by the mediation thereof, some kind of Influence (if it may bee so called, upon the manners; but to ascribe unto them any Dominion, is as much repugnant to Philosophy, as it is to Piety. For by Binding, the Actions of mans Will to such a Law of Destiny, and making them inevitably to depend upon Planets, Houses, Constellations, Conjunctions, &c. Wee doe not onely impiously take away the *Guilt* of Sinne, in that we make all mens Lapses

Vid. Euseb. Cæsarien. de præparat Evang. lib. 6. & Max. Tyrium dissert. 3. Plut. adverss. Stoicos. Tertul. Apol. c. 1. & ibi notas Herald. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 5. c. 1, 7, 8.

Lapses to be wrought without free Principle in himselfe (and so derogate from the Iustice of God, in punishing that, whereunto wee were by other of his Creatures unavoydably determined) nor onely rob God of his Mercy, in Ascribing those vertuous dispositions of the Mind (which are his immediate Breathings into man) unto the Happy Aspect of the Heavens) but withall wee deny to the Soule both Naturall Motion and Spirituality. *Naturall Motion* first; since that alwaies flowes from an *Inward Principle*, that is Essentiall to the Mover (which in the Will must needs be free and voluntary) and not from violence or impression made by some Extrinsicall Worker. And then *Spirituality* likewise; since the Heavens, being Corporall Agents, can therefore extend the Dominion of their Influence no farther than over Bodily Substances.

Ἐξ ἡμέων δὴ φασὶ κακὰ ἔμμεναι· οἱ δ' αὐτοὶ σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν.
Homer. Odyss. α.

Others there have been yet more Impious, which seeke to fasten all the Corruptions of their Wils on somthing above the Heavens, even the Eternall Foreknowledge and the Providence of God: As if my Foreknowledge, that on the morrow the Sunne will rise; or that such men as these shall one day be brought to a severe Doom, were the Cause working Necessity of the next Day, or the last Iudgement. It is true indeed, *Gods Prescience* imployes a Necessity of our working after that manner, as he foreknowes: but this is *Necessitas* onely *Infallibilitatis*, in regard of his Vndeceivable Knowledge, which ever foresees things as they will certainly come to passe by the free

free or naturall workings of the Agents, whence they proceed. It is not *Necessitas Coactionis*, or *Determinationis*, whereby the Will of man is without any other disposition or propension in it selfe, inforced or unspontaneously determined to the producing of such Effects. The Actions of our Will are not therefore necessarily executed, because they were foreknowne, but therefore they were foreknowne, because our Will would certainly execute them, though not without Freedome and Election. And for Providence notwithstanding there be *Providentia Permissiva*, whereby God hath determined to suffer and permit men to sinne; and moreover a *Disposing Providence* in Ordering all things in the World unto his owne Glorious Ends, yet we may not presume to think that God doth determine, or actuate, impell, and overrule the wils of men to Evill. It is true indeed that nothing is done which God in all respects doth will, shall not be done with the secret Will of his good pleasure (for who can withstand his Will) and that his purposes are advanced by all the operations of the Creature: but yet hee doth not so worke his Will out of mens, as thereby to constraine and take away their's (for indeed the constraint of a liberall and free Faculty, is (as it were) the extinction thereof) This were an Argument of Weaknesse, as if hee were not able to bring his owne Ends about, but by chaining and fettering his Oppugners from exercising the Freedome which he first gave them; nor doe his owne Will, but by taking away his owne Gifts. But herein

Aug. de Civ. Dei. l.11.c.17,18 l.14.c.26, Lib. de Continu. c.6. de Corrept. & Grat. c.10. Epist.120. Cap.2. de Gen. Contr. Manich. l.2.c.28. De Gen. ad lit. l.11.c.4. De Trin.l.3.c.4 Octoginta trium que.q.21.

vid. Euseb. de preparat. Evang. l.6.c.6.

Cyrill. Alex. contra Iul. l. 4.

Hinc etiam quod faciunt contra voluntatem Dei, non impletur, nisi voluntas Dei. Aug. de Praed. Sanct. l. 1. c. 16.

herein is rather magnified the Power of his Providence, and the great Wisedome of his Power, that notwithstanding every man worketh according to the inclination of his owne heart, and that even Rebelliously against him; yet out of so many different, so repugnant, so contrary intents, hee is able to raise his owne Glory (the End whether we will or no, of all our Actions) and even when his Will is most resisted, most powerfull to fulfill it. For as sundry times Gods *Revealed Will* is broken, even by those, whose greatest desires and endeavours are to keep it: so alwaies his *Secret Will* is performed. Eveh by the free and Selfe-moving Operations of those who set themselves stubbornly to oppose it. There is not then any Supreame Destiny, Extrinsically moving, or Necessarily binding any Inferiours to particular Actions; but there is only a Divine Providence, which can, as out of the Concurrence of differing and casuall Causes (which we call Fortune) so likewise out of the Intrinsicall Operation of all Inferiour Agents (which we call Nature) produce one maine and Supreame End, without strayning or violating the proper Motions of any.

Rom. 7. 17.

Math 4. 3.

Lastly, many men are apt in this case to father their sinnes upon the motions of Satan, as if hee brought the necessity of sinning upon them; and as Saint *Paul* said in Faith, *Not I, but Sinne in me:* So they in Hipocrisie, *Not I, but evill motions cast into me;* and because the Devill is in a speciall manner called the Tempter, such men therefore thinke to perswade themselves, that their Evill commeth not

not from any Willingneſſe in themſelves, but from the violence of the Enemies Power, Malice, and Policy. It is true indeed, that the Devill hath a ſtrong Operation on the Wils of Corrupt men

1 Firſt, becauſe of the *Subtilty* of his *Subſtance* whereby he can winde himſelfe and his ſuggeſtions moſt Inwardly on the Affections and Vnderſtanding.

2 Secondly, becauſe of the *Height* of his Naturall *Vnderſtanding* and Policy, whereby he is able to transfigure himſelfe into an *Angel of Light*, and ſo to method and contrive his devices, that they ſhall not miſſe of the beſt advantage to make them ſpeed.

3 Thirdly, becauſe of the vaſtneſſe of his *Experience*, whereby he is the better inabled to uſe ſuch plots as have formerly had the beſt ſucceſſe.

4 Fourthly, becauſe of his manner of Working, grounded on all theſe, which is *Violent* and Furious for the Strength; and therefore he is called a *Strong Man*, a *Roaring Lyon*, a *Red Dragon*. And *Deep* for the ſubtilty of it; and therefore his working is called a *Myſtery of Iniquity*, and *Deceivableneſſe of Iniquity*. Which is ſeene: Firſt in his *Accommodating* himſelfe to our particular Humours and *Natures*, and ſo following the tyde of our own Affections. Secondly, by fitting his Temptations according to our *Vocations* and Perſonall Imploiments, by changing, or mixing, or ſuſpending, or preſſing, or any other the like qualifying of his Suggeſtions, according as he ſhall find agreeable to all other Circumſtances. But yet wee doe not

Luke 11.21. 1. *Peter* 5.8. *Rev.* 12.3. 2 *Theſſ.* 2.7. *Heb.* 3.13. *Rom.* 7.11.

find in any of these any violation of mans Will, nor restraint of his Obedience; but rather the Arts that are used to the inveagling of it. The working then of Evill Angels, are all by Imposture and Deceit towards Good men; and in respect of Evill men, they are but as those of a Prince over his Subjects; or of a Lord over his Slaves and Captives; which may well stand with the Freedome of mans Will. And therefore his temptations are in some place called the *Methods*, in others, the *Devices*; in others, the *Snares* of Satan: All words of Circumvention, and presuppose the working of our own Wils: Though then Satan have in a notable manner the name of Tempter belonging to him; yet wee are told in another place, that * *Every man is tempted, when hee is drawne away of his owne Concupiscence, and inticed.* So that the Devill hath never an effectuall Temptation (such an one as carryes and overcomes the Will) but it is alwaies joyned with an Inward Temptation of our owne, proceeding from the deceitfulnesse of our owne lusts. So that in this case every man may say to himselfe as *Apollodorus* in *Plutarch* dreamed of himselfe, when he thought he was boyled alive in a vessell, and his heart cried out unto him, I am the cause of all this misery to my selfe.

Many more things might be here added touching this Faculty, which I will but name. As first for the *manner* of its Operations. In some cases it worketh *Naturally* and *Necessarily*, as in its Inclination unto *Good* in the whole latitude, and generall

Eph. 6. 11. *Ephes.* 7. 2. 2. *Tim.* 2. 26. *Eph.* 6. 11. 2. *Cor.* 2. 11. 2. *Tim.* 2. 26.

Iames 1. 14.

Vitty Author Diaboli decipientis Calliditas & Hominis Consentientis involuntas. Aug. de peccat. Orig. l. 3. c. 21.

Lib. de Superstitione.

rall apprehenſion thereof. For it cannot will any thing under the generall and formall notion of Evill. In others *Voluntarily*, from it ſelfe, and with a diſtinct view and *knowledge* of an End whereunto it worketh. In others *freely*, with a *Liberty* to one thing or another, with a power to elicite, or to ſuſpend and ſuppreſſe its owne Operation. In all *Spontaneouſly*, without violence or compulſion. For though in ſome reſpects the Will be not free from *Neceſſity*, yet it is in all free from *Coaction*. And therfore though *Ignorance* & *Feare* may take away the complete *Voluntarineſſe* of an Action proceeding from the Will (becauſe without ſuch Feare or Ignorance it would not have been done. As when a man caſteth his goods into the Sea to eſcape a ſhipwracke. And when *Oedipus* ſlew *Laius* his Father, not knowing him ſo to be) yet they can never force the Will to doe that out of violence, which is not repreſented under ſome notion of *Good* thereunto. Ethic. l. 3. c. 1.

Secondy for the *Motives* of the *Will*. They are firſt Naturall and *Internall*. Amongſt which, the *Underſtanding* is the principall, which doth paſſe Iudgement upon the *Goodneſſe* and Convenience of the Object of the Will, and according to the greater or leſſer excellency thereof, repreſent it to the Will, with either a *Mandatory*, or a *Monitory*, or a *permiſſive* Sentence. The *Will* likewiſe doth move it ſelfe. For by an Antecedent willing of the *End*, ſhe ſetteth her ſelfe on work to will the *Means* requiſite unto the obtaining of that End.

And the *Senſitive Appetite* doth *Indirectly* move

it too. By suppressing or bewitching and inticing the Iudgment to put some colour and appearance of Good upon sensuall things. And then, as the Sunne seemeth red through a red glasse: so such as a mans owne Affection is, such will the End seeme unto him to be, as the Philosopher speaks.

Next *Supernaturally God* moveth the *Wils* of men. Not only in regard of the *Matter* of the Motion: For *in him we live, and move, and have our being*; but in regard of the *Rectitude* and Goodnesse of it in Actions Supernaturall, both by the *Manifestation* of Heavenly Light. *They shall be all taught of God*; and by the *Infusion* and Impression of Spirituall *Grace*, preventing, assisting, enabling us both to Will and to Doe of his owne good pleasure.

Lastly, for the *Acts* of the *Will*, They are such as respect either the *End*, or the *Means* for attaining of it. The Acts respecting the End are these three. 1. A *Loving* and Desiring of it in regard of its Beauty and *Goodnesse*. 2. A serious *Intention* and purpose to prosecute it in regard of its *distance* from us. 3. A *Fruition* or Enjoying of it, which standeth in two things. In *Assecution* or possession, whereby we are Actually joyned unto it: and in *Delectation* or Rest, whereby we take speciall pleasure in it.

The Acts of the Will respecting the *Means*, are these: 1. An Act of *Vsing* or Imploying the Practicall Iudgement. An Application and Exercising of it to consult & debate the proper means conducible unto that End. Which Consultation having passed, and by the practicall Iudgement, a Repre-

Repreſentation being made of the Means diſcovered, there next followeth an embracing of thoſe means, and inclining towards them with a double Act. The one an Act of *Conſent*, whereby wee approve the means dictated, as *proper* and *poſſible*: the other, an Act of *Election*, whereby, according to the different weight of Reaſons, we adhere unto one *Medium* more than unto another, either as more proper, or as more feaſible. Thirdly, becauſe the Means do not bring us unto the End by being *Choſen*, but by being *Executed*. Hereupon followeth another Act of *Mandate* to all the Faculties intereſted in the Execution of thoſe Means, to apply and put forth their forces with vigor and conſtancy, till the End be at the laſt by the due Execution of thoſe Means attained and enjoyed.

Ethic. l. 2 c. 6.
Eadem l. 2. c. 2.

Now whereas the Philoſopher doth often diſtribute the things belonging unto the *Soule*, into *Affections*, *Faculties* and *Habits*. For the *Faculties* are moved by the *Paſſions*, and the *Paſſions* are regulated and managed by the *Habits*. The *Habits* procured for Facility and Conſtancy of *Action*, and the *Actions* directed to the obtaining of an *End*. This Method of the Philoſopher would now lead us to ſpeake further.

First of the *Habits* of the Reaſonable Soule, and they are either *Rationall* only, and in the *Minde*, as the Habits of Wiſedome, of Principles, of Concluſions, of Art and Prudence; or beſides that *Vertuous* and Vitious, converſant about Good or Evill Morall. Which are firſt the Habits of *Practicall Principles*, called *Syntereſis*; and next the Habits

bits of *particular Vertues*, whereby the Will is inclined and facilitated unto well doing. Vnto the felicity of all which are required these foure conditions.

1 *Iustice* and *Rectitude* disposing the Will to render unto God, unto our selves, and unto all others that which is theirs, and which of right wee owe unto them.

2 *Prudence*, discovering that which is in this manner *Right*, Iudging of it, and directing unto it.

3 *Fortitude*, enabling the Will firmely to persist in her vertuous purposes, according to the Instructions of Practicall Prudence, notwithstanding the labour it must undergoe, the delaies it must sustaine before it can obtaine the End, and the difficulties, impediments, discouragements it shall meet withall.

4 *Temperance*, suppressing and subduing those Sensuall Appetites, which would stagger, interrupt, divert us from these constant Resolutions.

Next, because all *Habits*, as I said, are directed to the facility and determining of *Actions*, wee should thereby be led on to the consideration of *Humane Actions*, *Fortuitous*, *Violent*, *Naturall*, *Voluntary*, *Involuntary*, *Mixed*. As also, to the grounds of the *Goodnesse* or *Illnesse* of *Actions*, taken first from the *Rule* of them unto which they are to conforme. Secondly, from the *Principles* of them, from whence they are to proceed, to wit, *Knowledge* and Faith to see, *Will* to purpose, *Love* to doe,

Subjection

ſubjection, to obey ſtrength, to finiſh and fulfill what vertue leads us unto. Thirdly, from the manner and meaſure of their perfection. And laſtly, from the ends unto which they ſhould be directed.

By which conſideration, we ſhould be led to take a view of the right end, and *ultimate felicity*, unto which all theſe actions ſhould leade and carry us; not as the cauſes of it, but as the way, and Antecedents unto it.

But theſe pertaining to a nobler ſcience, and being without the limits of the *ſubject* which I propoſed to ſpeake of, I ſhall follow *Plinies* counſell, and looke backe to the title of my Booke: Which having (as well as my weakneſſe was able) endeavoured to goe through, It now cals upon me to goe no further.

FINIS.

Faults escaped by reason of the Authors absence.

P*Ag.*17.*l.*1.read,*futuro imminentiam*,*p.*23.*l.*6.*r.*gnawing,*p.*24.*l.*4 *r.*this,*p.*26.*l.*5.*r.* likeneſſe,*p.*29.*l.*19. *r.*depravation,*l.*29 *r.*exci *re*,*p.*30.*l.*2.*r.*in,*p.*31.*l.*19.*r.*contracteth,*p.*32.*l.*16.*r.*thereon,*p.*34.*l.*23 *r.*lucation,*p.*40. *l.*6.*r.*contact,*p.*56.*l.*15.*r.*μῶμ,*p* 65.*l.*19. *dele* then, *p.*71.*l.*28 *r.*all theſe things,*p.*73.*l.*5.*r.*or other, *l.*12.*r.* concitation, *p.*74.*l.*13.*r.*heart,*l.*21.*r.*to an union,*p.*75.*l.*16.*r.*the,*p.*76.*l.*8. *r.*this, *l.*18.*r.*worke out of,*p.*77.*l.*8.*r.*concinnation,*l.*27.*r.*paſſion, *p.*96.*l.*3. *f.*in,*r.*is,*p.*100.*l.*29.*r.*διάθεσιν,*p.*103.*l.*14.*r.*capta,*p.*112.*l.*12.*r.*principall, *p.*118.*l.*21.*r.*had,*p.*122. *l.*22.*r.*done another wrong,*p.*125.*l.*14.*r.*whe it is naked,*p.*129.*l.*27.*r.*apprehenſion,*p.*132.*l.*26.*r.*ſeaſonable,*p.*136, *l.*8.*r.*were,*p.*145. *l.*1,2.*Hatterus*, *l.*6.*r.* alike occaſion,*p.* 147. *l.*8. *r.* μεθόριον,*p.*148.*l.*24.*r.*ενωσιν,*p.*155.*l.*30. *dele* which,*p.* 158.*l.* 2,*r.* numbred,*l.*6.*r.*with but,*p.*161.*l.*21.*r.*proverb,*p.*165.*l.*28.*r.* imbrute. *p.*168.*l.*26.*r.Philoxenum*,*p.*172.*l.*32.*r.*ἀναπτῦξ,*p.* 178. *l.*10.*r.* πάλυβδα *p.*179.*l.*2.14 *r.*ne're,*p.*181.*l.*6.*r.*ξυμπαγῶδες,*p.* 191. *l.*9.*f.*is,*r.*is not, *p.*197.*l. ult. r.*though the Philoſopher,*p.*199.*l.*23.*r.*ἐπιτείνει,*p.*205. *l.*8. *r.*revieweth,*p.*222.*l.*26.*r.*diformity,*p.*224.*l.*11 *dele* in,*p.*226.*l.*27.*f.* never, *r.*ever,*p.*229.*l.*7. *r.*cymbæ.*l.*20. *r.* ſtreame,*p.*233 *l.*16.*r.*will, *p.*234.*l.*21.*r.*νοήσεως. *l.*25 *dele*, firſt,*p.*235.*l.*2.*r.*the end,*p.*242.*l.*12.*r.* ἐλάττω καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ζῶντα,*p.*244.*l.*5.*f.*other,*r.*after,*l.*8.*r.Ticinum*.*p* 245. *l.*15.*f.*in,*r.*is,*p.*246 *l.*5. *dele* and common,*p.*247 *l.*8. *r.* ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ κοσμῷ *l.*2.*f.*and,*r.*but,*p.*248,*l.*7.*r.*ἀῦ,*p.*249.*l* 3.*r.*ἴσι,*p.*250.*l.*1.*r.*certemina,*l.*21.*r.*couched,*l* 17 *excidit*,*p.*255 *l.*28.*r.*and number,*p.*256.*l.*3, 4.*r.*unſubordinate.*p.*261.*l.*16.*r.*ἰσῶσι,*p.*262.*l.*26 *r.*ἢ πολιοῦχον,*p.*264.*l.*4 *aquas*,*p.*265.*l.*18. *dele* for,*p.*268.*r.* deſperate,272. *l.*23.*r.* their, *p. l.*73.*l.*27.*r.*froward,*l.*8.end the period at the word, Law,*p.*282.*l.*28 *dele* them,*p.* 283. *l.* 27. *r. pavidis*, *p.*284. *l.*5. *r.*or danger,*p.*286.*l.*6. *f.*and,*r.*as,*p.*292.*l* 17,*r.ominum*,*p.*295.*l.*20.*r.*ἀλλ᾽ *p.*296.*l.*19.*r.* elevated, *p.*300.*l.*18.*r.*διηχεῖσθαι,*p.*302.*l.*19 *r.Sertorius*,*p.*303 *l.*13.*r.*reviewed,*p.*304.*l.*1.Miniſteries,*p.*306.*l.*22.Levitie, *p.*308. *l.*10.*r.*truer *l.*17 *dele* the,*p.*310.*l.ult.r.*ἀρίστας,*p.*311.*l.*3.*f.*to *r.*in,*p.*313.*l* 8.*r.*though *l.*15.after ſharpe Anger, put in theſe words, A bitter Anger, *l.*25.*r.* formally,317.*l.*10.*f.*or,*r.*for,*f.*319.*l.*15. *dele* not,*p.*320.*l.*27.*r.* water *p.* 326.*l.*16.*r.inſidiatim*,*l.*17 *r.Caulas*,*p.*327.*l.* 5.*r.* the vaſte,*l. ult. f.* now,*r.*nor,*p.*328.*l.*2.*f.*yet,*r.*that,329.*l.*5.*f.*inquiry, *r.* injury,*p.*332 *l.*6. *r.*each to other,*p.*339.*l.*5.*r.*into *p.*397.*l.*6.*r.*the *p.*416.*l.*24. *f.*it is, *r.*Is it,*p.*441.*r. morality p.*483.*l.* 4 *Affectation*.*p.*493.*l.* 11.*f.* deſie, *r.*deiſie *p.*495.*l.*21. *dele* will *p.*498.*l.*1, 2 *f animam*, *r.*omnium *p.*499. *l.*5.*r.*mortall *p.*501.*l.*6.*f.*corruption, *r* confidence *p.* 502. *l.*7. thriftleſſe *l.*23 *r* meaſure.*p.*537.*l* 20.*r.*proportionate.

Errata

Errata in the Margin.

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